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C S A B A V A R G A * 
The Quest for Formalism in Law 
Ideals of Systemicity aiul Axiomatisability 
between Utopianism and Heuristic Assertion 
Abstract . After the relationship between form and content in art and law is surveyed and the 
axiomatic approach to systemicity in both philosophy and law of both the classic and 
modern ages is scrutinised, the want of axiomatisability-in presence of correlations between 
axiomatism and law notwithstanding-is established. The very nucleus of any axiomatic 
system is that in some set of building blocks there are few foundation stones from which one 
given overall building can be built up in one given form and with the inherent necessity of 
that the operation, in the security of reaching the same end result, can be repeated by any 
actor at any future time. However, the relationship amongst the constituents of legal systems 
is not such as to allow to make up their edifice in exclusively one form, only if the procedure 
is defined and some constituents as foundation stones are designated. For legal systems are 
truly dynamic systems thoroughly built on substantive interconnections. Therefore they resist-
albeit idealise-axiomatisation. In consequence, exclusively the heuristic value of the 
axiomatic ideal can be fully implemented and scholarly realised in the domain of law. 
Keywords: form, content, substance; philosophy, aesthetics; Hegel, Marx. Lukács: mos 
geometricus; legal concepts, law-codes 
F o r m a l i s m i s a r e c u r r e n t t o p i c i n d e b a t e s o n l a w w i t h o u t , h o w e v e r , i t s 
c o m p o n e n t s b e i n g a n a l y s e d t o t h e a d e q u a t e d e p t h . I n t h e E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g 
l e g a l w o r l d it t a k e s p r e c e d e n c e a s t h e d u a l i t y o r a n t a g o n i s m o f f o r m a n d 
s u b s t a n c e 1 t h e f a c t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t i t s o r i g i n s i n p h i l o s o p h y h a v e o n c e 
Scientific Adviser , Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungar ian Academy of Sc iences ; 
P ro fe s so r , Di rec to r of the Inst i tute fo r Legal P h i l o s o p h y of the Ca tho l i c Univers i ty of 
Hunga ry . 
E - m a i l : v a r g a @ j o g . m t a . h u 
1
 For some c l a s s i c s , see K e n n e d y , D. : Form and S u b s t a n c e in Pr ivate L a w A d j u d i c a -
t ion . Harvard Law Review, 89 ( 1 9 7 6 ) 8, 1 6 8 5 - 1 7 7 8 ; A t i y a h , P. S.: Form and Substance in 
Anglo-American Law. O x f o r d - N e w York , 1987; S u m m e r s , R. S.: The Jurisprudence of 
Law's Form and Substance. A l d e r s h o t - B r o o k f i e l d , 2 0 0 0 . For s o m e recent papers , c f . a l so 
Eps te in , E. J.: C o d i f i c a t i o n of C iv i l L a w in the P e o p l e ' s Repub l i c of Ch ina : Fo rm and 
Subs t ance in the R e c e p t i o n of C o n c e p t s and E l e m e n t s of Wes t e rn Pr ivate L a w . University 
2 CSABA VARGA 
been formulated-as they continue on being termed in the European continental 
culture—in the dichotomy of form and content. 
I. Systemicity 
1. Form and Content 
(In Arts and Law) Facing the challenge of how to define literature and above 
all poetry as its subject, the American New Criticism came to recognise the 
essential moment in the phenomenal form of human objectivations, with 
decisive significance granted to the arrangement of contentual elements in 
some selected way. With the fresh and almost neophyte impulse of the move-
ment, Austin Warren answered the underlying issue by claiming that poetry is 
reducible to the methods it uses.' Such a reply by one of today's classics 
(thanks to the Theory of Literature he co-authored with René Welle le ) is rather 
thought-provoking on account of its conciseness. What is even more striking is 
its one-sidedness augmented by its express simplicity. True, this is barely more 
simplified as compared to the one-sidedness in the opposite sense of the old 
formula, held universally valid in abstraction from any real connection, 
according to which content and form are reflexively co-existent. For the New 
Criticism opposed in fact the absolutism of contents, claiming that form can 
also become the generator of contents, at least in some specific domains of 
human artificiality with arts and law included, among others. 
With human objectivations, formal moments may carry on various features 
and serve a variety of functions. As known, Hegel had once differentiated as 
external forms those components that can be utterly incidental to internal ones 
while also indifferent to the definition of the subject. "In a book, for instance, 
of British Columbia Law Review, 32 (1998), 153 et seq.; Katz, L.: Form and Substance in 
Law and Morality. University of Chicago Law Review, 66 ( 1999) 566 et seq.; Madison, A. D.: 
Tension between Textualism and Substance-over-Form Doctrines in Tax Law. Santa Clara 
Law Review, 43 (2002-2003), 699 et seq.; Bigler, С. S.-Rohrbacher, В.: Form or Substance: 
The Past, Present, and Future of the Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance. Business 
Law, 63 (2007-2008), 1 et seq. 
Warren, A.; Literary Criticism. In: Foerster, N. (et al.): Literary Scholarship. Its Aim 
and Methods. Chapel Hill, 1941. in particular at 143. Cf. also Rákos, P.: Tények és kérdő-
jelek. Tűnődés az irodalmon [Facts and question marks: contemplations on literature], 
Bratislava, 1971, 17. 
3
 Warren, A.-Wellek, R.: Theory of Literature. New York, 1949. 
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it certainly has no bearing upon the content, whether it be written or printed, 
bound in paper or in leather."4 
In everyday life, formal moments play often the role serving as a criterion 
in distinction. Properly speaking, they may, by affording the differentia 
specifica, provide an outer sign identifying the subject and thereby lending it a 
proper denomination, certainly without playing any decisive role in shaping its 
substantial properties. In case of some metals, for example, defining specific 
gravity by indicating the proportion of weight to volume offers an easy way of 
differentiation. Moreover, a complete taxonomy can be achieved this way, 
without the criterion applied being able to furnish any information about the 
sorts of materials classified, besides serving with a merely pragmatic order 
helping classification in practice. In such cases, the distinctive role played by 
formal features, less significant in themselves, may perhaps be primarily 
explained by the particular relation of object to subject in everyday life, 
notably by the outstanding importance of the objec t ' s given features to the 
very subject. 
Formal features may promote the certainty of recognition and designation 
anyway. In everyday practice, by mentally anticipating some contentual 
definitions issuing f rom a generalised experience we can select out any object 
classified according to and identified by its particular formal appearance. 
However, in case of law or literary work, mere phenomenal forms are not 
simply external(ised) properties or characteristics of the object in question, 
attached to it constantly or temporarily in a historically sanctioned manner. 
Anything appearing as a legal form (organised at a given hierarchical level 
through given procedures and methods) is only an external expression of 
deeper social relations and interests, that is, of material contents. Nevertheless, 
this very form represents and also embodies the contents expressed, moreover, 
by becoming an alienatingly reified entity, it may even master it.5 And almost 
the same can be told of literature, too. 
(In German Pliilosophysing) Projected onto human objectivations, we may 
thus safely state the form being- ins tead of "a kind of envelope which 
4
 By Hegel. G. W. F.: Logic. Oxford, 1975. <http://www.kern-ep.de/Internet/ 
Hegels_Logik/appearan.htm> and <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/liegel/ 
works/sl/slappear.htm#SL133_l> Also Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 
im Grundriss [1817]. § 133n. <http://pedagogie.ac-toulouse.fr/philosophie/textes/ 
wl l31 .htm>. 
5
 Cf., by the author: 'Thing' and Reification in Law. In his The Place of Law in 
Lukács' World Concept. Budapest, 1985,21998, Appendix, 160-184. 
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'contains' the ' content" ' f l -an organic medium of contents, without which the 
latter could hardly be more than dead abstraction, facing the risk of switching 
repeatedly into something else. This is by far not a new realisation. Hegel 
already formulated the dialectic identity of contents and form in a radical 
manner explicating that "the content, as such, is what it is only because the 
matured form is included in it", "So it comes about that the form is Content: 
and in its phase is the Law of the Phenomenon,"7 Following this course of 
development, nei ther the founders of Marx i sm did content with merely 
establishing the mutual transubstantiation of contents and forms into one 
another but also found that an overwhelming role is being played by the former. 
However, not even within that tradition contentual priority must amount to 
nihilising the fo rm. For, according to Lukács, "the specific examination of the 
fo rm is by no means something unnecessary and even less a problem the 
exploration of which were [ . . . ] opposed to the method of the dialectical and 
historical materialism."8 
Returning to the starting point, the original objective of the New Criticism 
was to lead the formal organisation of contents back to the role it is due, of those 
contents which cannot indeed be but the outcome of such an organisation. By 
such a realisation the "heresy of paraphrase" become one of the central 
concerns of the New American Criticism. For, obviously, the production of 
some literary "contents" through non-literary "formless" means would deprive 
the outcome exact ly of its specif ic quality. Due to its normatively posited 
character, the legal form too is strictly inseparable from all its underlying 
contents. Otherwise speaking, no contents can be asserted as specifically legal 
unless organised in/into a legal form. From this perspective, it is quite indifferent 
how we do appreciate the apparent antagonism between the law's positivistic 
and sociologistic approaches in describing what role of container we ascribe to 
legal form and what criteria we set to it. Irrespective of whether the legal form 
is generated as a text through previously defined procedures or as selected out 
f r o m the actual practice (jurisprudence) of judic ia l organs or even if—ideally— 
it encounters both options to reach their synthesis, all show the emphatic 
6
 Brooks, C.: The Well Wrought Urn. Studies in the Structure of Poetry. New York, 
1947, 192. in which case "the ' fo rm ' [is| conceived as a kind of container, a sort of 
beautified envelope" (226), albeit (as continued on 197) "form and content, or content and 
medium, are inseparable." 
7
 Hegel, § 133n and 133. <http://www.kern-ep.de/Internet/Hegels_Logik/appearan. 
h tm> and <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/index.htm> and 
<http://pedagogie.ac-toulouse.fr/philosophie/textes/wl 131 ,htm>. 
8
 Lukács, G. : Über die Besonderheit als Kategorie der Ästhetik. Ber l in-Weimar , 
1985, 156. 
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formalism in anything coming into being as "distinctively legal".4 Or, the 
"paraphrase" of generating alleged legal contents through extra-legal means 
could only result in the loss of the law's specific quality: failure in form ending 
in evaporation of substance, i.e., juridicity. 
Consequently, what is at stake here is not simply "dialectic" identity. In 
addition, it also involves certain condensation of what makes its overall 
substance. In summary of his studies in Hegel, Lenin could only reassert 
that "Form is essential. Essence is formed. In one way or another also in 
dependence on Essence"."1 The form's essentiality can be varying in diverse 
types of human-societal-objectivation. For example, relating to the aesthetical 
quality of a work of art it has been found that "giving a form is the genuinely 
decisive principle while the aesthetical processing of contents is only 
preliminary to it, meaning but little artistically as stopping there could resul t -
instead of some poorer artistic performance-nothing in the least in an aesthetical 
perspective." Although "this lack of independence [ . . . ] does not change the 
priority of contents", all this is suitable to show " the form's decisive, 
independent, finishing function on the work . " " The basic relationship between 
contents and form is not different in law either. For the processing of contents 
to be objectivated as a law, preceding the act of giving it its due form, is 
theoretically nothing else than "preparatory work [ . . . ] which-as by itself it 
does not produce anything legally significant, valuable or valid-gains a normative 
character and strength, i.e., legal normativity, exactly in this particular legal 
formulation", as actually no kind of "legal-normative quality and significance" 
can arise preceding "the actual form-giving phase of the law-making process". '" 
Or, this emphatic significance attributed to formalism in law may not have 
been emerged by chance in history, as "all the needs of civil society-no matter 
which class happens to be the ruling one-must pass through the will of the 
' For the duality of how to understand legal form (either as the law's internal criterion 
or external description) and the need and availability of a synthesis, see, by the author: 
Quelques questions méthodologiques de la formation des concepts en sciences juridiques. 
Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 18 (1973) 205-244. The term 'distinctively legal' is 
used by Selznick, P.: The Sociology of Law. In: International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, 9, ed. D. L. Sills, New York, 1968, 51 et seq. 
10
 V. U. Lenin's Annotations on Book II (Essence) of Hegel 's Science of Logic in his 
Filosofskie tetradi [Philosophical notebooks] in his Collected Works 38. Moscow, 1960-
1967. 129-164. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/eons-logic/ch02.htm>. 
" Lukács: op. cit. 238 and 240. 
'" Peschka, V.: Jogforrás és jogalkotás [Source of law and law-making], Budapest, 
1965, 354, 360 and 357. 
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state in order to secure general validity in the form of laws."1 ' As proved by the 
example of bourgeois society, this significance is rooted in the nature of law, 
that is, on the final account, in the very nature and underlying relations of a 
society within which the objectification of the fundamental relationships and 
needs has become the primary condition of survival. The human will getting 
expressed in laws is socially conditioned in view of both their contents and 
form. "The individuals who rule in these conditions [...] have to give their will 
[...] a universal expression as the will of the state, as law", because "Just as the 
weight of their bodies does not depend on their idealistic will or on their 
arbitrary decision, so also the fact that they enforce their own will in the form 
of law, and at the same time make it independent of the personal arbitrariness 
of each individual among them, does not depend on their idealistic will."14 
Or, the increased significance given to the actual form of expression involves, 
too, that the shaping of substance-not in any but in one given and exclusively in 
that given w a y - i s no longer an external finishing but has itself been 
transformed into a substantial property, taking a share in the very substance of 
the subject, which will enter the scene as the given organisation of contents, 
moreover, as the substantive moment of the organised contents. 
In addition to the need of the ruling class to express its will in form of laws, 
the same authors took a stand in their German Ideology also on the inherent 
consequences and side-effects all the above have at the level of both social and 
individual consciousness. For such objectified expressions as "their relations 
assume an independent existence over against them" as "the forces of their 
own life become superior to them" and, embodied by concepts, they offer large 
scope to "il lusion" that may conceal or cover up their original determination 
and contents; for "Idea of law. Idea of state. The matter is turned upside-down 
in ordinary consciousness."1^ However, this upside-down turn is by far more 
than a mere appearance, a fa lse image in consciousness that may appear as a 
specific distortion "in ordinary consciousness." In the case of law as a formalised 
objectivation through institutionalisation, it is "the matter" itself that is turned 
upside-down: as a result of objectification, a ew quality may emerge that 
sublates the old one (negating while retaining it), with the perspective of 
detaching itself from it on principle. To be sure, the formal side of legal 
objectivation is granted a stressed and essentialised significance just for the 
reason that once objectification is perfected, it will have gained own existence 
Engels, F.: Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. 
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm>. 
14
 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03j.htm>. 
15
 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01c.htm>. 
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independent of its genesis, that is, in order that it can be applied-even if turned 
against its original determination, and preventing any criticism as may be f o r 
contents-as a means of social regulation, a pattern of behaviour with 
indisputable validity. 
Accordingly, the "enchantment" of social relations through their trans-
formation into legal form can also be recognised in the imperfection of their 
translation into abstract rules and in the la t ter ' s deliberately simplifying 
tendency."1 "Enchantment" gets completed when social relations transcribed 
into legal contents will have already lost their original-primary-essentiality, 
sublated into a new quality. 
Hegel encountered the specifically emphat ic role of form where an 
appropriate form was needed, that is, with works of art, where "So far is this 
right form from being unaffected by the content that it is rather the content 
itself."17 Or, there is a need for appropriate form in law, too, at least partially 
and in a restricted sense. This is the very problem of paraphrase. But certain 
elements of dif ference have also to be highlighted. Namely, the f o r m 
appropriate in aesthetical quality is the individual form of a unique work of 
art, a concrete totality with a set of formative elements having organised the 
contents, that may have generated aesthetical quality in its uniqueness. In 
contrast, the form appropriate to legal quality is less unique and concrete. 
Otherwise expressed, to reach an aesthetical quality, the form has to be 
regenerated in a concrete and individual manner; for if anyone only "makes the 
aesthetical a priori of the acquisition and formation of reality",18 will be 
incapable of creating any genuinely aesthetical quality. That is to say that the 
field of aesthetical quality is not formalised. There are no standardised fo rms 
there. As opposed to it, granting a specifically legal form is the normative a 
priori of the formation. It is indeed the schematic form or blanket formula that 
makes any formation transubstantiated into a legal quality as distinguished 
from anything else. 
2. Systemicity ancl Axiomatic Approach 
(The Idea of System and the Law-codes) It is the law-code's systemicity as an 
externally distinctive mark that characterises its technological and instrumental 
novelty both comprehensively and substantively. Systemicity as a formal 
16
 For an expressive description, see: Szabó, I.: Les fondements de la théorie du droit. 
Budapest, 1973. 
17
 <http://www.kern-ep.de/Internet/Hegels_Logik/appearan.htm>. 
18
 Lukács: op. cit. 159. 
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criterion fo rms a bridge between the historical proto-forms and the modern 
implementations of the ideal of codification. By breaking up the envelope of 
conceptuality and revealing its individual and particular (historical) layers (as 
in Henrik Ibsen s drama Peer Gynt did), systemicity will remain the very core 
of any conceptuality as its innermost domain. Or, this is the differentia 
specifica of one of the l aw ' s paths and ways of getting objectified, its sine qua 
19 
non property. 
Namely, systemicity as a technical term is in a position rather to suggest 
than to specify given contents. For systems can be constructed on different levels 
with differing structuration and complexity, with degrees of materialisation 
varied in "maturity" and "perfection". For the time being, the analysis of natural 
dynamic systems not having extended conventionalisedly onto linguistic and 
intellectual ones, general systems theory cannot yet offer a comprehensive 
definition to it. Nevertheless, its notion is suitable to reflect the heterogeneity 
of systemic contents. According to a min imum concept, "A system is a set of 
units with relationships among them." Or, "A system is a set of objects 
together with relationships between the objects and between their attributes."211 
According to a more sensitive and stricter definition, covering linguistic-
theoretical systems as well , "A system is: (1) something consisting of a set 
(finite or infinite) of entities: (2) among which a set of relations is specif ied, 
so that (3) deductions are possible f r o m some relations to other or f r o m the 
relations among the entities to the behavior or the history of the system."21 
There is a significant difference in degree between the two definitions above, 
although both represent dynamic systems that can be found in both natural and 
social reali ty. Considering the depth of internal coherence, interdependence 
11
 Cf., by the author: Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millennium. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica, 47 (2006) 2, 89-117. 
20
 Bertalanffy, L.: General System Theory, and Hall, A. D.-Fagen, R. E.: Definition of 
System. In: General System Yearbook, 1 (1956), 1-10 and 18-28 and <http://isss.org/ 
projects/general_system_yearbook>. Cf. also Uemov, A. 1.: Sistemy i sistemnye issledovannia 
[Systems and systemic research]. In: Blauberg, I. V. (ed.): Problemy metodologii sistemnogo 
issledovania [Problems of the methodology of systemic research], Moscow, 1970, 68. By 
adding "purposeful formation" as a common gencric concept, a similar definition was in 
fact proposed by Sadovskij, V. N. in his К voprosu о metodologicheskikh printsipah 
issledovania predmetov, predstavliaiushchij soboi sistemy [On the question of the 
methodological principles of the investigation of subjects presupposed by their system]. In: 
Suchotin, A. K. (ed.): Problemy metodologii i logiki nauk [Problems of the methodology 
and the logic of science]. Tomsk, 1962. 
21
 Rapoport, A.: General Systems Theory. In: International Encyclopedy of the Social 
Sciences. 15, ed. New York, 1968, 452^453. 
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and self-closure, their difference is by far not in degree but one result ing in 
new quality with those conceptual systems which, due to their logically 
exhaustive deductivity, are indeed axiomatic systems. 
For there is hierarchy among systems. The minimum is perhaps the state 
when some loosely co-related aggregation of objects is scarcely interlaced by 
affinities and when the centripetal forces cementing the system together are 
hardly capable of anything more than neutralising centrifugal forces. The 
maximum may be the state when each and every element of a system is tied to 
all the other ones so closely that owing to their multiple mutual intertwinings, 
each of them will by its very existence strengthen the other, while withdrawing 
any element(s) out of-or , properly speaking, any change made in- the system 
would necessarily collapse the entire system. Thus the course of systemic 
development ranges from some rudimentary stage to the state of axiomatisation 
completed. It is not by chance that Euclid's Elements has ever served to 
embody the ideal of law-codification in modern times. Within the scope of the 
classical model, "f t lhe terms belonging to the theory are never introduced into 
it without being previously defined; the theses are developed in the theory only 
after having been previously proved, except for a small number of them which 
are laid down as principles in the beginning: this way the proof cannot be 
extended to the infinity but has to be founded on some primary theses which 
have been selected excluding any doubt regarding their conceivability in a 
healthy spirit. And although anything proposed is empirically certainly true, no 
reference is made to experience in justification: the geometer pursues only a 
demonstrative route, founding his proofs exclusively onto what has been 
previously proposed, while taking into consideration nothing but the laws of 
logic. This way, any theorem is connected with the chain of necessity to such 
theses from which it has been deduced as a consequence, until a strictly 
enclosed network is gradually reached, in which all theses are directly or 
indirectly interconnected to be eventually concluded in a system, of which not 
any single part could be withdrawn or modified without the whole being 
dest royed."" 
In law, as early as in proto-forms, codification aimed at written recording 
of the law through its systematic elaboration. The quest for a systematic 
restatement of laws in one textual body emerged historically as functionally 
bound, and its social objectives always thematised the perspicuity and 
conclusion of regulation by its self-closing. Later on, hierarchical structures 
were built in, using a pyramidal construction. The lawyer, the jurisprudent and 
the legal philosopher were mostly led by other motives than inertia moment, 
22
 Blunché, R.: L'Axiomatique [ 19551 5e éd. Paris, 1970, 9-10 . 
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instinct to self-development or pragmatic consideration on how to fulfil the 
ideal-or fall in t rap-of axiomatism. Throughout history, the conception formed 
on the availability of axiomatic (re)construction through law codification had 
been closely connected with the idea of (re)structuring legal and social reality. 
(Early Modem Times) Although it was the 19lh century to mature codification 
into a classical type, it was the 17lh century to enhance ambitions to the law's 
axiomatic (reconstruction. Through the discoveries by Kepler, Galilei, Harvey, 
Gassendi, Huygens, Newton and others, this was the century to attain decisive 
victory of natural-scientific world-view over mediaeval scholastic thought, 
proclaiming the triumph of human intellect in victorious self-assertion of 
middle classes at a time preceding their political success through revolution, 
and granting autonomy recognition to sciences during the grand siècle. The 
sciences themselves were unified according to mathematics' pattern, in a way 
to prompt Galileo Galilei to declare that the language of nature is set by the 
symbols of mathematics. In one of the milestones of human intellectual history, 
the Discours de la méthode (1637), René Descartes formulated his basic meth-
odological tenets as follows: "The long chains of simple and easy reasonings 
by means of which geometers are accustomed to reach the conclusions of their 
most difficult demonstrations, had led me to imagine that all things, to the 
knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually connected in the same 
way and that there is nothing so far removed f rom us as to be beyond our reach, 
or so hidden that we cannot discover it".21 Far f rom content with establishing 
mere structural similarity, Descartes applied his geometrical notion for mentally 
building up the philosophical-scientific universe 011 solid foundations through 
irrefutable principles, advancing step by step f rom the simple towards the 
complex. And just in the way as the stand of cogito ergo sum could become the 
cornerstone of Cartesian rationalism, some maxims taken as universally valid 
could also substantiate the unfolding of law, while in political philosophy, based 
on the assumption of social contract, hypostatasing some natural state (by 
presuming isolated human beings without bonds of institutionally established 
trust amongst them) had to serve as starting point for reasoning. 
Of course, Cartesian rationalism was not launched in jurisprudence in a 
form achieved and completed like Pallas Athene, by one stroke and fully 
armed. Descartes himself, anticipating later developments, only accomplished 
the summation of progressive methodological tendencies already inherent in 
1
 Descartes, R.: Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and 
Seeking Truth in the Sciences. 1637. <http://bdsweb.tripod.com/en/106.htm>. 
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his age. For starting by the 15th century, the progressing course natural sciences 
had been taking instigated juris ts to lay the foundations of a new jurisprudence 
which could prove to be scientific, reliable and certain to the degree as the new 
science of Newton and Copernicus did. Accordingly, "many theorists wanted 
to ensure that choices among competing rights [werel constrained by clear and 
unambiguous principles, so that judicial judgment could be separated f rom the 
uncertainties of political rhetoric and metaphysical theory. The lawyers of the 
Enlightenment were, in a word, looking for a legal science in which certainty 
was guaranteed through method. Ever since the Enlightenment this implied 
that legal story [...] would have to be transformed from a religious fable into a 
scientific dissertation."" 
Back in the early 17lh century, Johannes Altliusius investigated law in his 
Dicaeologicae (1617) as part of natural reality, undertaking to describe scholarly 
this specific part of reality. At the same time, he framed his notions-following 
the method of Pierre de la Ramée, i.e., the Ramist logic- into a mathematical 
order. Thus his exposition was patterned by Petrus Ramus (in Latin),75 who 
himself stood on the borderline between the Middle Ages and modern times.2( ' 
Few years later, in 1625, Hugo Grotius erected in his De jure belli ac pacis a 
system of law, deduced with certainty that could only compare to conclusions 
reached in mathematics. For no doubt exists any longer for him. His law is 
quite autonomous a creature as "natural law has become the categorical 
imperative of creation";27 and the proud words of its Prolegomena also reflect 
this unwavering confidence, freed from church theology and moral philosophy 
alike, only restricted by nature and common sense: "What we have been saying 
would have a degree of validity even if we should concede that which cannot 
be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the 
affairs of men are of no concern to Him."28 This is how the axiomatic under-
standing of law and codification had gradually taken on a pure, theoretically 
sophisticated form; this is the way in which the great rationalising attempt by 
4
 Walt, A. J.: Marginal Notes on Powerful Legends: Critical Perspectives on Property 
Theory. Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg, 58 (1995), 402. 
25
 E.g. Merwe, D.: Ramus. Mental Habits and Legal Science. In: Visser, D. P. (ed.): 
Essays on the History of Law. Cape Town, 1989. 32 et seq. 
2<
' Cf. Villey, M.: La formation de ta pensée juridique moderne. Paris, 1968, 588-589. 
27
 Brimo, A. Les grands courants de la philosophie du droit de l'État 2° éd. Paris, 1968, 86. 
28
 Grotius, H.: De jure belli ас pacis. [1625), Prolegomena, sect. IL <http://www. 
lonang.com/exlibris/grotius>. The explication continues by stating that "The very opposite 
of this view has been implanted in us partly by reason, partly by unbroken tradition, and 
confirmed by many proofs as well as by miracles attested by all ages." 
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modern jurisprudence to reformulate the law within a geometrically inspired 
system of law-codes was finished and consummated. 
Namely, following the transition by Althusius and the breakthrough by 
Grotius, qui te a few jur isprudents ventured the impossible by attempting to 
implement it. The oeuvres of Weigel, Felden, Pufendorf and others are the 
methodical schools of deductive system building. Georg Wilhelm Leibniz was 
one of them, responding to the historical challenge of axiomatism with the 
entire passion of a l i fet ime's overall oeuvre, almost identifying his personal 
vocation on Earth with the underlying issue in a way to exert an impact upon 
us with his failures as well, up to the present day.29 
(Recent Times) True, the age of Descartes and Leibniz had passed once and 
for all, and Cartesian rationalism lost its vitality as a philosophical system of 
its own, surviving-like other great heritages of human knowledge-no longer in 
its individuality but as integrated into our culture of the Western knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the attempt at axiomatisation was not just a historical adventure 
but a fundamental logico-methodological challenge to be faced by varying 
ages under differing conditions and scholarly predispositions. To be sure, it was 
not Leibniz the first and Spinoza the last who ventured transforming the 
language of philosophy into mathematics. One of the roughest, strikingly distorted 
versions of the aprioristic method as a "sublime nonsense, the most characteristic 
mass product of Germany's intellectual industry" practically flooded 19th century 
Germany with which, in preparation of launching the coming new epoch of 
positivism and empirism in scholarship, Engels too entered into passionate 
polemics."0 
The revival (or renaissance) of axiomatism was accompanied by such and 
similar self-destructively sterile extremities, characterised by the brutal fact 
and inherent irony that, af ter all, it "yields nothing except a further image of 
itself. It is an elaborate tautology. Unlike numbers, words do not contain within 
themselves functional operations. Added or divided, they give only other words 
or approximations of their o w n meaning."31 
24
 Cf., by the author: Leibniz und die Frage der rechtlichen Systembildung. In: 
Mollnau, K. A. (ed.): Materialismus und Idealismus im Rechtsdenken. Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, Stuttgart, 1987, 114-127. 
311
 Engels, F.: Herr Eugen Düh ring's Revolution in Science. Anti-Diihring. Moscow, 
1947, 13. 
31
 A passage continued by an idea dear to Spinoza: "Language is seen no longer as a 
road to demonstrable truth, but as a spiral or gallery of mirrors bringing the intellect back 
to its point of departure." Steiner, G.: Language and Silence. Essays on Language, 
Literature, and the Inhuman, New Haven-London, 1998, 20. 
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Or, the re-emergence of axiomatism with a renewed attempt at breaking 
down the law into an axiomatically erected system is encountered where and 
when a comprehensive methodological foundation, like the one once provided 
by the Cartesian rationalism in 17th century, is made available. Such seems to 
be the case right in our mid-20 th-to-early-21s t century, when mathematical 
logic and cybernetics and legal informatics and e-government, as instruments 
of the ongoing second-to-third industrial revolution, are to recognise one of 
their forefathers in Leibniz; when Marx is referred to as one of the forerunners 
of mathematisation in social sciences;32 when reasonable, moreover downright 
desirable attempts are made for both the computerisation of legal information 
and the cybernetic approach to law and its codif icat ion-with the risk of 
absolutisation, no need to add.33 
In itself, the claim for the law's logical processing is by far not to lead 
necessarily to axiomatic system building. Nevertheless, the question of whether 
or not the law's formal reconstruction will necessarily imply axiomatic 
methodology arises at times, with the ensuing tendency to describe (or, rather 
to say: transcribe) legal operations in schemes of formal logic. The trend 
aiming at a complete and exhaustive formal logical reconstruction of the law's 
operations (usually referred to as formalist, in opposition to the anti-formalist 
direction)34 does not exclude axiomatic reconstruction from the outset.33 The 
very fact of a literary tradition of vague ideas and uncertain notions about 
axiomatisability in law is shown, for instance, by Josef Esser who, being far 
See, e.g., Vospominaniya о Markse i Engelse [Recollections on Marx and Engels). 
Moscow, 1956, 6, quoted by Kazimirchuk, V. P.: Pravo i metody ego izucheniya [Law and 
the methods of its researchf Moscow, 1965, 166. 
33
 Cf., only from the publications of the Viennese Internationale Rechtsinformatische 
Seminare at Salzburg, Schweighofen E. (ed.): Zwischen Rechtstheorie und e-Gouverne-
ment, gewidmet Friedrich Lachmayer, Wien, 2003 and Schweighofen E. (ed.): 10 Jahre 
IRIS. Stuttgart, 2007; as well as those titles including contributions by the present author as 
well, Schweighofen E. (ed.): Informationstechnik in der juristischen Realität. Aktuelle 
Fragen zur Rechtsinformatik 2004, Wien, 2004, Schweighofen E. (ed.): Effizienz von e-
Lösungen in Staat und Gesellschaft. Aktuelle Fragen der Rechtsinformatik. Stuttgart, 2005, 
and Jakob, R.-Phillips, L.-Schweighofer, E.-Varga, Cs. (eds.): Auf clem Weg zur Idee der 
Gerechtigkeit. Gedenkschrift für llmar Tammelo. Münster, 2009 (forthcoming). 
14
 For the basic controversy between anti-formalism and formalism, see the plenary 
session papers presented at the World Congress of the International Association for 
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Brussels in 1971, most eminently by 
Perelman, C.: Le raisonnement juridique, 1-15 and Kalinowski, G.: Le raisonnement 
juridique, 17^42, both in Die Juristische Argumentation. Wiesbaden, 1972. 
13
 E.g., Kalinowski, G.: Introduction à la logique juridique. Paris, 1965. 
14 CSABA VARGA 
away from formalism personally,1 6 uses the dichotomy of "axiomatically 
oriented" and "problem-oriented" all along his work.17 He conceives these 
opposites as synonymous to "c losed system" presupposed by codification, on 
the one hand, and "open system" operating with case law, on the other.18 -
This same approach is solidified by Julius Stone's definite assertion, according 
to which "If a legal order were designed to contain within itself a sufficiently 
comprehensive set of legal propositions precise and stable enough in meaning 
so that only one answer could be deduced from them for every problem 
presented for legal solution, those who operated with it would need to use 
only formal logic. [...] Such a legal order would be an axiomatic system-an 
axiomatics-like geometry or algebra."14 To be sure, logical conclusion does by 
no means presuppose an axiomatic structure, albeit by axiomatic character 
Stone exclusively means the logically operated nature of premises. His remark 
adds somewhat absolutistic a form to his thesis, claiming that "Clearly even 
the most axiom-oriented legal system will be only very imperfectly so, while 
even the most rhetorically, (that is, tópoi-) oriented legal order has within it 
numerous axiomatic sub-systems, some of its legal prepositions being apt for 
use as premises from which solutions can properly be deduced through 
stringent logical procedures. W e are, indeed, accustomed to viewing a legal 
order as axiomatic to some extent, that is, as containing many major premises 
f rom which answers to legal questions can be deduced in a logically 
guaranteed way."4 0 
Reverting to the German school of legal logic with strong axiomatic 
flavour, one of its most distinguished representatives, Ulrich Klug, treats both 
axiomatic system-building and the lawyers ' desire for the l aw ' s axiomatic 
codification.41 At the same time, he consistently avoids raising the dramatic 
issue, notably, its genuine feasibility. Apparently he is not even aware of the 
lack of deductivity from the l aw ' s notional structure and systemic components. 
On the final account and paradoxically, the only specific remark he has is 
echoing Bochenski's opinion on that every language, even if not elaborated, is 
Cf. Stone, J.: Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning. London, 1964, 195. 
17
 "A logically closed system-J. Esser writes in his Grundsatz und Norm in der 
richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts. 4th cd. Tübingen. 1990, 218-on the top of 
which there are deductively fertile major premises is axiomatically oriented." |„Ein logisch 
geschlossenes Rechtssystem, an dessen Spitze deduktiv ergiebige Obersätze stehen, haben 
wir als axiomatisch orientiert bezeichnet."] 
78
 Esser: op. cit.. especially at 44. 
34
 Stone: op. cit. 330. 
40
 Ibid., 332. 
41
 Klug U.: Juristische Logik. 3. Aufl. Berlin, 1966, 15-16 and 174-176. 
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spirited by axiomatism. " - Ilmar Tammelo goes further in offering an answer 
when he criticises the view arising out of "blind obscurantism" which holds as 
if it were the mere self-centred wish of logicians to systematise law axiomatically. 
But in fact, when he answers that "it is up to legal policy to decide whether or 
not the axiomatisation of law shall take place without the logician having any 
competence. Yet once a decision is taken, the logician may help", he seems 
responding the enigma in terms of professional competence in scholarship 
rather than in terms of realisability in practice.43 - Finally, Ota Weinberger 
treats axiomatism, too, as just one of logical methods, without entering into 
details as to its difficulties when applied to law. All he concludes is reduced to 
a blank prophecy, saying that "the logical analysis of legal thought is going to 
lead to the elaboration of pure deductive systems".44 
In addition to renewed approaches to axiomatism in law,45 there is a specific 
impetus that may have promoted axiomatism in the codes ' systématisation of 
law. This is the systemic investigation into conceptual sets, launched rather as 
a requirement than as a modest achievement. 
(Drawbacks in Philosophy) The tradition of systemic investigation into 
conceptual sets in philosophy is hardly sufficient for seconding the e f for t s in 
jurisprudence. Firstly, it concentrates on the analysis peculiar to philosophical 
systems. Secondly, drawing mainly on Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft,4ft  
both its issues and entire notional framework are inspired by the methodological 
limitations set by Kantianism, old and new.4 7 
As to the general systems theory and similar interdisciplinary trends, they 
are mostly preoccupied with dynamic systems in material and social reality. 
Consequently, conceptualisation in actual systems is secondary for them, seen 
mostly as a program to be addressed, if at all, in future. 
Considering the fact that neither theory of science nor scientific methodology 
have made striking progress on the field, formal logic has remained in charge 
of conducting research on conceptual systems. And indeed, logic can successfully 
Bochenski, 1. M.: Die zeitgenössigen Denkmethoden. 2. Aufl. München, 1959, 
quoted by Klug, 16 and 174. 
43
 Tammelo, I.: Rechtslogik und materielle Gerechtigkeit. Frankfurt am Main, 1971, 48. 
44
 Weinberger, O.: Rechtslogik. Wien-New York, 1970, 362. 
43
 E.g., Ferrajoli, L.: Teoria assiomatizzata del diritto. Parte generale. Milano, 1970 as 
well as Wróblewski, J.: Axiomatization of Legal Theory. Rivista internationale di filosofia 
del diritto, 49 (1972) 3. 380-389. 
46
 Kant, I.: Critique of Pure Reason 1 Kritik der reinen Vernunft , 1781]. 
47
 See, e.g., Bartók, Gy.: A 'rendszer' filozófiai vizsgálata |Philosophical investigation 
of the 'system']. Budapest, 1928. 
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utilise its entire store of analytic instruments for systems research; the terrain, 
however, where it can make ful l use of its properties to achieve results suited 
to such a purpose is but its most narrow field, notably, axiomatics. Therefore 
the circumstance that research in conceptual systems is earned out unchangedly 
within the competence of logic has eventually deformed research itself, by 
diverting it onto the forced path of axiomatics. Thereby the very method of 
analysis creates an object for itself. Firstly, it addresses the subject with means 
and approach alien to the sub jec t ' s own specificity. Secondly, this discrepancy 
with latent antinomy in between subject and approaching to it gets expressed 
in the subject's manipulation, equalling to distortion and falsification. Thirdly, 
axiomatism prevails with a subject transubstantiated. Or, what may have 
initially been a legal system, a mobile and dynamic conglomerate of both 
logical and alogical components, is going to eventually become a series of 
deductive conclusions, rigidified and broken into a construction unfolded and 
crystallised by the manipulator 's axioms. 
II. Axiomatism 
1. The Want of Axiomatisability 
(From Deductivity to Axiomatisation) For an external observer, human 
knowledge appears in form of written texts , involving a definite store of 
concepts with relations established amongst them. These texts contain pieces 
of information at various levels. Propositions and the linguistic units carrying 
them textually are formulated not inordinately but as organised according to a 
given order, mutually co-related as components of a well-constructed intellectual 
system. The order manifested in such texts is neither self-determining nor set 
fo r itself. It is designed to represent the connections of the object which the 
text has to express on a conceptual level. However, the underlying order may 
have concurring notional representations. For the representation to be adequate, 
its basic substantive features need to be identical. Or, the notionally schemed 
order has to be partly natural yet partly artificial, reconstructed and constructed 
at the same time.4 8 
48
 In its time, the Soviet philosophical literature elaborated the thesis of correspondence 
between formal and contentual components, and called it the principle of "parallelism of 
form and contents of thought". Accordingly, their parallelism was thought to be based 
upon the relative independence of both sides with exclusive operations within their basic 
correspondence. Shtshcdrovitskiy, G. P.-Alekseev, N. G.: Printsip parallellizma ' formy i 
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In case the components of a system are grouped in a way that its theses 
are logically to conclude f rom one another as necessary consequences, both 
their connection and the system itself qualify as deductive ones.44 The fur ther 
development of deductive systems by re-formulating them at a qualitatively 
higher level leads to axiomatisation. As a strictly consequent formal perfection 
of the deductivity of systems, axiomatisation amounts to the formal description 
(or reconstruction) of an already established system, elaborated exclusively in 
a deductive order. Axiomatic reconstruction is achieved through meta-
language formulation of theses specified in object-language provided by the 
underlying system. Its phases are rather strict as to the conditions to be met. At 
first, (1) the basic signs to be applied in the system are defined, followed by 
(2) the definition of the formulas suitable to provide the expressions of the 
system, then followed by (3) the selection of the basic propositions (axioms) 
from the formulas defined above as well as by (4) the determination of the 
(deductive) rules of inference (or derivation) to be accepted in the system, and 
finally, to be ended by (5) the conclusion of all the theses (theorems) provable 
within the system, according to the same accepted rules of inference.50 
(Futile Approximations at the Most) By projecting the Aristotle-inspired 
definition of axiomatic systems51 onto the law after having performed the 
necessary substitutions,52 we do reach the conclusion according to which the 
law can be conceived of and also treated as "a system S of normative concepts 
and propositions, whose property is that (a) all theses of S relate to the same 
domain of human behaviours and the relations among such behaviours; (b) all 
soderzhaniia mysleniia' i ego znachenie dlya traditsionnyh logicheskih i psihologicheskih 
issledovanij (The principle of parallelism of ' form and content of thought' and its 
significance for the traditional logical and psychological research], Doklady Akademii 
Pedagogicheskih Nauk RSFSR. (1960), paras. 2 and 4. 
44
 Sadovskij, V. N.: The Deductive Method as a Problem of the Logic of Science. In: 
Tavanec, P. V. (ed.): Problems of the Logic of Scientific Knowledge. Dordrecht, 1970, 
160-211 and 168. 
50
 Sadovskij: op. cit. 173 and 187. 
51
 Klaus, G.: Einführung in die formale Logik. Berlin, 1959. 290. 
2
 The replacement of the category Urteil [ ' judgement '] by ' theses' and the use of 
'validity' instead of Wahrheit [ ' truth']. For the intense debates they have otherwise rightly 
provoked, cf. Peczenik, A.: Doctrinal Study of Law and Science. Österreichische Zeitschrift 
für öffentliches Recht. 17 (1967) 1-2, 129-131 and 134-135; Opalek, K.: The Problem of 
Validity of Law. Archívum Juridicum Cracoviense, 3 (1970) 7-18; and as to the analogy 
between 'validity' and 'truth', Wright, G. H.: Norm and Action. A Logical Enquiry, London, 
1963, 196-197. 
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theses of S are valid; (с) providing that certain theses belong to S, every further 
thesis inferable from these according to the rules of logic has to belong to S\ 
(d) there has to be a finite number of concepts in S whose meaning needs no 
explication, and the meaning of all other concepts belonging to S has to be 
definable by that finite number of concepts; (e) there has to be a finite number 
of theses in S whose validity is evident, and all the fur ther theses of 5 are 
inferable f r o m that finite number of proposit ions according to the rules of 
logic." 
The condition (a) refers to the unity of legal regulation in a wider sense. 
Condition (b), a sine qua non one for descriptive propositions stipulating that 
"all judgements of S are true judgements" , is tautologie in law as accepted 
per definitionein from the very start. Condition (c) formulates a necessary 
presupposition for any logical treatment of law, postulating in doctrine [Rechts-
dogmatik]51 that both the posited norms and their logical consequences are to 
be taken as propositions of the law at the same level and to the same effect.5 4 
As to condition (d), the first specific requirement for the law's axiomatisation, 
we are now to encounter rather difficult dilemmas. In the first moment, how-
ever, a compromise solution may seem to offer itself. For instance, we could 
presume that both posited law and its doctrinal study (engaged in the law's 
linguistico-logical processing into a semantically higher-level meta-system), 
together with the set of principles asserted in standing jurisprudence and its 
underlying professional ideology, are to embody those principles of interpretation 
through which the meaning of the law's fundamental concepts can be established 
as evident, and the meaning of all the fur ther concepts as validly accepted.58 
However, the neuralgic point is not here but on deductive sequence, on the 
inferability of concepts allegedly derived from some fundamental concepts in 
the given axiomatic system. 
57
 Cf. by the author: Law and its Doctrinal Study (On Legal Dogmatics). Acta Juridica 
Hungarica, 49 (2008) 3, 253-274. 
74
 E.g., Wróblewski, J.: Zagadenienia teorii vykladni prawa ludowego. Warszawa, 
1959, 248 and 482, as well as Peczenik: op. cit. 131-134. 
55
 A similar approach is suggested by Wróblewski Zagadenienia teorii..., passim; 
Ross, A: On Law and Justice. London. 1958, 138-139; and Jprgensen, S.: Argumentation 
and Decision. In: Festkrift til professor dr. jar. et phil. Alf Ross. Kpbenhavn. 1969. as well. 
In fact, all such approaches share the conviction that meaning in law is a function of 
contexture and that the law's social context of interpretation is part o f t ha t contexture. Cf., 
by the author: On the Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning. Logique et Analyse 
16 (1973). Nos. 61-62 and in: Perelman, C. (ed.): Études de logique juridique V. Bruxelles, 
1973, 21-78. 
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If this is so, then law is unsuitecl to axiomatisation by virtue of the very 
nature of its concepts, considering the fact that in any system-constructing 
quality the very sinse of deductivity is alien to them. Or, the basic condition of 
the law's axiomatisability remains unfulfilled already at a conceptual level. For 
no law has fundamental concepts with meanings evident in themselves; no 
principles of interpretation are exhaustively defined by or construable f rom the 
system; moreover, the law's concepts are not necessarily inferable from within 
the system. 
Finally, condition (e), specific to law, raises drawbacks even more insur-
mountable. 
(1) A preliminary remark has firstly to be made. Condition (b) stipulates 
that "all theses of S are valid" and condition (e) stipulates that "there has to be 
a finite number of theses in S whose validity is evident". Accordingly, we have 
already stated that all the law's components have to be held valid, as the 
amalgamate of valid and invalid elements in law is per definitionem excluded. 
Indeed, a number of interpretive principles, enacted rules as well as professional 
maxims have for long been developed to deprive propositions with no validity 
within or incompatible with the system of their belonging to that sys tem." 
Nevertheless, law is a specific continuum in the unbroken process of norms 
gaining and losing validity, a continuum with boundaries constantly forming in 
time.5 (As it can be noticed, we are focussing here on the formal-posit ivist ic-
aspect of the very complex notion of validity." Although this fits in better with 
the specific direction our investigation is taking, the sociological approach to 
the notion of validity would cause no change in accepting validity as a prime 
criterion.59) 
All that notwithstanding, the category of truth (expressing correspondence 
between reality and its cognition in epistemology) and the one of validity 
(designating the legally normative quality of the regulation) do not have the 
same position when complying with the above conditions. For in case of 
descriptive propositions, there is a close and somewhat intimate relationship 
between the truth and the evidence of truth, an organic coupling which is quite 
alien to norm-propositions. The evidence of truth is revelative of contents and 
of the quality how they are reflected. The evidence of validity tells only about 
56
 See, e.g., Wróblewski Zagadenienia teorii..., op. cit. 282 adn 481. 
37
 Cf.. by the author: Lectures oil the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, 
particularly at para. 6.1. on 203 et seq. 
58
 Cf., by the author: Validity. Acta Juridicct Hungarica. 41 (2000) 3-4, 155-166. 
59
 Cf., by the author: Quelques questions ..., passim, especially at 601. 
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the respective norm's belonging to-by sharing in-the law's overall normativity.60 
In contrast to the evidence of validity, the evidence of truth cannot be self-
explanatory or tautologie. In Iiis Philosophical Notebooks, also Lenin identified 
the source of axiomatic evidence in the justificatory power of the continuity of 
m a n ' s practical activity,61 concluding therefrom that axioms "are not true 
because they are evident, but they are evident because they are true".62 No 
"transcript" in law of such an allegation-claiming that "norms are not valid 
because they are obvious but they are obvious because they are valid"-could 
lead to any plausible result. The norm acquires normative form by gaining 
normative expression in order to become separated from both epistemological 
truth and ontological necessity, in a way of being also freed of disputability 
any longer. This refers to the very fact that validity (like any other element of 
norm systems) appears as "an artificial human construction",63 a result of 
m a n ' s social activity. Simultaneously, it gets applied as a criterion set vis-a-vis 
norm systems as a sine qua non of the legal qualification of reality. Otherwise 
speaking, it has a constructive role in the specific establishment of the law's 
quality as "distinctively legal". 
(2) Our genuine problem relate only to the second phrase of condition (e), 
implying the cardinal query for the sine qua non condition of selecting axioms 
f rom theses of the system, in order to construct it deductively this way. 
Namely, law can be conceived as an axiomatic system in two ways. 
According to alternative (A), the total sum of the laws' posited provisions 
shall be taken simply as a set of axioms. Then the posited body of the law with 
all its logical consequences will stuff the axiomatic system as a series of 
axioms, and the theses elaborated by the l aw ' s doctrinal study, concluded 
deductively therefrom, as theorems. According to alternative (B), distinction is 
60
 Of course, the kind of validity referred to here accords with its positivistic under-
standing. Validity in a positivistic sense is indifferent to contents, so it carries the law's 
specificity-the "distinctively legal" quality-in a most pure form. Its sociologistic sense 
(which instead of signalling mere belonging-or ascription-to the system, describes actual 
functioning) remains a formal category on the whole. It asserts the normative quality of 
norm-propositions belonging to the legal system through their being asserted by (and in) 
judicial acts and other sociologically significant events. Besides these two senses, one may 
specify its contentual understanding as a further notion of validity. This relates to the value 
of norm-propositions some instrumental value (functionality, suitability, desirability, abstract 
acceptability, and so on), in view of the law's purposes accepted in a given circle. 
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 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/volume38.htm>. 
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 Quoted by Klaus: op. cit. 291. 
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to be made between provisions that provide fundamental regulation and ones 
only executing the former as subordinate to it. Either solution can only be 
accepted as failing presupposition. 
(Ad A) The first alternative of axiomatic system-construction is redundant 
as it can only offer a pseudo-solution. The qualification of the total sum of 
enacted provisions as axioms would deprive this artificial system exactly of its 
specific-axiomatic-character, for the selection of axioms would exclusively be 
directed by a wholly external factor, namely, by the act of the legislator having 
posited those provisions. In case if axiomatic quality is not defined by the 
suitability of the proposition in question to serve as a foundational stone for 
system construction, we may scarcely speak of an axiomatic system.64 
Ad B) By selecting axioms, the other alternative, too, is to bring artificial 
division in the system, as it will distinguish between axioms and normatively 
posited and not posited propositions as logically inferable theorems. 
In order to overcome artificiality, we could state that as regards the validity 
of contents, both normatively posited and not posited propositions, once 
logically inferable, are equivalent. Nevertheless, a division as outlined above 
could not be without problems. Partly because it is likely that we should select 
our axioms by far not exclusively from among the law's hierarchically upgraded 
provisions (from a Basic Law or a code 's General Part with fundamental 
principles of the regulation). By this, we would unavoidably contradict the 
very spirit of the structured law and the normative significance attributed to it. 
And partly because there is high probability for axioms getting selected not 
only from the law 's normatively posited stuff but of creating some of them, 
through mental (re)construction, as logical premise to some normatively posited 
provisions. Accordingly, our system would be constructed as an artificial set of 
four components, namely, normatively (1) posited and (2) not posited axioms 
and their normatively (3) posited and (4) not posited logical consequences, 
taken as theorems.65 
64
 Opatek, K.-Wolenski, J.: Das Problem der Axiomati sie run g des Rechts. Later in: 
Winkler, G. (ed.): Rechtstheorie und Rechtsinformatik. Wien-New York, 1975. 51-66. also 
foresaw such a solution (on 15-16) by accepting its set as a class of independent norms 
(axioms). Without objecting to or refuting it. they concluded that it cannot be but of a 
"minimum value" in practice. 
65
 Opatek & Wolenski, 16 also find this option feasible for a procedure when, first, 
axioms are inductively formulated from the posited stuff of norms, and then, the system's 
theorems are deduced from them. The criticism the authors exert seems however to focuss 
on a secondary point. The issue of deducibility being left untouched, they are only 
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One of the prerequisites of axiomatisation according to condition (d) has 
been a network of concepts constituting the system that can be arranged in a 
deductive order. However, as we have seen, concepts of law are not of such a 
type. In law, as known, it is by far not only concepts that resist getting trans-
formed into a deductive chain of consequences. For propositions defining the 
mutual relationships and connections amongst concepts withstand deductivity, 
too, by virtue of their nature shared with one of concepts. Posited law is 
scarcely stuffed with norms deducible f r o m the law's other norms in a formal, 
strictly deductive way.66 Propositions fundamental to delineate the contents of 
legal systems mostly appear as délimitations-actualisations and concretisations-
of purposes set forth by high-level politico-legal documents, the normative 
regulation of which will mostly provide the definition of those instrumental 
behaviours which have been selected by the legislator to achieve the desired 
aims. This is the reason why both the basic arrangement and its regulation in 
detai ls-often distinguishable through a thorough analysis of contexture 
exclusively-are provided by the legislator and in a normative way.67 Whereas, 
if we were indeed in a position to rely on deductivity, the legislator could 
safely leave the job of deducing systemic theorems from given axioms to either 
the professionals of doctrine or the law-applier. 
Or, as expounded elsewhere,6 8 processes of law-application cannot be 
reduced to deductive operations. Accordingly, attempts throughout history at 
eliminating par excellence creative moments from judicia l processes were 
always bound to failure.''" Neither doctrinal study can be based upon mere 
deductivity.70 In the law's proper domain, be it either made or applied, instead 
preoccupied with the consequence that such an implementation will inevitably exceed 
the boundaries of the underlying system and result in a "substantial overextension", 
unacceptable for a Rechtsdogmatik. 
Wróblewski: Axiomatization..., op. cit. especially at 380-381. The structure of legal 
systems is described as a complex-at the same time dynamic and static-entity in his System 
of Norms and Legal System. Rivistci internationale di filosofta del diritto, 49 (1972) 2, 
224-245, especially on 228-229 and 236. 
67
 Cf., by the author: Structures in Legal Systems: Artificiality, Relativity, and Inter-
dependency of Structuring Elements in a Practical (Hermeneutical) Context. Acta Juridica 
Hungarica, 43 (2002) 3-4, 219-232 . 
68
 Cf. Varga: On the Socially Determined..., op. cit. passim. 
64
 Cf., by the author: A törvényhozó közbenső döntése és a hézagproblematika meg-
oldása a francia jogfejlődés tükrében [The interim decision by the legislator as a way of 
filling gaps, as overviewed through the French legal development]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
26(1971) 1 ,42-45 . 
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 E.g.. Peczenik: Doctrinal Study of Law... , op. cit. 135-138. 
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of purely formal logical connections there are only interrelations of contents, 
which delimit the field of formal deductivity to a sheer hyperbolic ideal. 
(Lack of Deductivity in the Law's Deep Structure) The very nucleus of any 
axiomatic system is that in some set of building blocks there are few 
foundation stones from which one given building can be built up in one given 
form with the necessity that the operation, in view of the result, can be 
repeated by any actor at any future time. However, the relationship amongst 
the constituents of legal systems is not such as to allow to make up their 
edifice in exclusively one form, if its axiomatic procedure is defined and some 
constituents as foundation stones are designated. The principle of deductivity 
is at the heart of all axiomatism. The eventual lack of the deductivity of legal 
concepts affects directly the alternative (B) only. The alternative (A) seems not 
to be excluded as a job to be undertaken. Or, this alternative could be realised 
without, however, bringing us closer to the gist of legal axiomatism. Its 
acceptance would be like claiming to explain the structure of a building by 
defining its construction procedure and one or two foundation stones assigned 
to it, but presenting in fact the whole edifice with each and every (different) 
piece of stone built in as foundation stones, and with each and every concrete 
(different) manner of their building in as fundamental procedures. 
2. The Heuristic Value of an Ideal 
(Cases of N/A) As the basic characteristics of axiomatic systems are not 
applicable to law, we have to regard legal systems as non-axiomatic and not 
axiomatisable ones. 
As to the further, accessory properties of axiomatic systems, neither the 
principle of the independence of axioms71 nor the one of irreducibility12 is 
applicable in law. For providing that we accept all the normatively posited 
provisions of the system as axioms (proposal (A)), we exclude the above 
principles f rom the outset. Providing that we accept exclusively the sys tem's 
elaborated basic principles as axioms (proposal (B)), we do presume those 
principles already fulfilled f rom the very beginning. 
71
 According to which none of the axoms can be deduced from any other, serving as the 
latter's theorem. Klaus: op. cit. 303. 
72
 Fulfilled as an improved version of the former, "if each axiom of the system is 
independent of the conjunction of the other axioms", that is, "if both this very axiom and 
its logical negation are logically compatible with the conjunctions of the others". Klaus: 
op. cit. 321. 
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One of the advantages of axiomatic system construction is that by revealing 
the identical structure of seemingly differing theoretical and practical systems, 
it allows them to be analysed collectively and synthesisingly.73 This collectivity 
is introduced by the term of isomorphy in logic. Namely, "[ijf the models 
differ only in the different character of the specific interpretations regarding 
their components, and if they coincide totally when we disregard this for the 
sake of their treatment on a formal axiomatic plane, we say that the models in 
question are of an isomorphous character as they have quite identical a logical 
structure".74 
Well, in the domain of law, if we cannot speak of isomorphy among systems, 
the question itself becomes pointless. Although quite a few isomorphous 
structures can certainly be encountered among various institutions within given 
legal systems, their examination points beyond axiomatics. Consequently, also 
dependence-namely, "if the system itself or its logical negation can be inferred 
from the other"-is quite alien to legal systems, thus-apart from some exceptions 
in the domain of the techniques of legislation75-we may conclude that any 
legal system is "logically incidental" compared to other systems.76 
(Cases of Correlation) However, it does not result from the law's inherently 
non-axiomatic composition that legal systems could not carry features inter-
prétable within an axiomatic perspective.77 Even the law's geometric ideal can 
only gain a meaning in history if the law has a genuine façade suitable to be 
3
 Cf., e.g., Blanché: L'axiomatique..., op. cit. ch. IV, § 23. Lukács too, albeit opposed 
(as flatly hostile) to any formalism in general, welcomed the tendency towards "the 
mathematisation of all sciences". Lukács, Gy.: A különösség mint esztétikai kategória 
[Particularity as an aesthetical category]. Budapest, 1957, 149-150. 
4
 Blanché: op. cit. 46. 
Obviously, there is isomorphy in the exceptional cases of promulgating the same 
statutory texture in separate jurisdictions. Yet this is irrelevant for logic. Reception of legal 
texts can become relevant for isomorphy only provided that either the same basic 
principles are broken down differently in detailed regulations or differing basic principles 
will be asserted in the same texture of regulation. Properly speaking, this is not the issue of 
isomorphy to be at stake. Isomorphy is related to the identical structure of systems 
differently interpreted, while reception with variations testifies only to the dialectics 
inherent in the demand for harmony between basic principles and their detailed breaking 
down in a regulatory concrétisation. 
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 Klaus: op. cit. 321. 
7
 E.g. Savigny, E.: Zur Rolle der deduktivaxiomatischen Methode in der Rechts-
wissenschaft. In: Jahr, G.-Maihofer . W. (ed.): Rechtstheorie. Beiträge zur Grundlagen-
diskussion. Frankfurt am Main, 1971, 315-351 and Rödig, J.: Axomatisierbarkeit juristischer 
Systeme. In: Rödig, J.: Schriften zur juristischen Logik. Berlin. 1980, 65-90. 
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brought into connection with the characteristics of axiomatism in some way. 
Or, our basic rejection will reckon with moments suggest ing a certain 
connection notwithstanding. 
Although, according to the general theory of science, " f t | he re is something 
asserting itself as a rule in the development of sciences, driving them in an 
irreversible sequence in function of their place in the hierarchy along four 
subsequent phases, that is, the descriptive, the inductive, the deductive, and, 
finally, the axiomatic ones",78 yet we may agree with Klaus that "there is no 
science which could exclusively be axiomatic-deductive".7" For not even the 
focus of axiomatisation on formal definition can exclude that-methodologically 
speaking-axiomatics will be acknowledged as the endpoint of all processes 
arising from the analysis of any concrete totality of material or intellectual 
phenomena. "It may occur only in books that axiomatics begins with axioms, for 
with the axiomatician it is just the axioms where it ends. Namely, axiomatics 
presupposes substantive deduction to which it gives a shape, which requires 
lengthy inductive preliminary work in collecting the materials to be organised 
this way. On such a basis, the axiomatician's genuine job will be to identify 
axioms, that is, instead of drawing mere consequences from given principles, 
he will have, once a set of propositions is given, to find the minimum system 
of those principles from which the propositions in question can be deduced."Xl) 
This is but a concrétisation in logic, the epistemological formulation of which 
was already provided by Engels in his crude polemics with Dühring: "The 
general results of the investigation of the world will only be obtained when 
the investigation is already over : these are results in accomplishment rather 
than basic principles to start on. To construct the former mentally through 
concluding from the latter as reliable basis in order to reconstruct the world is 
sheer ideology"/1 
Or, axiomatic system building is by far not simply a game with signs for 
themselves, a futile exercise in some vacuum, but a way of systematising 
knowledge itself. Accordingly, its pattern may become an instrument of the 
3
 Blanche: L'axiomatique... op. cit. 84. 
71
 Klaus: op. cit. 325. 
80
 Blanché: op. cit. 87. 
81
 Engels, F.: Anti-Dühring. In: Marx, K.-Engels, F.: Werke, 20. Berlin, 1987, 574. 
Or, formulated elsewhere in the same developments, "the principles are not the starting-
point of the investigation, but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human 
history, but abstracted from them", <http://www.marxists.org/arehive/marx/works/ 
download/Engels_Anti_Duhring.pdf>. 
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theoretical appropriation of the world, albeit its suitability is by far not 
unlimited. Moreover, if we stated beforehand that there is no system exclusively 
axiomatic, now we may risk the opposite-direction statement, namely that 
there is no system with absolutely no features of axiomatism. For absolute 
axiomatism is an empty category so much as absolutely no axiomatism is. 
The two pillars of axiomatic system building h formal construction and its 
deductive definition. These are basically not proper to law, yet they may have 
some aspects within the perspective of which they may become method-
ologically significant fo r it. For instance, the very fact that "in the ax ioms of 
the Euclidean geometry, all propositions of this geometry are in principle 
involved,"82 is characteristic of all axiomatic systems. Among norm systems, 
there are in principle-as theoretical models-so-called static systems, in which 
the basic norm of validity elevates-by delineating the system's contentual 
boundaries as a general condition of validity, and with the rules of inference 
given-the whole system to be a logical consequence of the basic norm.8 3 No 
need to say that such systems are scarcely set up anywhere in practice. Yet in 
law, norms authorising the issuance of, or extending validity to, certain 
subordinate norms may be defined in a way that the conformity (e.g., constitu-
tionality) of the latter to this hierarchically higher level can be adjudicated, for 
instance, on the basis of the particular deducible from the general, or of its lack 
of contradictions, or of its recognition as embodying an instrumental value. 
On the other hand, there are general principles in law-codes, which may 
matter especially when treated quasi-axiomatically in the delimitation of the 
generalisable features of the details of the regulatory arrangement, as well as 
when decision is to be made in atypical or borderline cases, or when just filling 
gaps in the law are at stake. Or. the contentual superiority of general principles 
in so-called code systems8 1 does by far not amount to their suitability to be 
taken as axioms in the sense of entai l ing all the c o d e ' s proposit ions on 
principle. For general principles as the system's basic propositions may , by 
formulating the objectives and the overall ethos of the entire regulation, greatly 
delimit the circle of instrumental behaviours to be specified and legally 
qualified by the said regulation, without, however, def ining them, as there is 
82
 Klaus: op. cit. 319. 
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 Cf. Wróblewski: System of Norms .... op. cit. 226-227. 
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 Cf. Szabó, t.: Régi és új kcrdcsck a szocialista jogelméletben [Old and new questions 
in socialist legal theory]. In his Szocialista jogelmélet-népi demokratikus jog [Socialist 
legal theory-people's democratic law], Budapest, 1967, 119-120; and also Wróblewski, J.: 
The General Principles of Law. In: Rapports polonais présentés au sixième Congrès 
international de Droit compare. Varsovie, 1962, 220-222. 
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no exclusive, categorical equivalence between the objective set and the way 
the law may intend to reach it ." 
What is therefore proper to legal systems-instead of formal derivation and 
consequence-is but a mutual contentual relationship, within which eventual 
contradictions or disconformities between principles and actual realisations 
can quite well be detected, but not in a way to be substituted by relations of 
mutual definition and inferability. 
Finally, two further basic characteristics should as well be mentioned, ones 
that are requirements formulated in axiomatic systems as attached directly to 
their systemic character (rather than to their deductivity) and thus are asserted 
in law far more directly. The "requirements of deductive systems have different 
theoretical-cognitive ' force '"-according to science theory. "The most important 
of them is the requirement of consistency since otherwise the system is ruined. 
The other requirements have less importance."86 Well , this requirement can be 
formulated easily. An axiomatic system is consistent if it "does not contain two 
statements, one of which is the negation of the other." Or, in other words, if 
"of any two contradictory sentences at least one cannot be proved."87 If, there-
fore, consistency means that "it is not possible to prove from the given axioms 
both a certain formula X and the logical contradiction to X",88 then, in the 
domain of law, this will correspond to the requirement that, within the system, 
any behaviour can be qualified ei ther as X or as non-X. That is, the same 
behaviour cannot be regarded as lawful and unlawful by the same system at the 
same time. Or , freedom from contradictions is of an extraordinary signifi-
cance in and for law. In the technological elaboration of its store of instruments, 
this is one of the primary conditions of the law's internal "moral i ty", that is, 
of its efficient socio-political functioning.8" Simultaneously, this is also a 
presumed and necessarily postulated element of the legislator 's rationality 
83
 Cf., by the author: The Preamble: A Question of Jurisprudence. Acta Juridica 
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 12 (1971) 1-2, 101-128. 
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 Sadovskij: op. cit. 202. 
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 Sadovskij: op. cit. 200 and Tarski, A.: Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology 
of Deductive Sciences. 2"d American ed., New York, 1994, 125. 
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 Klaus: op. cit. 300. 
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" The freedom of contradictions was defined as the basic feature of law (which has to 
be "an expression coherent in itself ') by Engels, and as one of the preconditions of the 
law's "inner morality", by Fuller, L. L.: The Morality of Law. New Haven-London, 1965, 
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that allows and also necessitates kinds of interpretation which can prevent any 
contradiction that there may still be. '" 
In connection with consistency, the feature of categoricity as a specifically 
formulated prerequisite for f reedom from contradictions has also to be 
mentioned. As known, in the mid-19 l h century, János Bolyai and Nicolai 
Ivanovich Lobatchevsky proved on Euclidean geometry, the very first system 
of axioms ever elaborated in scientific development, that all its abstract perfection 
notwithstanding, it is not the exclusively feasible system of geometry, for when 
the system gets reorganised by changing its axiom(s) of, e.g., parallelism, the 
result can again be a system freed from contradictions which, among its 
boundaries, provides a complete answer to all questions that can at all be 
raised within the said system of geometry. Accordingly, we can state that a 
system "is not categorical, if a thesis p and also its logical negation can be 
proposed in an axiomatic system". " Well, while-as we have seen-in axiomatics 
it might have been conspicuous that Euclid's geometry was proved not to be 
categorical for, e.g., parallelism, categoricity in and for law may turn out to be 
of interest first of all in a positive sense. Namely, in law there are so-called 
basic principles, mostly particular to given types of legal arrangements.42 And 
this may lead us to the tentative conclusion that, on the last analysis, the legal 
system is a function of various "basic principles" taken as general theses, 
characterised by categoricity. However , legal sys tems are neither static, nor 
rigidified, and we know from legal sociology how contradictory tendencies 
law may incorporate and what tensions it may endure until a new start (e.g., by 
a revolution) brings a break into the system's development."3 Or, the flexibility 
of legal systems is also a function of their categoricity to a considerable extent. 
Along with consistency, another basic feature of axiomatic systems is the 
requirement of completeness. "A formal system is semantically complete in the 
absolute sense if every sentence, having value in reference to any model of this 
system, is inferable in it." That is, if "every sentence which is formulated by 
40
 Cf. Nowak, L.: Próba metodologicznej charakterystyki prawoznawstwa [Essay on 
the methodological characteristics of legal knowledge]. Poznan. 1968, 199-200. 
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 Klaus: op. cit. 322. 
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 For the socio-political bounds of-especially socialist-basic principles, see, by Szabó, 
I.: A szocialista jog [Socialist law], Budapest, 1963, 454 and 72-79 and Régi és új 
kérdések... [Old and new questions...], op. cit. 122-124. For some principles universalised 
and thereby also self-emptying, sec Péteri, Z.: The Nature of the General Principles of 
Law. In: Szabó, I. (ed.): Studies in Jurisprudence for the Sixth International Congress of 
Comparative Law. Budapest, 1962,43-59. 
" Cf., e.g., Lévy-Bruhl, H.: Tensions et conflits au sein d 'un même système juridique. 
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employing the terms of this theory can be proved or disproved within it."94 
Searching for the equivalent of axiomatic completeness in law, we can formulate 
that a legal system is complete if the qualification of any behaviour covered by 
the regulation of the given system can be deductively inferred f rom its 
propositions. The opposite of completeness is obviously incompleteness, the 
case of which can be established depending on how w e define the sys tem's 
boundaries to which it is related. Usual definitions relate it to theses either 
drawn " f rom the sys tem's area" or "correctly formulated in terms of the 
system".98 This way, applying axiomatism to law, we are to see that such a 
logical approach corresponds to the positivistic understanding of gaps in law: 
both define the system's boundaries f rom inside, by the system's own terms. 
Opposed to it, a sociological approach may result in a "more complete" 
concept of completeness, as it draws its boundaries f rom outside, by assessing 
the widely felt demands of social reality.96 
3. Conclusion: Ideals and the Dialectics of Substantivity 
With the present investigations concluded, it seems that the creed of David 
Hilbert, one of perhaps the greatest representatives of modern mathematics-
according to which "I believe that all that can at all be an object of scholarly 
thought is, by achieving its maturity for theory-building, suitable for axiomatic 
elaboration and thereby also for mathematisation."9 7-is based on an unproved 
and unprovable generalisation. Albeit it is true in a f igurative sense that "the 
block is not on the mason ' s side, but against him, and the first thing that 
happens in its shaping seems the most unnatural of all",9 8 yet it is not merely 
the inertia of the material concerned 1 mean by referring to law. For legal systems 
are truly dynamic systems thoroughly built on substantive interconnections. 
Therefore they resist axiomatisation.99 At the same t ime, the substantivity of 
inherently dialectic interrelations may not prevent theoretical reconstruction 
from treating legal systems in their sui generis type of intellectual representa-
44
 Sadovskij: op. cit. 202 and Tarski : op. cit. 135. 
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 Klaus: op. cit. 321-322. 
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 For the dichotomic approach of gaps in law and their feasible synthesis, see, by the 
author: Quelques questions méthodologiques..., op. cit. 205-241. 
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 Hilbert, D.: Axiomatisches Denken. Mathematische Annalen, 78 (1918), 415. 
98
 Mann, T.: The Tables of the Law. |Das Gesetz, 19441 New York, 1945, section 15, 36. 
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 Peczenik, A.: Jumps and Logic in the Law: What can one Expect from Logical 
Models of Legal Argumentation? Artificial Intelligence anil Law, 4 (1996) 3 -4 , 297-329 
will abstract his final message as follows: "A strict and formal logical analysis cannot give 
us the full grasp of legal rationality." 
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tions within which "the Parts altogether def ine the Whole by defining each 
other mutually". For such a sys tem-as the arguments holds on "'"-may prove to 
be "not only an organised but an organising unit to finally organise itself into 
one single entity with Parts organised by the Whole and the Whole prevailing 
through the Parts organised".11" 
100
 Bartók: op. cit. 19. 
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Confrontation from a Criminal Procedural Approach 
Abstract. The author made a research over the past six years, and gathered data regarding 
confrontation as truth-seeking method in the criminal procedure. He analysed the Hungarian 
legal rules of confrontation in historical and recent time and claimed that the concept and the 
types (classification) of confrontation was clear. As an evidentiary procedure, it can be well 
demarcated and distinguished from other applicable means of seeking the truth in CPA and 
beyond it in the area of criminal-tactics. Thus, from interrogation, identification parade, 
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polygraph and cross-examination. Above all you can read a few amendment proposals of the 
statutory regulation of confrontation. 
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1. The concept of confrontation 
It has become clear f rom my research with a historical perspective that it was 
not confrontation but rather torture that was used as a regulated method of 
seeking the truth in the ancient times or at the beginning of the feudal Middle 
Ages. Torture began to get 'loosened' in the late Middle Ages, in the 17"' and 18lh 
centuries, when the institution of confrontation came into existence. Torture was 
officially abolished in the 19"' century after a temporary duality i.e. coexistence 
and was replaced solely by confrontation sometimes together with an oath on 
the basis of an accusatorial attitude. 
Confrontation-with a stress on the trial stage-had a detailed legal regulation 
as early as the first part of the 20lh century in some codes of criminal procedure 
including the Hungarian one. However, these rules still lack the definition of 
confrontation leaving this task to scholarly jurists. Thus , the notional definition 
and the description of the essential features of confrontation are indispensable. 
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Before providing the definition, it should be noted that my legal historical 
research has made it clear that in the beginning, in the 17lh and 18lh centuries 
and even in the 19th century confrontation was also called 'counter-front-state-
ment ' , 'face to face testifying", and counter positioning. This latter one indicates 
that the persons confronted stood facing each other. The collation of testimonies 
was sometimes performed-vir tual ly-by reading, which means statements were 
not actually said to somebody's face . 
The modern theoretical grounding and the practice based on it is different. 
Special literature seems to be of a unified standpoint claiming that "the essence 
of confrontation is a special, ' combined ' interrogation, an independent investi-
gatory (procedural) act in the framework of which more than one person is 
interrogated concurrently in order to resolve any marked contradictions 
between testimonies made earlier by the interrogatees."' 
The definition 1 also agree with needs to be made more precise by stating 
that the term 'more than one person ' can only mean definitely two persons, not 
more and not less. If there were only one person, it would fall into the category 
of general interrogation and there could obviously be no confrontation; if there 
were more than two, the psychological and criminal-tactical reason for its 
existence would be called into question. 
2. The statutory regulation of confrontation 
Pursuant to the effective though fairly brief Section 124 of Act XIX of 1998 
(CPA): 
"( I ) If the testimonies made by the suspects and the witnesses or the suspect 
and the witness contradict, such contradiction may be clarified by confron-
1
 Tremmel, F.-Fenyvesi. Cs . -Herke, Cs.: Kriminalisztika Tankönyv és Atlasz (Text-
book and Atlas on Criminalistics], Budapest-Pécs, 2005. 385. 
A similar definition can be found in the German literature. "Confrontation, which 
serves the purpose of eliminating contradictions, is the simultaneous interrogation of the 
persons who have already been interrogated and whose statements markedly differ from 
each other." Ackermann. R.-Clages, H.-Roll , H.: Handbuch der Kriminalistik. Stuttgart-
Mimchen-Hannover-Berlin-Weimar-Dresden. 1997. 
According to the French special dictionary of criminal law, confrontation is "the 
counter-posing of witnesses, a witness and the victim, or a witness and the suspect. Thus 
their allegations may be checked, collated and measured in the presence of each other." 
Dictionaire de droit criminel. Paris. 1992. 
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tation if necessary. The persons con fronted shall make their testimonies in 
words to each other; they may put questions to each other. 
(2) The confrontation of the witness and the suspect shall he omitted if 
it is necessitated by the protection of the witness or the suspect. 
(3) A person not having attained the age of fourteen may be confronted 
provided it arouses no fear in the minor. " 
The statutory regulation may be analysed by the help of the main questions 
(guidelines) of criminalistics. These are: What? Where? When? How? Who? 
With W h o m ? Why? 
What is confrontation? It has already been dealt with in the part giving the 
definition of this concept, here it is only added that it is a method of seeking 
the truth expressly not specified or defined by law. It is referred to as an 
'evidentiary procedure' in CPA, which can be challenged from a terminological 
point of view, since evidencing is the alpha and omega of the whole criminal 
procedure, there is hardly such a thing as a procedure within a procedure, it is 
extremely misplaced, it bears unnecessary duplication. 
It is, however, praiseworthy that now it is unfolded from the gown of 
interrogation (of 1973) and now it is given a separate section emphasizing its 
special nature and existence on its own. 
Where can it be applied? This question should be rephrased as, Which 
authority shall apply it under which section of CPA ? 
Possible stages and actors are: investigatory-police (other investigatory 
organs such as customs investigators are not described here), interim-prosecu-
tion, and trial-judiciary. 
The issue may be examined from several aspects. On the one hand: 
a) What was the intention of the law-maker? 
b) What is the opinion of law enforcement and administration? 
c) What is the real situation? 
d) What is the author ' s position in this respect? 
Ad a) The legislator would have liked to shift the emphasis to the trial-
judiciary stage in the framework of the reform of criminal procedure initiated 
in the early 1990s. It was indicated by the fact that according to the legislator, 
the main aim of the investigation was to inform the prosecutor and the 
principles characterising the whole procedure could get unfolded in full in the 
trial stage in an independent and impartial court. Consequently, confrontation 
as the application of a truth seeking method was considered appropriate rather 
in the trial-judicial stage partly returning to the model of the CPA of 1896. 
This may be the reason for the polished amendments of the wording of the act 
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such as the inclusion of the word 'may' instead of 'shall ' in the scope of 
application and the protection of witnesses/suspects and children, which may 
be implemented more easily before the courts than before the investigatory 
authorities. 
Ad b) The opinion of law enforcement and administration, judges, pro-
secutors, (defending) counsels and police persons (and suspects) is well 
reflected in the finding of my empirical study: 
On the average, half of law enforcers and administrators are satisfied with 
the current legal regulation of confrontation with prosecutors standing out of 
this circle. Four f i f ths of them regard it appropriate as opposed to the suspects, 
of whom only one fifth approve it. The rate of satisfaction is similar in the case 
of the investigatory implementation (48%), while the method of implementing 
it in the trial-judicial stage is ranked at a higher quality level (67%). In accordance 
with it, only one third of the informants would place confrontation in the 
investigatory stage, however, the size of the group preferring the trial stage and 
the size of the group preferring both stages are approximately the same. 
In other words, no marked dominance has been established by law enforce-
ment and administration concerning the question "where shall we apply confron-
tation?" 
Ad c) In reality-as supported by the part of the empirical research processing 
files and by the author 's own practice-confrontations on the merit are carried 
out mainly in the investigatory stage, they are performed in the trial-judicial 
stage in a far smaller number and these tend to be formal and unsuccessful due 
to the lack of tension described in the theoretical grounding. 
Ad d) Fully agreeing with the theoretical shift of emphsis and the increase 
in the importance of the trial-judicial stage related to the reform of CPA, I 
suggest that confrontation-considering mainly its psychological and criminal-
tactical aspects-cannot be preferred and actually applied in the trial-judicial 
stage but rather in the investigatory-fact-finding stage. My argumentation is 
supported not only by the indicators of practical eff iciency-which are better in 
the investigatory stage-but also the psychological factors which may bring about 
the situation of distress on the side of the person making untrue statements. These 
psychological factors can hardly be created in huge, impersonal courtrooms 
where the trial with adverserial features is often held in front of the members 
of the press and the general public. There are a lot of things missing such as the 
intimacy of nearby bodies, the effect of surprise as everybody may be familiar 
with the documents of investigation and the former records of trials, the dawn-
raid effect, the harshness of the initial experience and I could keep enumerating. 
All these negatives make the trial application of confrontation unreasonable and 
ungrounded; consequently, I prefer its investigatory implementation. 
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The issue of the interim procedure may arise where the prosecutor with the 
results of investigation might perform confrontation. In theory. But in theory 
only, because on the one hand investigation has been completed by then and 
the same concerns may arise as in the case of timeliness in the trial stage, in 
other words participants may have become familiar with everything at the 
accomplishement of the investigation. In theory there is the possibility of a 
successful confrontation conducted by the prosecutor in the interim procedure 
where suddenly a new source of evidence for example a new-truthful-wi tness 
(the victim or the suspect making changes) appears and it has the power of 
surprise in the course of confrontation. This is highly unlikely in reality and so 
is the possibility of a prosecutor noticing the omission of confrontation during 
investigation and then performing it himself. Although nothing excludes its 
performance, empirical data show that members of the prosecuting authority 
rather send the documents back to the investigating authority to perform the 
act(s) of confrontation. 
Preparing the trial is also part of the interim stage but performing a confron-
tation in that stage is theoretically excluded since proving on the merits or an 
evidentiary procedure cannot be implemented there, it can only be implemented 
in the trial stage. 
A further argument for performing confrontation in the course of investi-
gation is that interrogation and confrontation have their own methods and 
descriptions which are taught at a professional level in substantial depth and 
number of hours only at the Police College in Hungary. Thus officials at the 
investigating authority may be assumed to have the greatest knowledge and 
competence in this respect. 
When and why is confrontation to be applied? 
The question does not refer to the issue of the relevant sect ions of CPA, now 
it should be rephrased as follows: in what cases and/or why must/may confron-
tation be applied? 
The answer may come partly from procedure law and partly from crimi-
nalistics (more precisely f rom criminal-tactics). This study covers only the 
legal aspects; its criminal-tactics deserves a separate study. 
It is clear from the wording of the act that if there is a 'contradiction' between 
testimonies, it "may be clarified if necessary." As lawyers say, each word is an 
'action-handhold'. Each word has its own importance and each can be examined.2 
2
 Mihály Tóth did so in two of his studies on the regulation laid down in the former 
Act on Criminal Procedure, Act I. of 1973, the wording of which differs from the now 
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First, the contradiction has to be interpreted as the following question 
immediately arises: Does the legislator's intention concern all conflicts and 
contradictions? 
I do not think this to be the case either in respect of the legislator's intention 
or the conduct to follow. It would be more appropriate-in accordance with the 
opinions of authors dealing with this i s sue- to insert an adjective into the legal 
provision, namely the need for confrontation may arise in the case of an 
'essential' contradiction. Seeming and trifling contradictions concerning details 
and minutiae are not worth 'shooting our bolt ' at. I use this phrase deliberately 
as one of the factors in the background of unsuccessful confrontations is the 
huge amount of unnecessary, schematic, apathetic and characterless confronta-
tions lacking atmosphere and concerning insignificant matters which may be 
regarded as a set of 'forced confrontations'. Concealed behind it-as the findings 
of empirical studies show-is the fear of the police for the prosecution regarding 
the omission of this procedural act as a reason for supplementary investigation 
( 'throwing it back), on the basis of the prosecutors' requirements. This fear can 
only be eased by the high-level and professionally well established joint (police-
prosecution) interpretation and application of the regulation pertaining to confron-
tation, and on the basis of the mutual responsibility of the two authorities. 
Mihály Tóth has already specified the most frequent theoretical and practical 
cases of contradictions which I can neither add to nor delete from as there is no 
such need. In his opinion the most frequent contradictions are as follows: 
,,a) The contradiction is only a seeming one as the the persons interrogated 
have stated the same but expressed themselves in a different way. 
b)The contradiction is a seeming one because the differing statements do 
not concern the same fact. 
c) The contradiction concerns the same fact but it is not significant f r o m the 
point of view of the instant case. 
d) The elimination of an essential contradiction concerning the same fact is not 
necessary since evidence on the one side outweighs evidence on the other side. 
e)The elimination of an essential contradiction concerning the same fact is 
a tactical mistake as its being insoluble is the evidence itself. 
f) The elimination of an essential contradiction concerning the same fact is 
necessary but it can be eliminated by some simpler and more certain method 
than confrontation. 
effective act. His findings still apply today. In more detail see: Tóth, M.: A szembesítés 
béklyójában [In the shackles of confrontation]. Jogtudományi Közlöny. 39 (1984) 139. 
and Feloldható-e a béklyó? [Can shackles be unfastened?] Jogtudományi Közlöny, 39 
(1984) 282. 
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g) The contradiction to be eliminated could only be eliminated by confron-
tation but no success can be expected f rom the confrontation."3 
There even seems to be some contradiction and uncertainty in the wording of 
the act as if there is a contradiction, a confrontation should be performed, however, 
there is an immediate concession stating that all this shall apply only 'if necessary'. 
Some fur ther questions arise: What does 'if necessary' mean? Who defines 
what necessity is? 
The latter can more easily be answered promptly, it is the master of the 
case, 'dominus litis', the prosecuter in charge of the investigation, however, he 
is rarely in a position close enough, in other words decision-making is vested 
in the law enforcement official of the police. In the course of a review by the 
prosecution, the prosecutor will order the 'necessary' confrontation if the feeling 
of lack arises. If the member of the investigating authority deliberately omitted 
confrontation, a conflict situation arises, as the police off icer met the persons 
testifying in the course of the procedure and for some psychological or rational 
reason he deemed confrontation to be unnecessary, inappropriate, undesirable 
or even detrimental to the whole evidentiary procedure and to its final outcome. 
The prosecutor implementing the review has not seen anyone, has not perceived 
any sign of metacommunication or any real personality, only the wording of 
CPA is imperative to him. The conflict can only be resolved on a professional 
basis, namely the investigator should inform the prosecutor about the professional 
reasons and conciliation should be conducted if needed. According to my 
experience of practice, unfortunately, we can never reach the situation in 
which the decision on performing a confrontation could be made solely by the 
investigators operating at the level of the executive since then it might soon 
turn out that there is no need for any confrontations or at least only a few 
would be performed. Investigators would immediately move in the line of least 
resistance since they do not have a high opinion of this institution at present-as 
has been shown by empirical research. They would try to omit confrontation 
due to its circumstantiality (it is always difficult to ensure the presence of more 
than one person at the same time), formality and the lack of faith, and would 
try to save time and energy, which might quickly lead to the decline and death 
of the institution. One counterargument is that an investigator is a lways 
interested in finding the truth, and is a lways urged on with what is referred to 
by the term 'houndspirit ' in American literature, and deploys all lawful means 
including confrontation as a possibility. The idea is quite likeable and works in 
especially important cases, nevertheless, in most of the cases there is no trace 
of such a spirit and it cannot be perceived according to the rule of big numbers. 
1
 Tóth, M.: A szembesítés béklyójában, op. cit. 140. 
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The discretion of a well established decision is respected by the guiding 
decision of the Supreme Court declaring, "if in a criminal case initiated for 
kidnapping the confrontation between the accused and the victim was not 
performed in the course of the investigation due to the sense of fear of the 
victim-and at the time of the trial the v ic t im's presence could not be ensured 
due to his or her staying at an unknown place-i t cannot be regarded as a 
procedural infringement affecting the well-groundedness of the judgement, for 
the very reason that besides the victim's testimony, the court considered and 
assessed all other evidences and evidentiary tools supporting it."4 
In the trial stage it is undoubtedly the independent judge (court) that orders 
a confrontation. Compared to the investigator, the judge is in an easy position 
because the contradicting parties concerned are present, ' ready at hand' in the 
courtroom thus the act can be performed quite easily in some moments without 
any special formal or written requirements. 
Revisiting the first quest ion, the necessary cases may be interpreted 
from a positive (permissive) and negative (excluding) aspect. Some important 
permissive conditions are: 
- there are essential contradictions between the testimonies; 
- the act of the confrontation is likely to be successful , a result can 
reasonably be expected. 
In my view, the necessity of a confrontation is excluded if: 
- a child should be confronted with an adult; 
- there is no real chance for the confrontation to be successful, it is reasonably 
assusmed that it will lead to no result and there are data supporting this; 
- the protection of the witness or the suspect (e.g. a pentito) requires it (as 
specified in Section 124 (2) of CPA) 
- in the interest of the investigation (its success); 
- the suspect makes a (even advance) statement refus ing to testify in 
confrontation. 
Further reasons may be found in both categories but these are the most 
frequent ones both in practice and at a theoretical level about which a decision 
must be made by the investigator, the prosecutor in charge of the investigation 
in the first main stage of the criminal proceedings, and the judge (court) in the 
trial stage. 
It may be clear from my enumeration that I cannot agree with the concession 
prescribed in Section 124 (3) of CPA, pursuant to which a child may also be 
confronted "provided it arouses no fear in the minor". Having regard to my 
studies, experiences, and the psychological factors, I claim it as a principle fact 
4
 Court Decisions 1999/12, case no. 544. (Supreme Court Bf. III. 1284/1998.) 
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that confrontation arouses fear and tension in a child under 14. The wording of 
the act questions the psychological principle of confrontation since the core of 
the act of confrontation is the intensified creation of distress and tension. This 
applies to the atmosphere and the circumstances of its performance even if it is 
not the child that is regarded as the person making untrue statements. It is 
impossible for a child to be in peace and quiet in a situation involving the 
police-authorities, where even adults would be 'shaky on their legs' even if 
they have got nothing to do with the crime. This section is welcome to have 
been included in the effective CPA, but it may be regarded as a first step only 
and not as ideal. I would consider it ideal and propose it as de lege ferenda to 
expressly exclude the possibility of confronting a child in the act itself. In my 
opinion subsection (3) should read: (3) A person not having attained the age of 
fourteen shall not be confronted. 
In this area my opinion dissents from the standpoint of Hungarian courts, 
which is in line with the act in force, and which considers the statutory 
(personal) guarantees sufficient for the protection of children as witnesses in 
the case of confrontation too. According to a guiding decision published in the 
Court Decisions: "In the course of interrogating children not having attained 
the age of 14 as witnesses, the investigating judge shall observe the special rules 
set forth in the act on procedure. These include that such witnesses need not be 
warned concerning the consequences of perjury, they may be confronted only 
if it does not arouse fear in them, and their caretaker or legal representative 
may be present during the ac t -and cannot be sent out e i ther-even if later they 
might be interrogated as witnesses." 
The reasoning contains that several provisions of CPA (the presence of a 
caretaker, a legal representat ive or perhaps an expert psychologist and 
interrogation by a closed-circuit telecommunication network) establish the 
possibility of mitigating the psychological and other harmful effects inherent 
in the interrogation of a child as a witness to the smallest extent possible and 
necessary thus preventing the possible damages caused to their personality 
development.5 
My argumentation is supported by the relevant legal practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights, according to which the state of being free 
from fear cannot be ensured at a trial. It should be added that in an investi-
gatory situation the negative effects would be magnif ied because client-
publicity is limited, the room is much smaller, mysteriousness, etc. 
The ECHR declared in its guiding decision that the British authorities 
violated the right to a fair hearing guaranteed in Article 6 § 1 when in the case of 
5
 Bírósági Határozatok (Court Decisions), 53 (2005) 738, case No. 343. 
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an 11-year-old accused the trial took place over three weeks in public in the 
Crown Court. In its reasoning the Court noted, "the formali ty and ritual of the 
Crown Court must at times have seemed incomprehensible and intimidating for 
a child of eleven, and there is evidence that certain modifications to the court-
room, in particular the raised dock which was designed to enable the defendants 
to see what was going on, had the effect of increasing the applicant's sense of 
discomfort during the trial, since they felt exposed to the scrutiny of the press 
and public. Both applicants suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, and had 
limited ability to instruct their lawyers and consult adequately the details of 
their acts. They found the trial depressing and frightening and were unable to 
follow it. In such circumstances the Court did not consider that it was sufficient 
for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 that the applicants were represented by skilled 
and experienced lawyers. Here, although the applicants' legal representatives 
were seated "within whispering distance", it was highly unlikely that the 
applicants would have felt sufficiently uninhibited, in the tense courtroom and 
under public scrutiny, to have consulted with them during the trial or, indeed, 
that, given their immaturity and their disturbed emotional state, they would 
have been capable outside the courtroom of cooperating with their lawyers and 
giving them information for the purposes of their defence. In conclusion, the 
Court considered that the applicants were denied a fair hearing in breach of 
Article 6 § l . " 6 
Concerning necessity, the following question may be asked, is there a 
compulsory confrontation ? 
Is there a situation where the confrontation must be performed in any 
case? 
The legal answer may be deduced from the act: no. The wording of the act 
contains two restrictions, necessity and possibility. In other words, it no longer 
uses the command 'shall' as it used to. I ful ly agree with it, all the more so as 
besides the legal arguments, there are the criminal-tactical arguments serving 
as confirmation which may occasionally be weightier, more marked and more 
powerful than the legal ones are. The criminal-tactical success cannot be 
sacrificed to the rigidity of the law, in other words the ammunition the 
investigating authorities have cannot be exhausted, jeopardized, weakened or 
'bungled' due to the rigid interpretation and application of confrontation. In several 
cases it must be saved for the trial stage even if in the course of discovery the 
'' Eur. Court It. R., Cases T. v. the United Kingdom, and V. v. the United Kingdom 
judgments of 16 December 1999. Available in Hungarian: Bírósági Határozatok, 49 
(2001)497, case No. 314. 
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'weapon' has become known for those against whom the documents contain 
incriminating data. 
In the course of elaborating on the issue of 'necessity', the question of who-
with whom has already been touched upon,7 in other words who is confronta-
tion carried out between, who are the persons who can participate in a 
confrontation as persons to be confronted? 
The (three) possible options can be inferred from the text of the act: 
a) suspect-with suspect; 
b) witness-with witness (including the victim-witness); 
c) suspect-with (victim)witness. 
Groups a) and b) are homogeneous in respect of form, in the case of g roup 
c) confrontation is heterogeneous, since the procedural statuses indicate similarity 
and difference. In the case of the latter, the order of warnings is different as 
well. 
Heterogeneous confrontation is the most frequent in real life, in which the 
suspect sits face to face with the winess, quite often the victim-witness. In 
most of the reported Hungarian crime cases the known suspect is there alone as 
opposed to an average of f ive witnesses in a Hungarian criminal case, not all of 
whom are obviously capable of contradicting the suspect in important matters. 
The findings of my empirical survey also show the actual investigatory 
ratios, out of 541 confrontations: 
a) suspect-witness 247 instances (46%), 
b) suspect-victim 122 instances (23%); 
c) suspect-suspect 88 instances (16%); 
d) victim-witness 18 instances (3%); 
e) witness-witness 66 instances (12%;) 
f) victim-victim 0 instance (0%). 
Altogether 541 confrontations were carried out in the 186 criminal cases, 
which means 3 (2.9) confrontations on average. It can also be seen that due to 
the average number of witnesses there are more (twice as many) confrontations 
performed between the suspect (and as it is true in the trial stage too, the word 
accused can also be used) and the witness than between the suspect and the 
victim. Altogether the two categories (witness/victim facing the suspect), the 
heterogeneous group makes up nearly 70% (69) of the confrontations. Only 
every sixth is carried out within the homogeneous group of suspects (16%) and 
within the homogeneous group of witnesses (the victim) (altogether 15%). 
7
 The question of how is not dealt with here, since the answer is given by criminal-
tactics, and it needs a separate study. 
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It should be noted here that besides the homogeneity and heterogeneity of 
the participants, Flórián Tremmel differentiates content homo- and hetero-
geneity depending on whether "the source of the contradiction is a mistake on 
both sides or a lie on both sides, or these contradictions were created on the 
one side by a mistake and on the other side by a lie."8 
3. Types of confrontation 
Besides the dichotomy between homogeneity and heterogeneity, confrontations 
can be classified into different groups. The following classification may also 
be applied: 
A) active (narrow)-passive (wide) (within them personal and material); 
B) formal—informal; 
C) replaceable-irreplaceable; 
D) ex off icio-upon request . 
Ad A) So far I have dealt with the legal aspects of confrontation taken in 
the narrow sense, the detailed rules of which are laid down by criminalistics, in 
particular criminal-tactics. This term has another, wider epistemological inter-
pretation as well; as I mentioned in the course of demarcating it from other 
investigatory-evidentiary acts, interrogations, crime-scene interrogations, identifi-
cation parades, attempts to prove, crime scene investigation, search and body 
search, the use of polygraph and hear ing experts all have elements of 
confrontation. Unlike personal confrontation which is active, it may be called 
'passive', since the person concerned, usually the suspect, sees the scene, the 
proving objects and events in front of him (material confrontation). He or she 
is looking at them passively, though not without being touched and impressed 
as they (may) induce inner tension and further deliberation in the person 
looking. Sometimes the passive looking and facing induces the confession of 
the truth, the modification of a testimony and testifying or confessing itself. 
A classic literary example of passive confrontation can be read in the short 
story entitled Brutes written by Zsigmond Móricz." 
The examining judge felt (knew) that the red faced shepherd and his mate 
had killed Curly the Shepherd and his son but failed to make the shepherd admit 
to it. However, when on his way out of the room the shepherd approached the 
3
 Tremmel—Fenyvesi-Herke: Kriminalisztika tankönyv és atlasz, op. cit. 386. 
' Móricz, Zs.: Brutes (Translated by Gulyás, Gy.). In: 44 hungarían short stories. 
Budapest, 1979, 68-86. 
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door, and reached his hand for the doorknob, he staggered back. He could not 
touch the doorknob. "He could not move. He jus t stared and stared and a small 
froth appeared around his mouth ." There, hanging on the doorknob, was the 
brass-ornamented leather belt, with which he and his mate had committed the 
brutal crime. 
The shepherd slowly raised his hand to his head, turned back, and then 
confessed to his crime, "We killed Curly the Shepherd for his three hundred 
sheep and two donkeys." 
Ad B) The former active and passive confrontations may be referred to as 
formal and informal confrontations. The formal confrontation is described and 
circumscribed by the provisions of CPA, while the informal confrontation is 
described in and by criminal-tactical recommendations. This statement is true 
even if the formal confrontation is claimed to be an institution with a double 
formation. It can be examined both in a legal and in a criminalistic sense and 
rules and recommendations can be found pertaining to it. (It should be added 
that considering its psychological features, it is rather an institution with a 
triple formation.) 
All acts-occurring in any stage of the criminal proceedings-can be called 
informal 10 in the course which confessors are faced in some form with the 
truth, a standpoint, some evidence, a testimony or some data different f rom 
what they have conveyed. And it applies to all possible participants of the 
confrontation such as thesuspect, the victim and the witness. 
An example of a confession induced by an informal confrontation can be read 
in the ballad entitled Call to the Ordeal by János Arany", in which there is an 
informal confrontation with a dead person. 
A young man was found in the woods with a dirk in his heart, " . . .he unto 
the ordeal calls / All he suspects, to view the test / Which must the guilt make 
manifest." First the young man ' s enemies are called to the dead body, then his 
friends, relatives and finally his beautiful lover and secret bride. When the girl 
appears, blood begins to flow out of the wound. Then the girl told what had 
happened. She didn ' t kill the boy, but she gave him the dirk. The boy urged 
10
 Endre Bócz refers to this category by the term 'tactical' confrontation. In more 
detail see Bócz, E.: A kihallgatások szervezése (Arranging interrogations]. Belügyi 
Szemle, 11 (1973) 93. 
11
 Arany, J.: Call to the Ordeal (translated by William N. Loew). In: Arany, J.: Toldi; 
Toldi 's eve; Ballads; Selected lyrics (translated by William N. Loew). New York, 1914. 
164-166. 
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her to say 'yes ' or else he would kill himself. Then the girl gave him the dirk 
and replied him to do so. 
"My heart in the truth, he did possess; 
He should have known it; but, ah, woe! 
He still besought another, 'Yes,' 
'Or , ' said he, ' to my death I'll go, ' 
Here, take my dirk, and end it so!" 
Besides objects, persons may also informally have an effect on persons 
lying or deceiving. 
Kálmán Mikszáth gives a wonderful literary example of it in his novel . The 
Noszty Boy 's Affair with Mari Tóth,12 in which Ferenc Noszty-who had already 
committed a bill f raud-and again wanted to get the girl with a big dowry by 
fraudulent means. 
"You haven' t heard the last of this," roard Feri and tore himself f r o m the 
hands that were restraining him. "We' l l settle accounts, master-baker! 
We'll settle accounts . . . " 
And, his bloodshot eyes rolling ominously in their sockets, he was 
moving towards Tóth again with raised fists when suddenly the library 
door opened and a tall, handsome soldier stepped into the room and said to 
him sharply: 
"Did you want something?" 
Ferenc Noszty recoiled at the famil iar voice and glanced fearfully in the 
direction from which the question had come. 
Colonel Stromm was standing on the threshold, his arms folded, and he 
repeated: 
"What do you want?" 
Noszty ' s arms fell limply down and a deathly pallor came over his face. 
"I want to go home. Colonel," he groaned in a pathetic, broken voice. 
Ad C) The pair of replaceable- i r replaceable confrontat ion is connected to 
what has been claimed about 'necessity' . The confrontation is necessary to be 
performed i f - among others- i t cannot be replaced with anything else, if we 
cannot get close to the evidence in any other way, or if there is no other 
12
 Mikszáth, К.: The Noszty Boy's Affair with Mari Tóth (Translated by Bernard 
Adams). Budapest. 2005. 414. 
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possibility. Consequently, it may be deduced from the train of thought and 
the wording of the act as a general rule that it is not an 'ult ima ratio', neither 
is it to be deployed in the first place; it may only be applied if it cannot be 
substituted with anything else, and it cannot be applied if the elimination of 
the contradiction would be a tactical mistake. What can replace it? Here we 
can refer to the thoughts above, the classification into active-passive and 
formal-informal. Active and formal confrontation acts may be replaced with 
passive and informal ones. The ' fa ther ' , the original source and the starting 
point of confrontation is interrogation, whose gown confrontation itself has 
slipped out of. Nonetheless, such may be the other special form of interroga-
tion, the crime-scene interrogation or testifying on the spot, further, identifica-
tion parades, and other open and covered data collection and requests. 
However, the danger of delay, 'periculum in mora' should be considered; a 
means which is also expedient in time, which serves the double requirement 
of swif tness and thoroughness of criminal proceedings and investigations is 
to be applied. 
Ad D) By prescribing confrontation as a possible method applicable if 
'necessary ' instead of the former imperative of ' sha l l ' , which I approve of, 
the legislator has el iminated the obligation stemming from official i ty, the 
obligation of carrying out confrontation ex officio. Consequently, even if there 
is a contradiction, it is not sure that there will be a confrontation. This has 
opened up the way in front of the theoretical and practical possibility of a 
petition to perform a confrontation which may come f rom both the subjects of 
the defense (the suspect, the defense counsel or the legal representative of 
the minor) and the victim or perhaps the non-injured witness. Petition is not 
the right expression, as I usually say, the defense counsel (the defense) is not 
a begger, he or she does not have to beg in the course of the proceedings, let 
alone in connection with evidencing. (The term petit ion to be released is 
appropriately replaced with the term motion in the act.) The defense can hand 
in a motion to perform a confrontation as part of the defense tactics. The 
victim is also entitled to it but the simple (non-injured) witness-qui te 
properly-not. 
The motion does not have to be agreed to, the confrontation does not have 
to be performed; it is at the discretion of the authorities. In the case of rejection, 
a resolution has to be made to this effect , against which the initiator is entitled 
to seek legal remedy. 
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4. Participatory rights and duties concerning confrontation 
4.1. Presence, activity and asking questions 
There at least three persons present at an investigatory confrontation (This is 
the main concern of my analysis) , the person conducting the confrontation 
and the two persons being confronted. Beyond this standard, however, other 
persons may be present, the official keeper of minutes, the defense counsel of 
the suspect, the attorney of the (victim)witness, the prosecutor and in the case 
of an illiterate person's confrontation-upon a motion to this e f fec t - two official 
witnesses at the disclosure of the minutes, since it is a special form of 
interrogation. All these persons have a statutory right to be present, moreover, 
the person conducting the confrontation may allow, if necessary, the presence 
of a (sign)interpreter, an expert , a psychologist, a probation officer, a legal 
representative, a caretaker, a teacher if the person to be confronted is a 
juvenile/child. 
It should be noted here that the Constitutional Court has touched upon the 
issue of confrontation only once and only indirectly. It declared the unconstitu-
tionality of the situation concerning the application of official witnesses by a 
majority decision. I myself agree with Árpád Erdei, who expressed a concurring 
opinion claiming that "the mere presence of an official witness at the con-
frontation entails his/her gaining an insight even into the most intimate details 
of the person(s), private individual(s) concerned (for example body search and 
house search)". It should be added that it appl ies to confrontat ions too, for 
instance one carried out in connection with a sexual crime (committed within 
the family). 
Árpád Erdei added, "The effect ive act on criminal procedure excludes even 
client-publicity in the case of most investigatory acts. Thus it does not allow 
the presence of either the suspect or the defense counsel at the interrogation of 
witnesses whose interrogation has not been requested by them, excludes them 
f r o m the confrontations between the witnesses, and even makes confrontation 
omissible. Taken all this together, it may be suggested that the presence of 
official witnesses is not required either by the efficiency of the investigation or 
by any noticable interest of the authorities. The advantages that used to be 
entailed by the application of off icial witnesses are now repleceable by other 
methods which better serve the prevalence of objectivity, and do not jeopardise 
the interests of others. The continuously expanding technical possibilities and 
methods which are also referred to by the act are suitable fo r eliminating 
all the disorders and abuses which the application of of f ic ia l witnesses 
automatically entail even in the case of a guarantee system satisfying higher 
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level requirements than those at present. It fol lows, that Section 183 of CPA, 
allowing for the application of official witnesses, is unconstitutional because it 
unnecessarily and disproportionately restricts the rights laid down in Article 
59. (1) of the Constitution."13 
A further issue may be whether only the leading defense counsel or all the 
defense counsels may be present in the case a suspect has more than one defense 
counsel. The act does not govern this issue; in my view only the leading defense 
counsel or an attorney or a legal trainee substituting him or her may be present. 
The size of rooms available for confrontations, the tactics of confrontation and 
the psychological requirement according to which the number of the 'adversary' 
should not be too large, it should not weigh on or be a psychological burden 
and pressure on the victim, on the witness or in rare cases on the other suspect. 
The same 'self-restraint' is to be voluntarily imposed on the investigating 
authority, since it may seem to be too much of pressure and forced interrogation if 
several persons queued up behind the investigator keeping the minutes as if 
showing off strength, which might induce fear and intimidate any of the persons 
to be confronted. 
In the case of a witness-witness confrontation, the question arises as to 
whether the defense counsel of the suspect may be present or not. Under the 
general rule of the effective Hungarian regulation, the defense counsel may only 
be present at the interrogation of his own witnesses. Considering that confron-
tation is a combined form of interrogation, this rule is applicable and has to be 
extended to cover it: the defense counsel may be present at a confrontation (the 
authority has the duty of notice) where one of the participants is a witness whose 
interrogation has been requested by the defense counsel. A counterargument 
may be that in this way the defense counsel might have access to the contents 
of the testimony of the other s ide ' s witnesses whose interrogation he was not 
present at and the minutes of which he has no copy of. The authorities have 
two ways to eliminate this concern: they either omit the confrontation for a 
tactical reason in the interest of the success of the investigation or postpone the 
confrontation until right before discovery when there is not too much left to 
hide from the defense. 
The presence of both the witness-provided he or she cannot refuse to 
testify, there is no obstacle to it, or he is not exempt-and the suspect may be 
enforced. A witness may be brought in if he fails to attend and may be fined 
for not testifying. If the witness still does not open up, it brings about the 
criminal law threat of perjury, though only at a theoretical level. Certainly, a 
13
 Decision No. 43/2004 (17. 11) AB of the Constitutional Court and the concurring 
opinion attached to it. 
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kind of a block which the authority has to remove by criminal-tactical means 
has occurred or the confrontation has to be cancelled due to fear, intimidation, 
psychological block, etc. which the witness himself may indicate. There is no 
point in increasing tension to the breaking point and stubbornly insisting on the 
confrontation of a witness who is blocked, since in such a situation no positive 
result can be expected. To the contrary, the witness may be expected to become 
more reserved and frightened, which does not do any good to the whole case or 
procedure. 
The suspect can also be forced to attend the venue of the confrontation, he 
or she has to appear once summonsed, however, it is pointless if the suspect, 
fully aware of all legal warnings, stated in advance that he would not make a 
confession at the confrontation. Forcing a confession would violate the Miranda 
principle, further, in my view forcing the suspect to make a confession against 
his own will and intention arouses the suspicion of a forced interrogation. 
Once it has been stated that confrontation is a special, combined interrogation, 
the rules of interrogation obviously apply to it as well, according to which in 
case of refusal, even putting questions is forbidden. A confrontation is, however, 
started by asking a question and is continued by doing so again. 
It may occur, and I have conducted some empirical research into this, that 
the suspect might be present, he may not have been able to avoid it, nonethe-
less, he does not look into the other's eyes or horribile dictu even lowers his 
head, closes his eyes or reads his notes, in other words shows total passivity 
(frivolousness) or resistance. There is no efficient means for preventing it, the 
person conducting the confrontation can do only one thing. The confrontation 
must immediately be terminated, as no success can be expected due to the lack 
of the psychological basis, further, this can stop the suspect from further 'taking 
the air' and possibly obtaining information from the other party. 
The situation in the courtroom is totally different. One of the persons to be 
confronted is already there, (just like the defense counsel, the attorney of the 
witness, the legal representative of the victim, the experts, etc.) he will hear the 
other contradicting suspects and witnesses, thus, following the passive (informal) 
confrontation, there can be no power of surprise, the formal confrontation can 
have no real strength. Besides, - a s I have already mentioned-by the end of the 
investigation he has got to know or may have got to know the standpoints of 
persons making contradicting testimonies, which also weakens the chances of 
a successful confrontation. 
According to the wording of the act, the persons being confronted may ask 
each other questions but this seems to be possible only after the authority has 
put its questions. This is in conflict with criminal-tactical requirements, since 
real confrontation develops through an argument which, of course, must be 
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channelled appropriately. I regard it redundant and unnecessary to grant the 
right to ask questions in a statute, as the content-requirements of confrontation 
are defined by criminal-tactics (and the person performing it) but these detailed 
rules must not be listed in the framework of criminal procedure law. 
In my view, as it is a special form of interrogation, the defense counsel, the 
attorney of the witness, and the legal representative of the victim may ask 
questions but only once the questions between the authority and the persons 
being confronted have been asked and recorded. The answer to a question 
asked by a 'quasi investigator' must be given by looking into each other 's eyes 
and not to the person asking the question. 
4.2. Taking the minutes and its copy 
Under the effective CPA minutes must be taken of the confrontation, while 
formerly a report could be drafted in misdemeanour procedures. It should be 
noted here that in my opinion minutes should only be taken if the formal 
confrontation has some result, namely one or both of the persons confronted 
have changed their test imonies. My argumentation is supported by the 
following: 
- It would make the procedure simpler and quicker if the investigator could 
record unsuccessful confrontations in reports. Usually no minutes are taken of 
negative (unsuccessful) investigatory acts and data collections, for instance of 
the fact that a person interrogated near the scene does not know about the case 
or knows only about irrelevant facts. 
- Only successful confrontations providing a result or a change deserve 
attention in the course of the rest of the procedure, but then taking the minutes 
is important due to the Miranda warnings and the evidentiary force of the 
testimony. 
- In the trial stage it is also recorded in one practical sentence only, "the 
confrontation has yielded no result". 
- My main argument is that during the preliminary proceeding the investigator 
performing the confrontation could focus on the core of confrontation: the 
atmosphere, inducing tension, genuine clashing, sharpening the actual counter-
front-statement, the personality of the persons being confronted, bridging the 
gap between them, observing the person (presumably) making an untrue 
testimony, the tactics of confrontation based on criminal-psychology, and 
moves in the direction of the result. 
- Taking the minutes/dictating, mainly in the case of persons not very good 
(but also who are good) at typing/dictating engages attention and consumes 
energy, makes the person conducting the confrontation unfocussed, disorganised 
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and scatterbrained and by giving substantial time for preparation, provides an 
escape pursuit for the liar who perceives that the person conducting the con-
frontation is uncertain and unfocussed. In this atmosphere, in the obscurity of 
typing, the other person telling the truth also weakens and fades away gradually, 
then eye-contact disappears, as 'there is nobody to shepherd the flock'. 
I fully approve of the fact that the two-coloumn composition of recording 
advised in books on criminal-tactics and used from the 1960s to the 1980s has 
disappeared f rom practice. On the one hand, the computer softwares and f o r m s 
used by the police do not apply this form. (I can only hope that partly because 
the editors came to the same conclusion as my aforementioned argumentation 
proposing simplification.) On the other hand, even law enforcers realised that 
it made taking the minutes of the confrontation even more complicated, more 
tiring, and slower. The two-coloumn composition of recording has never made 
any sense, neither has verbose and babbling minutes. 
Confrontations may also be recorded technically, following the tape-
recoding14 which has been used for decades, now (even digital) videorecording 
can also be applied. All the more so as this can record images not only voices. 
The whole procedure becomes visible for us afterwards, which may especially 
be valuable if either of the persons confronted has made a change concerning 
an essential, relevant, and material fact. It may strengthen the authenticity and 
the evidentiary force of the confession and it is true for the trial stage and for 
the scope of discretion applied there too. The recording can certify the fairness 
of the procedure, and can prevent a result achieved there going into the group 
of excluded evidence. 
A debated question is whether to record the official remarks about the 
perceived communication and metacommunication signs in the minutes together 
with any reference to the successfulness or unsuccessful/less of the confron-
tation at the end of the minutes. 
With regard to the first question, the findings of my research into the 
psychological basic features show that no certain conclusions concerning truth 
coverage or lying can be drawn from non-verbal signs (sweating, crossing legs, 
scratching, etc.). Consequently, their recording is also unnecessary, neither are 
they good for guidance, they may even influence and mislead subsequent readers 
of the minutes. Thus, also prosecutors and judges. It is one-sided because ei ther 
the defense counsel, the suspect, or any of the persons confronted might 
request their inclusion into the minutes. The suspect may claim the same with 
14
 A detailed study on the then modern taperecording: Bócz, E.: Szembesítés mag-
netofon alkalmazásával a nyomozás során [Confrontation and the use of a taperecorder 
in the course of investigation]. Ügyészségi Értesítő. 2 (1965) No. 4. 
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good reason; once the authority records such things about h im, why could not 
his observations be also recorded. Under such circumstances I am rather happy 
than discontented with the small number of the records of metacommunicative 
signs I found in the course of my empirical research. 
I regard the recording of successfulness/unsuccessfulness-contrary to the 
recommendations of many investigating instructions-absolutely unnecessary and 
pointless. It should be enough to simply report an unsuccessful confrontat ion-
as it has already been stated. However, due to the obligation to take minutes, 
as it is a special form of interrogation (especially if one of the participants is 
the suspect, since then taking the minutes is obligatory anyway), the outcome 
is obvious f rom the content. On the other hand, if there is a positive result, the 
consecutive (one-person) interrogation of the person making a change is desirable 
as may be the taking of the minutes of the cr ime scene interrogation. This will 
clearly show that the confrontation has been successful. If no interrigation 
follows, it may not be appropriate from the point of view of criminal-tactics to 
'blab it out' to him in writing that there has been a sort of shift or change, the 
authority has obtained some new infromation during the confrontation. In such 
a case there is no need for calling attention to it by declaring it. 1 have not been 
able to find one single argument in favour of it, only arguments against it. The 
question must be asked as to why the authority deemed it necessary to put that 
sentence at the end. 
Defense may get a copy of it for free (since April 2006), after-upon the 
initiative of among others, this author '5-the Constitutional Court has adopted 
its decision, concerning this issue, complying with European standards and the 
requirement of due process including the equality of arms. 
ccording to the general rule, the copy is not for free in the case of a victim-
witness; however, if the official of the authority al lows-and he can do so if it 
does not harm the interest of the investigation-a copy to be issued to him, the 
witness has to pay for it, actually HUF 100 per page. 
I agree with the provisions pertaining to copies, I do not consider their 
amendment necessary or desirable. 
4.3. Legal remedy 
As each coin has two sides, a complaint may be lodged by the defense (the 
suspect or the defense counsel). On the one hand because of performing a 
17
 Csorbul-e a védelem alkotmányos elve az iratmásolás illetékeztetésével? [Is the 
constitutional principle of defense victim by imposing a duty on copying documents?] 
Belügyi Szemle. 47 (1999) 45. 
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confrontation, on the other hand because of omitting it. If the suspect states it 
in advance on record (or in a self-testimony) that he does not intend to take 
part in a confrontation and he does not intend to make a testimony in the course 
of it, there is an obstacle to the confrontation. Even forcing him to attend against 
his own will is not useful. Even subsequent to the CPA coining into effect , i.e. 
even in 2003 (unfortunately quite frequently before it), the authorities conducted 
'one-party' confrontations where the suspect refused to make a testimony, and 
exercised his right to silence, nevertheless a 'one-sided' confrontation was 
carried out. Mainly due to being afraid of the prosecutor sending the case back 
for 'supplementation'. Fortunately, this practice, resembling forced interrogation, 
and going against the Miranda-principle, which was unfortunate even for 
criminal-tactical reasons (e.g. the suspect could obtain data and information), 
was abandoned in a few months as the result of the position of prosecution 
applying the appropriate interpretation. 
The defense counsel of the suspect sometimes 'objected to' performing a 
confrontation in advance, prior to the confrontation. I might say, he submitted 
a motion for not conducting the confrontation. However, such a form does not 
exist; defense may only note that according to its position the confrontation is 
not desireable or even unlawful for some reason. Thus, there is no advance 
legal remedy in the case of confrontation either, it can only be simultaneous 
with the implementation of the act or subsequent to it. 
Concerning this issue, there is a guiding court decision illuminating for the 
defense too, in which a defense counsel was found guilty of defamation. The 
counsel made the following statement before the confrontation of his client, "I 
am objecting to the hearing of this woman and to her confrontation with my 
client because she is the person who reported to the police and she is banned 
from the territory of the district anyway." The court held that only the 
statements of defense made in the framework required for deciding the case are 
privileged and this statement was not in this category. Confrontation is a means 
of evidencing the performance of which does not depend on the previous 
record of the parties, neither on their possible objectionable conduct. '" 
If defense submits a motion for the performance of a confrontation, the 
authority must handle it in line with the rules of evidentiary motions. It must 
either be approved of and then performed, or not approved of and rejected by a 
resolution in writing against which a complaint may be lodged which will be 
decided on by the prosecutor in charge of the investigation (or the super-
ordinate prosecutor). 
"'Court Decisions 1989, case no. 6. (Municipal Court of Budapest. 20. Bf. 1. 
5766/1988.) 
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Defense may complain about the fact of the investigatory confrontation and 
the way of its performance too. The complaint, however, has no delaying 
effect, thus the authority first performs the confrontation and only later decides 
about the legal remedy. A complaint may be directed against the conduct of 
the investigator and against the actual implementation too, alleging that it was 
biased, humiliating, suggestive, leading, treating the person concerned as 
guilty, degrading, violent, rough, etc. 
Confrontation is ordered in the form of an order guiding the proceedings 
aginst which no legal remedy is available. The defense, the attorney of the 
witness, or the legal representative of the victim may also note here that there 
is an obstacle to confrontation, it is not desireable and may request the court to 
omit it. 
5. The probative force of confrontation, excluded evidence 
The purpose of the whole criminal procedure including the investigation is to 
hold a proper mirror, ascertain the real (true) facts of a necessarily past act, a 
process of acquiring knowledge, in the course of which it can be decided 
whether a crime has been committed (can be prosecuted), who the offender is, and 
whether he is punishable.17 In the course of investigation, the facts establishing 
criminal responsibility are to be collected, relevant evidences are to be detected 
and collected on the basis of which the prosecutor can decide whether there is 
enough evidence for arraignment, for committal for trial or not. 
According to László Pusztai László, "Cognition is a progression from not-
knowing to knowing, from defective and imperfect knowledge to ever enriching 
and more and more thorough knowledge".18 Regarding the fact that the act to 
detect is a past and usually a concealed, a hidden, and a covered act, it is often 
a diff icult-even-painful process to grasp reality through senses and experience, 
and to detect evidence related to reality at the beginning and in the course of 
the whole process. This process may be facilitated by the mental-assessing 
activity of the authority trying to infer a past cycle of events from the present. 
In this framework it sets up hypotheses and versions. It deems something true 
and tries to confirm or refute it subsequently by evidence collected in the 
course of investigation. Confrontation as an act of investigation-evidencing in 
17
 For more details see: Barna, P.: A bűnüldözés elvi kérdései [Theoretical issues of 
criminal investigation]. Budapest, 1971. 376. 
18
 Pusztai, L.: Szemle ci büntetőeljárásban |Review in criminal procedure). Budapest, 
1977. 422. 
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which the authority has some sort of version or conjecture if not a pre-
conception fits into this train of thought. As the authority often has a bunch of 
evidence, however modest, and a hypothesis, upon noticing the contradictions 
between the testimonies, it starts out from the presumption that somebody 
has told the truth while the other person has told something untrue (a lie). 
Confrontation is meant to move this uncertainty into a direction, since if every-
thing was certain, clear and unambiguous, the procedure of confrontation would 
become unnecessary and a kind of over-evidencing. The purpose is to move 
from uncertainty towards certainty; it is an attempt to check existing versions 
and conjectures. Certainty may mean the exclusion of a version, and it may 
also be valuable, because it may show that the route is wrong, investigation 
might reach a deadlock, there is no point in taking that route so it must be 
quitted. A positive attempt confirming a version is not a complete success, 
taking the possibility that a confrontation may induce a suspect who has denied 
up to that point to change or perhaps make a confession which may not be real, 
full, and precise. 
Is a testimony evidence, what force does it have? 
According to one content-pillar of the warnings based on the Miranda-principle-
which the suspect to be confronted will get to know - , "anything you say can 
be used as evidence". On this ground all his words and sentences uttered 
during the confrontation can be used as evidence. This thought is strengthened 
by our definition, according to which confrontation is a special form of inter-
rogation and the minutes of the confrontation as the testimony of the suspect 
is included in the evidences. However, at the same time this weakens the 
argumentation, i.e. its independent existence as evidence. It is rather of a 
supplementary and subsidiary nature, according to Flórián Tremmel1 4 the 
'amplified/supplement-evidence' nature of the testimony made during con-
frontation is shown. It will become really valuable if following the 'test of trust-
worthiness' , the probative force of the words and the testimony is strengthened 
and made unambiguous in the framework of an individual interrogation or a 
crime scene interrogation (on-the-spot interrogation). In the quoted case of the 
suspect, he makes a detailed confession, a confession with a 'perpetrator 's 
mind ' , which can be checked. 
In the case of confrontat ions assessed to be successful, the party being 
confronted sometimes simply says, "so it happened", which indicates a wish to 
14
 See: Tremmel, F.: Bizonyítékok a büntetőeljárásban [Evidences in criminal procedure], 
Budapest-Pécs, 2006. 178. 
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get released f rom the situation of the confrontation rather than self-incrimi-
nation based on a genuine intent to change or confess which can be regarded as 
evidence. 
I do not deny the right of the authority in the final instance that of the court 
to have discretion in regarding what has been uttered during confrontation as 
evidence but I deem it appropriate only with the above restrictions and 
additions. 
Finally, when evaluating evidence, it must also be examined whether it lias 
been obtained lawfully in compliance with the requirements of a constitutional 
state founded on the rule of law and (European) human rights. The forms of 
negative conduct on the side of investigating-authority mentioned in the 
section on legal remedy may reach a level at which the possible result cannot 
be admissible, cannot be included among the lawfully obtained evidences and 
must be excluded. Such can be evidence obtained in a manner contravening the 
provisions of CPA, in other words, evidence obtained unlawfully, including-
but not limited to - the following cases: 
- the person conducting the confrontation uses violence against either of 
the parties being confronted; 
- the person conducting the confrontation threatens either of the parties 
being confronted; 
- the person conducting the confrontation fails to give the warnings 
(concerning the rights and duties) appropriate to the status of the parties to be 
confronted; 
- the official conducting the confrontation records falsities in the minutes 
and/or falsify the contents of the minutes; 
- the official violates the rules of criminal-tactics to such an extent which 
injures the fairness of the investigating act (e.g. sits/stands more than one 
person facing the other, continuously puts pressure on the persons being 
confronted, puts leading-influencing-suggesting and/or deceiving questions 
with an untrue basis). 
Infringements of the law concerning confrontat ion may occur during the 
trial stage too, the consequence of which is necessarily a procedural non-
compliance. 
The court has declared such non-compliances in its guiding decision when 
satating: 
"An unconditional procedural non-complience occurs when the court of 
first instance conducts a trial and takes evidence in the absence of the suspect, 
contrary to the statutory provision prescribing the presence of the suspect." 
The accused of the first order failed to appear at the trial of the first 
instance on 21s1 of March 2003, though duly summonsed. In spite of it, the 
56 CSABA FENYVESI 
court examined К. Gy. as a witness, who gave evidence concerning the act 
committed jointly by the accused of the second and third order, thus the court 
conducted evidencing. According to the record, the necessity of the confronta-
tion was replaced by allowing K. Gy. to give evidence in writing. This act of 
evidence was not repeated in the presence of the accused of the second order 
during a subsequent procedure.20 
It declared in another case: "During the interrogation of a child or a juvenile, 
the presence of his caretaker and teacher is not compulsory; it is a procedural 
non-compliance if the court excludes the testimonies of such witnesses made 
in the course of the investigation from the evidences." 
The court of first instance excluded the testimonies made by J. В., juvenile 
and G. В., child in the course of the investigation, and also excluded the 
confrontations. The court based its decision 011 the fact that these witnesses were 
interrogated late in the evening and late at night without the presence of their 
legal representatives.21 
6. Summary 
In conclusion to the study it may be claimed that the concept and the types 
(classification) of confrontation is clear. As an evidentiary procedure, it can 
be well demarcated and distinguished f rom other applicable means of seeking 
the truth in CPA and beyond it in the area of criminal-tactics. Thus , from 
interrogation, identification parade, attempt to prove, crime scene interroga-
tion, search/body search, parallel hearing of experts, polygraph and cross-
examination. 
Contrary to jurisprudence and the intention of the legislator, the emphasis 
of confrontation is still on the investigatory and not on the trial statge, which I 
myself support mainly on the basis of criminal-tactical arguments. 
I propose the amendment of the statutory regulation in force to the effect that 
the application of confrontation should be excluded in the case of children. 
Court Decisions 2005, case no. 100. (Legf. Bír. Bfv. [Supreme Court criminal 
appeal cases] 111. 613/2004.) This interpretation coincides with Court Decisions BH 
1987. case no. 187. "Evidence taken by a court of first instance during a trial in the absence 
of the accused does not constitute an unconditional annulment, provided evidencing is 
repeated subsequently in the presence of the accused." (Ein. Tan. B. törv. [Supreme 
Court Presidential Department criminal cases] 1426/1986.) 
21
 Court Decisions 1996, case no. 520. (Supreme Court. Legf. Bír. Bf. 1. 245/0996.) 
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further, the persons conduct ing confrontation should be provided with the 
possibility to record in a report-instead of the minutes. 
Finally, 1 claim that there is no such a thing as a compulsory confrontation 
and there are methods of confrontation which lead to the exclusion of 
evidence. 
In my view-based on research optimism-the consideration and application 
of these ideas in legislation and law enforcement may result in a higher level 
of efficiency and success, which is in the interest of all law-abiding citizens. 
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Abstract . The rapid expansion of the Internet has greatly expanded the context in which 
copyright infringement can occur. ISPs largely remain the gateway through which end users 
access the vast flow of digital content traveling throughout cyberspace. Unfortunately, ISPs are 
at the receiving end of many disputes involving IPR violations. The difficulty in pinpointing 
the real culprit has resulted in a situation where the ISP is often taken to the court. 
The paper examines such situations where the ISPs have been involved into litigations for 
third party copyright infringement across the globe. An attempt has been made to highlight the 
problems In such litigations and how it has affected the industry. An analysis has been made of 
all the laws passed by the legislations of various countries which has created a limit in the 
liability of ISPs in various countries if the ISP follows certain guidelines. Special emphasis has 
been given to the decisions of the courts of these countries alter the creation of such limitations 
and an analysis has been done of whether such exceptions have infact served the purpose or 
not. Finally the paper is concluded with the basic purpose and theme of the paper which is to 
create an international standard guideline and in doing so the point that the individual countries 
legislations wont have an effective control over the problem has been highlighted and this is 
the reason why an international body like WIPO and WTO has to enter to control the situation. 
Keywords: ISP. copyright infringement, internet. DMCA, copyright, internet service providers 
L Introduction 
Copyright law aims to balance the competing policy goals of encouraging 
creativity and allowing public access to information.1 
B . A . L L . B (Hons . ) , G u j a r a t Nat iona l L a w Univers i ty . G a n d h i n a g a r , Ind ia 
E-mai l : x y z v i n a y @ g m a i l . c o m 
B . A . L L . B , G u j a r a t N a t i o n a l Law U n i v e r s i t y , G a n d h i n a g a r , India 
E-mai l : x y z v i n a y @ g m a i l . c o m 
' S e e W e i n s t o c k - N e t a n e l , N.: A s s e r t i n g C o p y r i g h t ' s D e m o c r a t i c P r i n c i p l e s in the 
Globa l A r e n a . Vanderbilt Law Review, 51 ( 1 9 9 8 ) 217, 220 . T h i s ba lance is p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i m p o r t a n t a n d d i f f i cu l t w h e n it c o n c e r n s t he Internet , w h e r e m e a n i n g f u l c o p y r i g h t 
p ro tec t ion mus t exist in o r d e r to promote f u r t h e r intellectual d e v e l o p m e n t in the Internet 
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The Internet with which we are all familiar is a gigantic network of computer 
networks. The amazing capability of the Internet to promote the exchange of 
knowledge, information, and ideas on a universal scale has surely revamped 
the way people interact. It has been due to the internet that knowledge capital 
has been able to be communicated to others and recognized. 
The rapid expansion of the Internet, however, greatly expanded the context 
in which copyright infringement can occur. The Internet, with its inexpensive 
access, quick downloads and forwarding capabilities allow users to effortlessly 
bypass copyright laws at a substantial cost to legitimate users. 
The Internet Service Providers" have played a very important role in the 
development of the Internet. Even as the Internet continues to evolve, ISPs 
largely remain the gateway through which end users access the vast flow of 
digital content traveling throughout cyberspace. Unfortunately, ISPs are at the 
receiving end of many disputes involving IPR violations. The difficulty in 
pinpointing the real culprit has resulted in a situation where the ISP is often 
taken to the court. The courts of United States and some other countries have 
confronted this issue since the early nineties. In 1996, The World Intellectual 
Property Organization3 concluded negotiations to introduce new rules and 
clarify existing rules in order to provide adequate solutions to the questions 
raised by new economic, social, cultural and technological developments. 
Subsequent to this, various countries like United States, Australia, Singapore, 
India along with some other countries have enacted legislations in this regard. 
This article reflects upon the evaluation of the legal environment of these 
countries and concludes with the proposal to set an international standard norm. 
and failing to provide protection would lead to a reduction in the incentive to create and 
less material available for public use. Therefore, it is important that copyright owners are 
protected and compensated for infringements occurring over the Internet. See Mercurio, В.: 
Internet Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringements of Subscribers: A 
Comparison of the American and Australian Efforts to Combat the Uncertainty. Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law, 9 (2002) 51. 
Hereinafter referred to as ' ISP ' . 
3
 The World Intellectual Property Organization (Hereinafter referred to as 'WIPO' . ) 
is a specialized agency of the United Nations. It is dedicated to developing a balanced 
and accessible international intellectual property system, which rewards creativity, 
stimulates innovation and contributes to economic development while safeguarding the 
public interest. W I P O was established by the WIPO Convention in 1967 with a mandate 
f r o m its Member States to promote the protection of IP throughout the world through 
cooperation among states and in collaboration with other international organizations. 
Its headquarters are in Geneva, Switzerland. See "Wha t is W I P O " ; Accessed f r o m 
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html 
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II. What is an ISP? 
Before examining the liability of ISP it becomes essential to have a brief 
examination of ISP. These are companies or corporations that enable clients to 
connect to the Internet. Just as in any other business, ISPs may range from 
conglomerates to small companies having only a handful of clients. Typically, 
an ISP provides its clients with more than just an email account and access to 
the web; it offers facilitation to upload files including web pages to the ISP 's 
publicly accessible servers, enabling users to access these files.4 
III. The liability of ISPs - a controversial topic 
The liability of ISPs in cases of Copyright infringement is one topic which has 
generated lot of fiery debate throughout the globe. The legislation of various 
countries and the case laws decided especially by the United States Courts 
helps in deciding the true position of ISP liability in today s era. It also 
becomes particularly necessary to limit the unlimited liability for ISPs in cases 
of copyright infringement. 
While the Internet has helped artists, educators, researchers, and publishers 
explore and conquer their markets with their knowledge capital, the very same 
technology also makes it possible for copyright pirates to copy and distribute 
anything present on the Internet, while remaining both anonymous and 
undetectable. Copying is the easiest thing one can do on the Internet, and so 
has become a valid concern for IPR holders who urge that something be done 
quickly to address this menace. Identifying the individual who posts allegedly 
infringing material is not an easy task, whereas spotting a financially solvent 
ISP to impose liability can be the easiest and most obvious route for a copyright 
owner. With technical ability to close subscriber accounts, ISPs need to share 
with copyright owners the responsibility of curtailing and preventing infringe-
ment. Creating unified substantive international copyright law remains an 
impracticable solution to the mounting problem of global scale infringement.5 
4
 Unni, V. К.: Internet service provider's liability for copyright infringement- how to 
clear the misty Indian perspective. Richmond Journal of Law and Technology, 8 (2002) 13. 
5
 Soma, J. T.-Norman, N. A.: International take-down policy: a proposal for the 
WTO and WIPO to establish international copyright procedural guidelines for internet 
service providers. Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, 22 (1999-
2000) 391. 
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T h e p r o v i s i o n s f o r I S P l iab i l i ty in d i f f e r e n t pa r t s o f the wor ld h a v e been 
d i s c u s s e d b e l o w : 
A. The American perspective 
B e f o r e the e n a c t m e n t of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act1' 1998, re la t ive ly 
f e w c a s e s d e t e r m i n e d the ISP l iabi l i ty in C o p y r i g h t i n f r i n g e m e n t c a s e s . In 
1998, C o n g r e s s a d o p t e d § 5 1 2 of the D M C A , a l eg i s l a t ive a t tempt to f o r m a l i z e 
s t r u c t u r e d i m m u n i t i e s f o r ISPs , c l a r i f y the r ights of copy r igh t h o l d e r s , and 
o t h e r w i s e react to i n f r i n g i n g c o n t e n t and c o n d u c t p l a g u i n g the I n t e r n e t ' s new 
digi ta l r e g i m e . 7 
A . / . The historicalneedfor ISP Immunity—The pre DMCA era 
T h e e a s e w i th w h i c h ISPs w e r e b r o u g h t in to cos t ly l i t iga t ions f o r c o p y r i g h t 
i n f r i n g e m e n t w i thou t any e r ror on the i r par t ha s c rea t ed p r o b l e m s fo r t h e ISPs . 
T h e r e are th ree t heo r i e s u n d e r w h i c h ISPs are po ten t i a l ly l iable f o r their 
subsc r ibe r s ' copyr ight in f r ingement : direct ,8 vicarious4 or con t r ibu tory ' " i n f r i n g e -
6
 Hereinafter referred to as 'DMCA'. 
The Constitution of United States authorizes Congress to establish a legislative 
scheme "to promote Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
... the exclusive right to their ... writings..." See U.S. Const, art. 1, § 8, el. 8. See Also, 
Hsieh, L.-McCarthy, J. M.-Monkus, E.: Intellectual; Property Crimes. American Criminal 
Law Review, 35 ( 1998) 899. 
s
 A finding of direct copyright infringement is based on two factors: 1) the plaintiff 's 
ownership of a valid copyright and 2) a defendant 's violation of one of the plaintiff 's 
exclusive rights. The 1976 Copyright Act imposes strict liability for direct copyright 
infringement, but knowledge is relevant to an award of statutory damages. 
' Although the Copyright Act does not expressly provide for vicarious liability, courts 
have consistently imposed vicarious liability when two factors exist-"the right and ability 
to supervise" the primary infringer and a "direct financial interest in the exploitation of 
copyrighted materials." Sec Alfred C. Y.: Internet service provider liability for subscriber 
copyright Infringement, enterprise liability, and the first amendment. Georgetown Law 
Journal, 88 (2000) 1833. 
10
 To be liable for contributory infringement, the defendant must know of the activity 
constituting the infringement, and induce, cause, or materially contribute to it. See Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. 
Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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ment ." The pre-DMCA era was marked by cases addressing each type of 
liability, some of which have been discussed below: 
A. 1.1. Playboy enterprises, inc. V. Frena-the beginning 
The very first case regarding an IPR violation committed on the Internet came 
in 1993. But the Playboy12 case, dealt with the liability of a Bulletin Board 
Service12 operator, rather than that of an ISP. Fee-paying subscribers could 
upload and download photographs on the BBS. Playboy owned exclusive 
copyrights for many of these photographs. Frena claimed that it had not uploaded 
any of Playboy's images to the BBS and had removed those photographs from 
the BBS on becoming aware about it. 
The court found the BBS operator liable for direct copyright infringement 
because it supplied a product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted 
work. It does not matter that defendant claims it did not make the infringing 
copies itself. '4 This position was reaffirmed in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. 
MAPHIA.15 
A. 1.2. The Netcom decision: move toward safe harbors for ISPs 
A couple of years after Playboy case, a California federal court reached a different 
conclusion in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications 
Services, Inc.16 In Netcom, a user posted copyrighted material of the Church of 
Scientology on a Usenet newsgroup that was connected to the Internet through 
the ISP. '7 
11
 Salow, H. P.: Liability immunity for internet service providers-how is it working? 
Journal of Technology Law and Policy, 6 (2006) 1. 
12
 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
" An electronic bulletin board ("BBS") consists of electronic storage media, such as 
computer memories or hard disks, which are connected to telephone lines by modem 
devices, and are controlled by a computer. Users of BBSs can transfer information from 
their own computers to the storage media on the BBS by uploading the information, or they 
can download information from the BBS onto their computers. See Sega Enterprises, Ltd. 
v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Cal. 1996 ("Sega II"). |Hereinafter Bulletin 
Board Services is referred to as 'BBS'.I 
14
 See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena... op. cit. 1556. The court, citing the Copyright 
Act 's strict liability standard, rejected the BBS operator's argument that it was unaware of 
the infringement. 
15
 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
16
 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Netcom"). 
17
 Ibid. 1365-1366. 
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Because a finding of direct infringement would result in liability for every 
single Usenet server in the worldwide link of computers transmitting the infring-
ing message to every other computer , the court held liability better resolved 
under "the rubric of contributory infringement," a scheme more capable of 
addressing the complex relationship between ISPs and subscribers18 and is 
made out if the ISP knew or should have known of the infringement and had 
substantially induced, caused, or contributed to that conduct.1 9 A claim of 
vicarious liability could be sustained where the right or ability to control the 
infringing conduct exists and financial benefit , directly attributable to the 
infringing content, accrues to the ISP.20 
Unfortunately, from an academician's point of view, the case settled before 
trial. But. the decision in this case made it crystal clear that an act of volition is 
a prerequisite to copyright liability. This was surely good news for American 
ISPs. 
A. 1.3. Sega II case-a new approach by court to different theories of liability 
In Sega //,21 the same Netcom Court relying on its earlier decision in Netcom, 
again refused to find a BBS operator liable for direct infringement stressing 
that the BBS operator did not upload or download the infringing files himself 
and thus did not directly cause the copying.2~ However the court found the 
BBS operator liable for contributory infringement because it knew that BBS 
subscribers were copying Sega's video games.23 
18
 Ibid. 1369. 
19
 Ibid. 1382. 
20
 See Bretan, J.: Harboring doubts about the efficacy of S 512 immunity under the 
DMCA. Berkeley Technology of Law Journal. 18 (2003) 43, 46. See also Hayes. D. L.: 
Copyright Liability of Online Service Providers. The Computer and Internet Law. 19 (2002) 
15, 19. Although Hayes notes that at least one court relied on Netcom to establish no direct 
financial benefit where an ISP charged a flat fee for its services, Hayes suggests that the 
Netcom holding, which heavily relied on the district court ruling in Fonovisa, has been 
imperiled by subsequent findings. Namely, the Ninth Circuit 's reversal on the issue of 
financial benefit in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(establishing sufficient benefit to auction owners based on admission fees and concession 
sales) and a similar result in A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001) (establishing financial benefit based on the draw that infringing content has on users 
of the service) make any future reliance by ISPs on Netcom to establish no financial 
benefit a more risky proposition. 
21
 Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA : 948 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
22
 Ibid. 932. 
The BBS operator admitted that users were allowed to upload and download Sega 
games from his MAPHIA BBS. Moreover, evidence indicated that he tracked, or at least 
ISP LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. 65 
A. 2. The D M C A - f / t e basic framework and application of § 512 
T h e U.S. C o n g r e s s passed the D M C A on O c t o b e r 28, 1998 as an e f fo r t to set a 
s tandard of c o p y r i g h t p ro t ec t i on on the In te rne t . 2 4 
The D M C A limits ISP l iabi l i ty for th i rd-par ty copyr ight i n f r i n g e m e n t w h e r e 
the ISP c o m p l i e s with a d e t a i l e d sys tem o f no t i c e and t a k e - d o w n . 2 8 It l imi t s 
liability for f o u r general c a t e g o r i e s of ISP ac t iv i ty : 1) t rans i tory digital n e t w o r k 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , 2 6 2) sys t em cach ing , 2 7 3) i n f o r m a t i o n r e s i d i n g on s y s t e m s o r 
ne tworks at d i r ec t i on of use r s 2 8 and 4) i n f o r m a t i o n locat ion too l s . 2 9 
had the ability to track, user uploads and downloads. Sega II, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. 
MAP HI A... op. cit. 928. 
24
 The DMCA was enacted to as part of the US's effort to implement the WIPO treaty, 
and, while it is comprehensive relative to case law which existed prior to its enactment, 
some procedural nuances remain to be defined. The DMCA effectively gives legislative 
backing to the principle laid down in RTC v. Netcom by codifying its ruling that passive 
automatic acts shall not become grounds for a finding of online copyright infringement. 
There still exists no international standard for ISPs to follow with respect to copyright 
infringement. "There is no such thing as an 'international copyright' that will automatically 
protect an author's writings throughout the entire world. Protection against unauthorized 
use in a particular country depends, basically, on the national laws of that country." See 
Soma-Norman: International take-down policy... op. cit. 411. 
In its broadest definition, the term "notice" will refer to information an ISP receives 
that indicates infringement is occurring on one of its systems. "Take-down" will refer to 
the process whereby an ISP removes or disables access to material stored in or traveling 
through its networks. See Soma-Norman: ibid. 
26
 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a). The first type of safe harbor, transitory digital network communi-
cations, can be characterized as "passive conduit" activity. For purposes of this safe harbor, 
a servicc provider is defined as "an entity offering the transmission, routing or providing of 
connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a 
user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material 
as sent or received." 
7
 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(b). The second type of safe harbor, system caching, refers to the 
process by which ISPs temporarily "store material on a system or network," as part of 
managing network performance, in order to "reduce network congestion generally" and 
speed access to popular sites. 
28
 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c). The third type of safe harbor activity is storing material for 
subscribers on a system or network controlled or operated by the service provider. Examples 
of such storage include providing server space for a user's web site (web hosting) or for a 
chat room. 
29
 17 U.S.C.A. g 512(d). 
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In order to qualify for any of these liability limitations, or safe harbors, 
an ISP must meet the fol lowing eligibility requirements. First, it must adopt, 
reasonably implement and inform subscribers of a policy for terminating repeat 
copyright infringers.30 Second, it must accommodate, and not interfere with, 
standard technical measures.31 In addition to these basic eligibility requirements, 
ISPs must also meet the specific criteria for each of the four safe harbors.32 
30
 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)( 1 )(A). 
" 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(l)(B). A standard technical measure is a technology, subject to 
certain conditions, used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works. The 
technical measure must have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright 
owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary multi-industry standards process, 
must be available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, and must not 
impose substantial cost on service providers or their systems and networks. See 17 
U.S.C.A. § 512(i) (2). 
The conditions that apply to first type of carriers are that the If the ISP does not 
select the recipients of the infringing content, the content must have been transmitted 
through an automatic technical process32 and the ISP must not retain intermediate copies 
of the content for longer than necessary to transmit the information32 then, it receives 
immunity from monetary damages. See 17 U.S.C.A. § (a)(2)—(3) 
For the Second type of Safe Harbour, the transmission must be initiated by a third 
party, transmitted through the system to a second user, and stored via automatic processes. 
See § 512(b)( A)-(C). However, unlike protection for transitory communications, this 
subsection only limits liability for those service providers who, upon notification, "respond 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing." 
Sec § 512(b)(E) 
The Third type of safe harbor protects those ISPs that receive no financial benefit 
"directly attributable to the infringing activity", where the provider has neither the right 
nor ability to control the activity and where, if properly notified, the ISP suppresses access 
to the infringing content. See § 512(c)(1)(B)—(C). However, it does not protect ISPs with 
actual or constructive knowledge of infringing content who do not, on their own initiative, 
move quickly to disable access. See § 512(c)(l)(A)(i). However, § 512(c)(l)(C)(2)-(3) 
additionally details the need for ISPs to provide agents charged with handling infringement 
notifications on their behalf and enumerates the elements constituting notification sufficient 
to shift the liability burden back on to the ISP. 
Lastly, under § 512(d), ISPs are granted immunity for the "information location tools" 
that provide links to "online location[s] containing infringing material or infringing activity 
... including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link." But § 5 12(d)(l)-(3) 
provides that actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement proves fatal, but § (c) 
makes clear, takedown upon notification and the absence of direct financial benefit preserves 
the immunity. 
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A. 3. Court's interpretation of the provisions of DMCA-the post DMCA era 
Following the enactment of the DMCA, caselaw quickly began to erode the 
protections of § 512's safe harbors. A brief of some of the cases has been 
discussed below. 
A.3.1. The Napster litigation 
In Napster,55 the Ninth Circuit put the question of liability ahead of safe harbor 
defense consideration in forestalling protection. 
Napster owned proprietary "Music Share" software, which it made freely 
available for Internet users to download. Users could share MP3 music f i l e s " 
with others logged onto the Napster system. Napster allows users to locate and 
directly exchange MP3 files stored on others ' hard drives without paying a 
fee.35 The MP3 file is actually transmitted over the Internet directly between 
requesting and host users, but the connection could not take place without the 
Napster server.36 
The Court assumed that Napster is a "service provider'"7 i.e., Napster 
transmits information without modifying the content. Nevertheless, the Court 
held, that Napster 's role in the transmission of MP3 files was not entitled to 
§ 12(a) protection because such transmission does not occur through Napster 's 
system." In finding vicarious liability likely, despite § 512(m)'s "no affirmative 
duty to police," the Napster court looked upon the peer-to-peer provider 's 
ability to block access to material, or to otherwise terminate infringing users, 
" A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., op. cit. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
34
 MP3 technology allows for the fast and efficient conversion of compact disc 
recordings into computer files that may be downloaded over the Internet. 
35
 S e e d & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., op. cit. 33. 
36
 Id. Napster provides a directory and index of MP3 files that users who are logged on 
wish to share, but does not store any of the MP3 files on its servers. When the requesting 
user clicks on the name of an MP3 file listed in Napster's directory, the Napster server 
routes the request to the "host" user's browser. The host user's browser responds that it 
either can or cannot supply the file. If the host user can supply the file, the Napster server 
communicates the host's Internet Protocol (IP) address and routing information to the 
requesting user 's browser. 
37
 Under the broader definition of § 512(k)(l)(A). 
38
 S 512(a) is applicable only to service providers "transmitting, routing or providing 
connections for, material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the 
service provider." 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a). See Salow: Liability immunity for internet service 
providers... op. cit. I I. 
68 HARSHITA В H ATN AG AR-VIN AY V. MISHRA 
as e v i d e n c e that it had the r ight and ab i l i ty , and u l t ima te ly , the r e spons ib i l i t y , 
to control t h e i n f r i n g e m e n t / 4 
A.3.2. ALS Scan v. RemarQ communities 
In this c a s e , 4 0 users of the I S P R e m a r Q p o s t e d and a c c e s s e d n e w s g r o u p l i s t ings 
con ta in ing h u n d r e d s of i n f r i n g i n g c o p i e s of p o r n o g r a p h i c p h o t o s o w n e d by 
copyr igh t h o l d e r A L S S c a n . 4 1 T e c h n i c a l l y , A L S Scan f a i l e d to c o m p l y wi th 
§ 512(c) n o t i c e and did no t spec i fy the " i den t i t y of the p i c tu re s f o r m i n g the 
basis of t h e c o p y r i g h t c l a i m . " 4 2 Ra ther , t he cour t b a s e d l iabi l i ty on the m e r e 
provision of wha t it cons ide red informat ion suff ic ient to locate infr inging c o n t e n t , 
r easoning t h a t the safe h a r b o r i m m u n i t i e s a re "not p r e s u m p t i v e , but g r a n t e d 
only to ' i n n o c e n t ' se rv ice p r o v i d e r s w h o c a n p rove that t h e y do not h a v e ac tua l 
or c o n s t r u c t i v e not ice ." 4 3 
34
 Napster, 239 F.3d 1027. "Napster may be vicariously liable when it fails to 
affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access to potentially infringing 
files listed in its search index ... Napster ... also bears the burden of policing the system 
within the limits of the system." The Ninth Circuit grounded its vicarious liability analysis 
of Napster's services by analogy to the Fonovisa swap-meet, in which the ability to block 
infringers' access to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of the 
right and ability to supervise and direct financial benefit adheres where the availability of 
infringing material acts as a "draw" for customers. Napster, 239 F.3d 1023 (citing 
Fonovisa. inc. v. Cherry Auction. Inc., 76 F.3d 259. 262 (9th Cir. 1996)) 
40
 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc.. 239 F.3d 619 (2001). This was the first 
case where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided interpreting Title II. 
41
 Ibid. 620-621. 
42
 See Bretan: Harboring doubts about the efficacy of § 5 1 2 immunity under the 
DMCA. op. cit. 55. 
4
 ALS Scan. Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, op. cit. 625. In holding that the copyright 
owner need not identify infringing content with specificity, ALS Scan suggests ISPs may 
shoulder a much greater burden than originally contemplated in § 512. See generally 
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § I2B.04[B| | |4] [discussing 
notification procedures and the Fourth Circuit 's departure in ALS Scan from strict 
adherence to the statutory requirements under § 512(c)]. 
Although this provision requires a copyright owner to give the ISP a detailed notice 
of infringement, the copyright holder must only provide information that is "reasonably 
sufficient" to permit the service provider to locate the allegedly infringing material. The court 
correctly noted that the DMCA requires only "substantial" compliance with § 512(c)'s notice 
requirements. 43 Since ALS Scan's letter referred RemarQ to two weh addresses where 
RemarQ could find pictures of ALS Scan's models and obtain ALS Scan's copyright 
information, and virtually all photographs on the web sites identified in the letter were 
infringing, the letter "substantially complied" with the DMCA. Thus, RemarQ was not 
entitled to a safe harbor defense. 
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A.3.3. The Ellison case 
In this case, a noted science fiction writer brought copyright infringement claims 
against AOL.44 A O L ' s participation in the Usenet network was functionally 
identical to RemarQ's activities in ALS Scan except that AOL retained Usenet 
messages with binary content47 on its servers for 'approximately fourteen 
days. '4 6 The court, characterized A O L ' s participation as a peer in the Usenet 
message-forwarding system as 'transitory digital network communications ' 
entitled to safe harbor under § 512(a).47 Doing so, the court concluded that the 
threshold requirements of § 512(k)( l )(A) limiting eligibility for § 512(a) safe 
harbor to 'entities offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections 
for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a 
user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of 
the material as sent or received' merely restated the substantive provisions of 
§ 512(a), allowing it to bypass an extensive discussion of AOL ' s status as a 
§ 512(k)( I)(A) service provider.48 The court found that AOL's participation as a 
peer in Usenet met all the elements of the § 512(a) safe harbor.49 
44
 Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1054-55 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
47
 Binary content includes graphics files, audio files, motion picture files, and compiled 
computer programs, among other categories. Many Usenet peer servers retain messages 
with binary content for shorter periods of time than text messages because they occupy 
more storage space on the server. See Evans, E.: From the Cluetrain to the panopticon: ISP 
activity characterization and control of internet communications. Michigan Telecommunica-
tions and Technology Law Review, 11 (2004) 445. 
46
 Ellison v. Robertson, op. cit. 1054. 
47
 Ibid. 1067-1068. 
48
 See ibid. 1068. 
44
 The court rejected Ellison's claim that the automated filtering rules that AOL had 
applied—it is the rare ISP that carries every single Usenet newsgroup, and AOL certainly 
did not—constituted 'selection of the material' under S 512(a)(2). See id. 1071 (holding that 
service provider's selection of newsgroups to carry does not qualify as selection of material 
under § 512(a)(2)). The court reasoned that if automatic filtering barred ISPs from the 
§ 512(a) safe harbor, ISPs would be forced either to abandon their filtering practices-and 
therefore carry newsgroups for which there was no end user demand as well as newsgroups 
devoted to criminal practices like child pornography and prostitution-or abandon their 
§ 512(a) liability protection noting that economic and police power interests support 
interpretation of § 512(a) that allows ISPs to engage in automated selection of Usenet 
traffic for forwarding). See Evans: From the Cluetrain to the panopticon... op. cit. 486. 
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B. The Australian situation 
Not surprisingly, the case law and clarity of ISP liability for subscriber copy-
right infringements is less developed in Australia than in the United States. But 
it can be said that Australia is the only country other than the United States 
which through various amendments like the Copyright Amendment (Digital 
Agenda) Act 2000%) and Australia-Ua/terf States Free Trade Agreement,M there 
are now clear guidelines for liability of ISPs in Australia. 
B. I. Pre digital agenda law situation: The legacy of Telstra v. APRA-strict 
liability? 
The position in Australia cannot be answered without reference to the case of 
Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Australasian Performing Right Ass 'n. Ltd.52 Although this 
case does not involve ISPs, the decision holds much significance for them. 
An ISP may be subject to strict liability for any copyright infringement 
committed by its customers even though it had no way of knowing such an 
infringement had occurred and no chance of preventing it f rom happening. 
This is the legacy of the decision by the High Court in Telstra case. 
The case involved music, in which APRA owned copyright, played to 
persons 'on hold ' on the telephone.5 ' When the caller who was put on hold 
used a conventional phone, the High Court held by majority that Telstra had 
infringed A P R A ' s right to cause the works to be transmitted to the subscribers 
by a diffusion service.54 
"Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act, 2000. The Act received Royal Assent 
on 4 September 2000 and came into force on 4 March 2001. [Hereinafter Referred to as 
'CADA'.] 
51
 The enabling legislation for the AUSFTA. the U.S. Free Trade Agreement Implementa-
tion Act 2004 (Cth), was passed by the Australian Parliament on 13 August 2004 and 
received Royal Assent on 16 August 2004. The U.S. President, George W. Bush, signed the 
countervailing legislation, the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implemen-
tation Act on 3 August 2004. [Hereinafter referred to as 'AUSFTA' | . 
52
 Intellectual Property Rights, 38 (1997) 294. 
Telstra participated in the provision of music on hold in three ways: (1) when a 
person called a Telstra service centre and was put on hold, s/he was played music; (2) Telstra 
provided the transmission facilities for other businesses to play music to callers who were 
on hold; and (3) a person who called a subscriber to the "CustomNet" service heard music 
if the line was busy. See Paynter, H.-Foreman, R.: Liability of Internet Service Providers 
for Copyright Infringement. University of NewSoutli Wales Law Journal 4 (1998) 61. 
54
 The 'diffusion right"; Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), § 31(l)(a)(v). Conversely, when the 
caller used a mobile phone, the High Court unanimously held that Telstra had infringed 
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Subsequent to this case, APRA based its claim against ISPs on this right. 
The majority stated that in order to come under the purview of the diffusion 
right, three elements must be satisfied: 
There must be a diffusion service.55 The majority held that the unwanted 
music transferred over telephone lines constituted such a service. 
The work must be transmitted to the subscribers of the service. In Telstra, 
the subscribers to the telephone service were deemed to be subscribers to the 
diffusion service, because clients who used the telephone service were placed 
on hold and could receive the music transmission.5 '1 
The alleged infringer must cause the transmission of the allegedly infringed 
material. In Telstra, the person operating the service is deemed to be the "person 
causing work to be transmitted.87 The person who undertakes to provide the 
service to subscribers in agreements with them," is taken to be "the person 
operating the service."88 
Therefore, all three elements were satisfied, and the court held Telstra 
liable for the infringement. 
B.2. The Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000-A new beginning 
In a bid to address the challenges posed to Australian Copyright law by 
emerging digital technologies, the Australian government passed the Copyright 
Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth), amending the Copyright Act.89 
The Act implements major reforms to the Act in order to update Australia's 
copyright regime to take into account the rapid development of new techno-
logies.60 
APRA's right to broadcast the works. The 'broadcast right'; Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
§ 31(1 )(a)(iv). See Telstra, 38 1PR 294, 304, 316, 340. 
85
 § 26(1) provides a diffusion involves "the transmission of the work or other subject 
matter in the course of a service of distributing broadcast or other matter ... over wires, or 
other paths provided by a material substance." 
56
 Telstra, Intellectual Property Rights. 303. 
57
 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), § 26(2). 
58
 Ibid. § 26(4). 
84
 It received royal assent on September 4, 2000. and became applicable as of March 4, 2(301. 
60
 According to the Australian government's commentary on an exposure draft of the 
Digital Agenda Act, "the central aim of the reforms introduced by that Act was to ensure 
that Copyright law continued to promote creative endeavor while allowing reasonable access 
to Copyright material through the Internet and new communications technology." See 
Middleton, G.: Australia: Intellectual Property-Copyright: Case Comment. Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, 12 (2006) 2. 
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B.2.1. Right of communication to public 
The Act defines communicate as to "make available online or electronically 
transmit a work or other subject-matter."61 The functions of the broadcasters, 
cable operators, and ISPs have come under the new right to communicate. 
B.2.2. Limitation in liability of ISPs 
One of the important aims of the CADA is to limit the liability of ISPs for 
copyright infringements committed by third parties whilst using their facilities. 
In determining this, the court after the passing of this Act looks at 
- Whether the ISP had the power to prevent the infringement; 
- The nature of any relationship between the ISP and the infringer; and 
- Whether the ISP took reasonable steps to prevent infringement.62 
B.2.3. Exclusion for temporary reproduction 
The Act includes exceptions for temporary reproduction or copies of subject 
matter as part of the technical process of making or receiving a communi-
cation.'" Since numerous temporary copies of copyright material are made in 
the course of electronically transmitting material, this exception was necessary 
for the continued growth of the Internet.64 Further, reproductions made in the 
course of some caching are excluded from liability.65 
61
 The Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, c. 6, S 10(1), schcd. 1 
(Austl.) (2000). 
62
 Sec §§ 36(1 A) and 101(1 A). CADA. 
63
 §§ 43(A) and 111(A) of CADA. Prior to the Digital Agenda Act, there was concern 
among Internet users in Australia that, because browsing the Internet involves the making 
of temporary copies of materials which are the subject of copyright in the memory of the 
user 's computer, then Internet users could be liable for infringement of the copyright 
owner 's exclusive right to reproduce those materials. To address this concern, the Digital 
Agenda Act introduced §§ 43A and 111A into the Copyright Act. which provide that a 
person does not infringe copyright in online materials by making a temporary reproduction 
or adaptation of those materials as part of the technical process of making or receiving a 
communication, provided that the making of the communication does not itself infringe 
copyright. See Middleton: Australia: Intellectual Property-Copyright... op. cit. 
64
 To allow such temporary reproductions, §§ 45 and 94 make an exception to the 
copyright owner 's exclusive right to reproduce material. Moreover, the exception for 
temporary copies includes the browsing of copyright material online, thus excluding users 
from liability for browsing. See Mercurio: Internet Service Provider Liability... op. cit. 
65
 Mia Garlick & Simon Gilchrist. 'The Digital Age: Will Oz Ever Get There' (1999) 3 
TeleMedia 6. 79. The general view among legal commentators is that it is unlikely that 
proxy caching (as opposed to passive or automatic caching) is covered by the temporary 
reproductions exceptions in §§ 43A and I I IA of the Copyright Act, as reproductions of 
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B.3. Post digital agenda period 
The provisions in the digital agenda amendment were not complete to perfectly 
defi ne the liability of ISP due to which further amendments were introduced 
which brought the Australian Laws in abreast with that of international standards. 
B.3.1. TheAUSFTA Amendments 
Extensive changes to copyright law have been introduced by the AUSFTA6 6 It 
introduced new provisions which limit the remedies a court may award for 
infringement of copyright by an ISP, subject to certain conditions. An ISP may 
be liable for copyright infringement in relation to something it does itself, and 
for authorising infringements by people who use its facilities or service. 
B.3.1.1. The Safe Harbour Provisions 
The amendments do not affect whether or not an ISP is liable for infringement, 
but rather the consequences of that liability. The categories of online activities 
in §§ 116AC to 1 16AF of the Copyright Act to which the limitation on 
remedies under § 116AG apply are similar to the four "safe harbours" of the 
U.S. DMCA, and are as follows: 
Category A: providing facil i t ies for transmitting, routing or providing 
connections;67 
Category B: caching by automatic process;68 
Category C: storing material on a ISP system at the direction of a user;69 and 
Category D: referring users to an online location.7" 
copyright materials made in the course of proxy caching are arguably not temporary, and 
are not made as part of the technical process of making or receiving a communication. See 
Middleton: Australia: Intellectual Property-Copyright... op. cit. 
66
 Art. 17.11.29 of Chapter 17 of the AUSFTA deals with limitations on liability for 
"service providers", including providers or operators of facilities for online services or 
network access such as ISPs. Schedule 9 Part 11 of the AUSFTA implements this Article 
by inserting new Division 2AA of Part V into the Copyright Act. 
67
 § 116AC. It reads as "A carriage service provider carries out a Category A activity 
by providing facilities or services for transmitting, routing or providing connections for 
copyright material, or the intermediate and transient storage of copyright material in the 
course of transmission, routing or provision of connections." 
hS
 § 116AD. It reads as "A carriage service provider carries out a Category В activity 
by caching copyright material through an automatic process. The carriage service provider 
must not manually select the copyright material for caching." 
64
 § 116 AE. It reads as "A carriage service provider carries out a Category С activity 
by storing, at the direction of a user, copyright material on a system or network controlled 
or operated by or for the carriage service provider." 
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B.3.1.2. Conditions on Limitation of Remedies 
In relation to all categories of activities the ISP must provide for termination of 
accounts of the repeat infringers.71 In addition, if there is a relevant industry 
code in force, the ISP must comply with the relevant provisions of that code. 
The conditions that must be satisfied for ISPs to enjoy limited liability become 
more stringent for each category from Category A to Category D. The main 
provision for limitation under Category A activity is that the transmission must 
have been initiated by a person other than the ISP while the main conditions 
for Category С and Category D activity is that ISPs do not receive a financial 
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity and expeditiously remove 
or disable access to material residing on its network or systems when they 
obtain actual knowledge of copyright infringement.72 
B.3.2. The expanding nature of copyright liability through recent court 
decisions 
In two recent groundbreaking decisions, the Federal Court of Australia considered 
the liability of intermediaries for online acts of copyright infr ingement 
perpetrated by others by authorising those infringing acts. 
B.3.2.1. The Cooper Case: Liability for linking 
In the landmark judgment of Universal Music v Cooper,73 the Federal Court 
has held that a person who provides hyperlinks to online material provided by 
other persons which infringes copyright may be secondarily liable for that 
copyright infringement. 
70
 § 116AF. It reads as "A carriage service provider carries out a Category D activity 
by referring users to an online location using information location tools or technology." 
71
 § 116AH lays down the table for conditions for each category of activities. 
7
" This may be achieved through a notices regime whereby the ISP reacts to effective 
notices of infringement issued by copyright holders, taking down alleged infringing 
material, as well as effective counter-notifications by those whose material is the subject of 
the notice, restoring alleged infringing material. § 116 AI provides that If the ISP, in an 
action relating to this Division, points to evidence, as prescribed, that suggests that the ISP 
has complied with a condition, the court must presume, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, that the ISP has complied with the condition. 
7<
 [2005] F.C.A. 972. This case represents the first time in Australia that the recording 
industry has accused an ISP of direct involvement in music piracy by allowing its 
infrastructure to be used for file-trading activities. See Hyland, M.: The ever-expanding 
nature of Copyright Liability down under. Communications Law, 10 (2005) 157-163, 2005 
WL 3752722 (UK). 
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Stephen C o o p e r opera ted a w e b s i t e w h i c h c o n t a i n e d h y p e r l i n k s to h u n d r e d s 
of M P 3 m u s i c f i l e s stored on r e m o t e w e b s i t e s ope ra t ed by o t h e r s that cou ld be 
au toma t i ca l l y d o w n l o a d e d f r e e of cha rge by v is i tors to C o o p e r ' s webs i t e by 
c l i ck ing on t h o s e hyper l inks . C o o p e r p e r m i t t e d vis i tors to his w e b s i t e to c rea t e 
n e w hype r l i nks a l so . 
Un ive r sa l M u s i c and n u m e r o u s o ther c o p y r i g h t o w n e r s c o m m e n c e d p ro -
c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t C o o p e r and C o m - C e n fo r au tho r i s i ng i n f r i n g e m e n t of the i r 
copy r igh t in t h e mus ica l r e c o r d i n g s c o n t a i n e d in the i n f r i n g i n g M P 3 f i l es t o 
w h i c h C o o p e r ' s s i te l inked. 7 1 
C o m - C e n w a s held l iable f o r au tho r i s ing the i n f r i ng ing ac t s w h i c h t o o k 
p l a c e via C o o p e r ' s webs i te . T h e C o u r t no ted that the safe harbour p r o v i s i o n s 
in t roduced by t h e A U S F T A a m e n d m e n t s w e r e not in f o r c e at t he re levant t ime 
a n d do not a p p l y re t rospec t ive ly . 7 5 
B.3 .2 .2 T h e K a z a a Case : P e e r to P e e r (P2P) f i l e shar ing 
In Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Shannon License Holdings,76 the Fede ra l 
C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d fo r the f i rs t t i m e in A u s t r a l i a the l iabi l i ty of p r o v i d e r s of 
74
 E-Talk Communications Pty Ltd trading as Com-Cen Internet Services ("Com-Cen") 
hosted Cooper's website free of charge in exchange for Cooper displaying the "Com-Cen" 
logo on his website, and provided Cooper with assistance with respect to the establishment 
and operation of his website. Id. 
75
 Even if the safe harbour provisions had been in force, the ISP could not have relied 
on them because it received a financial benefit from the infringements in the form of free 
advertising on the website, the ISP used to receive financial benefit and because it failed to 
take action against the website proprietor despite knowing that infringements were taking 
place. Although Com-Cen denied having knowledge of the content of Cooper's website, 
the court found that this was unlikely, as the free hosting arrangement which Com-Cen had 
negotiated with Cooper was likely to be based on the fact that Com-Cen believed it was a 
high-traffic website, and would therefore provide valuable advertising exposure. Further, it 
is likely that Com-Cen would have visited Cooper's website to ensure that Cooper had 
added the Com-Cen logo to his website, as agreed. Com-Cen did not take steps to prevent 
the infringing acts by refusing to host Cooper's website, which was a reasonable step that it 
could have taken to prevent or avoid the infringing acts. See Williams, Micheals: "An 
overview of the current legal framework and predictions about the future of online liability 
in Australia"; Accessed from http://www.copyright.asn.au/pdf/powerpoint/f07n01williams-
ppt.pdf 
76
 [2005] F.C.A. 1242. In the decision delivered on 5 September 2005, the Federal 
Court held that Sharman Networks Ltd.which controlled had authorized infringement of 
copyright by users of its file-sharing software. See Baulch, Libby: "Major Copyright 
Reforms and software IPR protection in Australia" Accessed from http://www.copyright. 
org.au/pdf/acc/articles_pdf/a06n 17.pdf 
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p e e r - t o - p e e r f i l e s - s h a r i n g n e t w o r k s f o r c o p y r i g h t i n f r i n g e m e n t s p e r p e t r a t e d by 
users of the i r n e t w o r k s . 
T h e a p p l i c a n t s b r o u g h t an ac t ion aga in s t S h a r m a n N e t w o r k s L i m i t e d , 
which c o n t r o l l e d the K a z a a peer to p e e r f i l e sha r ing s y s t e m , fac i l i t a ted by the 
Kazaa M e d i a Desk top ( K M D ) s o f t w a r e p r o g r a m which use r s could d o w n l o a d f r ee 
of c h a r g e f r o m the K a z a a webs i t e . K a z a a g e n e r a t e d r e v e n u e f r o m s t r e a m i n g 
a d v e r t i s i n g to users of t he K M D . U s e r s of the K M D c o u l d access " b l u e f i l e s " , 
which a re not sub jec t t o any a r r a n g e m e n t wi th the c o p y r i g h t ho lde r s in those 
f i les , a n d "go ld f i l e s" , w h i c h are l i c ensed f i l es m a d e a v a i l a b l e by a r r a n g e m e n t 
with the r e l evan t c o p y r i g h t owners . . 7 7 
T h e I S P was he ld l i ab le fo r C o p y r i g h t I n f r i n g e m e n t . W i l c o x J e m p h a s i z e d 
that a n u m b e r of f a c t o r s suppor t ed th is f i n d i n g . Fi rs t , the cour t he ld tha t re-
sponden t s had long k n o w n that the K a z a a sys tem w a s wide ly used f o r the 
shar ing of copy r igh t f i l e s , and that the m e a s u r e s that t hey had a d o p t e d w e r e 
" i n e f f e c t i v e to p reven t c o p y r i g h t i n f r i n g e m e n t s by u s e r s . " Second , the r e s p o n -
dents h a d fa i l ed to t a k e technica l m e a s u r e s that w o u l d cur ta i l the s h a r i n g of 
c o p y r i g h t f i les . 7 8 
7
 The Kazaa website contained notices on each page that the respondents did not 
condone activities that infringe copyright. Kazaa users also had to enter into a browse-wrap 
end-user licence agreement which made it a condition of use of the KMD that users agreed 
not to use the software to infringe the intellectual property rights of others, and warning 
users of their potential liability if they infringed copyright or other intellectual property 
rights of others. However, the Kazaa website also linked to a website headed "Join the 
Revolution", which criticized the opposition of record and movie companies to peer-to-
peer networks, and encouraged the use of peer-to-pcer applications as being beneficial to 
everyone by providing lower prices, unlimited catalogues "and more". See Middleton: 
Australia: Intellectual Property-Copyright... op. cit. 
8
 Ibid. The Conti observed: "It is in the respondents' financial interest to maximize, 
not to minimize, music file-sharing." Also Wilcox J further observed that "far from taking 
steps that are likely effectively to curtail copyright file-sharing, Sharman Networks and 
Altnet have included on the Kazaa Web site exhortations to users to increase their f i l e -
sharing and a Web page headed 'Join the Revolution' that criticizes record companies 
for opposing peer-to-peer f i le-sharing." He further noted that this Web campaign 
would "encourage visitors to think it 'cool ' to defy the record companies by ignoring 
copyright constraints." The Court also ordered that the Kazaa Internet f i le-sharing 
system could continue to operate but only if within two months it was modified to 
include technology to prevent copyright infringement. 
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As a result of the decision, there is a concern that the burden of enforce-
ment may be shifted away from the rights holder and onto unrelated third 
parties such as ISPs.74 
Kaaza appealed against this decision but, on 27 July 2006, the parties 
announced that the action had been settled.8" 
C. The European approach 
The European approach towards ISP liability is primarily dealt with two 
Directives i.e., the EU Copyright Directive81 and the e-commerce Directive, 
which already has been implemented by a number of European Countries as 
part of their national legislation. Although EU directives do not have the force 
of law in EU member countries, they do require EU member countries to 
amend their own laws to the extent necessary to conform to the Directives' 
intended results.82 
C.l. The copyright directive 
This Directive sets out certain limitation on the liability of ISPs. Article 5(1) 
provides for an exception from liability for copyright infringement, where the 
reproduction is transient or incidental when the transient copies are an integral 
and essential part of a technological process whose sole purpose is to enable a 
transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary or a lawful 
use of a work or other subject-matter to be made; and they have no independent 
economic significance. The net effect of this is that ISP's will not be required 
79
 Ibid. The court ordered that the respondents could continue to operate the Kazaa 
network without liability for authorization infringement if they implemented a mandatory 
keyword filtering system in all new versions of the KMD, and imposed maximum pressure 
on existing Kazaa users to upgrade their existing KMD software to a version which 
included the keyword filtering system by the use of dialogue boxes which could not closed 
until the user upgraded. 
s
" The settlement also applied to legal actions relating to Kazaa in the US. The 
settlement agreement includes an undertaking by the Kazaa operators to introduce filtering 
technology to block access to infringing music files. 
81
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Counsel of May 22, 
2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of Copyright and related rights in the 
information society. 
82
 Scherzer, H.: European Copyright Directives Ushers in Era of Harmony, Change. 
(2001) 226 New York Law Journal. 113 (2001) 73. 
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to seek c o n s e n t , or to pay f o r t r ans ien t c o p i e s m a d e a c r o s s their n e t w o r k s as 
part of t he t r a n s m i s s i o n p r o c e s s . 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , the E U C o p y r i g h t D i r e c t i v e s o f f e r s n u m e r o u s o p t i o n a l 
e x e m p t i o n s that m e m b e r coun t r i e s m a y e n a c t so as to l imi t ISP l iabi l i ty u n d e r 
their o w n laws. 8 3 
C.2. The EU E-Commerce Directive 
T h e E U E - C o m m e r c e D i r ec t i ve o f f e r s ins ight in to the wi l l i ngness of E U 
m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s to a d d r e s s the l iab i l i t ies of ISPs as " s e rv i ce p r o v i d e r s " of 
" i n f o r m a t i o n socie ty se rv ices" , 8 4 a p p l i e s to ISPs e s t ab l i shed w i t h i n the 
E u r o p e a n Union . 8 " T h e key areas of t he d i r ec t ive r e l a t i n g to ISP l iab i l i ty a re 
.the 'mere conduit' e x c e p t i o n p r o v i s i o n , w h i c h p r o v i d e s that I S P ' s a r e not 
l iable f o r i n f o r m a t i o n t r ansmi t t ed on the i r n e t w o r k s p r o v i d e d they d o not 
ini t ia te t he t r a n s m i s s i o n , d o not select t he r ece ive r s of t he t r a n s m i s s i o n , a n d do 
not se lec t o r m o d i f y the i n f o r m a t i o n in the t r a n s m i s s i o n , 8 6 Caching p r o v i s i o n , 
w h e r e I S P will not b e held l iable fo r the a u t o m a t i c , i n t e rmed ia t e , and 
t e m p o r a r y s to rage of i n f o r m a t i o n that is ca r r ied out f o r the sole p u r p o s e of 
31
 Ch. It Art 5, 2-5 of the Directive. Although the EU Copyright Directive does not 
contain any provision in favour of copyright owners that is similar to the notice and take-
down procedure in the DMCA, it requires EU member states to provide and apply 
"effective, proportionate and dissuasive" sanctions and remedies for copyright holders in 
the infringement context. See Ch. IV, Art. 8, I of the Directive. 
34
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Union and of the counsel of June 8, 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of informations society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the internal market. ("Directive on Electronic Commerce") ("EU E-Commerce Directive"). 
Under this directive intermediaries are referred s "Information Society Services". It is 
defined as "Any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic 
means and at the individual's request of a recipient of a service". This definition is drafted 
in such a way as to include a wide range of intermediaries including content providers and 
traditional Internet Service Providers. 
33
 Fancher, C.-Dunn. G. H.: The Trend towards limited internet service provider (ISP) 
liability for third party copyright infringement in the internet: A United States and global 
perspective. Business Law International, 4 (2002) 152. 
3,1
 Art 12 of the Directive. Those on-line intermediaries found to meet these three 
conditions are considered mere conduits, and will not be held responsible for illegal infor-
mation put on the network by third parties. In other words, in so far as on-line inter-
mediaries fulfill the necessary conditions to be qualified as mere conduits, the standard of 
liability is "no liability". See Julia-Barcelo, R.: On-line intermediary liability issues: 
comparing E.U. and U.S. legal frameworks. European Intellectual Property Review, 22 
(2000) 105-119, 109. 
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making the onward transmission of the information more efficient;87 Hosting 
provision, where ISPs which provide storage space on web servers to third-
party users, an act known as "hosting", benefit from a limitation of their 
liability for acts related to such storage.88 
D. The Asian viewpoint 
D. 1. Singapore:Leading the Asian provisions 
Singapore has enacted various legislations dealing with ISP liability f rom time 
to time. The Singapore Electronic Transactions Act, 1998 and U.S. Singapore 
Free Trade Agreement84 are a step ahead in this regard. 
D.l.L Singapore's Electronic Transactions Act 1998 
In 1998 the Singapore Parliament adopted very clear measures aimed at 
insulating ISP 's from both civil and criminal liability under § 10 of the 
Electronic Transactions Act 1998. This provision provides that an ISP shall not 
be subject to any civil or criminal liability in the form of electronic records to 
which that ISP merely provides access. '"This immunity is granted only if the 
liability is founded on the making, publication, dissemination or distribution of 
such materials or any statement made in such material " or the infringement of 
any rights subsisting in or in relation to such material.42 The importance of this 
s
 Art 13 of the Directive provides that this immunity applies where the ISP does not 
modify the cached information, complies with access conditions in relation to the 
information, complies with any rules in respect of updating the information and does not 
interfere with the lawful use of technology with the intention of obtaining data on the use 
of the cached content. Art 13 of the Directive. See Sutter, Gavin: "FE/HE Institutions and 
Liability for Third Party Provided Content"; Accessed from http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/ 
publications/thirdpartycontent.htm 
88
 See Art. 14 of the Directive. An ISP will not be liable for hosting information, 
provided they do not have actual knowledge that the activity is illegal and, upon 
obtaining such knowledge, act quickly to remove it. 
89
 Hereinafter referred to as 'USSFTA'. 
90
 § 10(1)- For the purposes of this section-"provides access", in relation to third-party 
material, means the provision of the necessary technical means by which third-party material 
may be accessed and includes the automatic and temporary storage of the third-party 
material for the purpose of providing access; "third-party", in relation to a network service 
provider, means a person over whom the provider has no effective control. 
§ 10(1) (a). 
42
 § 10(1) (b). This exemption front liability is potentially very powerful. It is not even 
conditional upon lack of knowledge on the part of the service provider. Hence it will apply 
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piece of l eg i s l a t i on canno t b e overs ta ted , b e c a u s e pr io r to 1998 the p rospec t o f 
ISP liability u n d e r the l a w s of S ingapore w a s a real one , e v e n for those I S P ' s 
that took no m e a s u r e s at all t o patrol t r a f f i c on the i r s y s t e m s . 
D.I.2. The Singapore Copyright (amendment) Act 1999 
T h i s a m e n d m e n t " p rov ided tha t when the I S P m a k e s an e l e c t r o n i c copy of t h e 
copyr ight m a t e r i a l a v a i l a b l e on the n e t w o r k , it c a n n o t be l iable f o r 
i n f r i ngemen t if it is m a d e a v a i l a b l e in the c o u r s e of p r o v i d i n g c o n n e c t i o n s t o 
the copy, in t h e s torage, t r a n s m i s s i o n , r o u t i n g , o r p rov i s ion of c o n n e c t i o n s is 
d o n e at t he d i rec t ion of a user of the n e t w o r k w i t h o u t any d e l i b e r a t e 
mod i f i ca t ion o f its con ten t s by the ISP."4 
D.1.3. U.S. Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
T h e U S S F T A Implementa t ion Act was i m p l e m e n t e d by both count r ies on J a n u a r y 
1, 2004.9 5 T h i s ag reemen t p r o v i d e s for l imi t ed l iabil i ty f o r ISPs , r e f l ec t ing the 
ba lance s t r u c k in the U .S . D M C A b e t w e e n l eg i t ima te I S P act ivi ty and t h e 
i n f r i ngemen t of copyr igh ts . "" T h e cour t s wi l l be p r e c l u d e d f r o m g r a n t i n g 
mone ta ry r e l i e f f o r any c o p y r i g h t i n f r i n g e m e n t by ISPs in the c o u r s e of h o s t i n g 
even if a service provider knows that a certain web-site has a lot of unlicensed, pirated 
software for download, and that many of the service provider's subscribers access that 
"warez" web-site. 
In Singapore, the Registry of Trade Marks and Patents formed an Electronic 
Commerce Committee in 1998 to comprehensively study the issues involved and provide 
suggestions for dealing with these issues. In later part of 1999. the Singapore Parliament 
incorporated these suggestions in a Bill and enacted the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 1999 
incorporating it into the Copyright Act. 
44
 § 193C(1). However, if the copyright owner provides an ISP with a statutory 
declaration expressing his belief of the occurrence of a copyright infringement, then it 
is not exempt f rom liability for making the material available on the network under 
§ I93C(1) of the Copyright (Amendment) Act. This declaration from the copyright owner 
must outline the reasons under ly ing the copyright owner ' s al legat ions of copyright 
infringement. The ISP on receiving such notice has the responsibility of removing the 
copy from the network or disabl ing access to the material on the network. If the ISP 
fails to do this in a reasonable t ime, the Network Service Provider is liable. 
43
 The US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement was signed May 6, 2003 and ratified by 
the US House of Representatives on July 24, 2003 by a vote of 272-155. The US Senate 
ratified the bill on July 31, 2003 by a vote of 66-32. President George W. Bush signed into 
law the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act on September 
3, 2003. 
'"' See Report for Congress on US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement; Accessed from 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-5582:1 
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and transmitting material. However, this immunity applies only if ISPs comply 
with certain administrative requirements such as the taking down of infringing 
content once they have been notified by the copyright owner in writing, and 
the putting back of tha t same content on counter-notice by the website owner. 
D.2. The Indian stand 
The Copyright Act, 1957 was obviously drafted in complete oblivion of the 
phenomenon called the Internet. Even after its amendments in 1994 and 1999 
it does not contain any express provision for determining or limiting ISP 
liability. 
D.2.1. ISP Liability Under Information Technology Act, 2000 
The provisions relating to the ISPs are specifically legislated in the IT Act, 
2000 where an ISP is referred to as Network service provider and Explanation 
(a) to § 79 defines it as: "Network service provider" means an intermediary.47 
This provision exempts ISPs from liability if they can prove that they had no 
knowledge of the occurrence of the alleged act, and that they had taken due 
diligence to prevent a violation.48 The liability of ISPs could arise in a number 
of ways under different statutes. The liability could be criminal or civil in nature 
depending on various fac to r s . " The idea is that the liability of an ISP for his 
action or omission be first determined in accordance with the statute under 
17
 Intermediary has been defined under § 2(w) as: "intermediary" with respect to any 
particular electronic message means any person who on behalf of another person receives, 
stores or transmits that message or provides any service with respect to that message. 
18
 See Information Technology Act 2000 § 79. However, the existing provision does 
not clearly prescribe liability limits of service providers. For example, if a person makes a 
representation to a service provider claiming copyright on the material available on the 
network, will the service provider be liable if he fails to take steps within a reasonable time 
to remove the infringing material from the network? If the service provider fails to prevent 
infringement of copyright in the above circumstances, is the plea of not having knowledge 
of infringement still available to him? If the service provider removes the material f rom the 
network in pursuance to the representation made by a person which later on proves false, 
will the service provider be liable to the person whose material has been removed? 
44
 It is impractical to define the liability of ISPs which could arise in various forms at 
one place. Equally impractical could be to amend all our laws, which could hold ISPs 
liable, in order to limit their liability. The latter has not been attempted in any of the Indian 
legislations including the Copyright Act, 1957 till now. The IT Act, 2000 does not attempt 
the former but just seeks to create a filtering mechanism for determining the liability of 
ISPs. 
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which it arises and then if at all the ISP is held liable, his liability again be 
filtered through § 79 of the IT Act.100 
IV. Proposal for international standard guidelines and conclusion 
As courts and legislators continue to mold ISP liability standards, it is crucial 
that developments in substantive copyright law amendments occur alongside 
international agreement to create and adopt standardized procedures so that 
copyright holders, ISPs, and alleged infringers can easily follow where copyright 
infringement occurs on an international scale. 
This expansive growth of internet demands creation of a viable framework 
of international procedural standards that equip copyright holders and alleged 
infringers with a practicable means of contacting one another and resolving 
conflicts on a temporary interim basis. 
If the U.S . ' s recent legislative effort, the DMCA, is any indication of how 
other countries will treat ISP copyright liability for third-party infringement, 
then copyright will be limited by broad substantive legal exemptions for ISPs, 
leaving them with potentially divergent procedural standards to follow in 
jurisdictions where they are forced to guard their copyrights."" 
Designing an international notice/take-down standard requires consideration 
of the sovereignty of any given country's individual substantive copyright law. 
While it is impractical to include every potential caveat of individual laws in 
each country, it is feasible to generate a set of procedural guidelines applicable 
to all. Having examined both case law and legislative efforts in the U.S. and 
abroad, four viable behavioral elements appear to be essential: 1) designation 
of an agent to receive notice of infringement, 2) presumption of jurisdiction 
over the matter in the state where the ISP resides and accepts notice, but not 
necessarily in the jurisdiction where the copyright owner resides, 3) expeditious 
take-down pending formal resolution by a judicial body, and, 4) reasonable 
restoration of material or access to material where legitimate counter notifica-
tion is presented to the ISP. 
WIPO as a guardian and promoter of international property rights to imple-
ment international notice and take-down policy guidelines. WIPO is suitable to 
1,111
 An illustration of this can be of a situation where an ISP is accused of illegally 
distributing pirated copies of music, then his liability be first determined under S 51(a)(ii) 
and § 63 of the Copyright Act. 1957. If the ISP is found liable then his liability again be 
tested on the touchstone of § 79 of the IT Act. 2000. 
101
 See Soma-Norman: International take-down policy... op. cit. 
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address the complex issues that raise when copyright infringement spans 
international borders. Further support for WIPO steins from its position on 
multijurisdictional conflicts. 
Another appropropriate international organization for implementing inter-
national take down standards of conduct in copyright infringement claims 
could be the World Trade Organization102 It creates no new substantive rights, 
but seeks only to enforce compliance with existing substantive rights of 
member countries. Without having to interpret or select the law applicable to 
any given copyright infringement claim that occurs on an international basis, 
the W T O can effectively implement procedural guidelines to at minimum 
place parties to any controversy in a position where they can take the next step 
of litigating the matter. This relieves the WTO from making any jurisdictional 
determinations, or concluding which party should prevail. 
International standards for copyright protection must occur in the spirit of 
freely disseminating information and encouraging the broadest communication 
possible. International procedural guidelines implemented by the WTO and 
WIPO would strike a balance between the interests of copyright holders, ISPs, 
and alleged infringers without having to overcome the impracticable burden of 
creating uniform, substantive global copyrights. 
The internet is the future and ISPs are the gateway. Let the world come 
together and protect it f rom being dragged into gratuitous litigations. 
"
L
 The World Trade Organization (Hereinafter referred to as 'WTO') is the only global 
international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are 
the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world's trading nations and 
ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, 
and importers conduct their business. The World Trade Organization was created as part of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) revision signed April 15, 1994. As 
part of the 1994 revision of the GATT, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights,), established the WTO and created an enforcement structure to 
safeguard international intellectual property rights. See Soma-Norman: International take-
down policy.. . op. cit. 
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Gottfried divided his country-l ike Theodo Bavaria-among his sons into sub-
dukedoms, and Odilo had been most probably granted the territories lying 
south of the Boden See and in the surroundings of Augsburg, which helped 
Pirmin to found the monastery in Pfungen with Odilo's support.2 After their 
father's death, Odilo was ousted by his brother, Willihari f rom the territory, 
and probably Pirmin was forced to leave his monastery for the same reason. 
Between 709 and 712 the maior domus, Pippin II attacked Willihari several 
times, which was part of the intervention of the Franks in response to the 
conflict between the Bavarian and Alemannian branches of the Agilolfings, but 
in the course of this the maior domus did not contest the Agilolfing dynasty 's 
demand for ruling over the Alemannian and Bavarian Dukedom. However, he 
definitely had a say in deciding who was to be raised to duked m-through this 
act they considerably enhanced their power, which they could legitimise only 
after the uprising of Pippin III. Odilo was able to take the duke 's throne of 
Bavaria in 736.4 Yet from the initial period of his reign between 736 and 7 3 9 -
the establishment of bishoprics by Bonifatius-only a charter on the founding of 
the church sanctified by bishop Vivilo in the honour of Virgin Mary has been 
left to us. No traces of the duke ' s contribution in the establishment of this 
monastery can be identified though. Reference to the duke in this charter is 
rather unique, and shows somewhat remote-perhaps opposition-approach to 
him,5 which seems to be supported by the fact that a few years later a group of 
the Bavarian nobility appeared to be strong and resolute enough to expel the 
duke of Alemannian origin f r o m Bavaria.6 The opposition to Odilo can be most 
probably attributed to the Carolingian intervention implemented to further his 
ascension to the throne-just as earlier in the era of duke Hucbert, and later to 
reinforce the position of Odi lo ' s son, Tassilo7-since the Annales Mettenses 
Nótári T.: A salzburgi historiográfia kezdetei (The Beginning of Historiography in Salzburg). 
Szeged. 2007. 180 sqq. 
Zöllner: op. cit. 128 sq.; Stürmer. W.: Adelsgruppen im früh- und hochmittelalter-
lichen Bayern. Studien zur bayerischen Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte 4. München, 
1972. 23 sq. 
7
 Jahn, J.: Ducatiis Baiuvariorum. Das bairisclte Herzogtum der Agilolfinger. Stuttgart, 
1991. 124. 
4
 Wolfram: Die Geburt Mitteleuropas... op. cit. 98. 
Traditio Pataviensis Nr. 2. Quellen und Erörterungen zur bayerischen und deutschen 
Geschichte (1930) Nr. 2. In tempore duci Paiauuariorum erat nomen eins, et annum unum 
fait patria isla in sua potestate. 
6
 Breves Notitiae 8, 1, Losek, F. (ed.): Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger 
Landeskunde 130. 1990. 
7
 Jahn: Ducatus Baiuvariorum... op. cit. 127. 
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priores claims that Odilo was able to take dukedom owing to the generousness 
of Charles Martell.8 At that time Charles Martell 's wife was Swanahilt, a kin of 
Odilo, whom he had brought along from Bavaria in 725 together with Pilitrud. 
Most probably it was owing to Swanahilt's influence that until Charles Martel l ' s 
death the Frankish Empire and Bavaria and Alemannia maintained peaceful 
relations. Over these territories the Frankish ruler extended his influence 
without the need to integrate them into the Frankish state. Regarding Charles 
Martell 's death in 741, the author of the Continuationes Fredegarii note that 
he had withdrawn the neighbouring regno from his control." Nevertheless, the 
protocol on the division of his country shortly before his death does not mention 
Bavaria at all1" because it was allowed to remain an independent province 
not merged under Frankish supremacy-all the more as Lex Baiuvariorum 
guaranteed the rule over Bavaria to the Agilolf ings." It cannot be ruled out 
though-since Aquitania integrated into the impérium was not referred to in 
the protocol either—that external dukedoms were not mentioned at all during 
the division of the empire, and, albeit, eastern territories belonged to Carloman's 
competence, Pippin III quite often intervened in Bavarian affairs as early as 
during his brother's lifetime. 
Taking all the above into account, a consistent and already static conflict 
between the Agilolfings and the Carolingians cannot be stated, otherwise 
Odilo could not have fled f rom the threat of the Bavarian opposition in 740/41 
to the Frankish court, and it was only the succession discord among the 
Carolingians-when Carloman and mainly Pippin infr inged the Agol f ings ' 
interests several times-that made the relation tenser.12 From August 740 to 
March 741, Odilo stayed at the Frankish court after having been expelled by 
his enemies from Bavaria1 - o f the reasons for the expulsion and the identity of 
8
 Annales Mettenses priores 33. (Monumenta Germaniae Historien, SS rer. Germ. 10. 
1905.)... ipsian etiam ducatum suian, quod largiente olim Carola principe habuerat. 
' Continuationes Fredegarii 21. (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, SS 2. 1888.) 
10
 Continuationes Fredegarii 23. 
11
 Lex Baiuvariorum 3, 1. (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, LL nat. Germ. 5, 2. 
Hannover, 1926.) Dux vera, qui preest in populo, die semper de genere Agilolvingarum 
fuit et debet esse, quia sic reges antecessores nostri concesserunt eis, qui de genere illorum 
fidelis rei erat et pendens, ipsum constituebat ducem ad regendum populum ilium. Cf. 
Wolfram: Die Geburt Mitteleuropas... op. cit. 387 sqq.: Stürmer: Adelsgruppen... op. cit. 14 
sqq.; About the Lex Baiuvariorum see Landau, P.: Die Lex Baiuvariorum: Entstehungszeit, 
Entstellungsort und Charakter von Bayerns ältester Rechts- und Geschichtsquelle. 
München, 2004. 
12
 Jahn: Ducatus Baiuvariorum... op. cit. 130 sq. 
13
 Wolfram: Die Geburt Mitteleuropas... op. cit. 98 sq. 
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the enemies nothing is said in the sources. However, it is not unfounded to 
assume that this firm action taken by the nobles ' opposition must have been 
somehow related, on the one hand, to the approach engaged by Odilo, who 
ascended the Bavarian throne with the Franks ' support, to most probably 
ignore the demands for power of the nobles who had ma jo r influence under 
the Bavarian Agilolfing branch; and, on the other, to the establishment of 
bishoprics by Bonifatius, considerably furthered by Char les Martell, and 
perhaps Pippin and Car loman. Later, the duke was forced to win over this 
opposition that took firm action by granting them allowances, and that is how 
Odilo's age could become the period of the evolution of Bavarian nobility. '4 
During the last years of his rule, Charles Martell preferred Pippin, who 
appeared to be a more talented politician, to Carloman senior, and made him 
his co-ruler, '5 which led to attempts to take counter-action by his wife , 
Swanahilt and son, Grifo. However, once Gri fo-whose succession claim to the 
eastern territories must have been considered to have good chances by 
Bonifatius too " - a n d Swanahilt had been ousted from power , the Frankish 
policy turned to Alemannia and Bavaria with imperialistic demands.17 
Considering all the above, it is fully clear that Bavaria did not belong to the 
provinces intended to be divided by Charles Martell among his sons since 
Bavarian territories belonged neither cle iure, nor de facto to the Carolingians' 
power, and the Frankish ruler did not want to deprive the Agilolfings of the 
power they were lawfully entitled to-although Bavaria maintained an alliance 
with the Frankish Empire, it did not constitute a sub-province or a subjected 
province thereof.18 It was during the months spent at the Frankish court that 
Odilo acquainted with Charles Martell's daughter, Car loman ' s and Pippin 's 
sister, Hiltrud, and they were engaged-most probably enjoying the support of 
Swanahilt, kin of Odilo, who desired to make dynastic relations between the 
Carolingians and the Agilolfings closer through this event too, and having 
Charles Martel l 's approval.14 After Charles Martell 's death on 22 October 741, 
however, Hiltrud had to leave the Frankish court.2" Odilo returned to Bavaria 
before Charles Martell 's death, and re-obtained his dukedom with the Frankish 
14
 Jahn: Ducatus Baiuvariorum... op. cit. 173. 
13
 Annales Mettenses priores 31. Pippinus iam princeps factus ... 
16
 Bonifatius: Epistolae 48. (Moiuimenta Germaniae Historien, EE selectae 1. 1916.) 
17
 Strömer: Adelsgruppen... op. cit. 38. 
18
 Jahn: Ducatus Baiuvariorum... op. cit. 174 sqq. 
14
 Wolfram: Die Geburt Mitteleuropas... op. cit. 98; Becher, M.: Zum Geburtsjahr 
Tassilos III. Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte 52 (1989) 9 sqq. 
'"Annales Mettenses priores 33; Continuationes Fredegarii 25. 
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assistance, and in this sense it is well founded to deliberate the statement of the 
Annales Mettenses priores asserting that Odilo obtained his dukedom owing to 
Charles's generosity.21 In the same year, in 741 Odilo's and Hiltrud's child, 
Tassilo was born.22 Pippin and Carloman did not accept Charles Martell 's 
succession ordinance that-upon Swanahilt 's influence-granted Grifo share of 
inheritance f rom his empire.2 ' Sources assert that even Frankish dignitaries 
were not willing to consent to the decision made on the queen ' s influence, and 
with their army Carloman and Pippin prevailed over Grio and his mother, 
Swanahilt, who were seeking refuge in Laon, exiling the former to the 
monastery in Chèvremont, the latter to the monastery in Chelles.24 Pippin and 
Carloman again divided the empire at Vieux-Poitiers,25 which raised the 
number of consecutive divisions to three: Charles Martell 's first division was 
revised by him at Swanahil t 's advice; in the second division he ranked Gr i fo 
also among beneficiaries; and, then, the divisio by Pippin an Carloman at 
Vieux-Poitiers followed, which was, however, not generally acknowledged 
as shown by the uprising in Aquitania.2 '1 
Pippin's and Carloman's legitimacy seemed all the more questionable 
because Charles Martell exercised power since 737 also for lack of a legitimate 
ruler from the Merowing dynasty; and in terms of their rank his sons were not 
on a higher level either than the Alemannian, Aquitanian or Bavarian dukes, 
and the oath of allegiance of the latter bound them merely to fidelitas to 
Charles Martell-even Pippin made up for the lack of sacred legitimacy only 
through being anointed in 751.27 Therefore, Pippin and Carloman cannot be 
considered legitimate and his all the more aggressive policy understandably 
evoked the opposition of the ruling dukes of the territories that were partly 
integrated in the Frankish Empire, partly lay outside it but belonged to the 
Frankish sphere of interest. Odilo and Aquitania 's duke, Hunoald entered into 
a protection alliance through legates against the Franks,"8 which was joined by 
the Saxons and Alemannians too. After Pippin and Carloman defeated Hunoald 
21
 Annates Mettenses priores 33. ... ipsum etiam ducatum suton, quod largiente olim 
Carolo principe habuerat. 
22
 Reindel, K.: Das Zeitalter der Agilolfinger (bis 788). In: Spindler, M. (Hrsg.): 
Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte I. München, 1971. 124. 
23
 Jahn: Ducatus Baiuvariorum... op. cit. 177. 
24
 Annales Mettenses priores 32 sq. 
25
 Annales regni Francorum a. 742. (Monumenta Gennaniae Historien, SS rer. Germ. 
6. Hannover, 1895.); Annales Mettenses priores 33. 
26
 Continuationes Fredegarii 25; Annales regni Francorum a. 742. 
7
 Jahn: Ducatus Baiuvariorum... op. cit. 179. 
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in 742, they turned against the Alemannian duke, Theodbald, Odilo's brother, 
who had attacked them in the campaign against Aquitania." The Frankish 
army gett ing across the Rhine and setting up a camp beside the Danube 
represented due threat to get the Alemannians to acknowledge Frankish dicio 
over them;3 0 and it cannot be ruled out that the Frankish military force 
penetrated into Bavarian territories too.3 ' The dukes opposing Pippin's and 
Carloman's claims for power found an ally in Grifo and Swanahilt, who had a 
considerable number of loyal men-with the latter Odilo could maintain fairly 
good relations through his wife, Hil trut-and so an opposition covering the 
whole empire against Charles Martell 's sons from his first marriage evolved. 
In this system of alliance Odilo 's prestige can be hardly underestimated since 
his multiple kinship relations maintained with the Carolingians-established 
through Swanahilt, on the one hand, and Hiltrud, on the other32-could make 
him a worthy rival of Pippin and Carloman, similarly to the rivalry evolved a 
generation later between Tassilo and Charlemagne.33 In addition to the 
description of the armed conflict between Pippin and Carloman and their 
brother-in-law, Odilo, ended with the Franks ' victory, the sources expounded 
the reasons for the confl ic t : Odilo wanted to withdraw his country he had 
won owing to Charles Martel l ' s generosity from the Carolingians' influence.3 ' 
However, this act cannot be qualified a consistent deed against Frankish 
authority because in the 740 ' s the Frankish dicio cannot be unambiguously 
considered the synonym of the power exercised by the Carolingians.35 After 
the victory by the Franks, no reprisals were taken against Odilo-as stated in 
sources; keeping his duke ' s rank he could rule in Bavaria; all the more for he 
made his position firm and stable among the Bavarian nobles, who engaged an 
opposition initially, and in 744, perhaps in spite of Pippin 's will, Carloman and 
29
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32
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Odilo made a peace, fully acknowledging his duke 's ri ghts.36 Thus, it can be 
stated that the military events in 743 by no means sowed the seeds of discord 
between the Carolingians and the Agilolfings extending to several decades; 
instead, they confirmed the legitimacy of Odi lo ' s rule as a duke. '7 Slowly 
prevailing over his brother, Pippin strived to assert Frankish influence over 
Bavaria through several channels; for example, through actively intervening in 
the appointment of the Carantanian princes following Boruth, Cacatius and 
Cheitmar38 and in ordaining Virgil bishop of Salzburg, who was later involved 
in a conflict regarding several issues with Bonifatius vested with archbishop's 
powers by Carloman in 743.34 
The latter case is worth outlining briefly because it implies that the duke 
had a direct say in appointing bishops; yet there is no information on this right 
being regulated in one way or another. All the more since the development of 
Bavaria's church organisation and system of bishoprics reached the final stage 
only owing to Bonifatius's operation and that with the duke ' s considerable 
assistance. On 15 May 719, pope Gregory II (715-731) assigned missionary 
duties to Bonifatius without specifying any particular target area;10 then, on 30 
November 722, he ordained him bishop and directed him towards the countries 
and territories inhabited by Germans,41 and later received his reports and 
replied his questions.42 By the time of Gregory III (731-741)-al though there 
had been no accurately determined diocese borders-the period of wondering 
bishops in Bavaria had ended, they were replaced by (abbot(bishops having a 
permanent seat, on the one hand.43 In the year following his ascension to the 
throne, in 732 it was the pope himself who commissioned Bonifatius, who was 
made archbishop through having been granted the pallium although he did not 
obtain a definite metropolia, to restructure the Bavarian church organisation 
76
 Annales Mosellani a. 744. (Monumenta Germaniae Historiée, SS 16. 1859.); 
Annales Sitliienses a. 744. 
77
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 Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum 4. (Monumenta Germaniae Historien, 
Studien und Texte 15. 1997.) 
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and, if necessary, to ordain bishops.44 Bonifatius visited Bavaria as early as in 
719;45 then, between 733 and 735 at the invitation of duke Hucbert he paid a 
visit to all the Bavarian dioceses.4,1 Pope Gregory III appointed Bonifatius his 
legate, and in his letter addressed to the bishops of Bavaria and Alemannia he 
instructed them to gather in a meeting at a location beside the Danube defined 
by Bonifatius.4 Bonifatius finally determined four bishop's seats: Regensburg, 
Passau, Salzburg and Freising-these towns had attained a significant role not 
only as secular centres, their sacred legitimation was ensured-as far as Regens-
burg, Salzburg and Freising is concerned-by the operation of missionaries, 
Haimhrammus/Emmeram, Hrodbertus/Rupert and Corbinianus/Korbinian.48 He 
did not acknowledge the (abbot)bishops who operated at these four seats as 
diocese bishops-without questioning their rank as bishops-and fulfilled their 
places by bishops ordained by him: John in Salzburg, Erembert in Freising, 
and Gaubald/Gaibald in Regensburg.4 4 
In Passau, in spite of his reserves, he left Vivilo in his office, which was 
confirmed by the pope although this confirmation had some reproving over-
tone.80 In relation to Bonifat ius nothing is said about Augsburg established a 
long time before setting up the Bavarian church organisation, and Sähen ranked 
among Bavarian bishoprics later only; and the Bishopric of Eichstätt, which 
covered both Bavarian and Swabian territories, would be established only in 
743/44.51 The church organisation developed by Bonifat ius soon became 
even more consolidated through maintaining local traditions. In Regensburg 
St Emmeram ' s relics were ceremonially placed; in 764 Tassilo had St 
Valentine's relics brought to Passau. In 765 bishop Arbeo placed the mortal 
remains of St Korbinian in Freising; finally, in 774, bishop Virgil arranged for 
paying honour to the relics of St Rupert and his companions in the dome of 
4 4Jaffé 2239; Bonifatius: Epistolae 26; Schmidinger, H.: Das Papsttum und die 
bayerische Kirche - Bonifatius als Gegenspieler Virgils. In: Dopsch, H.-Juffinger, R. 
(Hrsg.): Virgil von Salzburg. Missionar und Gelehrter. Salzburg 1985. 94; Schieffer: op. 
cit. 153 sqq. 
45
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46
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47
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fränkische Spannung. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen dem Papsttum 
und den Karolingern. In: BosI, K. (Hrsg.): Zur Geschichte der Bayern. Darmstadt, 1965. 
280 sq. 
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Salzburg.52 Returning to the point of the duke ' s powers: it is known that until 
the dethronement of the Agilolfing dynasty in 788 the local council was chaired 
by the duke-since in Bavaria the archbishopric was set up only by pope Leo III 
(795-816) in 798, who raised Arn, bishop of Salzburg, Charlemagne's confidant 
to the archbishop's seat, and Salzburg to the function of archbishopric 5 3-
therefore, his power was close to the king's power, clearly demonstrated by 
the dating the charters of the period in accordance with the Bavarian duke ' s 
reign.54 
II. With respect to status libertatis the separation based on the opposition of 
free-servant(slave) (liber-servus) was formulated already by Gaius, jurist in the 
2nd c. AD;55 and later this divisio was repeated by Charlemagne in Capitularia 
missorum pointing out that no third option, i.e., personal status should exist.56 
On the grounds of the above, it would be righteous to set out from the fact that 
the Bavarian legal system of the period adopted and provided for only these 
two statuses-well, in the sources there are numerous personal statuses in-
between the above two. In the investigation of the concept of libertás, trends 
of research setting out primarily f rom German laws and using charters as basic 
sources constitute a kind of contrast, and it cannot be considered accidental 
that the former trend took up the cudgels for the so-called Gemeinfreiheit 
theory, and the latter developed and adopted the Königsfreiheit theory.57 All 
German laws (Volksrechte) set out from dividing society into freemen 
(liberi/ingenui) and servants (servus/ancilla/mancipium)-accordingly, the earliest 
f ragment of Lex Romana Visigothorum, which can be related to the name of 
king Eurich (466-484) , imposes different punishments on ingenuus who 
52
 Schmidinger : op. cit. 95. 
53
 Annales Iuvavenses maximi a. 798; Annales Iuvavenses maiores a. 798. (Monumenta 
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34
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geschichte 1. München-Leipzig, 1961. 213 sq. 
33
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36
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1883-1897.) 
37
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remove boundary-stones and on servus who implement the same d e e d / 8 and 
accordingly "Wergelcl" could be imposed for killed, or injured liber/ingenuus; 
however, for killing or injuring a servus only compensation for damage was 
stipulated.5" The phrase s ive ingenuus sive servus is used in Lex Romana 
Burgundiorum drafted before 506 and Lex Romana Visigorthorum published in 
506 as a natural expression. '" (Alemannian laws clearly split even freemen into 
groups: primus Alamannus, medianus Alamannus, minofletus M ) 
The term liber/ingenuus is interpreted exclusively by the root frei/fri in 
each German language and dialect,6- which result can be attained mostly 
through translations. The Old German texts of the 8th-9th c. interpret both 
liber and ingenuus as fri;b? e.g., the fragments from Mondsee from the late 8th 
c. The Old Alemannian Benedictine regula from approx. 800;65 the hymns 
from Murbach from the 9th c . / ' ' the capitulare from Trier from the mid 9th c / 7 
The Abrogans-glossarium drafted in the mid 8th c. interprets the word liber 
as frihals;(A in Notker ' s work libertás is covered by fri liai si and friheit; the 
Old Alemannian Benedictine regula use the phrase frihals in the sense of 
liberation. The terms libertinus/libertus are translated with terms frilaz, fri, 
frigeling, frigilazzan in the glosses.69 From the Lex Baiuvariorum both the 
male and female fo rms can be identified regarding freed persons (frilatz, 
38
 Leges Visigothorum, tit. 274. (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, LL nat. Germ. 1,1. 
1902.) 
34
 C. Schott: Freiheit und Libertás. Zur Genese eines Begriffs. Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung, 104. 1987. 92. 
60
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1. 1892.); Lex Romana Visigothorum 9. 14, 1. 
61
 Leges Alamannorum 3, 21. (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, LL nat. Germ. 5, I. 
1888.) 
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 Bischoff, B.-Duft, J.-Sonderegger, S. (Hrsg.): Die „Abrogans"-Handschrift der 
Stiftsbibliothek St. Gallen. St. Gallen, 1977. 191. libertás/frihalsi; libera/frihals. 
69
 Köbler, G.: Althochdeutsch-lateinisches Wörterbuch. Gießen, 1984. 191 sq. 
PERSONAL STATUS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN EARLY MEDIEVAL BAVARIA 95 
frilaza).7" Only in a rather narrow scope do German law (Volksrecht) provide 
points of reference for determining the concept of liber/ingenuus:71 in one of 
the manuscripts of Lex Salica the glosses from Malberg attaches the explanation 
frio falcino (Freienraub) to kidnapping freemen (ingéniais).12 Among Lango-
bardian laws those enacted by Liutprand use the term frea at two points to 
name free woman;7 3 and in Edictus (!) Rothari the term fulcfree (volksfrei) can 
be read several t imes; e.g., in the somewhat pleonastic compound midier libera 
fulcfree.14 
Searching for the earliest written records among the literary remains of the 
German language that can be used for the purposes of the investigation of this 
paper, it is possible to get to the Gothic nouns freihals and frijei, and the 
adjective freis left to us from the 4th c.75 However, the relation between these 
words and the Latin terms libertas/liber can be demonstrated only through the 
medium of Greek because the translation of the Bible into Gothic was based on 
the Greek text.7" At the same time, libertás can be undoubtedly matched with 
the terms freihals/frijei because the locus s ive liberi sive servi is interpreted in 
Justinian's Novellae as eite eleuteroi eite douloi1 and, accordingly, the term 
fratels can be matched with apeleutheros and libertus.1* It deserves special 
attention that the adiectivum freis and its derivatives show close links with 
the words frijon (philein, apagan, amare, diligere), frijonds (philos, amicus), 
frijathwa (agape, dilecti, Caritas), which makes it absolutely clear that the 
German concept of freedom-as in numerous Indo-European languages7 >-might 
have originally belonged to the scope of concept of kinship/clan relations.80 
7,1
 Lex Baiuvariorum tit. 5; 8, 10. 
71
 Cf. G. v. Olberg: Freie, Nachbarn und Gefolgsleute. Volkssprachige Bezeichnungen 
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York. 1983. 103 sqq. 
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Accordingly, those who belonged to the scope embraced by this concept-that 
is, to kinship/clan relations-could be considered protected, in spite of the fact 
that this social/legal process, and the process of changes in the meaning of the 
words cannot be fol lowed up step by step.81 In this case, kinship relations, as 
a matter of fact, cannot be construed as blood relationship stricto sensu, 
much rather a sort of belonging/alliance relation, which included, in addition 
to servants(slaves), the entourage. The social/clan structure developing during 
this process brought along as a natural consequence the evolution of 
subordination and superordination; and to qualify freemen it was required for a 
person to be able be covered by the influence of the entity exercising power, 
that is, the state; i.e., such person should not be under control of another 
person (limiting freedom). Thus, the concept of freedom that shows close 
links with Roman law traditions is nothing else than the sine qua non of the 
development of statehood, which was instrumental in clearly separating the 
scope of subjects-at-law, that is, the direct addressees of state regulations and 
the persons that could not be considered subjects-at-law.82 
As regards persons in free status. Lex Baiuvariorum reveals the following. 
The "Wergeld" for a free Bavarian person, either killed or unlawfully sold, 
was determined by law as one hundred and sixty solidi,83 plus forty solidi to be 
paid to the fiscus.84 Freemen were subject to the judicial power of the duke 
exercised by the dux through his counts (comités) and judges (indices); 
therefore, it is not by chance that all statutory provisions regarding f r eemen-
except for provisions on their personal protection-are set forth in the second 
part of Lex Baiuvariorum on matters to be handled by the duke.87 On the other 
hand, statutory provisions-which set out from the ideal picture formed of the 
freemen who constituted the core of Bavarian gens-do not supply extended 
information on the rate of freemen in the society of the period.8' The Bavarian 
army consisted mostly of freemen; at the same time, warriors included people 
of lower ranks (homines minore. v)87 and servants (servi j.88 Each part of the 
army (comitatus) was headed by a count (comes), who controlled centuriones 
81
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and decanif' Bavarians in the status of f reemen-af ter having handed over their 
share of the inheri tance to their successors-were allowed to grant their 
property to the church, and the duke did not have the right to submit any 
reserve against it.9" After taking into account the widow's rights, only male 
successors were vested with the right of succession; that is, by then the right of 
succession of the larger scope-of the clan-had been thrust in the background 
by the family right of succession;91 the clan (gens/Sippe) included relatives 
even of the seventh grade; and originally right of succession extended to the 
same grade."2 The significance of gens is demonstrated by the rule on 
cleansing oath since the twelve companions taking the oath had to come from 
the clan of the person taking the oath (de suo gene re).93 
Freemen were obliged to attend meetings serving public jurisdiction 
purposes (placita/Ding), arranged by the duke ' s iudex at the beginning or 
middle of each month.9 1 Persons not in the status of freemen could obtain 
freedman/liberated status (frilaz) through being set free (manumissio)f5 
However, it was possible to lose freedom, e.g., the ingenua who committed 
abortion was given by the duke into the service (servitium) of another free 
person.9'1 If the assets of the person who caused damage did not cover the 
amount of blood money or compensation for damage such person had to enter 
the servitium of another person, and were obliged to settle the amount of the 
sanction in monthly or yearly instalments from the amount so acquired.97 Once 
completing the above, he most probably regained freedom, which again 
confirms the picture developed about the possibility of mobility/transfers 
between statuses.98 Lex Baiuvariorum provided the members of free but poor 
layers with the option of placing themselves and their property under the 
84
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protection of a person with larger power and property; a similar kind of 
commendatio to the duke was also poss ib le ." One of the provisions of Lex 
Baiuvariorum regards the members of the entourage of the (Frankish) king 
the king's vassals (vassi), who were also subject to the duke 's iurisdictio,100 
but of these ra.w/-although their presence in Bavaria, and their increasing 
significance f rom duke Odilo 's period cannot be ruled out-nothing is said in 
the sources regarding the period before 787, that is, the vassal's commendatio 
made by Tassilo before Charlemagne. Consequently, it can be assumed that 
this passage was included in the text of Lex Baiuvariorum after 788.101 The 
significant social differences between freemen equal in theory were at some 
points taken into account in Lex Baiuvariorum; e.g., the leader of riots against 
the duke (carmulum)102 was obliged to pay a penalty of six hundred, his 
companions two hundred, and people of low order (minor populus) but in 
freemen status joining them forty solidi.m 
Contrary to freemen, servants (servi) were not entitled to potestas to make 
them able to dispose of themselves and their property. Although Lex 
Baiuvariorum provides for servants who had property (facilitates),101 in theory 
and generally they were subject to their lord 's authority,105 who was entitled to 
donate or devise them free from burdens. The campaigns of the duke outside 
the borders of the country were also good occasions for getting servants.106 
Their value was usually determined at twelve solidi: however, in the case that 
a servant was killed his lord was entitled to twenty solidi, that is, half of the 
"Wergeld" for a libertinus.wl Similarly to freemen, servants did not constitute 
a legally homogenous group: the class of servants ranged from mancipium 
l iving in full dependence to servus, regarding whom Lex Baiuvariorum ran 
the risk to state that they would kidnap and sell a freeman, and consequently 
sanctioned this deed.108 The Bavarian army included servants,109 and Lex 
Baiuvariorum refers to the state of facts where it prohibits any relation 
44
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between a f ree woman and a man in servant status,"" whereas a freeman was 
entitled to marry a servant woman (ancilla), although the successors were 
entitled to limited right of successions only. 1" The law adduces to the presence 
of servants (servi) in the duke ' s cour t" 2 where they had the option to r i se" 3 
as it is shown by the example of Tonazan and Ledi told concerning cella 
Maximiliani in Libellus Virgilii, which constitutes the core of Breves 
Notitiae.>u It was just due to their border guarding duties that the members of 
genealógia Albiiui qualified adalscalhae, exercitales homines-and later servi 
fiscalini, or servants not deprived of their f reedom-and several of them rose to 
church dignitaries' pos i t ions ." 5 Aldiones who appeared in several cases as 
the subject of traditiones were at the same level with liberated/freedmen 
(libertinif since also in Langobardian law successors of liberated parents 
qualified aldiones, and were clearly separated from servants ," 7 especially when 
considering Langobardian aldii ministeriales, who fulfi l led highly important 
(as it were administrative) functions.118 It cannot be ruled out that this term was 
borrowed by Bavarian law from the Langobards."" Owing to their special 
status, only the duke's family could afford donating aldiones 
III. Lex Baiuvariorum formally vested the duke from the Agilolfing dynasty, 
ordered and bound to be loyal by the Frankish king, with hereditary ruler 's 
rights121 but loyalty to the king and leading the Bavarian army did not involve 
the obligation to join the royal army unconditionally and at all times.122 The 
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111
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duke must have undoubtedly been the landowner with the greatest property in 
his province; yet, rather scarce information is available on the administration 
of duke 's estates and villae publicae, which also belonged to the d u k e ' s 
assets.123 Bavarian dukes-similarly to Langobardian rulers and the Caro l ingians-
sometimes divided their country into sub-dukedoms among their sons as duke 
Theodo 's example shows.124 The duke played an active part in the Bavarian 
church too: he founded numerous monasteries and provided them with goods. 
The scope of persons baptised by Rupert is defined in Gesta Sancti Hrodberti 
confessons drafted after 7 9 3 - w h i c h , however , goes back to Vita Hrodberti 
written by b ishop Virgil in approx. 746/47 i 2 5 -as the duke and several of the 
nobles of the gens (niulti alii illiits gentis nobiles viri);'26 and in Breves Notitiae 
written b e t w e e n 798 and 800 as duke Theodo and Bavar ian dignitaries 
(proceres sui Baioarii).127 Gesta Hrodberti c laims that Rupert was received by 
the duke h imsel f and his entourage (satellites) in Regensburg, ' 2 8 but the term 
satellites denot ing the entourage was replaced by the more colourless pronoun 
sui in chapter one of Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum written in 
870 l 2 9 -whieh is recognised as another variant of Vita Hrodberti. So each of 
the above descriptions relates on the duke and his environment, entourage who 
received Ruper t with due respect and being open to Christianity. Belonging to 
the duke 's environment raised the members of the entourage to a higher social 
level; and, accordingly, the original satrapes were replaced by nobiles in 
123
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chapter nine of the 9th c. version of Vita Corbiniani written by Arbeo.131 The 
satellites, and satrapes attended the duke's consilia,132 and as satrapes terrae 
disposed of significant estates,1" but sources do not give an answer to the 
question if they stayed permanently at the duke ' s court in Regensburg, or only 
for defined periods, or visited there occasionally.134 The military nature of this 
entourage can be deduced from the specification cohors,135 The duke might 
have assigned various duties to delegates (missi), e.g. supervising the operation 
of dioceses,136 which institution developed later in the empire of the 
Carolingians.137 
The duke 's administration also included centenaria, actores subjected to 
the count's authori ty-a title used on one occasion as a synonym of count 1 3 8-
they administered the duke's benefices,134 just as the castaldia, who appeared 
in the last phase of the age of the Agilolfings and bore a Langobardian 
function.14(1 In addition to of f ice holders, the duke ' s agents and the executors 
of his orders were provided with a relatively great elbow room and authority 
in the fulf i lment of their military and administrative duties by the Lex 
Baiuvariorum141 since both them and their successors were secured by the 
duke 's protection, which was meant to ensure continuity f rom one generation 
to the other of those acting in the duke's administration.112 If they died in war 
or while fulfi l l ing their duties, their successors-whether freemen or servants-
1,1
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could inherit their entire property, and the law gave reasons for this exception-
ally protected status. None should hesitate to observe the duke's command! 1 " 
Similarly, homicide committed on the orders of the duke resulted in no 
punishment; no revenge could be taken either on the perpetrator of the act or 
his successors."4 All these benefits must have made the duke's service a 
highly favourable and advantageous option to any social layer.145 
Bavarian genealogiae-which are treated under a separate title in Lex 
BaiuvariorumiAb-are topped by the Agilolfings as summi principes, who stood 
out among other genealogie, in addition to their hereditary duke's rank, for 
their blood money being four times the amount of the blood money of a Bavarian 
freeman, while the "Wergeld" of the members of other genealogiae-who were 
as it were the first (that is, had the highest rank) after the Agilolfings in 
Bavar ia-amounted to double "Wergeld" the of a Bavarian freeman.1 1 7 The 
"Wergeld" of the members of the gens Agilolfingarum was exceeded by the 
duke's "Wergeld", which was determined by law as an amount equal to the 
amount of the " W e r g e l d " of his relatives plus one third thereof.148 The double 
"Wergeld" of members of the genealogiae makes it possible to compare them 
both in terms of their social and political significance to the Longobard primi, 
who were also protected and provided the king's entourage; all the more since 
in the Bavarian legal system and social structure of the age of the Agilolfings 
several elements and comparable aspects of Longobard origin can be 
identified.14 ' ' As regards the five genealogiae (Hosi/Huosi, Drazza/Trazza, 
Fagana, Hahilinga, Anniona'8 0) specified in Lex Baiuvariorum it cannot be 
ruled out that somehow they reflect the stage of the Bavarian ethnogenesis 
where various Bavarian tribal groups having merged as Bavarian gens brought 
along the layer of their leaders, who were given a part in further political 
development. '8 ' Curiously, various sources of charters do not include each 
genealógia: from the age of the Agilolfings information is available only on 
the genealógia Fagana, and although certain members of the genealógia Huosi 
143
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are referred to in the age of the independent Bavarian Dukedom, as a uniform 
genealógia they played an active political role only after the dethronement of the 
Agilolfings, and the Carolingians' having seized power. In addition to assuming 
political roles, the genealógia Fagana and the genealógia Huosi must have 
been the most significant landowners in Bavaria beside the duke. Since, 
however, the charters of the age of the Agilolfings and the Carolingians 
mention only the aforesaid two genealogiae, in contrast with the five genealogiae 
described in Lex Baiuvariorum, it can be declared that Lex Baiuvariorum 
presents archaic conditions that had become outdated by the 8th c.172 On the 
other hand, sources include genealogiae-for example, the genealógia Feringa15*-
which were not entitled to potestas to enable them to dispose of their real 
estates in various legal transactions; instead of them the duke implemented 
traditiones s ince they were subjected to the duke as members of his 
154 
entourage. 
On the grounds of all that, two kinds of the Bavarian genealogiae can be 
distinguished: on the one hand, the old genealogiae directly following, in 
terms of their nobility, the Agilolf ings-cal led Geschlechtsadel, or alter 
Geburtsadel by Brunner,177 who were provided with prioritised positions 
owing to both of their legal status and political role. On the other hand, the 
new genealogiae belonging to the duke's entourage, who fulfilled both military 
and administrative duties.156 From among the new genealogiae subject to the 
duke it is worth mentioning the genealógia Albina, who fulfilled border 
guarding duties along the frontiers shared with the Slavs, and who represented 
the adverse actors versus bishop Virgil in the dispute evolved regarding cella 
Maximiliani and described in Libellas Virgilii and Breves Notitiae,157 The 
members of this genealogy rose from the group of Bavarians in status of 
freemen for they executed services for the duke as exercitales homines', in 
Virgil's presentation, however, they were described as servi, in spite of the fact 
that he uses the category genealógia also in their case.178 Between the more 
ancient genealogiae mentioned in the Lex Baiuvariorum and the Agilolfings, 
dynastic marriages might have been concluded because some members of the 
genealógia Huosi bore names typical of the Agilolfings (Egilolf, Odilo, 
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Lantfrid).154 The Agilolf ings and the genealogiae constituted the Bavarian 
nobility. The Bavarian genealógia can be compared to the Langobardian 
concept of fara, which was bound together also by blood relations as a military 
alliance."'" The power of the genealogiae and the danger they implied to the 
duke's power are clearly demonstrated by the provisions of Lex Baiuvariorum 
that stipulate that the duke shall be entitled to adopt a judgment on dignitaries 
(homines potentes) who call the enemy into the country and surrender the 
civitaslbl (presumably the duke 's seat, Regensburg) to them, and ignite riots.162  
Engaging a causistic approach. Lex Baiuvariorum probably would have not 
provided for these cases if it had not deemed there were reasonable chances for 
them to occur.1"3 
Lex Baiuvariorum reached an important stage in Bavarian law-making at 
the Council of Dignolfing, which created the novellae transplanting changes in 
the social structure into the law. The Council of Dignolfing held with the 
participation of six bishops and thirteen abbots"'4 can be dated to the seventies 
of the 8th c.; yet its date can be specified even more accurately. The date of the 
death of Wisurih, bishop of Passau attending the council (1 May 777) can be 
considered terminus ante quern.'"3 The minutes of the council was signed as 
doyen by Manno, bishop of Freising, who was followed in his seat by 
Oadalhart very soon in 777;'"" and Fater, abbot of Kremsmünster ordained on 
9 November 777 had not attended the synod yet. On the grounds of all the 
above it is reasonable to assume that the Council of Dingolfing must have been 
held in the first months of the year 777.167 At the Council of Dingolf ing, 
Tassilo and his advisors renewed some paragraphs of Le.x Baiuvariorum, which 
enabled them to guarantee to the nobles, freemen and the duke 's servants, i.e., 
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the adalscalhae, (nobiles et liberi et servi eins) statutory protection already 
obtained during duke Odilo's period, and the right to law (ins ad legem),168  
which led to the rising of the adalscalhae, on the one hand; and the develop-
ment of the independent ordo of nobles, on the other.169 It was in this spirit 
that the Council of Dingolfing determined the necessity of the presence of 
three reliable noble witnesses required for demonstration by documentary 
evidence,170 whereas Lex Baiuvariorum does not say anything of the personal 
status of witnesses. i 7 i Both Odilo-having learned his lesson from his earlier 
fa i lure-and Tassi lo made effor ts to win over the loyalty of nobiles and 
adalscalhae through donating them inheritable estates, al though they made 
this donation subject to discharging duties in the duke 's service172 and other 
services not specified.173 It should be added that this ruler 's practice can be 
compared to the oath of allegiance obtained from the royal arimanni, i.e., 
of f ice holders, by the Langobardian king, Liutprand, whom he strived to bind 
to him through granting them estates and limited right of disposal of estates as 
a positive motivation.17 ' Getting increasingly separated from freemen, prevailing 
over them and having maintained considerable political and economic influence 
for a long time, this layer fought for and achieved most probably at the Council 
of Dingolfing-as it were as a compromise entered into with duke Odilo, who 
re-obtained his rule with the assistance of the Franks but was unable to rule 
in the long run without the approval of the Bavarian dignitaries, and assumed 
by duke Tass i lo- the legal formulation of their acknowledgement as an 
independent order of nobles.173 The sources reflecting the conditions that 
prevailed in the first half of the 8th c. did use the term nobilis176 but in several 
168
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cases only as a hagiographie topos,177 and by no means as a terminus 
technicus. Lex Baiuvariorum applies the term nobilis no more than on two 
occasions;178 however, they do not help to demonstrate any consistency in the 
r 170 
use ot terms. 
As a matter of fact, it is possible to speak about nobles in Bavaria before 
Odi lo ' s period as the duke himself and the genealogiae referred to in Lex 
Baiuvariorum undoubtedly belonged to the nobility but it was by the 8th c. that 
the nobility as a uniform and legally acknowledged layer had fully developed, 
and obtained their attributes that had existed before but became clear cut only 
now: giving noble names; possessing huge and sometimes geographically 
scattered estates; having the right of disposal of private churches, and making 
efforts to attain such rights; and having the right to take part in the duke ' s rule 
and governance.1811 After power had been seized by the Franks in Bavaria, 
Char lemagne 's government was surprised to see and admit the Bavarian 
nobility's resolute insistence on keeping their rights, and the nobility-especially 
to ensure their estates-powerfully emphasised their privileges provided by their 
origin,181 which clearly reveals that by the last phase of the Agilolfings' rule 
genus nobilium had unambiguously developed having privileges ensured by 
and enshrined in legal acts.182 
The Council of Dingolfing confirmed the privileged "Wergeld" of the 
ruler, i.e., the duke, the servants, that is the noble servants, i.e., the adalscalhae 
(servi principis qui dicuntur adalscalhae),183 who directly belonged to the 
duke ' s entourage and through that considerably rose on the social ladder, 
which justified their peculiarly contradicting personal status of being nobles 
and servants simultaneously that cannot be matched with any status in the 
Frankish legal system.1 8 ' [To make the usual translation of adalscalha with 
the term Edelknecht somewhat relative, '8 5 it can be compared with the term 
adalporo-in Notifia Arnonis the word adalporo denotes the tax that the 
inhabitants of Reichenhall were obliged to pay to the duke as a kind of census 
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dominicus.m The base -poro/-paro can be related to the Greek word phoros 
meaning tax', therefore, adalporo might have meant the tax that the noble 
(adal-) was entitled to. On the grounds of the adalscalha-definition of the 
Council of Dingolfing (servi principis),K1 this term might have denoted the 
persons acting in the service of the noble, that is, the duke.188 This inter-
pretation is supported by the specification servi (homines) dominici used in 
Breviarius Urolfi,w> which corresponds with census dominicus applied in 
Notitia Arnonis.190 As the aforesaid tax was due and payable to the person 
whom these sources named adal- as a specification solely applied to him, that 
is, the duke, it is undoubted that the adalscalhae were meant to serve him.191] 
The adalscalhae were entitled to marry women of noble origin, which again 
clearly indicates mobili ty in the Bavarian society of the period;192 upon 
Tassi lo ' s fall in 788 and legitimised dethronement in 794,193 the subjection of 
the adalscalhae to the duke terminated, and they became in terms of their 
name free servants, barscalliae, and in terms of their status freemen.194 
The development and regulation of the personal status of the adalscalhae, 
which was logically not free from contradictions but was by all means unique 
and suited the purposes of the d u k e ' s rule, reveals the roots of the evolution 
of a peculiar Bavarian vassal 's system somewhat ahead of the Frankish 
development, which later, however, due to the Franks' gaining dominance, 
came to a standstill and could not reach its ful ly developed stage.195 The 
protection of persons representing the support of the duke ' s power was 
widened in legislation to the extent that in addition to the three capital offences 
set forth in Lex Baiuvariorum1'"' the Council of Dingolfing introduced 
l8
'' Notitia Arnonis 7, 6. ... et hoc decrevit censum dare unusquisque homo, qui in Hal 
habita ret, quod barbarice dicitur adalporo ... 
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homicidium, the act of murdering persons with close ties to the ruler (homo 
principis sibi dilectusJ,197 which was to guarantee the security and safety of the 
adalscalhae, on the one hand; and freemen and nobles who belonged to the 
duke's environment and administration, on the other.1"8 Although the estates 
donated by the duke (bénéficia) could be devised, re-donating them was 
subject to the duke ' s prior consensus and licentia since the ruler was entitled 
to exercise control over changes in estate conditions.199 Whereas, the duke 
donated certain estates with rights of full disposal to persons loyal to him; e.g., 
being considered firm support of both Odilo and Tassilo, count Machelm was 
entitled to re-donate estates without the duke's prior consent.2"" The donations 
listed in Notitia Arnolds could be divided into the traditiones of Bavarian 
freemen and persons not having power over themselves (homines potestatem 
non habentes de sef,2m and, complying with the above in content , albeit, 
applying somewhat modified terminology. Breves Notitiae distinguishes between 
donations granted by nobles (that is, freemen) and commons (that is, those 
who had no power): nomina et praedia fidelium virorum nobilium et 
mediorcum.A)2 Similarly, the traditiones of Freising include the act of ducalis 
consensus: having fallen of the horse, in 772 Hiltiprant felt he would soon die, 
and applied for the duke 's licence to donate his goods to the bishopric of 
Freising, and the duke gave Hiltiprant the licence owing to the kinship relation 
maintained with him and the services discharged by him. 03 
The counts in the period of the Carolingians fulfilled their ministerium 
under the king 's commission, which they could of course not devise to their 
descendants."04 Regarding Bavaria, however, sources mention counts even in 
the period of the Agilolfings. E.g., count Gunther, who founded the monastery 
of Otting in 749, and who is, therefore, recorded as the earliest count known by 
his name in Bavaria.2"3 Now, in Gunther 's lifetime, there was a count Grimbert 
acting in Bavaria;206 from the list of witnesses in Notitia Arnolds count Immino 
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and count Eimo2 0 7 and f r o m Breves Notitiae count Ugo are also known by 
name.208 Count Machelm, who several t imes granted donations to Bavarian 
bishoprics and the monasteries of Mondsee and Niederalteiehed from his rich 
estates lying in the region of Traun be tween the Inn and Salzach in Upper 
Austria, of ten emphasised his kinship relations tying him to the d u k e ' s 
dynasty, yet as comes Machelm was referred to in sources only with regard to 
the districts of Mattigau and Rottachgau.200 There were significant economic 
differences between counts: accordingly, it is possible to distinguish between 
fortis, mediocris and minor comités; the counts in the period of the Agilolfings, 
in addition to their ministériel, goods f rom the duke, disposed of bénéficia they 
were granted by the duke.210 The term ministerium highlights the royal, in Bavaria 
ducal, commission nature of counthood, under which the count discharged 
military and administrative duties. 
The considerable increase in the occurrences of counts and judges in the 
sources in the period following 741 can be probably attributed to duke Odi lo ' s 
ruler's programme striving to attain altered, more efficient governance, using 
methods both seen in the Frankish court and brought a long from his home 
country, Alemannia; yet, in spite of the fact that count Gunther and count 
Machelm belonged to the duke ' s most rel iable adherents, the existence of an 
integrated system of count ies in the Agilolf ings ' Bavaria cannot be demon-
strated by evidence. -" Lex Baiuvariorum sets forth that a count (conies) was 
responsible for leading comigatus, a part of the Bavarian army; and in a non-
military function for administering placita-then, 011 the other hand, the territory of 
competence of the count 's jurisdiction is also named comigatus in the law, 
most probably because the inhabitants of this territory constituted the military 
unit led by the count.212 The duties assigned to the judges (indices) subject to 
the count ' s control, who were required to provide jus t ice and comply with 
unbribability, were-as set out in Lex Baiuvariorum-to appoint dates of adminis-
tration of law and to implement adjudication, and to carry out certain church 
administration acts, especially in the event of deeds causing damage to the 
church.2" 
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Conclusions 
Regarding relations between the Franks and Bavarians up to 780, a consistent 
anti-Carolingian attitude manifested by the Agilolfings cannot be c la imed; 
these relations were determined by the current political constellation; in 
several cases, the members of the Agilolfing dynasty, e.g., Odilo and Tassi lo, 
were able to take the throne of Bavaria, and make their power firm and stable 
only with the support of the Franks. As a matter of fact, relations between the 
Carolingians and Bavarians were not free f rom rivalry but this had not become 
fatal for the Bavarian duke before the dethronement of Tassi lo III in 788 by 
Charlemagne. In Bavaria of the 8th c., numerous social processes can be 
explored and identified set forth in legal formulations that deservedly attract 
the legal historian's attention: among others the detailed regulation of status 
libertatis and the development of an independent order of nobles. The concept 
of freedom in German folk l aw-so in Lex Bain va riorum-might have originally 
belonged to the scope of the concept of kinship/clan relations. In this case , 
kinship relations cannot be, of course, construed as blood relations in stricto 
sensu, much rather a kind of belonging/alliance relations, which might have 
included, in addition to servants(slaves), the entourage. It was the d u k e ' s 
entourage and the ancient Bavarian genealogiae that the Bavarian nobility 
developed from; their rights were confirmed by Odilo, who obtained the throne 
of Bavaria with the assistance of the Franks, as it were as his own legitimation; 
in the period of Tassilo they achieved that these rights and the guarantees 
thereof were set forth in written form at the Council of Dingolfing. It was at 
this time that the adalscalhae were granted further rights; acting in the d u k e ' s 
service they represented a peculiar Bavarian mixture of servant and noble statuses, 
and then, upon the termination of the independent Bavarian Dukedom, became 
in terms of their name free servants, barscalhae, and in terms of their s tatus 
freemen. 
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Election campaign in the Antiquity 
The volume "How to Win Elections? Quintus Tullius Cicero: Handbook for 
Applicants for Offices" by György Németh and Tamás Nótári1 and the monograph 
"Law, Religion and Rhetoric" by Tamás Nótári" are not only professional works 
written for jurists of Roman law and historians of the Antiquity. The works of 
historian György Németh and jurist/philologist Tamás Nótári makes the oldest 
campaign strategy manual available to readers in Hungarian, and attaches 
ample commentaries and notes, after word and accompanying study thereto, 
from which we can develop an exact picture of the election system of the 
Republic of Rome, the methods of election campaign of the period, the state of 
facts of election abuses and the sanctions applied to them. All these are issue 
that may deservedly attract the attention of readers engaged in jurisprudence, 
interested in public and criminal law. 
One of the most famous orators of the Antiquity, Marcus Tullius Cicero 
entered the election for the consul's position held in 64 B.C. arranged under 
extremely disturbed circumstances and he won the consulatus for 63 B.C. 
Difficulties were caused among others by the fact that an indebted nobleman 
called Lucius Sergius Catilina saw the only breakthrough for ensuring his 
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political and financial survival in being elected consul, and manifested that in 
case he would lose he would be willing to take as well violent actions (later, he 
actually carried out his threats). The ora tor ' s younger brother. Quintus Tullius 
Cicero wanted to help his brother in his campaign foreseen as having quite a lot 
of turns; so, he wrote a manual for him on the lawful and illegal instruments 
that could be used in the elections. Th i s work, Commentariolum petitionis 
(A Handbook for Applicants for Offices) is the first summary of campaign 
strategy in the history of mankind. In addition to the evaluation of the given 
situation, the presentation (and exploitation) of the weaknesses of counter 
nominees, the book provides advice on several counts that might possibly 
continue to have relevance even today. 
In the opening lines and in the last paragraph of Commentariolum, Quintus 
Tullius Cicero addresses his brother, Marcus in a fairly close, brotherly 
manner, and at the end of the letter he asks him to share his comments on this 
writing with a view to adding or correcting things so that later on the work 
could be made public as a real little manual. Nótári asserts that it is not 
probable that after Marcus had reviewed and revised it Quintus published this 
work, in which he outlines the ways of organising and conducting the election 
campaign since he explores the stages of the fight for votes with merciless 
frankness. The exploration of uninhibited opportunism and manoeuvring must 
have been far from being in the interest of the ruling classes in the age of the 
late phase of the Republic, and especially, it would have put Marcus Tullius 
Cicero himself in an unpleasant si tuation-as he would not have been able to 
remove himself from the suspicion of having won the consulatus for no other 
reason than that he had used all these instruments in practice. 
The Republic of Rome recognised four kinds of popular assemblies; three 
of them played a part in the elections. The so-called comitia centuriata based 
on property census elected the prime leaders of the Empire , the consules and 
the praetores who carried out administration of justice as well as the censores 
who implemented property estimation. The point of the system was that based 
on their property status, income the population was ranked among mili-
tary/political centuriae. The centuriae of the wealthier as a matter of fact did 
not amount to one hundred persons while the number of persons in a single 
centuria of the pauper was at least as large as the whole first class; that is, the 
total of the eighty centuriae of the aristocracy. Equités constituted eighteen 
centuriae. The wealthier the people recruited were, the higher the number of 
centuriae was; i.e., the number of citizens classified in each centuria was 
steadily increasing when the given centuria consisted of less and less wealthy 
people. Through that it was possible to attain that people without any property 
were represented only by f ive centuriae. 
ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN T H E ANTIQUITY 113 
Elections were held in a process per centuriae—and "from up to down". 
This means that first wealthier people cast their vote and after that the poorer, 
finally the pauper, who constituted the major part of the population. Although 
the ballots cast by each citizen were equal but their ballots were aggregated per 
centuria and their centuria eventually represented only a single 'yes ' or 'no' 
vote, depending on which response the majority of the ballots was cast in the 
centuria. If a case had to be decided or an official had to be voted for, voting 
was carried out only up to the stage where the centuriae that had already cast 
their vote had reached fifty percent plus one ballot. As the eighty votes of the 
eighteen votes of the équités and the eighty votes of the first class of the 
patricians/the aristocracy themselves were more than half of the one hundred 
and ninety-three centuriae in total, it can be clearly realised that even the 
twenty centuriae of the second property class had to cast their ballots only in 
the very rare case that the centuriae of the knights and the first class had not 
reached accord for some reason. As, however, the first ninety-eight centuriae 
actually represented merely a fraction of the whole of the citizens, the election 
was far from reflecting the will of the majority of the citizens. 
The day of the election of the consuls always fell on the second half of 
July. The electors went out to the Mars field early morning and gathered by 
centuriae. The persons controlling the elections announced the names of the 
candidates; and, af ter that voting began. The identity of the voters appearing 
per centuriae was verified by the guards at the gateway to the voting bridge. 
Voters wrote the initials of the name of the candidate they supported on a wax 
covered piece of wooden board. At the other end of the voting bridge a ballot-
box was set up where they cast their boards. Once one centuria has cast their 
votes, ballots were aggregated in the ballot counting chamber, and the names 
of the candidates were written in a predetermined order, with the decisions of 
the centuriae added beside the names. When a candidate had reached fifty 
percent plus one vote of the ballots of the centuriae, voting was discontinued, 
and the result was proclaimed. 
The institution of campaign silence was unknown to the Romans since 
agents tried to convince voters to vote for specific candidates even at the gate 
of the bridge. If it was foreseen that the result would be unfavourable for 
patricians, then the voting bridge collapsed "accidentally", and the voting had 
to be interrupted-and be postponed for several days. Then, in some cases, 
augures showed up, who stated that they were seeing ill omina, and this 
allowed declaring the whole procedure null and void. 
As a matter of fact, it was much easier to influence voters efficiently during 
the campaign. Election announcements are still available to us-painted on the 
plaster of the walls in Pompeii that have been preserved by volcanic ash and 
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lava. These announcements were produced by a special branch of industry; 
first white washers worked, who primed the wall; then, scriveners painted the 
text of the announcement on the "poster prime". Sometimes they initialled these 
announcements, and it can be known from this that often the same advertising 
company offered its services to two opposing parties. Election "posters" include 
items with both positive and negative content. 
The person who summed up campaign strategy for the first time was Quintus 
Tullius Cicero, the younger brother of the famous orator who summed up his 
advice in his work Commentariolum petitionis in 64 B.C., which were then 
addressed to Marcus Cicero, who applied for the position of consul, i.e., the 
highest state of f ice . In addition to the evaluation of the g iven situation, 
presentation (exploitation) of the weaknesses of the opponents, the book provides 
advice on several counts, which possibly cont inue to have relevance even 
today. 
The first thing he advised was to determine the strategic objective exactly: 
he should think it over in what state he was living; what he was applying for; 
and in what situation he was. It is important in the advice that the candidate-in 
this case Marcus Tullius Cicero-should rely on his young students since, in 
Quintus 's view, the election will be won by the candidate who manages to get 
youth to stand by him, and he should build on everybody whom he had 
successfully defended in court as an advocate. He provided advice also on how 
to discredit political opponents: one of them had purchased his mistress on a 
slave market, the other was living in an incestuous relation with his own elder 
sister and had had noble knights killed. Even if all this was not completely 
true, it served to compromise them. 
Even more important than discrediting opponents is to win as many friends 
as possible. It is important to appear in the company of popular people, even if 
they do not support the candidate since those who can see them together will 
not necessarily know that. Quintus lists three kinds of ways of how to arouse 
sympathy: when one does good to somebody; when people hope that we will 
do good to them, or when people likes us. One should send the message to the 
fr iends of our friends that one will not be ungrateful if they support us. One 
should promise them offices since the worst that could happen is that we might 
possibly not keep our promise once having won the consul's off ice . The most 
important thing, however, is that when one appears in a village, everybody who 
counts must be called by their name. "Village folks-writes Quintus cynically-
will immediately imagine themselves our friends if we know their name." 
It is important to appear in the company of popular people, even if they do 
not support the candidate since those who can see them together will not 
necessarily know that. Quintus lists three kinds of ways of how to arouse 
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sympathy: when one does a favour to somebody; when people hope that we will 
do a favour to them, or when people likes us. One should send the message to 
the friends of our friends that one will not be ungrateful if they support us. One 
should promise them off ices since the worst that could happen is that we might 
possibly not keep our promise once having won the consul ' s office. Quintus 
asserts that a candidate should keep the map of entire Italy in his mind so that 
there should be no village where he has no sufficient support. Each electoral 
district should be covered by a web of friendly relations. The most important 
thing, however, is that when one appears in a village, everybody who counts 
must be called by their name. However, so many names to keep in mind is an 
impossible task for anybody. To this end, nomeclatores (name reminders) were 
used, who whispered who was who into one ' s ears. In Quintus Cicero's view, 
to contact those who are hesitating between political sides three things are 
needed: generosity, attention and, occasionally, some pretension and flattery, 
"since a candidate should every time adjust to those whom he just meets." One 
should let everybody to have access to him day and night; everybody should be 
helped; or at least one 's help should be promised but all this in such manner 
that one does not hurt self-esteem of those whom one helps. 
From all this it can deduced-in spite of Quintus Cicero not uttering it word 
for word-that in order to obtain the given office a candidate should not be 
afraid of using any tricks, making false promises, telling lies, using pretension 
and getting close to the group that seems appropriate for the purpose. 
After analysing the campaign strategy, Nótári returns to the state of facts of 
election fraud/bribery, the so-called ambitus, and demonstrates that as early as 
after the Twelve Table Law it was sanctioned if candidates called voters ' 
attention to themselves by wearing specially whitened clothes. There must 
have been little effect produced by this provision since it is on the grounds of 
whitened clothes, the toga Candida that nominees are still called candidates 
(candidati). In the Roman terminology only ambitus was in conflict with law; 
whereas ambitio (winning voters' mercies through ways that can be considered 
unacceptable in terms of ethic but not in terms of law) did not. This was often 
applied as a term interpreted as the act of obtaining votes; its meaning was 
sometimes undoubtedly pejorative but it had never become a legal technical 
term-the borderline between the two terms, however, was never clear cut. 
Later, laws punished candidates who violated the fairness of the elections by 
being exiled, imposing a fine and losing the right of being elected; so, for 
example, actual bribery, holding large feasts, distributing complimentary tickets 
to theatre performances and gladiators' games, etc. The author, however, might 
be right when having analysed several cases he asserts that the actual limits of 
election abuses were restricted only by the financial possibilities of candidates. 
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We do not know to what extent the experienced politician, Cicero adhered 
to his younger brother's advice; it is, however, a fact that he was elected 
consul, and as a consul he defeated Catil ina's revolt in. 63 B.C. This volume is 
interesting not only for historian of the Antiquity and jurists of Roman law since 
the work written with profound scientific erudition and the precise translation 
conveys the picture of a colourful world exciting to people of the present day. 
Finally, to illustrate this, a few sentences f rom the election advice, campaign 
tricks provided by Quintus Tullius Cicero, also quoted in the dust jacket 
comments of the volume, fol low: "People living in the provinces and village 
folks will immediately imagine that they are oar friends if we know their name. — 
Acquire the skill that is not yours from nature: you should pretend to make 
your acts appear natural! - (The candidate) should shape and adjust his 
countenance, look and speech to the way of thinking and will of all those whom 
he meets. - Do not let that there should be a single provincial town, a single 
settlement, a single local authority or any place where you do not have 
sufficient support! You must have a plan that covers the whole town, each 
territory, district and neighbourhood! - Attain that your (competitors) should 
know that you supervise and watch them! - Make sure that the whole 
procedure of candidacy should be pompous, bright, gleaming and kind to the 
people, and should be fairly striking, ... and that the sentence condemning the 
way of life of your competitors should be spread! - Attain that all those who 
you hold in your hands as people committed to you, should have tasks clearly 
determined and allocated! - In the procedure of candidacy special attention 
must be paid to achieving that the State should entertain good hopes and 
respectful opinion towards you; yet, you must not appear to be ... thirsty of 
power. - And the masses should think that you will work for their benefit!" 
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V A N D A L A M M * 
Rethinking the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Abstract. The article aims to assess the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime 
established more than 40 years ago with the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since that time the international community had achieved con-
siderable success in the prevention of nuclear weapons' proliferation. Nevertheless, while 
noting the results of the NPT and the verification system established under that instrument, one 
cannot remain silent about the shortcomings of the system and the non-compliance with some 
of its provisions. By its structure and provisions the NPT has divided States into two groups, 
distinguishing those possessing and those not possessing nuclear weapons. In effect, the rights 
and obligations of the Contracting Parties to the NPT are tailored to the group to which they 
belong, and the gravest violation of the NPT is that when States seek to change their status as 
defined in the NPT, notably by trying to munfacture or control of nuclear weapons. Under the 
NPT, research in, production and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are 
inalienable rights, but their exercise should be in keeping with the basic obligation of non-
nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty not to acquire in any form nuclear weapons and not to 
carry out unauthorized nuclear activities under the guise of their peaceful nuclear programs. 
While emphasizing the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, the article describes in 
nutshell the nuclear program of two States (the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea) which gave cause for serious international concern. 
Keywords: Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), nuclear weapons 
proliferation, peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, nuclear-free zones. International Atomic 
Energy Agency, safeguards, nuclear export, KEDO, Nuclear Suppliers Group, India, Islamic-
Republic of Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
More than four decades ago that on the 12th June 1968 the United Nations 
General Assembly, by its resolution 2373 (1968), adopted with a vast majority 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which was the 
result of more than ten years ' negotiations in the United Nat ions and in the 
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.1 
Professor of international law; director, Institute for Legal Studies, HAS. H-1014 
Budapest, Országház u. 30. 
E-mail: lamm@jog.mta.hu 
1
 The solemn singing of the Treaty took place simultaneously in London, Moscow and 
Washington on I July 1968, and the instrument entered into force on 5 March 1970. 
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This instrument, by which the international community tried to prevent the 
world-wide spread of nuclear weapons and sought to remove, at long term, this 
destructive device f rom the arsenals of States, has been regarded as one of the 
most important disarmament agreements down to our times. The main purpose 
of the Treaty was to halt all direct and indirect forms of access of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear explosive devises by those States which do not possessed 
them at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty.2 
Subject to the remark that the cause of nuclear disarmament cannot be 
judged f r o m the operat ion of a single instrument, it may be stated that since 
the entry into force o f the NPT there has been made significant progress 
towards achieving the objectives the Treaty. 
According to some estimates, there would be 30 to 40 nuclear-weapon States 
today had the Non-Proliferation Treaty not been concluded.3 Unfortunately, 
however, the number o f de facto nuclear-weapon States has grown despite the 
NPT. These States include India and Pakistan, which carried out nuclear test 
explosions in 1998,4 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, 
North Korea), which in October 2006 informed world public of having carried 
out an underground nuclear explosion. Other States, which will be discussed at 
a later stage, are but supposed to be secretly working on nuclear weapons 
programs.3 In our days there are virtually 9 nuclear-weapon States, namely the 
5 nuclear powers as well as India, Pakistan, Israel and DPRK, with none of the 
latter being a party to the NPT." It is worth mentioning that to this very day 
In our days there is a voluminous literature on the Treaty. Of these publications see in 
particular Willrich, M.: Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control. 
Charlottesville, Virginia, 1969; Fischer, G.; The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
London, 1971; Bellany, I. Blacker, C. D - Gallacher, J. (eds.): The Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. London, 1985; Delcoigne, G.-Rubinstein, G.: Non-Proliferation des armes nucléaires. 
Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie, Bruxelles, 1970. 
2
 Under Art. 9, Para. 3, of the NPT "For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon 
State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.". 
Cf. Timerbaev, R.: What next for the NPT? Facing the Noment of Truth. IAEA 
Bulletin, 46 (2005) No. 2, 4. 
4
 In May 1998 both States carried out a series of 5 nuclear test explosions each and 
both Governments announced their undertaking a voluntary moratorium on further explosions. 
On the test explosions by India and Pakistan, see Kile, S.: Nuclear Arms Control apd non-
proliferation. SIPRI Yearbook 1999. Armament. Disarmament and International Security. 
Oxford, 1999. 520-522. 
Iran, Israel and Libya are usually referred to as such States. 
6
 The nuclear warheads possessed hy India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel number 
70 to 120, 30 to 80, 1 to 10, and 75 to 200 respectively. Cf. www.uspw.org. 
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S o u t h A f r i c a is t he on ly Sta te w h i c h h a d f o r m e r l y p o s s e s s e d n u c l e a r w e a p o n s 
b u t vo lun ta ry g a v e up its n u c l e a r a rms . In the 1980s t h e racist r e g i m e o f South 
A f r i c a has deve loped nuclear w e a p o n s , but all of these w e a p o n s were d i s m a n t l e d 
in t h e ear ly 1990s . 7 
It can be c l a i m e d as a s u c c e s s by a n y m e a s u r e t h a t the N P T , w h i c h was 
o r ig ina l ly adop t ed f o r a t e rm o f 2 5 years , w a s e x t e n d e d indef in i te ly a n d wi thou t 
c o n d i t i o n at t h e F i f t h R e v i e w a n d E x t e n s i o n C o n f e r e n c e o f 1 9 9 5 b y v i r tue 
o f A r t . X. Pa ra . 2 , o f t he N P T . 8 F u r t h e r p r o g r e s s is m a r k e d by t h e f a c t that 
t o d a y 188 S t a t e s a r e pa r ty to t h e T r e a t y , wi th al l n u c l e a r p o w e r s h a v i n g 
a d h e r e d to the N P T , fo r the o r ig ina l s igna to r i e s to t h e Trea ty did n o t inc lude 
t w o n u c l e a r - w e a p o n Sta tes , F r a n c e a n d C h i n a . P r e c i s e l y for this r e a s o n , the 
a c c e s s i o n of C h i n a on 9 M a r c h 1992 a n d then of F r a n c e on 2 A u g u s t o f that 
y e a r w e r e e v e n t s o f g rea t i m p o r t a n c e to the p r e v e n t i o n o f the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of 
n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . T h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t he N P T r e g i m e is fu r the r e v i d e n c e d by 
h u n d r e d s of o n - s i t e i n s p e c t i o n s e x e c u t e d annua l ly b y the In te rna t iona l A t o m i c 
E n e r g y A g e n c y ( I A E A ) by w a y o f ve r i f i ca t ion o f t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f t he treaty 
A known view claims that in the absence of the NPT nuclear weapons would today be 
possessed by Argentina, Australia, Belorussia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan and Ukraine, as well as former Yugoslavia along with the 9 
States mentioned above. Cf. Bunn, G.: The world's Non-Proliferation Regime in Time. IAEA 
Bulletin, 46 (2005) No. 2. 8. 
7
 South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991, and until the end of 1992 the IAEA 
conducted inspections at 75 sites in the country, one at a dismantled uranium-enriching 
unit and one in a desert region where nuclear tests had been carried out previously. 
8
 See resolution No. 3 adopted at the Fifth Conference on the Review and Extension of 
the NPT. United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 1995. 27-28. 
Review conferences are provided for by the NPT in Para. 3 of Art. VIII, under which 
on expiry of 5 years from the entry into force of the Treaty the implementation thereof is to 
be reviewed by a conference and at 5-year periods. Thereafter the majority of the States 
parties may request the convening of more such conferences. Review conferences were 
held on that basis in 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. 
Extension of the term of the Treaty is covered by Para. 2 of Art. X, stating that, by the 
lapse of 25 years from the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference is to decide whether 
the NPT should continue in force for an unspecified term, or its operation should be 
prolonged for a specified term or for further specified terms. 
On the Review and Extension Conference of 1995, see Simpson, J.: The nuclear non-
proliferation regime after the NPT Review and Extension Conference. SIPR1 Yearbook 1996. 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford, 1996. 561-573. 
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obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States, ' as well as by the comprehensive 
safeguards agreements which the Agency has concluded with 82 States.1" 
I. Criticisms levelled at the NPT 
Nevertheless, while noting the results of the NPT and its system of verification, 
one cannot remain silent about the fact that ever since its adoption the Treaty 
has received several criticisms part ly for its deficiencies, partly for non-
compliance with some of its provisions. In what follows I wish to single out 
but a few of them. 
a) The nuclear disarmament 
One of the objections most f requent ly raised in connection with the NPT 
concerns the fact that the instrument, apart from the provisions of the Preamble 
thereto, refers to disarmament in a single provision (Art. VI.), spelling out that 
"Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at 
an early date and to nuclear disarmament as well as to a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". 
The cited provision is undoubtedly formulated in rather general terms, and, 
al though nuclear disarmament is to be expected primarily f rom the nuclear-
weapon States (since, after the entry into force of the instrument, such weapons 
9
 In virtue of Art. III. of the Non-proliferation Treaty the fulfilment of the obligations 
undertaken by the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty is to be verified by the 
IAEA applying its safeguards system. Under Para. 1 of Art. X, non-nuclear-weapon States 
are required to subject all their peaceful nuclear activities to the IAEA safeguards. 
On this score see Cooley, J. N.: International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards under 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Challenges in Implementation. 
In: Avenhaus, R.-Kyriakopoulos, N.—Richard, M.-Stein, G. (eds.): Verifying Treaty 
Compliance. Berlin-Heidelberg, 2006. 61-76. 
10
 A review of the IAEA safeguards system had become necessary by the 1990s. In 
order to strengthen the system and to increase its efficiency, the Agency prepared in 1997 a 
supplementary model protocol on the safeguards agreements (see IAEA INFCIRS/540). On 
the model protocol see Priest, J.-Rockwood, L.: Protocols for Strengthened Safeguards: 
Progress and Prospects. IAEA Bulletin, 41 (1999) No. 4. 14-23. 
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may only be possessed by those States), the NPT makes it an obligation of all 
Contracting Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith. 
A great shortcoming of the NPT consists in containing no further provisions 
on such negotiations, failing as it does to indicate a deadline for commencing 
negotiations or a date, if only an approximate one, for the destruction of the 
world's nuclear arsenal. 
As regards the Treaty's provisions on nuclear disarmament talks, it is worth 
while to note that the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 
1996 on the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, made a special 
point of Art. VI. of the NPT, emphasizing that the said Art. provides not only 
for the conduct of negotiations, but also for the need for such negotiations "to 
achieve a precise result-nuclear disarmament in all its aspects". In the Cour t ' s 
view this twofold obligation applies to all parties to the Treaty, i.e. to the 
overwhelming majority of the international community (at the time the advisory 
opinion was rendered there were 182 States party to the NPT) . " An insuff i -
ciency of the advisory opinion, as Matheson points out, that it "does not dictate 
any timetable or negotiating forum for reaching this result".12 For that mat ter , 
Richard A. Falk notes on the advisory opinion that the Court has certainly 
created a clear situation with respect to the future: "either a specific prohibition 
of nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament".1 3 
There is no doubt that the past four decades have witnessed considerable 
step forward with respect to nuclear disarmament. However , the NPT provi-
sions on nuclear disarmament have only been implemented in part, albeit the 
one-time Soviet Union, or Russia and the United States have signed highly 
important agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapons1 4 and there have 
been cuts in the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States 
and Russ ia ." 
" Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Advisory Opinion, 8 July 
1996. I.C.J. Reports, 1966. 263-264. 
12
 Cf. Matheson, M. J.: The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons. American Journal of Internationa! Law, 91 ( 1997) 434. 
ь
 Falk, R. A.: Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic 
Encounter. American Journal of International Law, 91 (1997) 75. 
14
 See the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (commonly known as SALT I) which 
resulted in the conclusion of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the SALT 
II in 1972. One should mention also the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) started 
in 1982. 
15
 On the Soviet-American agreements see Smith, S.: US-Soviet Strategic Nuclear 
Arms Control. From SALT to START to STOP. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, op. 
cit., 49-74. 
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Apart f rom all these results, however, the number of nuclear warheads existing 
in the world today can be put at 13.000, of which 11.000 are possessed by the 
United States and Russia."' 
The fact that international agreements have by now established nuclear-
weapons-free zones in different parts of the globe can be seen as an important 
step towards nuclear disarmament. The signing of these treaties is closely 
interrelated whi t the NPT, all the more so since Art. VII. of the NPT specifically 
refers to nuclear-weapons-free zones in providing that 
"Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude 
regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in 
their respective territories." 
It is due to all this that one can speak, on the one hand, of certain zones not 
belonging to any State like Antarctica, outer space and the sea-bed as being 
free from nuclear weapons and, on the other , of the establishment of regional 
nuclear-weapons-free zones in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967) and 
in the South Pacific Region (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985), in South-East Asia 
(Treaty of Bangkok, 1995), in Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996), and recently 
in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk, 2006) . 
In the 1990s an outstanding event in the field of nuclear disarmament was 
the opening of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for signature 
at New York on 24 September 1996. However, the CTBT has not entered into 
force to this very day, although it was signed by 180 and ratified by 148 States. 
This delay in entry into force can be ascribed to the fact that certain States, on 
whose accession the operation of the Treaty is conditional; have not yet ratified 
the instrument.17 These States include two nuclear powers (the United States 
and China) and several States which, though not deemed to be nuclear-weapon 
State by the te rms of the NPT, have conducted nuclear test explosions or are 
capable of doing so.18 The cause of nuclear disarmament is greatly prejudiced 
by these States ' reluctance to ratify the CTBT, although a reference to nuclear 
disarmament is also found in the Preamble of the NPT to the effect that the 
16
 Cf. Kile, S. N.-Fechenko, V.-Kristensen, H. M: World Nuclear Forces, 2006. SIPRI 
Yearbook 2006. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford, 2006. 644. 
17
 Under its Art. XIV, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is to enter into 
force 180 days af ter its signature and ratification by 44 States as enumerated in Annex 2. 
Until August 2008 the Treaty was ratified by 35 out of the 44 States. 
18
 Among those Stales, mention may be made of Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea 
and Pakistan. 
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Parties to the Treaty "Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible 
date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures 
in the direction of nuclear disarmament." 
However, all these international instruments mentioned above could not 
hid the fact that there is no result in the conclusion of a convention on the 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, although 
the question of nuclear disarmament was on the agenda of the General Assembly 
and the Conference on Disarmament of Geneva since the beginning of the 
1980s. 
The only international instrument connected with nuclear weapons concluded 
in the post-Cold War era was the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005.14 The making o f t h a t instrument was 
necessiteted by the threat that terror agents can construct or acquire nuclear 
weapons, or they might built "dirty bombs", and by the fear that nuclear instal-
lations could be the target of terrorist groups ' attack.2" 
b) Discriminatory character of the NPT 
Already from the beginning the NPT was challenged of being discriminatory, 
pointing out that the Treaty creates unequal obligations for States and 
distinguishes between the Contract ing Parties according to whether in 1967 
they were qualified as nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States.21 
The underlying reason of that argument being that whereas the freedom of 
action of the non-nuclear-weapon States is greatly restricted by the Treaty, the 
same does not hold for the nuclear-weapon States. Precisely on this ground it 
is maintained by many that "the NPT starts to appear as a device for freezing 
the world power structure"." 
This claim is absolutely true in so far as the NPT required the non-nuclear-
weapon States to renounce acquisition in any form of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear explosive devices, but it did not do so in respect of the nuclear-weapon 
" The Convention on Nuelear Terrorism entered into force on July 7, 2007. 
20
 On the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism see Joyner, C. C.: Countering Nuelear 
Terrorism: A Conventional Response. European Journal of International Law, 18 (2007) 
225-251. 
21
 According to Art. IX. Para, 3. 
"For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured 
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967". 
E.g. India refused to accede to the Treaty by invoking its discriminative character. 
22
 Cf. Simpson, J.: The Non-Proliferation Treaty at its Half-Life. The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, op. cit. 6. 
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States. It should nevertheless be stressed that, since complete nuclear disarma-
ment is by all means the long-term objective-notably the desideratum to remove 
this destructive type of weapons f rom the arsenals of States-, there is perhaps a 
hopeful possibility that mankind will some time come to see that such weapons 
are not possessed by the nuclear-weapon States either. 
It is indisputable that the NPT differentiates between the Contracting Parties 
by dividing them to nuclear-weapon States and to non-nuclear-weapon States. 
Most of the rights and obligations of the States Party to the Treaty depend on 
their status under the Treaty i.e. whether they have the right to posses nuclear 
weapons and nuclear explosive devices, or this is forbidden to them. In that 
perspective their is an inequality between the Contracting Parties, five of them 
have the right to posses nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and all 
the other Contracting Parties are so called non-nuclear weapon States which 
had to renounce the possession of these weapons and devices and had to submit 
all their peaceful nuclear activities to the safeguards system of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.2 1 
However, John Simpson is right in poining out on this score that the Treaty's 
"discriminative" character and the freeze imposed by it on the existing world 
power structure "do not appear to outweigh the particular security advantages 
offered by the NPT". 2 4 
It should be stressed that the Treaty intends to keep the above mentioned 
inequality in certain limits and it tries, especially in the field of the peaceful 
utilization of nuclear energy, to compensate by the provisions on the coopera-
tion in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
c) The withdrawal of the Treaty 
The decades which have passed since the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty have proved that the instrument 's provision on withdrawal is a weak-
ness thereof, namely the fact that the Treaty may be denounced through a rather 
simple procedure, a State leaving with relative ease the regime which has been 
designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Under Art. III. the International Atomic Energy Agency has to apply its safeguard 
system to all nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPT in order to 
verify the fulfilment of their obligations assumed in the Treaty with a view of preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. 
24
 Simpson: op.cit. 6. 
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Art. X. Para. 1, of the Treaty runs as follows: 
"Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to 
withadraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to 
the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests 
of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to 
the Treaty and to the Uni ted Nations Security Counci l three months in 
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events 
it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests." 
As is noted by Jozef Goldblat , the problem with this provision lies in the 
State itself being entitled to decide on the existence of "extraordinary events", 
on whether such events have cocurred at all, the State being under no obligation 
to justify its action. Furthermore, the kind of extraordinary event the drafters 
had in mind-other than that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a potential 
adversary-is not clear from wording of the Treaty.23 Fortunately, during the past 
40 years, the NPT was denounced by one State only, DPRK,2" but at the same 
time threats to denuonce it were also voiced by other State (e. g. Iran) as well . 
Another problem with the provisions on withrawal o f the NPT is that if a 
non-nuclear-weapon State chooses to denounce the Treaty, that is, it leaves the 
NPT regime, the international community ceases to have any information about 
the purpose for which that State, once free from its obligations under the NPT, 
intends to use the nuclear materials it posses and the technical knowledge it has 
acquired as a party to the Treaty. This is all the more so since the safeguards 
agreements on IAEA control will also remain in force until such time as the 
State concerned is a party to the NPT. Thus, in the last analysis, the inter-
national community is exposed to the danger that the denouncing State will 
undermine the non-proliferation regime as a whole. 
Eventual withdrawal f r o m the NPT by a State or States might produce a 
highly dangerous domino effect in the sense that eventually other States will 
reconsider their participation in the NPT. Especially because States have 
undertaken their non-proliferation obligations in respect to each other or to one 
another is likely to come into play in the case of the N P T more strongly than in 
"'Goldblat, J.: Arms Control. A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. PRIO. Inter-
national Peace and Research Institute. Oslo, 1994. 82. 
2l
' In March 1993 North Korea announced its intention to leave the NPT and then, in 
June of the same year, it suspended the execution of its withdrawal. Yet, with effect from 
11 January 2003, it definitely denounced the NPT. We shall revert to the case of North 
Korea later on. 
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that of any other treaty. Considering that a State not possessing nuclear weapons 
has renounced acquisition, possession, etc. of such weapons in the hope that 
other States not possessing nuclear weapons will undertake similar obligations, 
and it would certainly like to receive a guarantee that nuclear weapons will not 
be used against it. It will be remarked, parenthetically, that the fears of States 
about the eventual use of nuclear weapons are but increased to some extent by 
the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons since the Court failed to give a def ini te 
answer "as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State 
in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would 
be at stake".27 
Obviously, any effort to prescribe stricter rules on withdrawal from the 
N P T would raise a whole range of legal and political issues. At the same time, 
however, one must not overlook the fact that the provisions on withdrawal 
were formulated at the time when the success of the NPT regime was far f rom 
sure. It was not by chance that the instrument was originally concluded for 25 
years, with a decision on the extension of the Treaty fol lowing the expiry of 
that term. At the time of conclusion it was not possible to know how the first 
25 years of the Treaty's life would shape up and what would happen in inter-
national politics during that period. Precisely for that reason, the possible 
solutions after the first 25 years were articulated in advance. In other words, it 
was laid down in the Treaty itself that by the lapse of 25 years a decision may 
be made as to whether (i) to keep the Treaty in effect indefinitely, or (ii) to 
extend for an additional fixed period or periods.28 These provisions were by all 
means intended to rule out the possibility to terminate the Treaty after the lapse 
o f 25 years. 
However, the four decades since the conclusion of the N P T have proved 
to the viability of the regime as well as to the fact that the overwhelming majority 
o f the States does make serious efforts to prevent the world-wide proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. This is borne out by 188 contracting States to the NPT and 
by the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the Fifth Review and Extension 
Conference. 
As can be seen, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has by our days become a treaty 
wi th indifinite duration and is one of the multilateral international instruments 
o f whose importance and necessity the international community of the States is 
~
7
 Cf. Legality of the Treat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Advisory Opinion, 8 July 
1996 . I .C.J. Reports, 1996.263. 
On the Advisory Opinion see Matheson: op. cit. 41 7—435. 
28
 Cf. Art. X. Para. 2, of the NPT. 
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earnestly convinced. All this naturally leads one to ask whether mankind has 
by now reached the state at which to make the NPT obligations everlasting, 
keeping in mind the final object of the complete nuclear disarmament. To 
restrict in some form the withdrawal from the NPT can be conceived of as a 
first step towards this goals. 
Restiricting the withrawal from a treaty is not unknown to international law 
at all. Typical instances are the conventions on humanitarian law, but also worth 
noting is the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpilling, Pro-
duction and Transfer of Anti-Personal Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa 
Treaty), providing in Art. XX. that the "instrument of withdrawal shall include a 
full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal" and that if during 
the six months of notice of withdrawal "the withdrawing State Party is engaged 
in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the 
armed conflict." Incidentally, publicists have recorded treaties which by their very 
nature are unlikely to be capable of withdrawal are treaties of peace, disarme-
ment and those establishing permanenet regimes, such as for the Suez Canal.24 
It would obviously be not easy to amend the N P T in the direction of 
prescribing stricter conditions for withdrawal, yet this question should also 
certainly be addressed, and it could be on the agenda of the next NPT Review 
Conference to be held in 2010. 
II. The inalienable right to develop, research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
Since the first attempts to restrict the possession of nuclear weapons by certain 
States it was a long debated question how to reconcile these restrictions with 
the peaceful utilization and development of nuclear energy. In other words, 
how to assure the peaceful utilization and development of nuclear energy in 
those States which will renounce of any possession of nuclear weapons. That 
problem arose because according to a number of States the restrictions on the 
possession of nuclear weapons influence or even hamper the peaceful utiliza-
tion and development of nuclear energy. 
Knowing that was not surprising that in the 1960s during the talks on the 
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was a key-issue how to 
secure the progress of peaceful nuclear industry in States giving up the 
possession of nuclear weapons, and should they get some reward for that. 
24
 Cf. Aust, A.: Modem Treaty Law and Practice. Cambridge, 2002. 234. 
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At the Geneva talks several delegations tried to present the development of 
the peaceful nuclear industry in such a way as being dependent to the possession 
of nuclear weapons. Needless to say that this is totally misinterpretation of the 
development of nuclear industry in the middle of the 20lh century. It is true that 
the progress of peaceful nuclear industry was stick to the manufacturing of 
nuclear weapons; or even one can say that the peaceful nuclear industry was to 
some extent the by-product of the military nuclear industry. But this was due 
first of all to the military and political situation at end and after the Second 
World War. The States spent billion of dollars, roubles or pounds to the research 
works connected to nuclear weapons and as a consequence the nuclear weapon 
industry developed considerably and also the knowledge on the possibilities of 
the peaceful utilization of nuclear materials evolved. But if these huge amounts 
o f money were to be spent only to the development of the peaceful nuclear 
industry, the progress would be the same, as the example of several States 
without nuclear weapons capacity show to us. One can say that there is no 
direct connection between the possession of nuclear weapons and the peaceful 
utilization of nuclear energy. A State could have very developed peaceful 
nuclear industry without the possession of nuclear weapons. In that connection 
one can refer to Canada, Germany, and other States as well. 
During the negotiations on the NPT a number of small and medium-size 
non-nuclear-weapon States, in return to undertake not to get any possession and 
acquisition of nuclear weapons advocated to receive certain compensation and 
promises for greater cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
After long debates two sets of provisions were included in the NPT,30 both 
of them giving guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States to have access to 
the benefits of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. 
The first set of these provisions are in the Preamble and Art. IV. securing 
the right to all part ies to the Treaty to develop research, produce and use of 
nuclear energy. The other guarantees are included also in the Preamble and 
Art. V. of the Treaty providing on the sharing of non-nuclear-weapon States in 
the benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. 
The detailed provisions on the share of the non-nuclear-weapon States in 
the benefits of these explosions are the consequence of the fact that explosive 
devices used for peaceful nuclear explosions are the same as those built in 
nuclear weapons, and therefore the Treaty prohibits any kind of acquisition of 
these devises to non-nuclear-weapon States. 
30
 It is worth mentioning that the American and Russian drafts of 1965 and 1966, 
contained no provisions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
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The other reason was that at the time of the conclusion of the NPT there 
were great hopes in the utilisation of peaceful nuclear explosions in the extraction 
of mineral resources, construction of canals, tunnels, etc. Therefore the non-
nuclear-weapon States had real fearing that by their accession to the NPT they 
would renounce to utilise that very important tool of civil engineering. 
a) The "inalienable right" is not an unlimited right 
As it was mentioned before, on the wish of the non-nuclear-weapon States, in 
the Preamble and in Art. IV. special clauses were included in the NPT on the 
right of these States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In Para. 1, of Art. 
IV, the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was formulated by a so 
called interpretative provision,31 which says that 
"Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right 
of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity 
with Articles 1. and II. of this Treaty". 
According to writers of international law this kind of interpretative provision 
aims to exclude a certain interpretation given to a treaty, creating a c lear 
situation and prohibiting an otherwise possible interpretation.3-
Speaking on the right of non-nuclear weapon States to the peaceful uses, 
development, research of nuclear energy, the NPT qual if ies that right as 
"inalienable", which means that the non-nuclear-weapon States could not be 
deprived of this right or this right is not capable of being taken away. 
As we could see the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
is subject of two limitations: namely, that right should exist without discrimi-
nation and this right is not unlimited and it is subordinated to Art.s 1, and II, 
containing the basic undertakings to prevent the dissemination of nuclear 
weapons. 
The inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is not an 
unlimited right. Para. 1, of Art. IV, makes clear that the right to the peacefu l 
uses of nuclear energy should be "in conformity with Articles I. and II. of this 
11
 This technique is well known in international treaty practice and e.g. one can find 
similar provision in Art. IV. Para. 1. of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Cf. Haraszti, G.: A nemzetközi szerződések értelmezésének alapvető kérdései (Basic 
problems of the interpretation of international treaties). Budapest, 1965. 88. 
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Treaty". T h u s under Art. IV. the non-nuclear-weapon States ' right to develop 
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is secondary 
to the fundamental obligations accepted by all the Contracting Parties with 
regard to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the 
fundamental purpose of the Treaty to halt the dissemination of nuclear weapons. 
The right to develop research, production etc. of nuclear energy could not 
serve to the evasion of the basic commitment of the non-nuclear weapons 
States under the Treaty, not to acquire in any form nuclear weapons or nuclear 
explosive devises and the development, research, production and use of nuclear 
energy could not lead to the violation of the basic provisions of the Treaty. The 
subordination of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy to Art.s I, and II, 
indicates, that no kind of peaceful nuclear activity could be tolerated which 
result in any form of the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons or 
nuclear explosive devices by the non-nuclear weapons States. 
Since the entry into force of the NPT the right to the peaceful utilization of 
nuclear energy and the interpretation given to Art. IV, of the NPT was dealt by 
numerous international conferences, fo rums etc, and among others it was on 
the agenda of the NPT review conferences, which has special importance in 
that respect since the task of these conferences is, according to Para. 3 of Art. 
VIII., to review the operation of the Treaty "with a view to assuring that the 
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." 
One can say that all review conferences strongly reaffirmed the right of all 
parties to the NPT to develop research, to produce and to use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes.11 
b) International cooperation 
Para. 2, of Art. IV, treats the international cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. The first sentence of that paragraph provides that 
"All the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and 
" See Decision 2 adopted at the Fifth Review and Extension Conference, on "Prin-
ciples and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", Para. 14. Ibid. 26. In 
2000 the Sixth Review Conference not only reaffirmed the inalienable right of all parties to 
the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination and in conformity with Art.s I.-III. of the Treaty, but even it 
adopted a decision in which the Conference recognized "that this right constituted one of 
the fundamental objectives of the Treaty". Cf. Part I, and II. p. 8. Para 2. 
RETHINKING T1 IE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 131 
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy." 
Thus according to this sentence all parties to the Treaty should facilitate the 
exchange of information etc. although as we know, not all the Contract ing 
Parties were at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty or even now-a-days in 
a position to do that. The second sentence of that paragraph regarding interna-
tional cooperation is more precise because it refers only to those parties to the 
Treaty which are in an appropriate position (under the Treaty: "which are in a 
position to do so") and these States should co-operate in contributing "to the 
further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, 
with due consideration for the need of the developing areas of the world". 
Thus in connection with the international cooperation the Treaty expressly 
says that in the course of international cooperation the Parties should take into 
consideration the demand of developing areas of the world. 
The co-operation in contributing to the further development of the application 
of nuclear energy could be executed by States Party alone or together with 
other States or international organizations, which gives broad discretion to the 
States Party and creates new perspectives for the development of international 
co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And, as the Third Review 
Conference stressed, international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy could contribute to the elimination of technological and economic 
differences between the developed and developing countries.34 
By comparing the provisions on the exchange of information and cooperation 
regarding to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes (Art. IV.) with those concerning the peaceful nuclear explosions (Art. 
V.) one can conclude that Art. IV. is far less concrete than Art. V. 
Art. IV. is rather general, while Art. V. lays down the most important condi-
tions of the share of non-nuclear-weapon States in the benefits of peaceful 
nuclear explosions. Thus under Art. V. the potential benefits of the peaceful 
nuclear explosions to non-nuclear weapon States i.) should be made available on 
non-discriminatory basis, ii.) the charge to such parties for the explosive devises 
used will be as low as possible, iii.) the charge should not include any charge 
for research and development, iv.) the negotiations on this subject shall start as 
soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. 
'
1
 Cf. Third Review Conference of the NPT. See in United Nations Disarmament 
Yearbook, 10(1985) 179. 
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The above mentioned differences between Art. IV. and V. are due, among 
others, to the fact that at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty it was 
considered as a big sacrifice by the non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce of 
the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosion devices and to calm 
these States detailed provisions were included in the Treaty on the conditions 
of non-nuclear-weapons States' shares in the benefits of these explosion devices. 
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference when interpreting Art. IV. of 
the NPT, added two very important conditions to the international cooperation 
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, saying that preferential treatment 
should be given to the non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty in all 
activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that the 
transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be prompted.17 
Although the international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy is prosperous, both on bilateral basis and under the auspices of the 
IAEA, there is wide divergence of views between the nuclear-weapon States 
on the one hand, and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other, on a number 
of questions connected with international cooperation. On different occasions 
several non-nuclear-weapon States have challenged some developed States, 
particularly the nuclear Powers, not to fulfil their obligations under Art. IV. 
The nuclear-weapon States, to prevent nuclear proliferation due to nuclear 
exports and imports, tried to establish special arrangements for nuclear exports, 
which were again considered by a number of non-nuclear-weapon States as 
additional restrictions to their access to nuclear technologies. 
III. Other proliferation risks 
The NPT although containing detailed provisions on the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons it treats only nuclear weapons and explosive 
devices and is silent on some other nuclear activities which could lead to the 
35
 Decision 2 on the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament". Para. 16. and 17. See United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. 20 (1995) 27. 
The reference to preferential treatment of non-nuclear-weapon States was repeated in the 
document adopted at the Sixth Review Conference held in 2000. 
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production of nuclear weapons.31 ' It should be mentioned that already not long 
after the conclusion of the Treaty several authors pointed out to these gaps. 37 
By our days it has become clear that uranium enrichment and production 
of plutonium entail t remendous risks to non-proliferation, since the related 
technologies are capable of obtaining fissionable materials necessary for the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons. Another short-coming of the NPT can be said 
to lie in the absence of provisions on the trade of nuclear materials and transfer 
of nuclear technologies and assuring that they will not result in support for 
military nuclear programs. 
a) Unranium enrichment and production of plutonium 
The problems relating to uranium enrichment and production of plutonium were 
addressed by several delegates at the Seventh NPT Review Conference, and 
Art. 4 of the Treaty was mentioned as one of the weakest provisions thereof. It 
was claimed that the "inalienable right" of non-nuclear-weapon States potentially 
allowed those States to put into operation, under the pretext of their peaceful 
nuclear programs, such facilities which are capable of manufacturing nuclear 
weapons.38 With a view to averting the inherent proliferation risks, the Review 
Conference considered the proposals which advocated international cooperation 
in uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing as well as control over 
repositories for spent fuel and nuclear waste.34 These initiatives, however, were 
conceived by several non-nuclear-weapon States to place further limitations on 
their rights of access to nuclear technologies.4" 
More than 25 years af ter the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty the 
aforementioned short-coming of the instrument came into the focus of attention 
principally in connection with Iran's nuclear program, when several sources 
said, as will be discussed later, that under the guise of developing the country 's 
peaceful nuclear industry a secret nuclear program was being implemented, 
with Iran attempting to produce plutonium and enriched uranium. 
36
 On the shortcomings of the NPT see also the present writer 's treatise: The Utilization 
of Nuclear Energy and International Law. Budapest, 1984. 94-97. 
'
7
 Cf. Courteix, S.: Exportations nucléaires et non-proliferation. Paris, 1978. 4. 
38
 Cf. Kile, S. N.: Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. SIPRI Yearbook 2006. 
op. cit. 611. 
39Ibid. 
40
 Ibid. 611-612. 
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b) Nuclear exports 
As early as the 1970s there were adopted certain restraints, both in internal 
laws and on the international plane, in order to ensure that trade in nuclear 
equipment, materials, etc. should not be al lowed except in accordance with the 
NPT. This issue received still greater emphasis after the nuclear explosion by 
India in 1974, which led to the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(hereafter N S G ) with the a im of blocking the way to unauthorized nuclear 
activities by nuclear exports.41 
The N S G ' s activity was o f little, if any, relevance for qui te a few years, but 
the NSG became increasingly active as from the 1990s, with its Warsaw session 
of 1992 resulting in an agreement of States on Guidelines for Transfers of 
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology (the 
so-called Warsaw Guidelines).42 No doubt that the Guidelines are not deemed 
to be a binding instrument o f international law, but, considering that the 
substance thereof came to be incorporated in the internal laws of the N S G 
States, their application is obligatory. Under the Warsaw Guidelines specif ic 
rules of verification govern the nuclear materials and equipment that are capable 
o f being used in both lawful and nuclear-weapon-related programs. The Annex 
to the document has listed the materials, equipment, etc.43 that may only be 
exported to those non-nuclear-weapon States whose present and future nuclear 
activities as a whole come under IAEA safeguards. There can be but two 
exceptions to full safeguards control: on the one hand, an extraordinary circum-
stance, in which an item on the list is required for the safe operation of a facility 
subject to safeguards control and , on the other hand, a given transaction takes 
place on the basis of an agreement signed before 3 April 1992. 
These provisions were t ightened further af ter 11 September 2001, when the 
President of the United States called on the 40 member s tates of the NSG not 
to sell equipment and technology necessary for uranium enrichment and 
plutonium reprocessing to the States not possessing enriching or reprocessing 
facilities in operation. So, according to the American proposal, such installa-
t ions, equipment and technologies may only be transferred to a state which 
w a s a party to the NPT on 1 December 2003 and operates an enriching and 
reprocessing facili ty which has not been closed definitively and is subject to 
41
 No treaty was concluded for the establishment of the Group, at present 45 States are 
participating in the NSG's work. On the NSG see IAEA INFCIRC /539/ rev. 3. 
42
 See IAEA INFCIRC /254/rev. 1/ Part 2, July 1992. 
4
' There are 67 kinds of equipment and material enumerated in the Annex. See IAEA 
INFIClRC/254/Rev. 1/ Part 2, note 91. 
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IAEA safeguards control. All this means in effect that t rade in enriching and 
reprocessing facilities is limited to the trade among the f ive nuclear-weapon 
States, to Japan, and, in the case of enriching facilities, to Argentina, Brazil, 
Germany and the Netherlands.44 
The problems relating to the exportation of nuclear materials and equip-
ment have given rise to some concern in respect of India during the most recent 
years. 
As noted earlier, India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in 
1974 it conducted a nuclear explosion, insisting that it was engaged in peaceful 
nuclear activity. Nevertheless, that explosion turned India into a de facto 
nuclear-weapon State, altrough it is doubtless that, under the NPT, considered 
as nuclear-weapon States are only those that carried out a nuclear explosion 
prior to 1 January 1967. In this connection, however, the real problem concerns 
not the category to which India is nominally consigned, but the fact that, on the 
one hand, there is an admittedly nuclear-weapon State which is not a party to 
the NPT, with only a fraction of that State 's nuclear activity being under IAEA 
safeguards control,45 and, on the other hand, one wonder if, from the point of 
view of trade in nuclear materials and equipment, India is deemed to be a nuclear-
weapon or a non-nuclear-weapon State. 
It is in recent years that India's status under the N P T has come into par-
ticularly sharp focus since in 2005 the United States and India s igned an 
agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.4'1 As is pointed out by 
publicists, that agreement has brought a radical change in the non-proliferation 
policy of the United States, because India nuclear-weapon State not party to 
44
 Cf. Michel, Q.: Critical Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. Nuclear Law Bulletin. 79 (2007) No. 2. 21. 
41
 IAEA safeguards control as applied in respect of India is similar to that implemented 
in respect of nuclear-weapon States insofar as no more than certain nuclear facilities are 
under Agency safeguards on the basis of voluntary submission, whereas in the case of non-
nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT the totality of a given State's nuclear activities is 
subject to verification. 
4<
' On 18 July 2005 President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India issued 
a joint statement entitled „Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative" containing, among others, 
a commitment by the US to "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation" and 
trade with India; while India pledged to separ its civilian and military nuclear facilities 
and programmes, to place under IAEA safeguards its civilian facilities, to continue its 
unuilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, etc. That document was followed by a further 
accord of the Ministers of Defence on cooperation between the two countries in the Held of 
missile defence. 
On the accord see Ahlström, С.: Legal Aspects of the Indian-US Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation Initiative. SIPRI Yearbook 2006. op. cit. 668-685. 
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the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and whose nuclear activity has not been under 
IAEA control up to now.47 T h e agreement is therefore open to objection in 
two aspects, since the ques t ion arises, on the one hand, of how such an 
agreement can be reconciled with the non-proliferation obligations assumed 
by the United States in various treaties, particularly the NPT,4 8 and, on the other 
hand, of whether the agreement is not in contradiction with the provisions of 
different international instruments on the trade of nuc lear materials and 
equipment as well as of the internal law of the United Sta tes and India.44 It 
appears that the Indian-American agreement also runs counter to the Warsaw 
Guidelines accepted by the Uni ted States, and that the agreement has for some 
t ime divided the NSG States, several of which objected to lifting the nuclear 
t rade embargo which had been ordered against India 34 years before.80 By 
September 2008, however, the NSG States had finally agreed on lifting the 
embargo, and the United States Congress approved the agreement with India at 
the end of September of the s a m e year.81 
In order to extend IAEA safeguards on Indian nuclear installations, since 
November 2007 the IAEA and India conducted negotiations on safeguards 
agreement, what was finally signed by the Parties in February 2009. In the 
future, under that agreement additional 14 India nuclear reactors are expected 
to be under IAEA safeguards.82 
47
 See Michel: op. cit. 682-685. 
48
 Along with these treaties, mention may be made of Security Council Resolution 
1 172 of 1998 calling upon the member States of the United Nations to block trade in any 
nuclear material or technology that would in any way promote Indian and Pakistani weapons 
programmes or ballistic missile programmes for nuclear delivery vehicles. 
44
 On this score see Ahlström: op. cit. 682-685. 
50
 At the Vienna Conference of the NSG States, held at the end of August 2008, 
France, Russia and the United States came out for lifting the embargo, while Austria, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and New-Zealand were strongly against 
doing so. 
51
 At the time of closing the manuscript of this study, the agreement did not have the 
Senate 's approval required for its entry into force. 
52
 The agreement will enter into force on the date the IAEA receives from India written 
notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been 
met . 
Some of India's nuclear facilities (six in number) have for years been under IAEA 
safeguards by the terms of the agreement between the Agency and India, but this number 
af fec ts only a fraction of India's nuclear activity. 
IAEA control over additional facilities is not feasible unless India strictly separates its 
military and peaceful nuclear programmes. On this score see IAEA IN FC IRC/731. 
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IV. A few words about the "problematic" States 
/. The Iranian nuclear program 
The problems with Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, when evidence 
showed that the Islamic Republic of Iran was constructing two undeclared 
nuclear fuel facilities south of Teheran.53 The IAEA has s ince sought to shed 
light on I ran 's uranium enrichment and heavy water p rograms first of all in 
the f ramework of safeguards agreements.3 4 Teheran, however , has re fused to 
cooperate with the Agency, and the Iranian nuclear program being and remain-
ing intransparent for the IAEA.33 The problem with Iran has for long years 
reside in the fact that, on the one hand, the question is left open whether or 
not they operate secret nuclear installations in the country and, on the other, 
whether activities prohibited by the N P T are not being carried out at the 
declared nuclear installations. 
The international efforts for a solution of the problems relating to Iran 's 
nuclear program have been exerted for years basically a long two main lines. 
One line is that of the IAEA and the Security Council and bears upon Iran's 
obligations under the NPT and the safeguards system of the IAEA, and it was 
submitted to the Security Council and wich lead to imposing of sanctions on 
Iran. The other strand is that of diplomatic efforts, for which the take-off point 
was marked by the talks which three EU member states (France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom-the so-called EU-3) initiated with Iran in 2003,56 with 
" T h e start of Iran's nuclear programme goes back to 1959, when the US-supplied 
experimental reactor was put into operation. In the Shah's time it was planned to build 23 
nuclear power plants up to 1990. The programme was stagnant for years because of the 
Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Iraqi-Iranian war, but from the mid-1980s a start was 
made on its continuation. An Iranian announcement of 2002 said that reactors of a 
combined capacity of 6,000 Mwe would be constructed during the following 20 years. For 
Iran's nuclear programme, see Kile, S. N.: Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation. 
SIPRI Yearbook 2004. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford, 2004, 
604-612. 
34
 The safeguards agreement between Iran and the Agency is dated 13 December 1974. 
See IAEA INFCIRC/214. 
53
 In 2003 Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement on 
verification, but it has not ratified it to date. 
5
 The legal basis of the talks was provided by the Paris Agreement of 15 November 
2004. For the instrument, see IAEA INFCIRC/637. 
In the Agreement Iran reaffirmed its intention not to acquire nuclear weapons in 
keeping with Art. II. of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it pledged itself to full and 
complete cooperation with the IAEA. 
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China, Russia and the United States joining in from 2006 and with the active 
participation of chief EU representative of common foreign and security policy. 
As noted previously, the IAEA has for years been dealing with I ran ' s 
nuclear program, the A g e n c y ' s General Conference and Board of Governors 
adopting numerous resolutions on the matter, Iran, however, failed to comply 
with the Board resolutions and continued its uranium enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities.7 This finally led to the Board deciding to report " I ran ' s 
nuclear doss ie r" before the Security Council on 4 February 2006.58 Board 
Resolution 2006/27 emphasized that even more than three years of effort had 
stopped short o f clarifying all aspects of I ran 's nuclear program, the gaps in 
the Agency's information had continued to give cause for concern, and the 
Agency was not in a position to ascertain whether there were not being carried 
out any undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. 
On 31 July o f t h a t same year the Security Council adopted its Resolution 
1696 (2006) on Iran's nuclear program,74 calling upon Iran to take the steps 
required by IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14 and to 
suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The Resolution 
made it clear that if Iran failed to comply with that resolution, the Council will 
adopt appropriate measures unde r Art. 41. of the Charter. Since Iran had failed 
to give evidence of having suspended of its uranium enrichment activity and 
heavy water project, to implement the resolutions of the IAEA Board of 
Governors, the Security Council adopted several resolutions imposing sanctions 
against the Islamic Republic o f Iran, these were Resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 
(2007) , 1803(2008).6I) The Counc i l ' s Resolutions 1737 and 1747 are among 
For the talks between Iran and the EU-3, see Kile, S. N.: Nuclear arms control non-
proliferation. S/PR/ Yearbook 2006. up. cit. 619-623, 629-630. 
57
 On 1 August 2005 Iran not i f ied the IAEA of continuing its uranium enrichment 
programme. 
58
 Cf. IAEA Board Resolutions GOV/2006/14. Sea also IAEA Board Resolutions 
GOV/2006/15, GOV/2006/27, GOV/2006/38. 
74
 The resolution was carried by 14 votes in favour and 1 vote (Qatar) against. 
60
 These sanctions have banned Iran's amis export, freezed the assets of private persons, 
entities engaged in the country's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities as well as on the 
development of nuclear delivery systems. The Security Council resolutions even called 
upon States to restrain the entry into or transit through their territories of individual who 
are engaged in directly or providing support for Iran 's proliferation sensitive nuclear 
activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. The names of key 
persones, entities, etc. concerned were enumerated in the Annexes. 
In its resolution 1835(2008) of 27 September 2008 the Security Council reaffirmed the 
provisions of its previous resolutions on Iranian nuclear issue and called upon "Iran to 
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its rare cases deciding on sanctions by unanimous votes, a fact indicative in 
the first place of the gravity of the situation and of the proliferation risks 
inherent in Iran's secret nuclear program.61 
As mentioned earlier, the diplomatic talks seeking a solution to the Iranian 
nuclear problems have been under way, with longer or shorter interruptions, 
since 2003. Participating in them are Iran on the one hand and, on the other, 
six States (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States) as well as the chief EU representative of common foreign and 
security policy. The foremost aim of the discussions is to have Iran give up its 
uranium enrichment program in its entirety. In June 2006 the "Six" presented 
to Iran a proposal for a long-term comprehensive agreement, with a view to 
seeking a comphensive, long-term and proper solution on the problem and to 
develop cooperation with Iran, based on mutual respect and the stablishment of 
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of I ran ' s nuclear 
program.6 2 In its response to the proposal Iran said it was not engaged in any 
prohibited activity and that otherwise, in developing its peaceful nuclear 
industry, it was making use of its right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
as recognized by Art. 4 of the NPT.6 3 Some progress toward a sett lement of 
the situation is indicated by the events in the summer of 2008; among them 
emphasis is deserved, on the one hand, by Iran's Note of 16 June to IAEA, in 
which the Teheran Government expressed its readiness to conduct constructive 
negotiations within six months,64 and, on the other hand, by the Note of 25 
June 2008, which, formulated by the "Six" with the support of the chief EU 
representative of common foreign and security policy, contains very detailed 
proposals for various facets of cooperation with Iran in the fields of politics, 
economy and regional security, but makes related negotiations conditional on 
comply fully and without delay with its obligations under the previous resolutions of the 
Security Council, and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors." 
61
 It should be mentioned that this kind of sanctions imposing Security Council's 
resolutions and the Security Council's anti-terror resolutions were strongly criticised by 
several authors. 
62
 For the proposal, see UN A/61/514-S, 2006/806. 
63
 For Iran's response to the proposal, see IAEA INFCIRC/685. 
According to some views, Iran's persistence in its nuclear programme is made suspicious 
by the fact that Iran is one of the world's richest countries in oil resources and that it can in 
no way be said to face with energy problems. Nonetheless, Iran has repeatedly stated the 
same, namely that nuclear energy serves to meet national energy needs, while it wishes to 
use its revenues from oil and gas for increasing its foreign exchange reserves. 
64
 For the Iranian Note, see IAEA INFCIRC/729. 
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Iran 's ceasing its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities in 
compliance with Security Council Resolution 1803.65 
However, according to the last report submitted by the Director General to 
the IAEA Board of Governors in February 2009, since Iran does not implement 
the transparency measures required by the Security Council, the Agency is still 
not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared 
nuclear material and activities in Iran.'1" 
2. DPRK s nuclear issue 
The concern about the nuclear program of the DPRK emerged after the country 
had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 and the full-scope safeguards 
agreement with IAEA as required by the NPT had entered into force in 1992.''7  
From the very beginning there had been contradictions between the data 
reported by DPRK to the IAEA under the safeguards agreement and the results 
of the Agency's analysis, and, according to the IAEA, there existed in the DPRK 
undeclared plutonium. With a v iew to clarifying the situation, the Agency 
requested access to additional information and initiated on-site inspections, but 
the DPRK rejected them and, moreover, informed the world public in March 
1993 of its withdrawal from the Non-Prol i ferat ion Treaty.''8 However, as a 
result of the negotiat ions between the DPRK and the United States, the 
DPRK announced, one day before the expiry of the 30 days' notice of with-
65
 For the proposal, see IAEA INFCIRC/730. 
66
 Cf. IAEA GOV/2009/8. 
h l
 The first experimental nuclear reactor of North Korea was built in Yongbyon with 
Soviet assistance and started operation in the 1960s. From the end of the 1970s North 
Korea has sought to have its nuelear programme gradually achieve a „status of its own", 
without the need to rely on foreign assistance. 
For the safeguards agreement, see IAEA 1NFCIRC/403. 
(
'
8
 North Korea said that its withdrawal from the NPT had been motivated by, inter alia, 
the US military manoeuvres threatening the country with nuclear war. After the notification 
of withdrawal the three depositaries of the Treaty-the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom 
and the United States-published a joint declaration questioning the real cause for with-
drawal as stated by North Korea to be „exceptional circumstances relating to the substance of 
the Treaty" under Art. X. Para. I, thereof and „jeopardizing the higher interests" of the 
country. At the time the withdrawal by North Korea was also dealt with by the Security 
Council, which in Resolution 825 (1993) called upon that country to reconsider its decision. 
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drawal, the suspension of its withdrawal f rom the NPT for as long "as it 
considers necessary."69 
Since that country continued raising obstacles to IAEA inspections in 
violations of the safeguards agreement, the case of the DPRK was considered 
both by the IAEA Board of Governors and, on the basis of its report, by the 
Security Council. The situation was further complicated by the DPRK's with-
drawal on 13 June 1994 from the International Atomic Energy Agency, of 
which it had been a member for 20 years. There is no doubt that this step 
entailed an interruption of relations between the Agency and the DPRK in a 
certain aspect, but at the same t ime the country's withdrawal f r o m the Agency 
did not affect its contractual bligations under the NPT and the safeguards 
agreement concluded as required by that Treaty. 
In the autumn of 1994 the North Korean nuclear crisis seemed to be lessened 
somewhat insofar as the United States and the DPRK signed a framework 
agreement (the so-called Agreed Framework)7" at Geneva on 21 October 1994, 
to the effect that the United States would build two light water reactors in the 
DPRK71 in return for the latter country halting the construction of its nuclear 
research centre in Yongbyon and giving up its nuclear weapon program.7-
This notwithstanding, the following years witnessed the continuation of 
verification-related disputes between the DPRK and IAEA. The greatest problem 
concerning the DPRK's nuclear program lay in that the Agency actually never 
having had an opportunity to receive an overall picture of the DPRK' s nuclear 
activity and to satisfy itself in a manner admitting of no doubt that the country's 
nuclear industry was serving peaceful purposes, and in that, as mentioned 
already, the IAEA had been of the position since 1993 that the DPRK was not 
69
 Thereafter North Korea agreed to limited safeguards control, but these steps fell 
short of clarifying the question whether North Korea was really using its declared nuclear 
Facilities for peaceful purposes. 
" For the Agreed Framework, see http://www.Kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework 
1
 Also, the Agreement provided lor the normalization of economic and political 
relations between the two States, the promotion of cooperation in the field of peace and 
security on the Korean Peninsula, and stated, inter alia, that North Korea would remain a 
party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
72
 With the aim of implementing the agreement of 1994, the United States and North 
Korea set up in 1995 the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to 
which adhered later Australia and New-Zealand; Argentina, Chile and Indonesia in 1996; 
the European Union and Poland in 1997; the Czech Republic in 1999; and by Uzbekistan 
in 2000. Owing to North Korea's continuous breach of its obligations under the agree-
ments, the Executive Board of KEDO decided to discontinue the light water project on 3 1 
May 2006. 
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acting in compliance with the provisions of the safeguards agreement. The 
Agency's suspicion was heightened by the implementation of secret uranium 
enrichment programs in the DPRK, the inobservance of the American-North 
Korean framework agreement of 1994, and the expulsion of IAEA inspectors 
from the country. 
In 2002 North Korea came to openly concede its implementation of a 
uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapon purposes. That admission not 
only offended the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreement, but 
also ran counter to other international documents, such as, inter alia, the joint 
declaration of North and South Korea concerning the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula.71 
Afterwards North Korea was unwilling to cooperate with the IAEA in any 
way, to comply with the provisions of the safeguard agreement, and announced 
instead, that it would withdraw from the N P T with effect from 11 January 2003. 
In an endeavour to resolve the security problems associated with North 
Korea's nuclear weapon program there were started negotiations in August 
2003 with the participation of the United States, Russia, the Republic of China 
and Japan, along with the representations of the two Koreas.7 4 The negotiations 
were conducted in several rounds, with dangers of an ultimate break thereof, 
when in February 2005, for instance, North Korea announced that it was in 
possession of a nuclear weapon and concurrently suspended its participation in 
the six-party negotiations for an indefinite period. The discussions nevertheless 
ended up yielding results in that the part ies adopted a Joint Declaration, in 
which Nor th Korea, a f f l ic ted as it was by immense poverty and famine, 
undertook in principle, in exchange for food aid and energy sources, to end its 
nuclear program, return to the NPT, and apply the I A E A safeguards system. 
Yet, for all that, on 9 October 2006 it informed the world public that it had 
carried out an experimental nuclear explosion, which consequently led to the 
interruption of the negotiations.75 
' In December 1991 North and South Korea signed a declaration on denuclearization, 
committing themselves not to possess either nuclear weapons or plutonium reprocessing 
and uranium enrichment facilities, and to conduct negotiations on a mutual verification 
system. Still, as early as 1992, the IAEA found evidence that North Korea was secretly 
engaged in plutonium reprocessing. 
4
 The nuclear program of North Korea was looked at ab initio with particular concern 
by the neighbouring States of Asia, fearing that North Korea's nuclear policy would generate 
a nuclear arms race in the region. Cf. Lee, К. В.: North Korean nuclear development, 
missiles and energy crisis. Cf. Friend of North Korean People, 18 (2004) 55. 
77
 In the wake of the North Korean nuclear explosion the Security Council, in its 
Resolution 1718 of 14 October 2006 adopted by a unanimous vote, ordered the application 
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However , owing to Beijing's pressure on North Korea, the negotiations 
were resumed in February 2007. On 13 February of that year an agreement was 
reached in Beijing to the effect that, in return for economic, energetic and 
humanitarian assistance, North Korea undertook to end its nuclear program for 
military purposes and to ensure that the shutting down and disablement of its 
nuclear centre in Yongbyon would take place under IAEA control. First it 
appeared that North Korea had observed the provisions of the aforementioned 
agreement for a few months only, and on 24 September 2008 it requested the 
IAEA to remove the Agency's seal from the Yongbyon centre, while announcing 
that reprocessing would go on at the installation and that from that point of 
time the Agency's inspectors would have no access thereto. But, according to 
the letest information, in the DPRK the IAEA has continued to monitor and 
verfy the shutdown status of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and the fuel rods 
discharges from the facility are under Agency surveillance. '' 
Conclusions 
The NPT is one of the most important treaties which, concluded in the middle 
of the 20"' century, have considerably enhanced the cause of nuclear disarma-
ment during the past period of more than four decades. When emphasizing the 
significance of the Treaty one cannot be silent about certain weaknesses of its 
regime, of which reference is made by many to the discriminative character of 
the NPT. 
By its structure and provisions the Non-Proliferation Treaty has divided the 
States into two groups, distinguishing those possessing and those not possessing 
nuclear weapons at the time the Treaty was concluded. In effect, the rights and 
obligations of the States party to the NPT are tailored to the group to which 
they belong, and the gravest violation of the NPT is that when States seek to 
change their status as defined in the NPT, notably by trying to gain control of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
of sanctions under Chapter Vll of the Charter, calling on Pyongyang not to carry out any 
further nuclear tests nor to launch ballistic missiles, to return forthwith to the NPT, and to 
accept safeguards control by the IAEA. 
76
 Cf. IAEA Director General's introductory statement to the Board of Governors on 2 
March 2009. However, some weeks later, on 15 April 2009 the DPRK has announced of 
ceasing all cooperation with the IAEA and asked the Agency's inspectors to leave the 
county at the earliest possible time. 
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Under the NPT, research in and production and application of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes are "inalienable rights", but their exercise should 
be in keeping with the basic obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States under the 
Treaty not to acquire in any form nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices and not to carry out unauthorized nuclear activities under the guise of 
their peaceful nuclear programs. 
The 40lh anniversary of the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
the four decades that have passed since the Trea ty ' s entry into force, and the 
next Review Conference will afford a good opportunity77 to strengthen the 
non-proliferation regime, perhaps in form of a protocol annexed to the NPT. 
Adoption of such a document is necessitated by the fact that there are new 
dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation coming into view in our days. 
If the States of the international community are in real earnest about the 
cause of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they should make 
every effort to assist the non-nuclear-weapon States in the implementation of 
their peaceful nuclear programmes, for it is abundantly clear that international 
cooperation, surrounded with reliable guarantees, in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy is of paramount importance to non-proliferation. 
77
 The negotiations concerning the preparation of the next Review Conference, due to 
be held in 2010, have been under way since 2007. 
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The concept of confrontation 
This paper has been prepared in the hope of giving new insights into the above-
mentioned case. The respective ECJ judgment can be interpreted, based on its 
wording.' It seems to be more important, however, to try to explore the process 
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H-1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8.; Research Fellow, Taxation Law and Policy Research 
Institute, Monash University, Melbourne 
E-mail: daniel.deak@uni-corvinus.hu 
' The case of 446/03 Marks & Spencer v. David Halsey concerns the ability of a 
profitable UK parent company to offset losses generated by its overseas subsidiaries under 
the UK group relief rules. The case was referred to the ECJ. The ECJ made its judgment on 
13 December 2005, referring the case back to the High Court for resolution. The ruling of 
the High Court was challenged before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals entered 
its judgment on 20 February 2007. The House of Lords Appeals Committee refused to 
grant an appeal against the Court of Appeals judgment. 
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of communication as well, the final result of which is the judgment. Community 
and tax law commentators have cited this case more widely than any other 
direct tax case before. Perhaps not surprisingly, the judgment is not unambiguous. 
One can find plain arguments both for the effect ive protection of EC freedoms, 
including the f r eedom of establishment, one the one hand, and for stopping 
regulatory and tax competition, and safeguarding the national interests of 
Member States, on the other one. The methodology of legal autopoiesis may be 
useful in better understanding of the message the judgment has negotiated. 
I. Major theses of the legal autopoiesis theory 
An analytic viewpoint that highlights stability in social practice with regard to 
the interaction between a system and its environment is an integral part of the 
sociology as elaborated already by Talcott Parsons: „one very highly generalized 
way of conceptualizing a minimal aspect of a system might be to consider it an 
area of relative non-randomness."; „Not only must system boundaries, by some 
mechanism(s), be maintained in relative integrity, but by some mechanism(s) 
the system must both draw 'sustenance' from the environment and 'defend itself 
against extreme environmental fluctuation. At the boundary of the sys tem-
permeable, open to environmental impingement and intrusion-there must be 
filtration mechanism, accepting and rejecting possible environmental inputs, 
and regulatory mechanisms minimizing environmental fluctuation either by 
direct action into the environment toward control of its relevant aspects or, at 
least, by neutralizing those effects of such fluctuation as cannot effectively be 
controlled."" 
From the viewpoint of the sociology of functionalism (Malinowski) and 
neo-functionalism (Merton, Parsons, Luhmann), it can be highlighted in social 
practice what is congruent while the macro conditions of social structure are 
unaffected. From the perspective of functionalism, what has remained in our 
view on social pract ice is residual, instead of taking into account the big 
categories of the production and reproduction schemes of social relationships 
(social classes, capital entitlement and poverty, the conflict between North and 
South, etc.). Thus, one can take a look at the various patterns of social integration 
(like redistribution or reciprocity) or at the process of the internal reconstruction 
Ackennann, Ch.—Parsons, T.: The concept of'social system' as a theoretical device. In: 
McQuarie, D. (ed.): Readings in contemporary sociological theory: from modernity to 
post-modernity. Englewood Cliffs, 1995. 24 [from: Direnzo, G. J. (eds.): Concepts, theory 
and explanation in the behavioural sciences. New York, 1966]. 
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of argumentative discourse where the inter-subjective use of a common language 
will be developed. Functional differentiation (into the spheres of economy, law, 
sciences, religion, etc.) is a basic development of the Western-type modern 
history. 
From the viewpoint of late functionalist sociology, social life cannot merely 
be described by the traditional categories of class conflicts, the ownership of 
the means of production or the nation state. As a product o f modernisat ion, 
in the Western societies it has been more relevant to focus on the events of com-
munication. This way, the monological view of society can be overcome by 
relying on communicative rationality, as identified by Jürgen Habermas. 
With the onset of modernisation, individuals have been liberated from pre-
economic control. A social community is able to organise itself as civil society, 
independent of its nation state. In addition to the autonomous forms of social 
activities, autopoietic (self-referential) systems can emerge as well. As explained 
by Niklas Luhman, in a theory of such self-referential systems, the traditional 
link of the idea of self-reference to consciousness as the basis of operation is 
abandoned. Thus, the theory of "subject-ness" of consciousness (subiectum or 
hypokeimenon) and the primacy of the epistemological difference between object 
and subject are rejected. Instead, two kinds of operations are distinguished, i.e., 
self-reproduction and observation.1 An empirically ascertainable connection 
exists between the principle of differentiation of social systems and the form, in 
which subsystems differentiate themselves in society, being self-referentially 
closed, and open to their environment.4 In late functionalist sociology, what is 
causal will be replaced by what is structural. 
Given the phenomenon of the autopoietic development of society, a certain 
break with Kantian methodology can be explained by Luhmann as follows: the 
voluminous empirical research on causal attribution teaches us that in the 
matter of causality there is no way of avoiding selective judgments, and this 
shifts the question of the essential causes into the question of the structural 
conditions of the causal plan used. Autopoietic systems need not be transparent 
to themselves; they find nothing in themselves that could be regarded as an 
undeniable fact of consciousness and appl ied as an epistemological a priori 
principle; the assumption of an a priori is replaced by recursivity itself.7 
Luhmann, N.: The unity of the legal system. In: Teubner, G.: (ed.): Autopoietic law: 
A new approach to law and society. Berlin, New York, 1988. 13. 
4
 Ibid. 31. 
Luhmann, N.: Closure and openness: On reality in the world of law. In: Teubner 
(ed.): Autopoietic law... op. cit. 336. 
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Whereas classical scientific thought holds a paradigm to be a "linkage through 
inputs" (the outside determines the changes in the sys tem) , the paradigm of 
"linkage through closure" can be proposed as an alternative: it is the internal 
coherence of the system that determines its development. Then autopoietic 
systems def ine themselves against the background of an environment." The 
differentiation of a legal system is based on the distinction between normative 
and cognit ive expectations. Legal sys tems are to c o m b i n e the c losure of 
recursive self-reproduction and the openness of their relation to the environment 
(closure in normativity and openness in their cognitive respect). 
The conceptualization of social systems brings about three important changes 
in social t h e o r y / 
- a radical temporalisation of social systems, meaning that the elements of 
social life are not stable, but are "events"; 
- what has to be maintained in a society is the recursively closed organi-
sation of an open system (closure in operation); and 
- observation itself is an operation of an autopoietic system (openness in 
cognition). 
According to the theory of Niklas Luhmann (on the unity of the legal system)4 
- legal acts are those communicative events that change legal structures; 
- the legal system is defined by the circular relationship between legal acts 
and legal norms; and 
- the interplay of closure and openness is represented in the legal system 
by the combination of normative closure and cognitive openness. 
Jean-Pierre Dupuy supplies three different interpretations of how the legal 
system can be open and closed at the same time: '" 
- closure and openness refer to d i f ferent domains o f the legal system 
(normatively closed, cognitively open); 
- legal closure implies legal openness (order from noise 11); and 
6
 Ost, F.: Between order and disorder: The game of law. In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic 
law... 73. 
7
 Luhmann: The unity of the legal system. In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic law... op. cit. 
19-20. 
8
 Teubner, G.: Introduction to autopoietic law. In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic law... 
op. cit. 3. For concept summaries of the autopoiesis and legal autopoiesis theories, see 
separate annexes below. 
9
 Ibid. 4. 
10
 Ibid. 5. 
" Atlan, H.: Le crystal et le fume. Paris, 1979. 5, 41, 56. 
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- self-transcendence of a normative order can be explored (see Robert 
Nozick's theory of entitlements with its self-referential character of procedural 
justice or Friedrich Hayek ' s theory of law as a spontaneous social order). 
Law that negotiates reflexive communication provides procedures without 
intervening in the internal matters of the subjects-at-law. In the beginning of the 
20th century, Georg Jellinek identifies the term of legal reflex with the indirect 
effect of law in the absence of explicit statutory law provisions.12 According 
to Gunther Teubner, reflexive law is characterised by a new kind of legal self-
restraint. Instead of taking over regulatory responsibility for the outcome of 
social processes, reflexive law restricts itself to the installation, correction, and 
re-definition of self-regulatory democratic mechanisms. '3 
According to Teubner, autopoiesis does not exclude evolution, but implies 
a redefinition of evolution. The questions that can be raised in this respect are:14 
- How does the legal system evolve into autopoietic closure? 
- How does legal evolution operate after an autopoietic closure of the legal 
system? 
The proposed solutions are as follows: 
- The first question can be answered with reference to the construction of a 
hyper-cycle (pre-autopoietic evolution-socially d i f fuse law develops higher 
forms of autonomy via the cyclical constitution of its system components). 
- The second quest ion can be answered with reference to internalisation 
(post-autopoietic evolution-legal development is coupled to broader social 
developments by specific mechanisms of co-evolution). 
Upon applying the legal autopoiesis theory to real life, it is crucial to 
explain changes in the environment (structural couplings). Luhmann explains (in 
his theory on closure and openness) that the theory of self-referential systems 
leads inevitably to the following dilemma: on the one hand, no system is in a 
position to operate outside its boundaries, on the other, structural evolution requires 
the assumption that a system's environment produces effective constraints 
on the system. Luhmann ' s proposal for the solution consists in a distinction'3 
12
 Jellinek, G.: Allgemeine Staatslehre. Berlin, 1914. 69-70. 
13
 Teubner, G.: Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. Law and Society, 17 
(1983) 239. 
14
 Teubner: Introduction to autopoietic law. In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic law... op. cit. 8. 
15
 Ibid. 10. 
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between internal information processing and external constraints.16 As to the 
realisation of external constraints, the following can be highlighted: 
- the materiality continuum as the material-energetic basis of meaning 
systems; and 
- the simultaneous presence of events in several meaning processing systems. 
II. Application of the legal autopoiesis theory to the case of C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer 
1. Temporalisation of law: flexibility in the application of the very same 
statutory schemes 
Legal rules are being replaced by legal acts which are simply communicative 
events (enouncements) appearing in the legal order. Teubner asserts17 that legal 
rules lose the strategic position they once had as core elements of law. In a switch 
from structure to process, the central elements of a legal order are "énoncés", 
communicative events, being legal acts, and not legal rules. It has proved to be 
hopeless to search for a criterion delineating social norms from legal ones. The 
decisive transformation cannot be found in the inherent characteristics of rules, 
but in their insertion in the context of different discourses. 
From the perspective of the legal autopoiesis theory, the case of C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer can be seen as a product of the temporalisation of legal institu-
tions. It is embarrassing to admit, how difficult it is to interpret this case. The 
story can be told in different ways, depending on the standpoint the story-teller 
has held. Surely, one can realise the legal acts as communicative events that 
may change legal structures. Key to understanding this case is to appreciate the 
degree of flexibility of the national tax administration in applying statutory 
schemes. In the specific case, the UK loss relief regime is put in the context of 
the question as to whether the UK parent company should be granted a last 
resort. The question is answered (in the affirmative) as a result of a series of 
discussions. At the end of the process of communication, an answer is given, 
which cannot yet be repeated in the same way in another case. 
"' As an antecedent, see Ashby's theory on a cybernetic system that can be defined as 
one "open to energy but closed to information and control"; Ross Ashby, W.: An introduc-
tion in cybernetics. London, 1956. 4. 
17
 Teubner, G.: Global Bukowina: Legal pluralism in the world society. Teubner (ed.): 
Global law without a state. Aldershot, 1997. 
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The facts that are relevant to the particular legal case do not really provide 
solution (for a summary of facts, see the separate annex below). It would be 
misleading just to focus on the mere facts as covered by statutory law schemes. 
For example, a particular meaning could be given to the legal fact that the UK. 
consortium system is different f rom the Scandinavian loss contribution system. 
It is still more interesting to look behind the pure facts. The U K consortium 
system is not deemed to be inconsistent with Community law. The competent 
UK tax authority is, however, expected to apply national law in a manner, which 
is friendly enough for the purposes of the e f fec t ive enforcement of taxpayer 
rights in association with the EC freedom of establishment. The legal acts o f 
the tax authority may lead to real changes in the legal structure. While the U K 
tax law on consort ia does not require generosi ty, the application of it to a 
particular case does require taking into account how effect ively taxpayer 
rights can be exercised. The legal acts of the tax authority may thus imply the 
possibility of a last resort to the effective protection of taxpayer rights, not 
arising purely f rom the legal facts. 
It is important to distinguish between the internal conception and organisa-
tion of a national tax system and the possible effect of its operation on the 
exercise of EC freedoms. The Community legislator, like the Council or the 
Commission, or judiciary bodies like the ECJ, must not interfere with the internal 
organisation of a national tax system. They can halt, however, their operation 
where the application of national tax law results in the unjustifiable restriction 
of EC freedoms. The application of particular national tax rules constitutes com-
municative events-and resources of the self-generation of Community law-at the 
time when they commence interaction with the exercise of fundamental freedoms. 
2. Closure in operation and openness in cognition, order from noise and self-
transcendence 
No sub-systems can be reasonably supposed unless they are close in their 
operation and open in their capacity of observation at the same time. Structural 
coupling and openness to its actual environment cannot thus be interpreted 
without the presupposition of normative c losure . A subsystem will not be 
closed due to its simple separation from its environment. It will be closed in 
the process of communication with its actual environment only , at the end of 
which both the system and its environment will be changed. 
Closure in operation and openness in observation do not only mean that they 
refer to the different domains of a legal system. It also means that, paradoxically, 
legal closure implies legal openness. In other words, law-as reflexive law-f i l ls 
in an autopoietic system the role of installation, correction and redefinition of 
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self-regulatory mechanisms. It provides filtering of non-legal events through 
the lens of law. As already Kelsen explains, "the law is like King Midas. 
Whatever he touched was immediately changed into gold; likewise, everything 
the law has to do with becomes law".'s Due to a series of communicative events, 
a type of order can be developed without antecedents. Namely, these develop-
ments cannot be interpreted based on the simple causality or the s tudy of the 
relationship between what is objective and subjective. This way, order can be 
evolved f rom "noise", a normative order can emerge that is able to j u s t i f y itself 
by way of self-transcendence. 
Despite the common assumption of a common static view of law, the actual 
meaning of legal norms may be instable. This is because different elements of 
the sets of legal norms may be called forth, depending on the circumstances. 
Coping with the vulnerability of such norms requires a kind of relational way 
of thinking. A correspondence theory is operational, provided that the facts 
relevant to legal decisions do not change in an abrupt, comprehensive manner. 
In the instance where there is no longer stability in the relevant meaning of legal 
institutions, harmony cannot be achieved between the legal norms and the ever-
changing outward reality. Harmony can, however, be reached in another respect, 
suggested precisely by a coherence theory. Legal institutions may produce 
harmony in discrete micro relations where the applicable norms are coherent and 
the people involved in them have developed their sense of communicat ion, 
adequate to the particular case. 
A legal system can eventually be expected to have provisions that are in 
conformity to each other. This is a holistic idea of law, based on the assumption 
of system-oriented conformity. That is, legal sources need to be interpretable 
in a close-circuit system, which is legitimised in itself. Recursive reasoning is 
not given f rom the outset: it appears at the end of a process of communication. 
A good judgment may benefit from the communication completed in the court 
room. Submissions, statements and declarations of judges and litigating parties 
are made in interaction with each other. At the end of this process, a ruling 
should emerge which contributes to the strengthening of the consistency and 
integrity of law. A good judgment is an example of the coherence to be 
achieved during the litigation process. 
Is
 Ost: Between order and disorder... In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic law... op. cit. 79; 
Kelsen, H.: Pure theory of law. Berkeley, 1967. 369. 
CONFRONTATION RE: LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS THEORY IN OPERATION. 153 
(i) Simultaneous application of the principles of fiscal cohesion and the effective 
enforcement of rights 
The case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer cannot be solved without understanding a 
micro system of the effective enforcement o f taxpayer rights in the light of 
Community law, which is normatively closed and cognitively open. In general, 
Community law has been developed without relying on the legitimising force o f a 
nation state. Instead, it has been evolved over the decades due to the practice 
of the citizens to apply it as a system of law, which is autonomous, takes 
priority over national law, implies a number of provisions with direct e f fec t , 
and provides for the effective protection of individual rights. The Community 
law product of "acquis communautaire" and the judiciary practice developed 
by the ECJ have never been posited by single nation states. They have been 
evolved due to the functional differentiation of Community law itself. Community 
law is still open to the changes taking place in its social environment. For 
instance, in the recent three or four years, m o r e emphasis has been placed on 
the application of the EC Treaty to specific cases than on interpreting the EC 
Treaty in a rather innovative way, with the result of developing judiciary law. 
The judgment in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer can rely on the Community 
case law developed on the assessment of the restrictions of national legislation 
on the freedom of establishment, and on the possible justification of these 
restrictions. The process of applying the non-restriction principle to direct tax 
cases started with C-264/96 ICI and has been open to date. Furthermore, it has 
been uttered, among other things, in the case o f C-446/03 Marks & Spencer that: 
- the territoriality principle of taxation, as recognised in the C-250/95 Futura 
Participations case, needs to be respected; 
- the fiscal cohesion principle as introduced in the C-204/90 Bachmann 
case must not be interpreted too narrowly, that is to say, only in relation to the 
same taxpayer and the same item of tax liability; and 
- the competent tax authority must not disregard if there is any instance for 
the taxpayer in the UK to recognise for tax purposes (and c a n y over) the losses 
sustained in another Member State; as a last resort, the relief of the cross-border 
loss transfer must be granted. 
The Community law, being applicable to the case of C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer, and consisting of the above components, can be considered as a 
normatively closed system. It can be interpreted as a resul t of the combined 
application of the principles to the single case, which otherwise are in contradic-
tion with each other. The Community law, serving as a basis for the decis ion 
in the C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, has been developed progressively dur ing a 
process of about half of a decade as a result of the assessment of the restrictions 
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on the f reedom of establishment by national tax legislation and the evaluation 
of their possible justification. 
The Communi ty law, applicable to this case, can still be regarded as a 
cognitively open system. Notably, the fiscal cohesion principle has been altered 
significantly since its formulation in the C-204/90 Bachmann case. T h e EC 
Court of Justice has been careful in applying this principle since the t ime the 
C-204/90 Bachmann case was decided, giving all the less opportunity for its 
application. More importantly, the non-restriction principle has been extended 
to direct tax cases even by providing for the granting of tax relief as a last resort. 
This constitutes evidence for the right o f citizens to exercise the f r eedom of 
establishment even in direct tax cases. T h e UK can be implicated in the case 
of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. This is because it has infringed both the 
effectiveness principle (Article 10 EC) and the proportionality principle (third 
Paragraph of Article 5 EC) to the extent that the taxpayer would unreasonably 
suffer from the non-recognition of tax losses and, in particular, from the fact 
that the restriction on the cross-border loss-transfer would go beyond what is 
necessary in order to protect the national tax base. 
(ii) Emergence of the principle of equivalence, applicable to direct tax cases 
The judgment in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer has created a new language. As a 
result, a new view has formed on the old i tems of EC harmonisation, the non-
restriction of fundamental freedoms and the effective protection of taxpayer 
rights. The principles of fiscal cohesion, non-restriction and effectiveness 
cannot be regarded in the same way, as it was the case before. Through the 
decision in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, a new type of balance between the 
territoriality principle of taxation and the non-restriction principle has been 
achieved so far. 
It is a major development that, for the first time, the equivalence principle 
as enshrined in Article 100b of the Maastricht Treaty has been applied to a 
direct tax case. This means first that national tax systems can be developed due 
to the recognition of the sovereignty of Member States in the formulation of 
their system of taxation and economic policy. A Member State is expected 
secondly, however, to take into account that its own legal institutions need to 
be compatible with its counterparts, i.e., the law adopted in another M e m b e r 
State. Once the discrepancy between national legislations constitutes an obstacle 
to the exercise of fundamental freedoms, it must be eliminated. The non-
recognition of the losses with the Luxembourg subsidiary o f Marks & Spencer 
UK in the UK represents such a discrepancy, although the UK is not requested 
to change its statutory law. 
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Article 95 EC on internal market legislation requires the advanced forms of 
harmonisation compared to the common market legislation, even though not in 
the area of taxation. The Article 95-based power o f Community legislation 
may be in contradiction with the subsidiarity principle (second Paragraph of 
Article 5 EC). However, the principle of subsidiarity does not call into question 
the powers conferred on the Community by the EC Treaty. It is still true that 
Article 95 does not give the Community exclusive p o w e r to legislate. It gives a 
certain competence only for the purposes of improving the conditions for the 
functioning of the internal (single European) market by eliminating barriers 
from fundamental f reedoms and removing distortions of competition.14 
Entitlement for the transfer of a Member State 's regulatory power to the 
Community level comes from the specific conferment of the power principle 
(first Paragraph of Article 5 EC). It is reflected in the joined cases of C-154/04 
Alliance for Natural Health, Nutrilink and C-155/04 National Association of 
Health Stores where the EC Court of Justice has conf i rmed its practice that the 
disparities between Member States do not require harmonisation, taken by 
itself. Harmonisation is necessary only where disparities in national legislation 
disturb the smooth operation of the internal market, and it is therefore necessary 
to remove those disparities.2" By virtue of the EC Court 's case-law, a mere 
finding of disparities between national rules is not sufficient to jus t i fy having 
recourse to Article 95 EC (Para. 28 of the quoted judgment). The Court explains 
(in Para. 78 of the jo ined cases of C-154/04 and C-155/04): the procedure of 
the so-called comitology2 1 is intended to reconcile, on the one hand, the 
requirement for effectiveness and flexibility, arising f rom the need regularly to 
amend and update aspects of Community legislation in the light of develop-
ments in scientific understanding in various areas and, on the other hand, the 
need to take account of the respective powers of Community institutions. 
The need of coordination between Member States does not prejudice the 
basic principle that Member States enjoy freedom in deciding matters that do 
not require a higher level of decision. The national competence of regulation of 
one Member State cannot be exercised, however, without taking into account 
what is happening in another Member State. For example , where a lady insured 
in France, staying in Germany is in a need of hospital treatment in Berlin, the 
French national authority of social security cannot refuse giving its permission 
for this treatment outside France and reimbursing her for the costs of treatment 
19
 C-491/01 BAT, ECR 2002.1-l 1453, Paras 178-179. 
20
 European Court Review, 2005. 1-06451, Para. 28. 
21
 Report from the Commission on the working of the Committees during 2001, COM 
(2002) 733 final. 
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where it has turned out that on her stay away f rom France it was not possible 
to provide her with treatment in France without delay that would be equivalent 
to treatment provided in Berlin."" 
A Member State is not obliged to co-operate with another Member State 
unless the denial of coordination with the other Member State would prevent 
citizens from exercising their fundamental rights across the Community. The 
EC Court made use of this principle in the Marks & Spencer case as well: for 
the lack of a fiscal nexus established in the UK, the United Kingdom is not 
obliged to grant the opportunity o f carrying over the losses of a Luxembourg 
subsidiary to a UK parent company unless the UK taxpayer proves that in 
Luxembourg there is no way of recognising for tax purposes any loss carry 
over, f his is something new in the Advocate Genera l ' s opinion that he would 
extend the equivalence principle as enshrined in Article 100b of the Maastricht 
f r e a t y to the matters of direct taxation, that is, to a territory where Member 
States traditionally enjoy freedom.2 3 
(iii) Striking a balance between instances of f ighting against trafficking in 
losses and granting a last resort to cross-border loss carry over 
f he starting point for the ECJ in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer is its concern that 
the arbitrage in jurisdictions and trafficking in cross-border losses needs to be 
stopped. Clearly, the ECJ is anticipated to combat tax avoidance or the abuse 
of Community law. f his is one aspect of the complexity only the EC Court has 
to encounter, however, f h e other one is equally important, fliat is, the taxpayer's 
right to exercise the EC freedom of establishment needs to be effectively 
protected, f h e EC Court must not stop therefore at the point of combating the 
abuse of law. It has to assure at the same time that national tax law measures 
will not unreasonably put restrictions on one of the fundamental f reedoms that 
can be exercised in the internal market . 
Our thesis in this paper is that the EC Court cannot make a link between the 
two opposite goals unless it has recourse to legal autopoiesis. It will not be 
successful in striking a balance between the two extremes unless it is able to 
create "order from noise", by starting to apply the equivalence principle to a 
direct tax case in parallel with the aspiration of stopping tax avoidance, f h e 
equivalence principle purports that both ideas need be protected equally and 
simultaneously: citizens need be prevented from the abuse of law, but they need 
22
 C-56/01 Patricia Inizan, European Court Review 2003. 1-12403, Para. 60. 
23
 C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, European Court Review 2005. 1-10837, Para. 59, 
opinion of AG L. Poiares Maduro, Paras 76-77. 
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be assured at the same time that they will not be prevented from exercising 
fundamental freedoms. 
The EC Court is taking a hard look at whether the taxpayer has ful ly 
exhausted the possibilities of loss carry over, including all affected jurisdictions. 
If not, legal autopoiesis is not invoked. If so, it is because the grant of a last 
resort shall be accompanied with the warning given about avoidance and abuse. 
The assumption of equivalence is of a theoretical nature. It starts operating, 
however, where communication between the jurisdictions of Member States is 
a problem. National jurisdictions are not requested to be unified. They are, 
however, expected to be compatible with each other, and national public 
authorities need to start communicating with each other accordingly, whenever 
it is necessary. 
The assumed operation of legal autopoiesis is not static. The legal positions 
to be taken will depend on how particular factual circumstances will be 
developed. They are thus open to changes that will be elaborated, provided that 
the legal acts associated with these changes will be successful, leading to 
communication with a view to reaching balance and coherence in the case under 
discussion. This is the filtration effect by law of the non-legal environment. The 
non-legal considerations o f combating avoidance and abuse are not refuted, 
and they are not accepted either: instead, they are digested and reformulated. 
Legal autopoiesis is thus a matter of dynamics. 
One can learn from the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer that tax law 
does not resist economic reality; rather, it starts reshaping economic reality 
from non-law into law. In tax cases, conflicts do not arise between law and 
economic policy in and of itself but between law and economic policy-as they 
stand at the outset-and the redefined law that appears at the end of the process 
of communication between the factors of law and non-law. 
The emergence in tax law of anti-avoidance rules is not a matter of the 
intrusion of economic policy considerations into the body, form or language of 
tax law, but the corollary of the collapse of traditional legal institutions that are 
not able to provide taxpayers any longer with sufficient guidance. The 
emergence of anti-avoidance rules is the consequence of a failure of the law 
used up to the time when taxpayers become engaged in tax avoidance. A court 
decision that reflects a problem of tax avoidance does not lead simply to the 
assertion of a new type of law. It can happen to do so only if legal and non-
legal systems go through the filter of self-referential law, producing a new 
order of law. This is precisely what happened in the case of C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer: the EC Court spelled out the law on granting a taxpayer a last resort, 
following the exhaustion of all opportunities for loss carry over across the 
border. 
158 DÁNIEL DF.ÁK 
(iv) A micro perspective of the approximation of national laws in direct tax 
matters 
The work of autopoiesis is largely constrained by the outward (non-legal) society. 
It can only emerge where the process of functional differentiation has reached 
a sufficiently high level of social consensus and welfare. Where poverty and 
degradation prevails, no autopoiesis can be developed. Autopoiesis is not a macro 
category of social structure. It can only occur as an except ion, that is, f rom 
time to time where all the conditions for its development are fulfilled. 
Importantly, the autonomy of a legal system can only be interpreted f rom 
case to case. The standpoint taken by the ECJ in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer 
suggests the approximation of Community law, although not by way of statutory 
legislation. As an alternative to the bureaucratic coordination of Member States, 
harmonisation can be achieved, although in the micro sphere of the judgment 
made in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. This micro perspective of harmonisation 
also means that it must be redefined in another legal case. What has been stated 
in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer is not necessarily valid in another case. It is there-
fore a matter of communicative legal acts to be taken whether a new quality of 
legal autonomy and coherence is developed in a new case, again in a micro 
situation. 
A major source for harmonisation is not necessarily the Member States ' 
agreement of their political will top-down. One has to explore citizens as well 
who may experience restrictions on their exercise of fundamental rights f rom 
case to case, due to the lack of harmony in the Member States' statutory 
legislation. In such cases, it is ultimately not the question of harmonisation that 
can be raised. Instead, it is the enforcement of civil rights, which is at stake. 
Harmonisation, if any, is the inadvertent consequence of creating the possibility of 
the enforcement of civil rights. This is a micro perspective of harmonisation, 
which still does not invalidate the relevance of agreements on harmonisation, 
to be made on a macro level of the institutions of official policy. 
Micro-level harmonisation might be seen as a reason for generating casuistic 
legislation in the instance that the issue of correcting national legislation arises 
from the limited outlook of the specific problem. This correction must still not 
be considered as a new branch of national legislation. Instead, the legislator's 
goal is to make adjustment to national laws in order to achieve harmony in 
implementing national law in line with its counterpart, effect ive in the other 
Member State. The adjustment required by the individual case can take place 
in terms of modifying the respective national law, releasing implementation 
decrees or guidance for the interpretation of the law applicable to the case, 
with a view to bringing national law in accordance with its counterpart. This 
CONFRONTATION RE: LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS THEORY IN OPERATION. 159 
process can be seen as a matter of adjustment rather than the creation of new 
law in a spontaneous way. 
With regard to the above ECJ cases, we need not require f rom France to 
change its law on social security. It can even be maintained that the French 
legislator does not have to do anything other than to harmonise the implemen-
tation of rules on the reimbursement for the costs of the hospital treatment 
made outside France with the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty. The UK 
is not expected to change its tax system of loss carry over either. It is only 
important to assure that the UK tax law is to be read in accordance with the EC 
Treaty and, if necessary, make provisions to ensure that exceptional foreign 
losses can be recognised for domestic tax purposes despite the missing fiscal 
nexus, provided that the taxpayer does not have an opportunity to effectuate 
loss carry over for tax purposes in any of the affected jurisdictions. In these 
cases, a Member State is invited to amend its legal practice in order to avoid 
impeding the exercise of fundamental freedoms. It is up to the Member State to 
determine which legislative or other measures will be taken to achieve the 
desired harmony. 
3. Evolution from diffusion into coherence: reconciliation of conflicting 
principles (constructing a hyper-cycle) and showing sensitivity to tax 
competition (internalisation) 
The evolution of an autopoietic legal system can be explained (i) by a hyper-
cycle of the development of d i f fuse law into autonomy and coherence, and (ii) 
by means of internalisation, that is, by coupling with major social develop-
ments. The particular law that has been applied in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer 
has not existed before. It has been developed through the various processes of 
communication followed by the lawyers specialising in tax law, Community 
law and public international law. There were judges, EC servants, legal advisers 
and scholars both in the UK and abroad who pursued the disputes. 
It was not clear in advance of this process of communication, what emphasis 
should be placed on the different principles of Community law that could be 
applied to a case like that of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. In particular, it was 
not clear in which combination these principles could be applied. Due to the 
hyper-cycle of the development of the Community tax law related to C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer, diffusion could be transferred into coherence. Diffusion has 
been turned into coherence as a result of reconciling with each other the 
principles of fiscal cohesion and the non-restriction of fundamental freedoms. 
It has been possible to forge a particular quality of law-this has achieved a fine 
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balance-, which can still be interpreted from opposite directions, depending on 
where the emphasis is placed in fact. 
In addition to the hyper-cycle of the development of the relevant Community 
law, coupling with social changes was also necessary. It was not possible to 
take out of consideration that Members States have been all the more 
susceptible to preserving their sovereignty in legislating their own national tax 
system. At the same time, it must not be disregarded either that EC freedoms 
would be undermined if it were precluded to give special relief in specific 
circumstances, and remove administrative barriers accordingly from the 
smooth operation of the internal market. 
Furthermore, the EC Court of Justice struck a particular balance as a result 
of coupling with the Member States current policies. In the case of C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer, it was first of all at stake as to how policy expectations will 
be reflected in the ECJ judgment to give more emphasis to the subsidiarity 
principle and to stop tax competition. Following the accession in 2004 of a 
number of law tax jurisdictions, a new meaning had to be given to the internalisa-
tion of Community law at a particular phase of its development. Sensitivity 
to the harmful effects of regulatory and tax competi t ion, or to the abuse of 
Community law could not be taken out of consideration any longer. At the 
same time, the achievements of the internal market legislation could not yet be 
given up. 
4. Structural couplings: exploring the obstacles to Community law freedoms 
and identifying the legal basis for the removal of these obstacles in a 
changing environment 
It is a question whether an autopoietic system of law, once it has been developed, 
is able to survive despite the changes in its environment. This suggests the task 
of (i) filtering the diverse interpretations of the materiality continuum, and (ii) 
identifying the components that may qualify the events in several meaning 
processing systems, relevant to the specific legal case. The materiality continuum 
arising from outward meaning bases is manifested in restrictions by national 
legislation on fundamental freedoms that need to be overcome. Disparities in 
national tax laws cannot be considered taken by themselves as obstacles to the 
exercise of EC freedoms. Hence, they are not to be eliminated, except in cases 
where the different legal forms of different jurisdictions are comparable with 
each other. However, coherence in Community law cannot be achieved unless 
one day the dispersion and diffusion, arising from the differences in national 
legal measures is removed. 
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In addition to the filtration of outward influences (by way of information 
processing), identifying complex events (as external constraints) is also important. 
Disparities arising from national loss relief regimes parallel to each other need 
to be removed, in the event that they impede the smooth operation of the 
internal market. For instance, a Member State may be in a position to choose 
legislative means that serve the integrity of the national tax system, but which 
are still less restrictive than they would otherwise be. 
It can be important to encounter the changing external constraints on the 
process of internal information processing. Openness of an autopoietic legal 
system to energy flows means that it is vulnerable to outward changes in meta-
jur idical values. Where non-legal values are not digested and built in the 
particular micro-system of law, coherence cannot be achieved that would 
otherwise be necessary for the development of autonomy, or rather of the self-
generation of the system itself. A vast array of the possible solutions, proposed 
by the profession of Community tax lawyers has been filtered by the EC Court 
of Justice, arriving at a decision in the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. The 
communicative process of developing the particular law, which can provide the 
basis for a final decision, has not yet been concluded by the ECJ decision. The 
national court, deciding eventually in the case, may have much elbowroom in 
formulating its final standpoint. To date, it has been the practice of the EC 
Court to leave all the more room for the national court to assess the relevant 
circumstances, and freely decide the case on its merits. 
III. Lessons to be taken from the angle of the legal autopoiesis theory 
1. Filling the gap left in national law by the recursively closed organisation 
of interpreting and applying Community law 
A vocabulary of analysing the texts of the ECJ judgment, the AG opinion and 
the national court decisions following the ECJ judgment may consist in 
particular of the following terms: 
- legal acts as communicative events; 
- normative closure and openness in cognition, order from noise, reflexive law; 
- hyper-cycle of pre-autopoietic evolution, internalisation upon post-auto-
poietic evolution; and 
- structural couplings ( internal information processing and coping with 
external constraints). 
The Community law principles applicable to the case of C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer deliver arguments in two opposite directions. Some of them serve for 
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the protection of the UK sovereignty in legislating direct tax matters; others 
can be used in favour of the taxpayers' freedom of establishment. The principles 
that belong to the first type are as follows: 
- territoriality principle of taxation; and 
- fiscal cohesion principle. 
The principles that belong to the second type can be enumerated as follows: 
- proportionality principle; 
- equivalence principle; and 
- effectiveness principle. 
It is not difficult to fol low the ECJ argument aimed at the protection of the 
Member State's position on the ground of the territoriality principle. N o r is it 
problematic to apply the fiscal cohesion principle either as a means of just ifying 
restriction on the freedom of establishment. Furthermore, its meaning has even 
been broadened significantly to the extent that fiscal cohesion can now be 
interpreted widely, that is, not only in respect of the same taxpayer and the 
same item of tax liability. 
By way of contrast, it is a novelty of the ECJ decis ion to see the way in 
which the proportionality principle has been utilised. It was used until the time 
of the decision in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer in the sense that restrictive 
national measures can be challenged or approved, depending on whether they 
meet the proportionality test. The ECJ decision is new, however, at the point of 
C-446/03 Marks & Spencer that the UK national legislation is subject to the 
proportionality test in the instance where there is no explicit restriction by national 
law on an EC freedom that would be plainly inconsistent with Community law. 
The proportionality principle would then be left in a vacuum. This is not yet 
the case in point because the gap arising from the lack of explicit restrictive 
national law measures is filled by the special meaning of Community law, 
suggested by the profession and represented by the ECJ. The expression of this 
meaning is a result of the recursively closed organisation of interpreting and 
applying Community law. The law-generated as an order from noise—is the 
result of the redefinition of Community law, without interfering yet with the 
sovereignty of a Member State in legislating direct tax matters. The law that 
has been developed in deciding the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer is the 
product of self-generation, that is, it has been developed in the absence of a 
peculiar legislator who would have been authorised to adopt the applicable law. 
A key to understanding the decision in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer resides 
in the EC Court ' s assessment of whether the opportunity of loss carry over for 
the company group has been fully exhausted in the particular case. It is not the 
UK law, strictly speaking, which is being evaluated. N o single legal measure 
of the UK tax law has been condemned in the abstract. It is the U K legal 
CONFRONTATION RE: LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS THEORY IN OPERATION. 163 
practice that has been condemned, not proven friendly enough in a particular 
case. No statutory provision of the UK tax law has been challenged. The UK 
law has been criticised, however, because its impact has been detrimental, 
constituting a restriction on the taxpayer 's right for cross-border loss carry 
over. This way, the UK law has resulted in an infringement of the effectiveness 
principle, not providing the taxpayer any guarantee for the effective protection 
of his or her rights. 
Interestingly, the follow-up UK legislation has in fact resisted the Community 
law developed in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, having implemented the ECJ 
decision. The UK reaction to the ECJ challenge was to make changes in 
statutory law,24 the result of which has been the introduction 
- of a statutory regime that allows in principle the carry over of qualifying 
cross-border losses; and 
- of detailed provisions made in the Finance Act 2006 on the conditions, in 
which a UK company group is in a position as to know whether it has exhausted 
the possibilities to have the loss taken into account in the jurisdiction of a non-
resident subsidiary. 
Importantly, on 10 April 2006 the High Court gave its judgment on the 
question as to what the relevant t ime is at which point the parent company has 
to demonstrate that all possibilities have been exhausted in order to take into 
account for UK tax purposes the losses sustained by the overseas subsidiary. 
The High Court ruled that the relevant time for determining if conditions exist 
for cross-border group relief is the later time when the group relief is claimed, 
not when the losses arise. This position is consistent with the logic arising 
from the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. However, it is different 
from the said provisions of FA 2006. 
The main issue is still not whether the reaction of the UK legislation is 
severe or generous for the purposes of the exercise of taxpayer rights. It is more 
important to emphasise that the UK legislator was quick in filling the gap left 
by the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, breaking the process of self-
generating Community law. It is not precluded, however, that the interpretation 
of the principles of effectives and equivalence will receive fresh impetus from 
4
 The UK has already revised its group relief laws, allowing qualifying losses from an 
EEA subsidiary to offset income of a UK parent company (with a 75% ownership at least). 
The UK has still introduced provisions in the Finance Act 2006 to give effect to the ECJ 
Marks & Spencer decision. As a result, the FA 2006 provisions are very difficult to satisfy. 
See: Downs, A.: Marks & Spencer: A case for pro-European tax harmonization. The CPA 
Journal, 78 (2008) Jan. Commission Communication on the tax treatment of losses in 
cross-border situations [SEC (2006) 1690], COM (2006) 0824 final. 
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the profession by developing new aspects of the old principles, f rom now on 
based on new statutory law. 
2. Conclusions 
It is clear from the above analysis that 
- the legal actions (statements, explanations, arguments, etc.) of the legal 
representatives of taxpayers and of public authorities, finding and applying the 
proper law cannot be described as simple equivalents of naked statutory law structures, 
like the UK loss relief regime (this development is associated with a phenomenon that 
can be called the temporalisation of legal institutions); 
- normative closure and cognitive openness can be developed due to the 
combined effect of the concurrent application of the principles of fiscal cohesion, 
the non-restriction of fundamental freedoms and the effective enforcement of 
rights, applicable in a particular context to the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer 
(simultaneous view of a single case); 
- a peculiar legal order as a new quality of Community law can be developed 
(one can explore order from noise) due to the emergence of the equivalence 
principle applicable to direct tax mat ters in parallel with the aspiration of 
stopping the t raff icking in losses (emergence of the idea of equivalence); 
- the judgment in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer is bounded to the particular 
time when the taxpayer, seeking to get access to cross-border loss carry over, 
is granted a last resort, following the exhaustion of all the opportunities that 
would have been available for him or her before (striking a balance); 
- harmonisation can be achieved on a micro level as a consequence of creat-
ing the possibility of the enforcement of taxpayers' rights, while not invalidating 
the relevance of legislative steps, taken by Community bodies on a macro level 
of official policy (happening on a micro level); 
- reconciliation of conflicting principles with regard to reaching equilibrium 
between national and Community law (constructing a hyper-cycle of pre-
autopoietic evolution) is possible, and sensitivity of public bodies to the harmful 
effects of tax competition, or to the abuse of Community law (internalisation 
upon post-autopoietic evolution), is growing (evolutionary aspect of autopoietic 
law); and 
- filtration of diverse interpretations of law and digesting the changing 
external constraints on the ECJ practice made in direct tax matters are necessary 
(producing structural couplings). 
It follows from the above that the theory of lega l autopoiesis, as applied to 
the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, seems to show the characteristics as 
enumerated below, f h u s , it 
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- explores temporality in law; 
- comprises simultaneous events; 
- embraces the idea of equivalence; 
- is able to strike balances; 
- is understandable on a micro level; 
- brings about reconciliation of conflicting ideas and sensitivity to crisis 
phenomena; and 
- contributes to the filtration of diverse interpretations of law and to the 
removal of discrepancies. 
There are a few policy issues that can be raised in connection with the 
application of the legal autopoiesis theory to the case of C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer. They can be summarised as follows: 
(i) Does it make sense that relief should be available only where there is no 
relief in the jurisdiction of the subsidiary? H o w would foreign rules that 
terminate the right to loss set-off after a period fit into this f ramework? 
(ii) Why should a group be entitled to relief in respect of the losses of the 
foreign subsidiary when the group did not have to pay tax on the subsidiary's 
profits? 
(iii) If a Member State allows the free export of capital by taxpayers, why 
should it have to allow free export when the taxpayer decides to establish a 
subsidiary? Are EC Treaty rights for the benefit of humans or of companies? 
Why should a company, which is fictional, be entitled to the rights of this 
kind? 
The above questions can be answered in brief as follows: 
(i) Yes, it does. For the UK, it is important to preserve the integrity of its 
national tax system and resist the trafficking in cross-border losses. This is a 
materiality cont inuum (as explained by Luhmann), however, that needs to be 
taken into account. It should be overcome as long as national tax legislation 
endangers the exercise of EC freedoms, in particular, the freedom of establish-
ment. Foreign rules on the carry over of losses need not be taken into account 
in general. However , the UK is obliged to check if the opportunities of setting 
off foreign losses have been exhausted. If so, the UK has to provide a last resort, 
which comes f rom the normative closure of the Community law, applicable to 
the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. A new order can be developed f rom 
noise to the extent that a balance can be reached between the tax competences 
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retained by the Member States and the requirement of the freedom of move-
ment, f lowing from the idea of the internal market. For the achieving of this 
result it is also required that the normatively closed Community law applicable 
to this case be cognitively open. 
(ii) A company group could be entitled under national law to the U K relief 
of the transfer of cross-border losses even if no tax is paid on the profi ts of the 
subsidiary in the UK because the lack of this relief would discourage the UK 
parent company from extending its business to another Member State through 
forming a subsidiary there. This position comes from the equivalence principle 
applicable now to a direct tax case. According to this principle, to have useful 
effect, Article 43 EC requires the national authorities competent to grant the 
tax advantage at issue to take account of the advantages likely to be afforded by 
the legislation of the state, in which the subsidiaries of the group are established. 
This solution comes from the reflexive nature of Communi ty law. By virtue 
of this reflexive nature, the national tax law need not be changed. A Member 
State is still required to give a last resort if there is no alternative to the 
restrictive national law on cross-border loss carry over. Otherwise the freedom 
of establishment-an integral part of the operation of the internal market-would 
be unjustifiably restricted. 
(iii) The EC Treaty has been designed for European citizens. Th is comes 
from the requirement of free competi t ion and the smooth operation of the 
common marke t - f rom 1993 on, the internal market-whereby c i t izens may 
widely benefit from the principles of the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital. The freedom of establishment arises from the f reedom of 
citizens to extend their business to another Member State by establishing there 
their branches or subsidiaries (freedom of persons) there. According to the ECJ 
practice, the freedom of establishment can be carved out from the f ree move-
ment of capital where citizens (or companies) can exercise decisive influence 
over their vehicle of investment made in another Member State. It can neatly 
be explained by means of the legal autopoiesis theory why companies-a legal 
f ic t ion-may be entitled to exercise r ights that are otherwise avai lable for 
citizens. Corporations can be seen from the viewpoint of the corporatist pheno-
menology in a process of collectivisation where groups can emerge as the 
instrument of gathering and enforcing individual interests. A corporation as a 
legal entity can be interpreted in the light of reflexive law. In order to grasp the 
substrate of a legal person, it is not suf f ic ient to refer to a system of actions, 
to the group of persons, to peculiar f unds or to decision schemes. Rather , it 
is necessary to get involved in the analysis of ref lexive communicat ion as 
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well. To this end, a business organisation must be discerned as a unit of the 
process of collectivisation. The two sides of collectivism are the realm of 
collective imagination (solidarity as interpreted by Parsons) and the reality 
of the corporative body (capacity for actions in concert as suggested by 
Parsons).25 
IV. Appendix 
(i) Main proceedings in the C-446/03 Marks & Spencer v. David Halsey case 
as summarised by the ECJ in its judgment 
"18 Marks & Spencer is a company incorporated and registered in England and 
Wales. It is the parent company of a number of companies established in 
the United Kingdom and in other States. It is one of the leading United 
Kingdom retailers of clothing, food, homeware and financial services. 
19 From 1975 Marks & Spencer began to move into other States, with the 
opening of a store in France. By the end of the 1990s it had sales outlets in 
more than 36 countries, with a network of subsidiaries and a system of 
franchises. 
20 A trend towards increasing losses became evident in the mid-1990s. 
21 In March 2001 Marks & Spencer announced its intention to divest itself 
of its Continental European activity. By 31 December 2001 the French 
subsidiary had been sold to third parties, while the other subsidiaries, 
including those established in Belgium and Germany, had ceased trading. 
22 In the United Kingdom, Marks & Spencer claimed group tax relief pursuant 
to paragraph 6 of Schedule 17A to the ICTA in respect of losses incurred 
by its subsidiaries in Belgium, Germany and France for the four accounting 
periods ended 31 March 1998, 31 March 1999, 31 March 2000 and 31 March 
2001. It is clear from the file before the Court that both parties to the main 
proceedings agree that the losses must be computed on a United Kingdom 
tax basis. At the tax author i ty ' s request, Marks & Spencer therefore 
recomputed the losses on that basis. 
25
 Teubner, G.: Unternehmenskorporatismus. Kritische Vierteljahresschrift, 3 (1987) 70; 
Ackennann, Ch.:-Parsons, T.: The concept of 'social system' as a theoretical device. In: 
McQuarie D. (ed.): Readings in contemporary sociological theory... [from: Direnzo (eds.): 
Concepts, theory and explanation... op. cit.] 
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23 Each of the subsidiaries had operated in the Member State in which it had 
its registered office. The subsidiaries had no permanent establishment in 
the United Kingdom and had never traded there. 
24 The claims for relief were rejected on the ground that group relief could 
only be granted for losses recorded in the United Kingdom. 
25 Marks & Spencer appealed against that refusal before the Special Com-
missioners of Income Tax, which dismissed the appeal ." 
(ii) Expression of the legal autopoiesis theory in the wording of the judgment 
of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer 
The particular statements of the judgment and the AG opinion can be structured, 
depending on how they are associated with the components of the legal 
autopoiesis theory. The result of this is depicted in a series of tables below. 
Components of legal 
autopoiesis theory AG opinion ECJ judgment 
Legal acts as 
communicative 
events, taxpayer 
claims and tax 
authority react ion-
looking behind the 
pure legal facts 
It is neither the intention, nor 
the avowed aim of 
Community law to call in 
question the limits inherent in 
any power of taxation or to 
disturb the order of priority 
of the allocation of tax 
competences as between 
Member States; it should be 
recalled that, in the absence 
of Community 
harmonisation, the Court is 
not competent to interfere in 
the conception or 
organisation of the tax 
systems of the Member 
States 
(Para. 60) 
... it is clear from the file 
before the Court that both 
parties to the main 
proceedings agree that the 
losses must be computed on 
a United Kingdom tax basis; 
at the tax authority's request, 
Marks & Spencer therefore 
recomputed the losses on 
that basis; each of the 
subsidiaries had operated in 
the Member State in which it 
had its registered off ice; the 
subsidiaries had no 
permanent establishment in 
the United Kingdom and had 
never traded there. 
(Paras 22-23) 
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Components of 
legal autopoiesis 
theory 
AG opinion ECJ judgment Post ECJ history 
Normative closure The proposed judgment The restrictive The High 
and openness in is a solution, which measure at issue in Court ruled 
observation; order requires the authorities the main pro- that the 
from noise- of the Member State ceedings goes relevant 
application of concerned to take beyond what is time for 
the principles of account of the tax necessaty to attain determining if 
proportionality situation of companies the essential part of conditions 
and effectiveness not resident in its the objectives exist for 
in the absence of territory; being complex, pursued where: cross-border 
explicit national yet in the absence of — the non-resident group relief is 
law measures that Community subsidiary has the later time 
would infringe harmonisation, only a exhausted the when the 
Community law solution of this kind possibilities group relief 
allows a balance to be available in its claim is made, 
maintained between State of residence not when the 
the tax competences of having the losses arise 
retained by the losses taken into (otherwise 
Member States and account for the the parent 
the requirements of accounting period company 
freedom of movement concerned by the could hardly 
How ing from the claim for relief and make use of 
internal market also for previous the transfer of 
(Para. 83) accounting cross-border 
periods, losses) 
if necessary by 
transferring those 
losses to a third 
party or by offsett-
ing the losses 
against the profits 
made by the 
subsidiary in 
previous periods, 
. . . (Para. 55) 
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Components of legal autopoiesis 
theory 
AG opinion 
ECJ 
judgment 
Reflexive law-application of the 
equivalence principle (no interference 
with the national legislation on its 
merits) 
It follows that the margin of 
manoeuvre granted to the 
Member States in order to justify 
their tax regimes is excessively 
reduced; for that reason, it is 
necessary, as Advocate General 
Kokott recommended, to relax 
those criteria; to that end I 
propose to revert to the criterion 
of the aim of the legislation at 
issue; cohesion must first and 
foremost be adjudged in light of 
the aim and logic of the tax 
regime at issue ( Para. 71 ) 
Justification based on cohesion 
of the system of relief can be 
accepted only if the foreign 
losses may be accorded 
equivalent treatment in the State 
in which those losses arise (Para. 
76) 
A solution of that kind based on 
the comparison and equivalence 
of the treatment accorded in 
various Member States has 
already been developed by the 
Court in regard to health 
services in the context of 
national social security systems 
(Para. 77) 
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Components of 
ECJ judgment Post ECJ legal autopoiesis 
theory 
AG opinion history 
Hyper-cycle of The conflict between The fact that it does 
pre-autopoietic the power conferred on not tax the profits 
evo lu t ion- the Member States to of the non-resident 
reconciliation of tax income arising in subsidiaries of a 
conflicting their territory and the parent company 
considerations freedom conferred on established on its 
(reaching Community nationals territory does not in 
equilibrium) to establish themselves itself jus t i fy 
within the Community restricting group 
cannot be saved; this relief to losses 
gives rise to a tension incurred by 
between two opposing resident companies 
systems and to the need (Para. 40) 
to establish an 
equilibrium in the 
allocation of 
competences as 
between the Member 
States and the 
Community (Para. 6) 
Internalisation The national legislation Member States are Lack of 
upon post- is not precluded from free to adopt or to internalisation 
autopoietic making entitlement to maintain in force by making 
evolut ion- cross-border loss relief rules having the changes in the 
showing subject to the condition specific purpose of UK statutory 
sensitivity to a that it is established precluding from a loss relief 
new accent of that the losses of tax benefit wholly regime 
harmonisation subsidiaries resident in artificial 
(showing more other Member States arrangements 
sensitivity to tax cannot be accorded whose purpose is to 
competition) equivalent tax circumvent or 
treatment in those other escape national tax 
Member States law (Para. 57) 
(Para. 82) 
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Components of 
legal autopoiesis 
theory 
AG opinion ECJ judgment 
Materiality 
cont inuum-
restrictions by 
national legislation 
to be overcome 
Within the group the claim is 
made by the parent company 
resident in the United 
Kingdom which is subject 
under that head to unlimited 
fiscal obligations in that 
country; in regard to it the tax 
competence of that Member 
State is not limited; in those 
circumstances the United 
Kingdom is not entitled to 
rely on the principle of 
territoriality in order to refuse 
to a company within a group 
resident in its territory the 
grant of an advantage 
connected with the transfer of 
losses 
(Para. 63) 
The United Kingdom and the 
other Member States which 
submitted observations in the 
present proceedings claim 
that, from the aspect of a 
group relief system such as 
that at issue in the main 
proceedings, resident 
subsidiaries and non-resident 
subsidiaries are not in 
comparable tax situations: in 
accordance with the principle 
of territoriality applicable 
both in international law and 
in Community law, the 
Member Stale in which the 
parent company is established 
has no tax jurisdiction over 
non-resident subsidiaries 
(Para. 36) 
Identifying the 
particular meaning 
of simultaneous 
events-removing 
disparities arising 
f rom national loss 
relief regimes 
parallel to each 
other, provided that 
they impede the 
smooth operation 
of the internal 
market 
The difficulties ensuing for 
economic operators as a result 
of mere differences in tax 
regimes as between Member 
States are outside the scope of 
the EC Treaty; in particular it 
is well established that the 
differences in treatment 
resulting from legislative 
disparities as between the 
Member States do not 
constitute discrimination 
prohibited by the Treaty 
(Para. 23) 
In so far as it may be possible 
to identify other, less 
restrictive measures, such 
measures in any event require 
harmonisation rules adopted 
by the Community legislature 
(Para. 58) 
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(iii) Key terms relating to the legal autopoiesis theory: temporality, closure and 
openness, evolution and structural couplings 
Temporalisation: there are not legal facts, but events; legal acts are 
communicative events that change legal structures. 
Interpreting of how the 
legal system can be open 
and closed at the same 
time: 
- closure and openness refer to different domains of the 
legal system (Luhmann: normatively closed, cognitively 
open); 
- legal closure implies legal openness (order from noise-
Atlan: le crystal et le fume); 
- reflexive law (Teubner); and 
- self-transcendence of a normative order (Dupuy). 
Evolution of the 
autopoietic legal system 
(Teubner): 
- construction of a hyper-cycle (pre-autopoietic 
evolution-socially diffuse law develops higher forms of 
autonomy via the cyclical constitution of its system 
components); and 
- internalisation (post-autopoietic evolution-legal 
development is coupled to broader social developments 
by specific mechanisms of co-evolution). 
Interpreting changes in 
the environment: 
a distinction between internal information processing 
and external constraints needs to be taken into 
consideration (Ashby: a cybernetic system is open to 
energy but closed to information and control); there are 
two mechanisms of environmental couplings: 
- materiality continuum is the material-energetic basis of 
meaning systems; and 
- simultaneous presence of events in several meaning 
processing systems. 
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(iv) Table: Legal autonomy and autopoiesis2" 
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Legal autonomy Legal autopoiesis 
Independence f rom internal factors Operating a particular selective 
mechanism for responding to the 
environment 
Autonomy is a matter of degree, ranging 
from autarchy to total dependence 
Autopoiesis is an all or nothing category 
Independence as freedom from outside 
control 
Independence as self-dependence 
Non-correspondence to other social 
factors 
Refiexivity (circularity) 
Responsive to plurality of interests Self-observation 
Justification of legitimacy Operating according to its own code 
Derives from institutional (e.g., 
organisational), occupational (e.g., legal 
profession) and procedural specialisation 
Derives from functional differentiation 
of subsystems 
Ideal of separation of powers and rule of 
law 
Maintaining evolutionary complexity 
and avoiding de-differentiation 
Limits of law's ability to transcend 
political and economic interests 
Internal limits on law's conditional 
programmes 
On an ontological axis, law can be seen 
as distinct from society according to the 
mainstream law and society studies (e.g., 
Kelsen: imputation versus causality 
theory) 
On an ontological axis, law can be seen 
as inseparable from society according to 
alternative law and society studies (e.g., 
Luhman, Teubner) 
On an epistemological axis, society can 
be seen as being independent of law as its 
object (e.g., theories of the capitalist 
mode of production, of social action, etc.) 
On an epistemological axis, law can be 
seen as a competing discourse with 
sociology (e.g., Teubner 's theory on 
reflexive law) 
26
 Nelken, D.: Changing paradigms in the sociology of law. In: Teubner, G. (ed.): 
Autopoietic law: A new approach to law and society. Berlin-New York, W. de Gruyter, 
1988. 196-197,210. 
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(v) Table: Types and dimensions of modern legal rationality27 
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Dimensions 
Types 
Formal Substantive Reflexive 
Justification 
of law 
The perfection of 
individualism and 
autonomy: 
establishment of 
spheres of activity 
for private actors 
The collective 
regulation of economic 
and social activity, and 
compensation for 
market inadequacies 
Controlling self-
regulation: the 
coordination of 
recursively 
determined forms of 
social cooperation 
External 
functions of 
law 
Structural 
promises for the 
mobilisation and 
allocation of 
resources in a 
developed market-
oriented society 
and for the 
legitimation of the 
political system 
The instrumental 
modification of market-
determined patterns and 
structures of behaviour 
Structuring and 
restructuring systems 
for internal discourse 
and external 
coordination 
Internal 
structures of 
law 
Rule-orientation: 
conceptually 
constructed rules 
applied through 
deductive logic 
Purpose-orientation : 
purposive programmes 
of action implemented 
through regulations, 
standards and principles 
Procedure-
orientation: 
relationally oriented 
institutional 
structures and 
decision processes 
27
 Teubner, G.: Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. Law and Society, 
Vol. 17, No. 2 (1983), 257. 
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It is obvious that the South American legal systems, specifically the develop-
ment of private law were influenced to a high extent by the European legal 
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dispute resolution method2 which won particular popularity in the European and 
American legal systems in the previous century, however, remained playing 
different role in the Latin American region in the recent past and to some extent 
in the present time. 
Alejandro M. Garro in his essay published in the 1980's puts that South 
American legislation does not provide favourable conditions for arbitration.3 
As it is noted by Claudia Frutos-Peterson in a publication in 2002, it is long 
established within the field of international law that the Latin American region 
is unwilling to use this dispute resolution system. In Frutos-Peterson's view, 
the legislation related to international commercial arbitration is not as "healthy" 
as it could be.4 Taking into consideration these remarks, in the present study I 
deal with the South American commercial arbitration focusing on certain 
issues concerning the appointment and challenge of the arbitrator, considering 
the novel tendencies of legislation. In this essay I also analyse the regulations 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico separately. 
If we scrutinize the history of international commercial arbitration it may 
seem odd to state that international commercial arbitration is often applied 
between the foreign investor and the host state, or one of the entities of the 
host state or a business domiciled in the host state. This can be interpreted 
together with the traditional advantages of commercial arbitration.5 Foreign 
investors, however, can only resort to international commercial arbitration as 
an alternative dispute resolution method if the appropriate legal conditions are 
the Civilian Tradition in the Shaping of Modern Systems of Private Law], Budapest, 2002. 
275-276. For the relationship between the Latin American legal systems and Roman law 
see: Catalano, P.: A ma is élő római jog: a világ nagy jogrendszerei és a római jog [Roman 
Law Still Existing Nowadays: The Most Important Legal Systems and Roman Law]. In: 
Tanulmányok a római jog és továbbélése köréből. I. Budapest, 1987-1988. 
As it was noted by Iván Szász in an interview: "It has an eminent national and inter-
national career [i.e. commercial arbitration] which is still going on. " See: http://vg.hu/ 
index.php?apps=cikk&cikk= 1 16366. 
Garro, A. M.: Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Jurisdiction of Arbitral 
Tribunals in Latin America. Journal of International Arbitration, 1 (1984) 320. 
4
 Frutos-Peterson, C.: International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: As 
Healthy as It Could he? See: www.texasadr.org/intlarb.cfm. 
3
 For the advantages of arbitration particularly see: Gellért, Gy.: Új törvény a válasz-
tottbíráskodásról [New Act on Arbitration], Magyar Jog. 45 (1995) 451-452. From the 
subsequent Hungarian literature about the international commercial arbitration and its 
importance, see: Horváth, E.-Kálmán, Gy.: A nemzetközi eljárások joga. különös tekintettel 
a választottbiráskodásra [Law of International Procedures, Especially Arbitration]. Buda-
pest, 1999; Vörös, I.: A nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok joga [Law of International 
Commercial Relations], III. Budapest, 2004. 266-275. 
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available. The legal systems in South America are not homogeneous- in spite 
of the considerable linguistic similarity. We can state, however, that South 
American legal systems were averse to foreign investors up until the latest 
legislation. 
W e can ascertain that the theoretical basis for this phenomenon is the so-
called Calvo Doctrine. The Doctr ine was established by Carlos Calvo, a 
diplomat and legal scholar in Argentina in the 19lh century/' The Calvo Doctrine 
says that foreign investors shall be under the jurisdiction of the country where 
they invest into, therefore they shall be subject to the same judgement as 
persons domiciled in that country. Bernardo M. Cremades-who drew attention 
to the re-emergence of the Calvo Doctrine-summarized the importance of the 
Doctrine as follows: (i) the host state is requested by international law only to 
provide similar treatment to foreign investors and domiciled persons, (ii) the 
activities of foreign investors are governed by international law, (iii) the courts 
of the host state have exclusive jurisdiction over the disputes of the foreign 
investors/ It is obvious that the Calvo Doctrine did not serve the emergence of 
the international arbitration. The fact that the Doctrine did not only influence the 
commercial legislation of the South American states, but even certain consti-
tutions also, illustrates the high impact of the Calvo Doctrine. The Mexican 
constitution of 1917 provides that-concerning their properties in Mexico-foreign 
investors cannot invoke the aid of their own government. Regarding the fact that 
Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
this provision shall not be applied in relation to the member states of the 
agreement. It shall be noted that Luis Maria Drago also went along with the 
Calvo Doctrine. Drago-who was a diplomat, lawyer and foreign minister in 
Argentina-established the Drago Doctrine which prohibited the aggressive 
efforts of foreign states to recover debts.8 
The Bolivian constitution still contains the provision which provides that 
natural persons and undertakings are under the Bolivian jurisdiction; therefore 
they cannot claim any extraordinary treatment or diplomatic protection.9 The 
constitution of Colombia provides the same. By interpreting these regulations 
we can observe that it was the Calvo Doctrine and the subsequent legislation 
6
 See: Calvo, C.: Le droit international théorique et pratique. Paris, 1896. 
See: Cremades, B. M.: Resurgence of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America. Business 
Law International. 7 (2006) 54. 
8
 In this regard see: Grigera Naon, H. A.: Arbitration and Latin America: Progress and 
Setbacks. Arbitration International, 21 (2005) 135. 
9
 For the texts of the constitutions of the Latin American states visit www. 
georgetown.edu. 
180 ÁDÁM BOÓC 
that substantially hindered the implementation of international commercial 
arbitration in the Latin American states. 
Resulting from the Calvo Doctrine the so-called Calvo Clause was adopted 
in transactions related to foreign investments. This clause explicitly emphasized 
in the contracts that any dispute shall be settled by the fora of that state, based 
on the domestic legislation.10 The omission of the Calvo Doctrine was reached 
with certain bilateral agreements which were concluded in order to promote 
foreign investments. These agreements made it possible to stipulate arbitration 
in contracts. However, the influence of the Calvo Doctrine can be observed in 
early bilateral agreements too. For instance, one of such agreements (concluded 
by Argentina), provides that arbitration can only be commenced if a local court 
has already decided the case; or a particular period of time passed after a 
lawsuit had been initiated, and the court did not reach a judgement.1 1 This rule 
regarded the exhaustion of the opportunities for legal remedy provided by the 
state as a prerequisite of commencing arbitration. This rule is fundamentally 
contradictory to the purpose of the international commercial arbitration or the 
arbitration in general. 
The influence of the Calvo Doctrine can be observed in relation to the Andea 
Treaty which was concluded on 30lh November, 1977 by Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Its purpose was the regulation of foreign invest-
ments. Decision Nr. 24 regarding the treaty excluded the application of foreign 
laws and the jurisdiction of foreign courts, including arbitral tribunals, concerning 
foreign investments and the reception of foreign technologies.12 
These bilateral agreements, the conclusion of certain international treaties and 
their ratification, moreover the practic e resulting f rom them essentially con-
tributed to the adaptation of arbitration in the Latin American region.13 
1(1
 About this usage of Calvo Clause see: Sornarajah, M.: The Climate of International 
Arbitration. Journal of International Arbitration. 2 ( 1991 ) 70 - 7 1 . 
" See: Cremades, B. M.: Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin 
America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues. Dispute 
Resolution Journal. 20 (2004) May-July. 
12
 See: Sanders, P.: Quo vadis arbitration? Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice. The 
Hague, 1999. 42. 
13
 Many South American countries ratified the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) convened in 
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The importance of the Panama Treaty (1975) and the MERCOSUR Agree-
ment (1985)-which regards the international commercial arbitration-shall be 
emphasized. The fact that most South American countries ratified the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 
(New York Convention) has also great importance.14 
The purpose of the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Panama Convent ion) concluded on 30th January, 1975 was to 
eliminate the obstacles which hindered the spread of international arbitration. 
The following conditions in the legislation were regarded as hindrances: (i) the 
courts refused to enforce those agreements that contained stipulation of arbitra-
tion for disputes occurring later; (ii) there were many ways to oppose the 
arbitral awards, which created an obstacle for enforcement; (iii) foreign persons 
were prohibited or prevented f rom acting as arbitrator;15 (iv) the requirement to 
include the stipulation of arbitration in a public instrument (i.e. authentic act)."' 
It is obvious that these circumstances and requirements made the application 
of arbitration, moreover the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
more onerous. These issues were capable of causing funda)-mental harm to the 
parties. 
Among the international agreements we emphasize the importance of the 
Inter-American Convention Concerning the Extraterritorial Effect of Judge) -
ments and Arbitral Awards concluded in Montevideo on 5lh May, 1979. The 
Convention was drafted in English, Portuguese and Spanish.17 
According to Cremades, the most important obstacle-which was capable of 
hindering or even making impossible to employ arbitration-was the so-called 
clausula compromisoria according to that, even if there was a stipula)-tion 
in the contract, arbitration could only be initiated provided the parties later 
confirmed this stipulation via compromise (in Portuguese language: compro-
misso)\ in some cases, the confirmation of the compromise by the court was 
1965, Washington D. C. Many bilateral agreements were also concluded: for instance 
Argentina concluded 43, Chile 22, Peru 24 bilateral agreements. 
14
 The New York Convention was ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Surprisingly, Brazil 
ratified only on 23rd July, 2002. 
17
 For the topic of the present essay it may be regarded as very significant. 
16
 See: Bowman, J. P.: The Panama Convention and Its Implementation Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act. www.texasadr.org/panama.cfm. 
1
 The text of the Convention: http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/intl_conv/ 
caicmoe.asp. The Convention was originally signed by Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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also necessary.1 8 This rule is very problematic should one of the parties is 
unwilling to sign the compromiso after the emergence of the dispute. The refusal 
of the compromiso (which in many cases contains essential information regarding 
the appointment of the arbitrator) can create an obstacle to the settlement of 
the dispute via arbitration. In some countries there is a way to establish the 
compromiso with the intervention of the state court system; if such a solution 
does not exist, the arbitration cannot be commenced.1 4 It should be noted that 
the origin of the compromiso can be traced back to the compromission in 
Roman law aimed at the appointment of the arbitrator. " 
The issue related to the compromiso caused many controversies even after 
the conclusion of the Panama Convention. For instance, in Brazil, the Supreme 
Court of Sào Paulo ruled in a case between Brazilians and companies from 
France and other European countries on 16lh September 1999 that the stipula-
tion of jurisdiction of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in a 
contract is valid and enforceable independently of any additional confirmation 
or agreement, therefore a separate compromiso is not a condition of employing 
arbitration.21 
Robert Layton in the first half of the 1990's summarized the still existing 
obstacles which hindered the spread of commercial arbitration in South America. 
Layton found that the impressions according to which international commercial 
arbitration was impractical, uncertain, expensive and hard to enforce were still 
discoverable in the region."" It is also notable concerning the present essay 
that-according to Layton-the stipulation of arbitration was also problematic 
because a very limited number of people were allowed to be appointed as 
18
 See: Resurgence of the... op. cit. 57. 
" With respect to this see : Sanders: Quo vadis arbitration? op. cit. 41. 
For the Roman law definition of the compromission (which is the agreement of the 
parties submitting their dispute under the jurisdiction of the appointed judge) in the 
Hungarian literature see: Földi, A.-Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói [History 
and Institutions of Roman Law], Budapest, 2008. 13. ed, 544. For a summary of the 
arbitration in the Roman law, see: Käser, M.: Das römische Zivilprozessrecht. München, 
1996. 2. ed. 639-644. For a detailed study on the arbitration in the Roman law, see: Ziegler, 
K. H.: Das private Schiedsgericht im antiken römischen Recht. München, 1971. For a review 
on this work, see: Schmidlin, В.: Ziegler, К. H.: Das private Schiedsgericht im antiken 
römischen Recht. Savigny Zeitschrift Romanistische Abteilung, 91 ( 1974) 435-443. 
21
 See: Renault do Brazil SA and others v. Carlos Alberto de Oliveira and others. 
Quoted by: Cremades: Resurgence of the...op. cit. 62. I am dealing with this case in details 
later on. Robert Layton emphasizes that certain similarities exist between the compromiso 
and the Terms of Reference of the ICC. Layton, R.: Changing Attitudes Towards Dispute 
Resolution in Latin America. Journal of International Arbitration, 10 (1993) 128. 
22
 Layton: Same art. 132-133. 
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arbitrator due to the legislation. Layton-in order to solve this issue-proposed 
appointing the arbitrator in the arbitration clause itself.23 (However, we 
should mention that this solution is very questionable resulting from the fact 
that it is possible that the elected persons no longer can act as arbitrators at the 
time of the occurrence of the dispute.) 
The MERCOSUR (South Common Market)24 Agreement played an impor-
tant role in the spread of international commercial arbitration in South America. 
MERCOSUR was founded by the Asuncion Treaty of 1991. Currently it has 5 
member states, 5 associated members and one observer state. The MERCOSUR 
Treaty on International Commercial Arbitration was signed by the foreign 
ministers of the South Common Market on 23rd July 1998.27 This agreement was 
concluded by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay; ratified later by Chile and 
Bolivia. 
There is a long-run story preceding the conclusion of the MERCOSUR 
Treaty on International Commercial Arbitration. One of the antecedents is the 
Montevideo Treaty on international procedural law (1889) that was ratified by 
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. The Treaty was revised in 1940 by 
another Treaty signed in Montevideo. Another preceding event was the Pan-
American Conference on the minimum requirements of arbitration held in 
Montevideo in 1933.2" The Bustamante-code and the Panama Convention 
(which we already mentioned) are also important in this regard. The two direct 
antecedents are the bilateral Las Leilas Protocol (1992) regarding judicial co-
operation and the Protocol convened by the MERCOSUR member states in 
Buenos Aires in 1994 on the international jurisdiction in contractual matters.27 
23
 Laylon: Same art. 128. 
24
 In Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur; in Portuguese: Mercado Comum do Sul; in 
English: Southern Common Market. The current members of the Southern Common Market: 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela. Associated members of MERCOSUR: 
Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador. Observer member is Mexico. 
21
 Spanish name of the convention: Acuerdo sobre Arbitraje Comercial International 
del MERCOSUR. 
26
 For the character as legal sources of the Bustamante-code see especially: Mádl, F.— 
Vékás, L.: Nemzetközi magánjog és nemzetközi kapcsolatok joga [Private International Law 
and the Law of the International Commercial Relations], Budapest, 1992. 82-83. About the 
Bustamante-code see: Samtleben, J.: Internationales Privatrecht in Lateinamerika. Der Codigo 
Bustamante in Theorie und Praxis. I. Bd. Tubingen, 1979. 
27
 It should be noted that the Arequipa conference played an important role in the 
unification of civil law in Latin America. The conference was held on 41 —7lh August, 1999. 
Its participants were Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Puerto Rico. During the conference Acta 
de Arequipa was concluded, the fourth article of which provides that concerning the 
important areas of civil law shall be harmonized in Latin America. The basis for the 
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The dispute settlement system of the MERCOSUR Treaty on International 
Commercial Arbitration is described by László Palotás in the Hungarian literature 
as follows: "The Mercosur dispute settlement system theoretically lay down 
the basis for adequate sanctions ruled by ad hoc board of arbitration. However, 
the member states have usually settled their disputes via political negotiations, 
often on presidential level; therefore not via arbitration. This method provided 
opportunity to retreat f rom the provisions of the Treaty, which regarded the 
effectiveness of the rules of integration as a function of the conformity of the 
member states."2S According to Palotás, the MERCOSUR dispute settlement 
system cannot be analysed disregarding the political factor. 
The MERCOSUR Treaty can be regarded as a completely unique institu-
tion, because it establishes a regional international arbitration law. 4 
It should be noted that the first MERCOSUR arbitral award of the Arbitra-
tion Tribunal was given on 1st April, 1999. In this case, the parties were the 
Brazilian and Argentine governments; the board of arbitration was composed 
of an Argentine, a Brazilian and an Uruguayan arbitrator.2" To sum up, the 
South American region is not a "hostile" region to international arbitration any 
longer according to Fernando Mantilla-Serrano.11 
It has to be highlighted that we can consider as a significant measure of the 
acceptance of arbitration in Latin America the degree of use of the arbitration 
in contracts involving governmental entities in the region in a variety of 
commercial activities. As it is stressed in article of Paul E. Mason and Mauricio 
Gomm-Sandos , the arbitration including state or a s tate-owned company has 
been the subject of a "hot debate" in Brazil, as well. As it has been elaborated 
by the case law two principles are applied to consider whether a legal dispute 
harmonization is the Roman-German origin of the South- and Central-American legal 
systems. In detail, see: Hamza, G.: Az európai magánjog...op. cit. 293. 
~
s
 See: Palotás, L.: Az összamerikai szabadkereskedelmi kezdeményezés. PhD-érte-
kezés [The pan-Americal free-trade initiative. PhD thesis], http://www.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/ 
phd/palotas _laszlo.pdf. In the quotation the expression fours refers to the founders of the 
Southern Common Market (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay és Uruguay). Venezuela joined 
MERCOSUR in 2006, based on a decision made in Caracas in July, 2006. 
" ' Sec in this respect: Blackaby, N.-Noury, S.: International Arbitration in Latin America: 
Overview and Recent Developments, http://www.iclg.со.uk/index.php?area=4&show_ 
chapter=767&ifocus=l &kh_publications id=35. 
'" See: Cattaneo, M.: Recent Developments of Arbitration in Latin America-Focus on 
Mercosur Countries: Argentina and Brazil, http://arcnet.org/arclibrary/more.php?id= 
22_0_I_0_M. 
j l
 See: Mantilla-Serrano, F.: Major Trends in International Commercial Arbitration in 
Latin America. Journal of International Arbitration, 1 7 (2000) 139. 
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of a state or a state-owned company can be arbitrated. First one should analyze 
the principle of legality under Article 37 of the Brazilian constitution, according 
to which public assets and rights are always subject to prior legislative authori-
zation. Secondly one has to take into consideration the principle of arbitrability, 
which provides that the government could agree to arbitrate only with respect 
the so-called disposable assets (bens on direitos disponiveis):2 
III. 
The legislation of the South American countries regarding arbitration is highly 
influenced by the process that in several states in the region adopt legislation 
harmonious to the UNCITRAL Model Law. 33 The purpose of these acts is 
not only harmonization, but the elimination of the obstacles hindering the 
adaptation of arbitration. 
Another factor is the difference between the levels of the influence by the 
state courts. Also, several legal systems did not recognize the so-called 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle, i.e. the rule that the arbitrators can decide 
independently their competence.34 These phenomena can only partly be explained 
by the influence of the Calvo Doctrine. 
Legislators in the region shall face several particularities concerning 
arbitration, such as the fact that certain international conventions-for example 
the already mentioned New York Convent ion-were adopted in completely 
different times in the South American countries. Also, there is no consensus 
about the scope of cases that can be decided via arbitration (arbitrability). 
Another particularity-being closer to the present study-is the distinction between 
the arbitraje de derecho (arbiter juris or arbiter de jure) and the amiable 
compositeur (arbitrator who judges ex aequo et bono). This distinction originates 
from traditions of continental law. In certain countries the acts regulating 
arbitration used to separate (and in certain cases they still separate) the arbiter 
~'
2
 See in that regard the case Companhia Paranaense de Energia v. LIEG Araucaria 
Ltda. See: Mason, P. E.-Gomm-Santos, M.: New Keys to Arbitration in Latin-America. 
Journal of International Arbitration, 1 (2008) 34-35. 
"The UNCITRAL Model Law was compiled in 1985. See: http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html. For a brief essay 
on the Model Law: Horváth-Kálmán: A nemzetközi eljárások joga... op. cit. 65-66. For a 
comprehensive commentary on the Model Law: Binder, P.: International Commercial 
Arbitration and Conciliation in Model Law Jurisdictions. London, 2005. 2. ed. 
31
 See: Tawil, G. S.: Arbitration in Latin America: Current Trends and Recent Develo-
pments. http://www.bomchilgroup.org/argmar04.html. 
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juris (arbitraje derecho) and the arbiter ex aequo et bono. The former one had 
to strictly follow the laws (both in the aspects of substantial and procedural 
law), while latter was allowed to administer justice more freely, even adopting 
principles of natural law in his judgement. Also, this distinction can be observed 
in the appointment and even the challenge of the arbitrator.45 (However, the 
ordre public shall be respected by the arbiter ex aequo bono also.16) It should be 
noted that in several Latin American countries only persons having a law 
degree can act as an arbiter de jure.1'1 
These rules-being in force only partially nowadays-highly influence the 
nature and practice of law on arbitration. In the fol lowing, we analyse (in 
different extent and ful lness of details) the law concerning the appointment and 
challenge of the arbitrator in some Central and South American countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico). 
A) Argentina 
Argentina is a federal state therefore composed of provinces. The constitutions 
allows the provinces-similarly to the constitution of the United States-adopting 
independent act of procedure. In the present days, on federal level the arbitration 
is governed by certain provisions of the Code of Federal Civil and Commercial 
Procedure (Código Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Náción) which was 
promulgated in 1967.38 The states of the highest importance in Argentina (such 
as Buenos Aires) adopted independent acts concerning arbitration-however, these 
acts show high similarity to the federal code. 
Surprisingly, arbitration is regarded by the federal code as a special court 
procedure, not an independent dispute resolution system. It should be also noted 
that only the amendment which was passed in 1981 allowed appointing foreign 
" Pieter Sanders in this respect notes that the arbitrator proceeding ex aequo et bono is 
also bound by the public policy (ordrepublic), therefore he also has to respect the laws in 
force. See: Sanders: Quo vadis arbitration? op. cit. 43. 
" 'See: Grigera Naón, H. A.: Arbitration in Latin America: Overcoming Traditional 
Hostility. Arbitration International. 5 (1989) 138. 
'
7
 Inter alia the law on arbitration of Peru (Ley General de Arbitraje) takes up this 
position. 
'
s
 It may be noted with respect to the name "code of civil procedure" that the Latin 
American countries (contrary to e.g. Spain) do not follow the mainly German tradition to 
use the terminology of "orders" (such as Zivilprozessordnung) to the procedural laws. In 
Latin America these acts are also called codes. See: David, R.-Brierley, J. E. C.: Major 
Legal Systems in the World Today. An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law. New 
York, 1978. I0277. 
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board of arbitrators in cases having international aspects. Before this amend-
ment this was not possible in the Argentinean law. We can observe many 
attempts to reform the rules of arbitration. From 1990, codifying the law of arbi-
tration according to the UNCITRAL Model Law was attempted five times. 
Lately, the draft (Proyecto de Lex de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional) was 
filed in March 2005; however, none of the two chambers accepted it.34 In the 
fol lowing, we are studying the provisions of the code currently in force 
which are relevant for our topic. To some extent, we are also indicating certain 
provisions of the draft law. 
The rules currently in force requires-besides a valid stipulation of 
arbitration-the compromise, duly signed by the parties after the dispute arises 
as a confirmation of the intention to settle the dispute via arbitration. Art 740 of 
the federal procedural code defines the necessary elements of the compromise 
as follows: 
- It shall be drafted in writing indicating the date; 
- It shall include the name and address of the parties; 
- It shall include the names and addresses of the arbitrators; 
- It shall include the subject of the arbitral procedure representing the 
facts; 
- It shall mention that the party breaching the compromiso shall pay a fine. 
According the Art 741 of the federal procedural code, the optional elements 
of the compromiso are the followings: 
- Rules of the procedure; the location where the arbitrators shall proceed 
and pass the award (if this is not included, the location is the place 
where the compromiso was signed);411 
- The t imeframe available for the arbitrators to conduct the proceedings; 
- A decision about the appointment of a secretary or leaving the appoint-
ment to the arbitrators ' discretion; 
- Stipulate a f ine in case a party initiates the nullification of the award -
excluding the situation if the parties explicitly declare the appeal off. 
'' See: Blackaby-Noury: International Arbitration... op. cit. 
411
 It shall be noted that il is essential to differentiate between the location of the 
procedure and the passing of the award. It can give help for instance in clearing such 
questions, like when the members of an arbitral tribunal located abroad pass their award in 
the domicile of the arbitrators and not at the location of the tribunal. 
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Provided one of the parties will not sign the compromise-in spite of the valid 
arbitration c lause- the other party has to initiate proceedings at the state court 
to substitute this statement. Therefore, the state courts have extensive rights to 
interfere in the commencement of the arbitral procedure due to the fact they are 
to take up a position on a preliminary question of the proceedings, i.e. a question 
of law. If the state court finds the requests for issuing the compromise grounded, 
it creates the compromise, so opens the possibility for an arbitral procedure. In 
case the motion is rejected, the cost of the procedure shall be borne by the party 
who filed the motion. 
The compromise, therefore, also means the agreement on the appointment 
of the arbitrators. (The fact whether the court or the parties appointed the 
arbitrator has also serious relevance regarding the challenge of the arbitrators). 
T h e agreement on the arbitrators is typically an issue that cannot be agreed 
on at the time of the stipulation of the arbitration; i.e. the stipulation can be 
done even years before the emergence of the dispute; therefore it is more than 
possible that the parties are not able to nominate the arbitrators. 
It shall be noted, however, that the practice of the courts shows that the 
judges have already acknowledged in the I980 ' s the stipulation of arbitration 
as being independent, therefore not linked to the compromise and the validity 
of the contract including the stipulation. This was established by the Argentinean 
Commercial Supreme Court in a case concerning a stipulation in a contract 
concluded in Hamburg. The Court denied ruling that there is no opportunity in 
Argentina to initiate a lawsuit to appoint a board of arbitrators based on a 
contract concluded in Hamburg.41 
The Argentinean law concerning the appointment of arbitrators is regarded 
as very special (however, not unique in South America, but inevitably peculiar). 
Second paragraph of Art 766 of the Federal Procedural Code provides that in 
lack of particular provision in the contract in this relation, the arbitrators shall 
act as arbiter ex bono et aequo, therefore proceed on the basis of the principles 
of natural law. This is why the parties are to stipulate explicitly if they are 
wil l ing to appoint arbitrators who act as arbiter de jure (proceeding based on 
the statute law). In my opinion, the fact that the parties have to solve this 
question even in the arbitration agreement, but the arbitrators are appointed 
only in the compromiso is questionable. 
In the Argentinean case law, the difference between the arbiter ex aequo bono 
and the arbiter de jure is also very significant. The Argentinean Commercial 
Supreme Court ruled on 4lh March, 2005 that the arbiter de jure comes to his 
41
 See: Càmara Naeional de Apelaciones en to Commercial-Sala, 26 September 1988; 
http://www.khiwerarbitration.com/ arbitration/arb/country/Argentina.asp. 
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decision based on his specialized and legal knowledge, in comparison with the 
arbiter ex bono et aequo who settle the dispute according to the best of his 
knowledge, even by surpassing the legal formalities.42 The judgment of the 
Commercial and Civil Court of Appeal of Formosa is also remarkably in this 
regard: the court ruled that the award of the board of arbitri ex bono et aequo 
could not be appealed against because they reached their decisions on the basis 
of natural law, not the positive law.43 
Contrary to the above-mentioned strict rule, the Procedural Code is more 
compliant on the rule setting the minimum number of arbitrators. The parties 
shall agree on the number of arbitrators in the compromiso. The parties may agree 
on all arbitrators together, but they are also allowed appointing one arbitrator 
each, then the third arbitrator is appointed by the other two arbitrators. Art 750 
of the Code is also worth mentioning, according to which the arbitrators-
appointed by the parties-vote one from themselves as the president of the arbitral 
panel. Therefore, the chair is not necessarily the third arbitrator-appointed by 
the other two arbitrators. This rule is opposite to the rules of certain arbitral 
organizations.44 In case the parties cannot agree on the arbitrators, it is the court 
which appoints them. If a position of an arbitrator becomes vacant, the rules to 
be followed are the ones which were laid down in the compromiso. 
According to the Argentinean law, every adult person having full capacity 
may be appointed as arbitrators. Professional judges and employees of just ice 
can only act as arbitrator in cases where one of the parties is the state.45 
We can find several distinctions in the Argentinean law concerning the 
challenge of arbitrators. The most important-which often can be observed in 
the South American legal systems-is that the arbitrators appointed by the court 
can be challenged based on the same conditions as professional state judges , 
whilst the arbitrators appointed by the parties can only be challenged due to 
facts that arose after their appointment. 
In this regard we shall emphasize the observation of Jan Kleinheisterkamp, 
who points out the problem in the Argentinean law-similarly to other legal 
systems, for instance the Uruguayan one-that it does not deal with the situation 
clearly in which the parties do not appoint the arbitrators jointly, but they 
' "See: C. Nac. Com., sala В, 04/03/2005-armex S. A. v. Application Software.; 
http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/ arbitration/arb/country/Argentina.asp. 
4
' S e e : Telecom Argentina Slet-France Telecom S.A. (10. 03. 2005); http://www. 
kluwerarbitration.com/ arbitration/arb/country/Argentina.asp. 
44
 See: Burghetto, M. В.: Current Status of Arbitration Legislation in Argentina. Journal 
of International Arbitration, 21 (2004) 523 n . 
47
 See: Art 765 of the Federal Procedural Code. 
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each have the right to appoint one arbitrator separately. It does not seem to be 
reasonable that the other party, who has no right to interfere in the appointment 
of the arbitrator appointed by his opponent, can only challenge this arbitrator 
based on grounds arose af ter the appointment.46 
As it is already mentioned, if the court appoints the arbitrators, the parties 
can initiate the challenge of an arbitrator on grounds being similar to the 
challenge of the professional judges. These are the followings: 
- If the arbitrator has family relations with one of the parties or his organiza-
tional or legal representative; 
- If the arbitrator or one of his relatives have interest in the dispute, provided 
the arbi trator has identical interest with one of the parties or his organi-
zational or legal representative, excluding the shareholders ' position in 
a public limited company; 
- If there is legal dispute between the arbitrator and the party initiating 
his chal lenge; 
- If the arbitrator is the creditor, the debtor or guarantee against one of the 
parties, excluding professional banks; 
- If the arbitrator against the party, or the party against the arbitrator 
performed denunciation before the beginning of the arbitral procedure; 
- If the arbitrator previously acted as a representative of one of the parties, 
or provided legal counsel or opinion either before or after the beginning of 
the procedure; 
- If the arbitrator was given significant advantage by one of the parties; 
- If a f r iendly relationship exists between the arbitrator and one of the 
parties which makes their communication direct and close; 
- Apparent hostility showed by the arbitrator against a party, excluding the 
situation in which there was any kind of assault against the arbitrator 
fol lowing his conduct of the case. 
It shall be noticed that these reasons for exclusion include several ones 
that can also be found in o ther countries' laws concerning arbitration and the 
procedural rules of international arbitral organizations.47 
46
 See: Kleinheisterkamp, J.: International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America. 
Regulation and Practice in the MERCOSUR and the Associated Countries. New York, 
2005. 214. It shall be noted that the Brazilian law governs the exclusion of the arbitrator 
appointed by the other party in a more sophisticated way. This difference is explained in 
detail later on. 
4
 See e.g. Art 7. of the Procedural Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce 
and Art 5.3 of the Procedural Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration. 
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In case the arbitrators act as arhitri ex aequo et bono (following the explicit 
order or reserve of the arbitration agreement), initiating challenge of an 
arbitrator is only possible based on narrower scope of reasons arising after the 
appointment. For example, if there is a direct or indirect interest in the result of 
the dispute; or apparent hostility resulting from unidentifiable motive. This 
rule-which is also existent in the Uruguayan and other South American legal 
sys tems- is explained by Kleinheisterkamp with the greater flexibility of ex 
aequo et bono arbitration.48 
According to Art 747 of the Argentinean Federal Procedural Code, challenge 
of an arbitrator shall be initiated at the board of arbitrators within 5 days after 
obtaining knowledge of the appointment of the arbitrator. According to Maria 
Beatriz Burghetto, this deadline is also applicable if the initiation of the challenge 
is based on a reason arose after the nomination.4 4 If the arbitrator does not 
renounce, the state court has to decide on the petition. The competent court is 
the one which has otherwise jurisdiction, or the court where the compromiso 
was concluded. This decision cannot be appealed. However, we shall refer to 
the interesting fact that the arbitral procedure is suspended until the court rules 
on the challenge.5" This can constitute means for obstructing the procedure. 
Another rule worth mentioning provides that a judge-therefore an arbitrator 
also-is allowed denying the participation in the case based on incompatibility 
without disclosing the reason itself. This rule can be found not only in the 
Argentinean but also in the Brazilian law. This solution is self-evident for 
the arbitrator, because be can deny his participation without making the reason 
public.5 ' 
According to Art 746 of the Argentinean Procedural Code, the parties can 
agree on challenging the arbitrator; before this agreement, one of the parties 
shall file a motion of challenge. 
The Argentinean law provides a peculiar solution for modifying the number 
of the board of arbitrators after the award. Provided the arbitrators cannot reach 
consensus concerning the award, therefore the decision is obtained via voting, in 
which the majority makes the decision on the award. If a majority cannot be 
obtained following the composition of the tribunal, another arbitrator shall be 
appointed in order to make decision.52 The number of the board necessarily 
48
 See: Kleinheisterkamp: International Commercial Arbitration... op. cit. 210. 
44
 See: Burghetto: Current Status of Arbitration... op. cit. 5242 ' . 
50
 See: Art 747 of the Federal Procedural Code. 
81
 See: Art 30.2 of the Argentinean Federal Procedural Code, respectively Art 135 of 
the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure. 
82
 See: Art 757 of the Argentinean Federal Procedural Code. 
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varies, so they can obtain majority. It shall be noted here that-on the contrary-
according to Art 25 of procedural rules of the ICC (International Chamber of 
Commerce) Court of Arbitration, the chair has the right to decide in lack of 
majority."3 
The draft o f the new procedural code contains several novelties being 
relevant also for this essay. The draft concerns the Argentinean and also the 
international arbitration (provided the location of the arbitration is in Argentina). 
The draft-in accordance with the UNCITRAL Model Law-would abolish the 
dualism of the arbitral agreement and the compromise, using the uniform 
concept of arbitration clause. In case the parties do not agree on the procedural 
rules, the arbitrators have the right to choose the most appropriate rules. 
Another important difference in the draft is that arbitrators can only decide ex 
aequo et bono if the parties explicitly authorize them to do so."4 
Regarding the appointment of the arbitrators, Art 10 of the draft provides 
that if the parties do not agree on the number of the arbitrators, one arbitrator is 
going to proceed. With respect to the exclusion grounds, it should be noted that 
an arbitrator shall not act in a jo in t arbitral procedure, excluding the situation 
if the same tribunal proceed in the other case. Therefore, one may challenge an 
arbitrator successfully if the given arbitrator proceeds in a case and in a joint 
case at the same time, and the composition of the two tribunals is different. The 
legislator is willing to ensure the impartiality of the procedure by this regulation. 
Jo in t case is a case in which the petitions and evidences are connected or the 
outcomes of the two cases are interrelated. However, some issues arise 
concerning the application of this rule. For instance, if the correlation between the 
t w o cases is not obvious, a party can initiate the challenge of the arbi t ra tor-
as a tactical m e a n s - a t any time,5 5 almost, stating that he got to know the 
information just before filing tbe motion of challenge. 
The draft-in accordance with the Model Law-includes the principle of equal 
treatment of the parties and due process. In accordance with these principles, 
Ar t 24 (3) provides that the challenge of the arbitrator can based on the fact 
that the arbitrator does not forward any communication between him and one 
of the parties to the other party. The adaptation of a rule laid down in order 
to prove the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator can create some 
hindrances. 
53
 Concerning the practice of the ICC, see: Schäfer, E.-Verbist, H.-Imhoos, Ch.: ICC 
Arbitration in Practice. The Hague, 2004. 
54
 For the summary of the most important changes in the draft, see: Burghetto: Current 
Status of Arbitration... op. cit. 534-535. 
55
 S ее: Ibid. 531Л6. 
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In Argentina, one can find several renowned arbitral tribunals. The Stock 
Exchange Arbitration Court of Buenos Aires (founded in 1963), the Court of 
Arbitration at the Argentinean Chamber of Commerce and the Corn-Exchange 
Court of Arbitration (founded in 1905), which decides ex aequo et bono shall 
be referred here. The proceedings of these tribunals are determined by the legal 
framework of the Federal Procedural Code. The adaptation of the analyzed 
draft would contribute to the further development of the Argentinean arbitral 
practice. 
B) Brazil 
The Portuguese legal system has striking impact on the development of the 
Brazilian law, especially on the private law.2'1 (We should also mention the fact 
that the German law played also an important role in the development of 
private law-with especial regard to the civil code.57) Arbitration was not 
unfamiliar to the Brazilian law at all, since Art 160 of the Constitution (known 
as the "imperial Magna Carta") recognized arbitration as a means of settling 
disputes. The Decree number 737 of 1850 rendered explicitly possible applying 
arbitration for merchants. It shall be noted that this Decree was abolished by 
Act 1350 promulgated on 14th September 1866. In spite of the fact tha t - for 
instance-in 1910 the dispute between Peru and Brazil on a conflict related to 
their borders was settled via arbitration (however, not commercial arbitration), 
until the new law on arbitration (currently in force) was adopted, the legal 
framework did not fit the needs of arbitration. The arbitration clause was not 
directly enforceable; the arbitral awards were to be homologated by the state 
judicial bodies; finally, Brazil ratified certain important international conven-
tions concerning international arbitration relatively late.58 Despite the fact that 
the Geneva Convention was signed in 1923 and ratified in 1932, the Panama 
Convention was ratified only in 1996, while the New York Convention in 
56
 See: Hamza, G.: A magánjog kodifikálása Brazíliában [Codification of Civil Law in 
Brazil], Acta Faculatis Politico-Iuridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de 
Rolando Eötvös Nominatae, 29 (1987) 203; Hamza, G.: Törekvések a magánjog újra-
kodifikálására Brazíliában [Approaches of the Recodification of the Civil Law in Brazil], 
Magyar Jog, 44 (1997) 756. 
57
 See: Valladäo, H.: Der Einfluß des deutschen Rechts auf das brasilianische Zivil-
gesetzbuch (1857-1922). Rio de Janeiro, 1973. 
See: Brechbühl, В.: 44 th Congress of the International Association of Lawyers 
(UIA) in Buenos Aires-International Arbitration Commission. Journal of International 
Arbitration, 18 (2001) 239. 
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2002.59 Until the Convention on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards was ratified by Brazil, the gap resulting from the late ratification led to 
serious problems for the arbitral practice.60 
Prior to the act in force governing arbitration was passed, three drafts were 
presented, in 1981, 1986 and 1988. In 1991, a committee called Arbiter Operation 
was established. The final text of the draft was created in 1992 and the legislature 
passed the law in 1996. The Act 9307 on arbitration (Lei de Arbitrageni) was 
promulgated by the president on 23rd September 1996 and came into force on 
24 th November, 1996. This act substantially modified the legal framework of 
arbitration; concerning inter alia the enforceability of the arbitral award and 
the importance of the arbitration clause (that is analysed later in detail).61 
Before the law currently in operation was promulgated, the rules of the arbitral 
procedure had been included in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1973. 
The Brazilian law in force follows to a great extent the provisions of the 
Model Law-regarding both the domestic and international arbitration. It has, 
however, preserved certain traditional rules that are very important for the 
practice. Therefore , the Brazil ian law on arbitration can be regarded as a 
combination of the modern and traditional legislation.62 For the topic of the 
present study the questions related to the arbitration clause and the compromisse 
have great importance. Until the present legislation the conclusion of the arbitral 
agreement, the compromisse had striking importance besides the arbitration 
clause-similarly to several South American legal systems. In case one of the 
parties was unwilling to agree on the compromisse, it was the ordinary state 
court whose procedure could result in the conclusion of such agreement. It is a 
fair question, whether the party commencing arbitral procedure who acts bona 
fides may claim damages and costs at the end of the procedure of the state 
court, when the arbitral agreement is concluded. However , in the Brazilian 
practice, such claims do not exist.61 
The act in force regulates also the compulsory e lements of the arbitral 
agreement (compromisse), providing that it shall include—ш/ег alia-the name, 
59
 The Panama Convention was ratified by the Regulation 1902 of 1996, while the New 
York Convention was ratified by the Regulation 431 of 2002. 
60
 Bowman holds a similar opinion. See: Bowman: The Panama Convention and... 
op. cit. 
61
 For the importance of the law on arbitration see: Lopes, S.-Sodré, A.: Arbitration 
Procedures in Brazil. In: Campbell, D.-Rodriguez, S.-Prell, B. (ed.): International Assistance 
in Judicial Matters. Ardsley, N. Y „ 1999. 27-28. 
62
 See: Kleinheisterkamp: International Commercial Arbitration... op. cit. 8. 
63
 See: Gomm-Santos, M.: Arbitration in Brazil. Journal of International Arbitration. 
21 (2004)496. 
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profession and domicile of the arbitrators. If the arbitration clause was concluded, 
however, one of the parties will not agree on the compromisse, Art 7 of the act 
may be applied saying the other party can commence a procedure at the ordinary 
state court. This court provides an oral hearing and decides on the compromisso 
arbitral. During the oral hearing the court tries to convince the parties to agree 
jointly on the compromisso arbitral. If the parties are unable to agree on the 
content of the compromisso arbitral, it is the court which creates it either at the 
oral hearing or within 10 days after the hearing. 
According to Pieter Sanders this rules means the preservation of the 
compromisso. It constitutes an evidence for the legislative process in which 
the provisions of the Model Law are adopted in parallel with the traditional 
rules.64 
At the present time, however, it is also possible-due to the influence of the 
practice, to some extent- to commence the arbitral procedure based directly on 
the arbitration clause. In this case the arbitration clause shall be the so-called 
complete arbitration clause, including-besides the submission of the parties' 
dispute under the jurisdiction of an arbitral panel-the precise procedure of the 
appointment of the arbitrators. This standpoint was explained in the already-
mentioned Renault do Brazil SA and others v. Carlos Alberto de Oliveira 
Andrade and Others case. According to the facts of the case, in the arbitration 
clause the jurisdiction and procedural rules of the International Chamber of 
Commerce were stipulated in such a manner that the location of the arbitration 
was the USA. Considering the indicated arbitration clause included the precise 
rules for appointing the arbitrators, the Court of Appeal of Sào Paulo ruled that 
there was no need for concluding compromisso. In a subsequent case, a par ty-
based on an arbitration clause not including the appointment of the arbitrators 
(i.e. not complete arbitration clause)-was unwilling to submit a dispute under 
the jurisdiction of an arbitral panel, this is why the resolution of the court 
substituted the compromisso.65 
Therefore, in order to conclude an arbitration clause being capable to 
completely ignore the jurisdiction of the state courts and to commence the 
arbitral procedure, the clause shall include the exact procedure of the appoint-
ment of the arbitrators. The parties can either stipulate the procedural rules of a 
certain arbitral body or they may lay down the decisive rules of the appoint-
ment. This requirement shows the essential purpose of the legislature: the 
parties submitting their possible dispute under the jurisdiction of an arbitral 
64
 See: Sanders: Quo vadis arbitration? op. cit. 49. 
65
 See: Americel S.A. v. Compushopping Informática Ltda. ME and Others. Quoted by: 
Gomm-Santos: Arbitration in Brazil... op. cit. 52. 
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panel shall know the entire procedure of establishing the panel, because that will 
decide the case regarding possibly very large sum in issue. 
Concerning the legitimacy of the arbitral procedure, it is essential for the 
contracting par t ies to know the procedure of the appointment before the 
dispute arises; therefore, this cannot constitute basis for ignoring the arbitral 
procedure. If the parties conclude the above-mentioned complete arbitration 
c lause (no fur ther compromisso arbitral is necessary), but one of the parties 
is not willing to take part in the arbitration, the state court declares the 
enforceability o f the complete arbitration clause and oblige the reluctant party 
to participate in the arbitration. 
Concerning the procedure o f the state court it is essential to recognize the 
difference between this procedure and the one based on Art 7 of the act on 
arbitration. Latter is applied if a complete arbitration clause does not exist; 
therefore the conclusion of the compromisso arbitral is necessary, however 
o n e of the parties will not agree on it. In the case analyzed above the conclu-
sion of the compromisso arbitral is not necessary (due to the fact that a 
complete arbitration clause exists). So, the duty of the court is to declare the 
enforceability of the complete arbitration clause in case one of the parties will 
not agree on the arbitral procedure. 
According to Art 12 of the law on arbitration, in case the parties conclude 
the compromisso, it expires immediately, if the arbitrator refuses the appoint-
men t and the parties explicitly stated previously that they would not call for a 
substitute person. This applies if the arbitrator dies or certain circumstances 
occur that prevent him from voting. These conditions shall be taken into 
consideration when the parties conclude the complete arbitration clause or the 
compromisso. 
According the Art 13 of the law on arbitration, every person having full 
capacity being trusted, therefore appointed by the parties may act as arbitrator. 
It is worth mentioning that the Brazilian citizenship is not a condition. The law 
requires that the number of the appointed arbitrators must be odd. If the parties 
appoint even number of arbitrators, the arbitrators can appoint one further 
person. Provided the arbitrators are unable to reach an agreement on this issue, 
the parties may commence the action of the competent state court. However, 
the law does not define timeframe for the parties to commence a procedure when 
they realize that the arbitrators cannot agree on the one further arbitrator. This 
issue shall be solved by the legal practice; however, this provision provides a 
means for the arbitrators to prolong the procedure. Provided the arbitral panel 
is not constituted by a sole arbitrator, the arbitrators elect one from themselves 
as chair of the panel . If the arbitrators are unable to agree on the chair, the law 
renders help: in this case the most elderly arbitrator will act as the chair. 
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Art 13 (6) of the Brazilian law on arbitration concerning the impartiality 
and independence of the arbitrators follows specifically the related provisions 
of the Model Law. It provides that arbitrators shall act independently, impartially 
and carefully.6" Concerning the professional state judges , the grounds of 
exclusion are divided into two groups: absolute (strict) and less strict grounds 
of exclusion."7 This provision regards state judges; however, Art 14 of the law 
on arbitration provides that a person who is in such relation to the parties or 
the case itself that-as a state judge-would lead to exclusion shall not proceed 
as arbitrator. It is necessary to mention that this provision does not show the 
above-mentioned differentiation between strict and lesser strict grounds of 
exclusion. 
The Brazilian law requires the arbitrators-similarly to the Model Law- to 
disclose, before they accept the assignment, any fact that would raise justified 
doubts concerning their impartiality or independence. In order to ensure fair 
trial, the law further requires equal treatment of the parties (Art 21 ) and that 
the arbitrators shall provide oral hearing for both parties."8 
The Brazilian law is very clear concerning the challenge of the arbitrators, 
providing that-based on grounds having arisen before the appointment-a party 
can file motions of challenge only if he had not taken part in the appointment 
or had obtained knowledge about the certain information after the appointment.69 
These provisions creates a regulation more sophisticated than the Argentinean 
system, which provides that a party may file motions of challenge against an 
66
 The wording of the law on arbitration follows also that of the Model Law using the 
appropriate Portuguese expressions: „No desempenho de sua funçào, о arbitre deverá 
proceder com imparcialidade, independência, competência, diligência e discriçâo." The 
Model Law uses the terms "impartiality" and "independence". It shall be noted that Section 2 
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arbitrator appointed by himself only on grounds arose after the appointment. In 
this regard, the Argentinean law does not differentiate between the separately and 
jointly appointed arbitrators; the rule applies to both groups. While this rule is 
appropriate if the arbitrators are appointed jointly by the parties, in case of 
separate appointment, it is more questionable. For the party who could not 
participate in the appointment of the given arbitrator it is not fare to refuse the 
right to challenge him on grounds arose before the appointment. 
The motion of challenge-according to Art 20 of the law on arbitration-
shall be fded immediately after the ground for challenge arises. With respect to 
the decision making, the Brazilian law follows such a "radical" method, which 
is the stricter solution provided by the Model Law. According to this, the state 
courts cannot interfere in this case; it is exclusively the arbitral panel that can 
decide. There is no legal remedy against this decision. 
The decision concerning the challenge of the arbitrator may only be 
challenged in the legal remedy provided against the arbitral award. Within sixty 
days of the date of service of the award a party may file for an action to have 
the award overturned-based on certain grounds.7" The party may invoke the 
lack of the arbitrators' impartiality or independence; the text, however, does not 
fol low the wording of the Model Law. Art 32 lists the grounds for declaring 
the award null and void. It includes the case when the award was given by an 
arbitrator who could not proceed as arbitrator; also, when the award was a 
result of corruption. The burden of proof-as it can be derived from Art 33—is 
on the side of the party who filed for an action. 
It is clear that the arbitrators have serious responsibility in connection with 
the challenge of the arbitrators, because this decision highly influences also the 
award. If the arbitrators are negligent in this respect, it may lead to serious 
damages of the parties. (It should be noted that Art 17 of the law on arbitration 
orders the application of the rules governing the responsibility of persons 
having official positions.) Jan Kleinheisterkamp argues that it would have been 
a better solution to provide a legal remedy by the state judicial bodies against 
the decision concerning the challenge of the arbitrators.71 
It should be also noted that it could take relatively a long time to enforce an 
arbitral award in Brazil. As a reason for that we can mention that the losing 
party usually attempts to challenge the award itself in front of a regular court. 
Nevertheless the regular court in most cases rejects the challenge, it can take 
significant time before the court in charge reaches such a decision. 
70
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As a recent example on the chal lenge of arbitrator we can refer to the 
fol lowing case. The parties agreed on arbitration in Sào Paulo under the 
UNCITRAL rules administered by American Arbitration Association. The parties 
defined the number of the arbitrators by ruling three arbitrators, each party 
could appoint one-one arbitrator and the party-appointed arbitrators could 
select the chairperson of the tribunal. Furthermore the parties composed a 
submission agreement, in which they expressly waived any challenges to all 
arbitrators. After two years of procedure the panel issued an award. Af te r the 
receipt of the award the losing party started judicial proceedings in order to 
have the award annulled, based on the fact that the arbitrator nominated by the 
winning party had not disclosed the fact that he had offered legal services to 
another member of the same company-group several months before the 
arbitration procedure took place. The losing party argued that it learnt this fact 
only after the award had been rendered with the help of an Internet research of 
the arbitrator's law firm. The state court judge in Sào Paulo nullified the award 
based on Articles 32, II and VIII, 13, paragraphs 6 and 14 of the Brazilian law 
on arbitration. It is interesting to note the reasoning of the award, according to 
which the provisions regarding disqualification of arbitrators and judges 
cannot be derogated or modified by the agreement of the parties.72 
The Brazilian law on arbitration combines the traditional rules and the 
provisions of the Model Law. I illustrated this approach above with some 
examples . However, the Brazilian law shall face some challenges. The Act 
11079 on the Public-Private Partnership was promulgated on 30lh December 
2004. It allows settling the related disputes via arbitration; however , the 
location of the procedure shall be in Brazil and its language Portuguese. It is 
very questionable how the foreign investors will react to such provisions.73 
C) Chile 
The fundamental changes concerning arbitration that occurred in the Latin 
American countries took place also in Chile. The legal framework, however, 
is slightly different from the above-mentioned legal systems; we can observe 
some sort of duality. Chile ratified many international conventions rather earlier. 
For instance, Chile was one of the first countries which ratified the New York 
convention (being in force in Chile f rom 3'd December 1975) and the Panama 
Convention; moreover, Chile ratified the Washington Convention on settling 
disputes related to foreign investments. It has been in force since 24Ih October, 
12
 See in detail: Mason-Gomm-Santos: New Keys to Arbitration... op. cit. 65. 
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1991. Chile concluded a free trade agreement in 1997 with Canada; in 1998 with 
Mexico and in 2003 with the European Community, South Korea and the United 
States of America . Moreover, Chi le concluded many bilateral agreements on 
the protection of the investments with a number of European and Asian 
countries.74 
Not surprisingly, the state o f the economy was also attractive to foreign 
investors. However, in spite o f the ratified international conventions including 
arbitration as an alternative dispute settlement system, very old rules were 
governing arbitration in Chile until 2004. The relevant provisions of the Code 
on Civil Procedure (Côdigo de Procedimiento Civil) of 1902 and the law on 
the judicial organization (Código Orgánico de Tribunales) of 1943 had been 
applied to arbitration. These rules were highly influenced by tbe Spanish law 
of the 19th century.75 Chile attempted several times to modemize the legal frame-
work governing arbitration. The draft of 1992-for example-was rejected based 
on constitutional grounds. Only in 2004 the Chilean legislature could pass the 
n e w law on arbitration.76 
The draft of the law in force was brought in on 2nd June, 2003. The Congress 
passed the law on 10lh August, 2004, and then it was forwarded to the Constitu-
tional Court for preliminary constitutional control. On 25lh August 2004 the 
Constitutional Cour t ruled that no constitutional issue was found, therefore 
the new law was delivered to the President on 10lh September 2004. The Act 
N r 19.971 on international commercial arbitration {Ley de Arbitraje Comercial 
Internacional) was promulgated on 29th September 2004.77 
The new law follows the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law; there-
f o r e it is regarded as the first law governing international arbitration in Chile. 
T h e Chilean Juan Eduardo Figueroa Valdes emphasizes the importance of the 
law as follows: 
- The law contributes to c rea te a legal f ramework in Chile beneficial to 
foreign investors, therefore it increases the volume of investments; 
74
 Concerning these issues see: www.direcon.cl. 
With respect to these two laws see: Jorquiera, C.-Helmlinger, K.: Chile. In: Blackaby, 
N. et al. (red.): International Arbitration in Latin America. The Hague, 2002. 90. 
7i>
 About the Chilean law on arbitration in the Spanish literature see especially: Paillas, E.: 
El Arbitraje Nacional e Internacional Privado. Santiago, 2003. albónico, E. P.: Arbitraje 
Comercial Internacional. Santiago, 2005. 
77
 Regarding the drafting of the new law on arbitration see especially: Conejero Roos, C.: 
The New Chilean Arbitration Law and the Influence of the Model Law. Journal of Inter-
national Arbitration. 22 (2005) 151-152. 
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- The law provides rules that are in close compliance with the international 
arbitral regulations, so it encourages stipulating Chile as the location of 
the arbitral procedures; therefore it contributes to the improvement of the 
standard of the Chilean arbitral bodies.78 
The Chilean legislature follows the monist concept with respect to arbitra-
tion, because the law in issue governs only international arbitration. The Chilean 
domestic arbitral processes are still regulated by the previous rules. This 
differentiation has great importance for the topic of the present essay. In the 
following, I am analyzing the provisions of the new law on international 
arbitration; however, indicating certain rules nomiative to domestic arbitration. 
Concerning the concept of international arbitration the Chilean law follows 
entirely the UNCITRAL Model Law. Contrary to the previous regula t ions-
which are ordinary in the region-the new law does not require a second 
agreement for the arbitral procedure. Therefore, in case an arbitration clause 
exists, no further agreement shall be concluded when the dispute arises; so the 
duality of the clausula compromisoria and the compromiso does no longer 
79 
exists. 
The Chilean law follows the provisions of the Model Law regarding also 
the appointment of the arbitrators.8" According to the Chilean law on arbitration, 
the parties may agree on the number of arbitrators freely. In case they cannot 
reach an agreement on the number of arbitrators, three arbitrators shall proceed. 
This rule is compliant to the standard practice of international commercial 
arbitration. 
First paragraph of Art 11 of the Chilean law provides that in absence of 
different agreement, arbitrators with any nationality can proceed; the law does 
not contain any prohibitive rules. According to Figueroa Valdes, if advocates 
may act as arbiter de jure only, this would lead to an ostensible contradiction, 
because the Chilean law on the judicial organization, provides that only 
Chilean citizens can act as advocates in Chile. That would mean that a foreign 
advocate could not be arbiter de jure. The contradiction is ostensible only, 
however, because the law on international arbitration explicitly provides that 
78
 See: Figueroa Valdes, J. E.: The New Chilean Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Law 19. 971). www.camsantiago.eom/html/arehivos/espanol/articulos. 
74
 It should be noted that Art 234 of the law on the judicial organization provides that 
the parties shall conclude-besides the arbitration clause-an agreement including certain 
necessary elements. Otherwise, the lack of such agreement hinders the arbitral procedure. 
80
 See: Art 10 of the Chilean law on arbitration (Numéro de arb/7ras-Number of the 
arbitrators), moreover Art 11 (Nombramiento de los árN'/rar-Appointment of the arbitrators). 
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anybody can proceed as arbitrator, irrespective of his nationality. This may 
only be limited by the agreement of the parties. Therefore, foreign advocate 
can also act as arbiter de jure in Chile. A contradictory interpretation of these 
rules would decrease the autonomy of the parties, which would violate one of 
the fundamental principles of the law governing international arbitration.81 
According to the relevant provisions of the Chilean law, the parties may 
agree on the procedure regulating the appointment of the arbitrators freely. (It 
shall be noted here that it used to be the compromise, the second agreement 
concerning the arbitration, which related to the procedure of the appointment.) 
Provided the parties do not reach an agreement on this issue and three arbitrators 
proceed, each party may appoint one arbitrator, and the third is appointed by 
these two arbitrators. The chair of the competent court of appeal shall decide 
on the appointment, if one of the parties does not appoint an arbitrator within 
30 days, or the two arbitrators fail to appoint the third member of the panel 
within 30 days. Provided the parties agree on a panel constituted by a sole 
arbitrator, and the parties are unable to appoint the sole arbitrator, on the 
motion of a party it is the chair of the competent court of appeal which appoints 
the sole arbitrator. If the parties, or-concerning the appointment of the third 
arbitrator-the t w o arbitrators w h o are already appointed by the parties, or a 
third person being in charge of the appointment (including arbitral organi-
zations) breach the rules of the appointment, on the motion of a party, it is the 
chair of the competent court of appeal that decides on the appointment 
(provided the agreement of the parties does not contain other provisions in this 
respect). 
Section 5 of Art 11 of the law on international arbitration provides that these 
decisions of the chair of the competent court of appeal are not appealable. 
During the appointment, the required qualification of the arbitrator and the 
question of his impartiality and independence shall be taken into consideration. 
Provided that the third arbitrator or the sole arbitrator is to be appointed via 
this procedure, the possibility of appointing an arbitrator having different 
nationality than the arbitrators appointed by the parties shall be considered. 
This rule is based on the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
Some remarks should be made regarding the rules indicated above. Cristián 
Conejero Roos in his essay emphasizes the difference between the concept of 
the law in force (arbitrators are appointed independently by the parties) and the 
traditional concept of the law of Chile and other Latin American countries 
(arbitrators are appointed by the parties joint ly) . 2 In connection with the 
81
 See: Figueroa Valdes: The New Chilean Law... op. cit. 
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 See: Roos: The New Chilean Arbitration Law... op. cit. I 56. 
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challenge of the arbitrator, however, the Argentinean law does not differentiate 
between the jointly and independently appointed arbitrators either-as it has 
been noted above. According to Conejero Roos, emphasizing the concept of 
the arbitrator appointed by the parties is very important in the Chilean law, 
because it substantially differs from the earlier concept-being parallel to some 
extent to the traditions prevailing in the Roman law-of the appointment of the 
arbitrator.71 It should also be mentioned here that the new law gives the chair 
of the court of appeal the right to decide-contrary to the former regulation, 
which delegated this right to the court of first instance. 
In my view it ought to be also emphasized that-provided the parties did not 
agree on the procedure of the appointment and a panel of three arbitrators 
proceed-the right for the decision by the chair of the court of appeal opens after 
the thirty-day-long deadline expires. However, concerning the sole arbitrator, 
the law does not set such a deadline; it just provides that in case the parties 
cannot agree on the appointment of the sole arbitrator, on a motion of a party 
the court of appeal appoints the arbitrator. Taking into account the fact that 
there is no appeal against the decision, the rule not setting any deadline for the 
parties to appoint the sole arbitrator may allow misuse of the law. Therefore, 
the chair of the court of appeal is to be very careful in his decision concerning 
the appointment of the arbitrator, because this unappealable decision has very 
great impact on the arbitral procedure. 
Traditionally the Chilean law differentiates between the arbiter de jure and 
the arbiter ex aequo et bono concerning the challenge of the arbitrators.74 It 
provides the same rules to the ordinary state judges and the arbiter de jure; 
while-according to certain judgements-i t shall not be applied to the arbiter ex 
aequo et bono.*5 
Compliant to the Model Law the Chilean law on international arbitration 
orders the arbitrator to disclose and fact that may raise doubts concerning his 
impartiality or independence. The former law did not include such a provision. 
83
 About the compromission in the Roman law see: Ziegler: Das private Schieds-
gericht... op. cit. 47-77. 
84
 It is worth mentioning that the traditional Chilean law did use the concept of a 
combination of the arbiter de jure and the arbiter ex aequo et bono. This arbitrator was not 
bound by the procedural rules laid down in the law; however his award was to be based on 
the law-contrary to the award of the arbiter ex aequo et bono. See especially: Grigera 
Naôn, H. A.: Arbitration in Latin America... op. cit. 139. 
87
 The consequent application of this interpretation of the two categories of arbitrators 
would lead to an undesirable differentiation. For this judgement see: CA Santiago (Oct. 17, 
1994) 91 11-2 RDJ 95, 96-97 (1994). Quoted in: Kleinheisterkamp: International 
Commercial Arbitration... op. cit. 210. 
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Art 12 of the new law provides that a party may fde a motion of challenge, if 
such doubts arise concerning the impartiality or independence of the arbitrator. 
A party who appointed or took part in the appointment of the certain arbitrator 
may fde a motion for challenge based only on grounds that became known 
after the appointment. Therefore, in case the party appointed an arbitrator and 
was aware of the fact that a challenge would be grounded against the arbitrator, 
the right for challenge is regarded as renounced.8" 
The text of the Chilean law follows verbatim the expressions "independence" 
and "impartiality" of the Model Law using the Spanish words "independencia" 
and "imparcialidad". 
According to the new Chilean law parties are free to agree on the procedure 
of the challenge of the arbitrators. In case the parties do not stipulate such 
procedural rules, the law provides subsidiary provisions.87 According to these 
subsidiary rules a party is given 15 days following the establishment of the 
tribunal or obtaining knowledge about the ground for challenge to file a 
motion of challenge in writing at the panel. If the arbitrator does not renounce 
or the other party does not accept it (that would cancel the arbitrator's assign-
ment), it is the panel itself that decides on the challenge. 
The Chilean law-contrary to the above-mentioned Brazilian rules-provides 
legal remedy against such decision of the panel. Provided the procedure on the 
challenge-based on the law on arbitration or the agreement of the parties-does 
not lead to the desired result, the party who filed the motion of challenge may 
appeal against the decision. The right for the appeal is conferred on the chair 
of the court of appeal whose decision can no longer be appealed.88 In my view, 
the importance of this appeal is highly decreased by the fact that the arbitral 
procedure is not suspended by the appeal, therefore even the award can be 
reached with the participation of the arbitrator in issue. 
It should be noted that the procedure of challenge is more complicated if 
domestic arbitration is concerned.8 ' Similarly to the Brazilian law, regarding 
domestic arbitration strict (causas de implicancias) and lesser strict grounds 
(causas de recusaciones) for challenge are differentiated. If one of the causas 
de recusaciones arises, the motion is decided by the state court of first instance-
this decision is unappealable. Concerning the causas de implicancias, in case 
there is sole arbitrator, it is the sole arbitrator who decides on the challenge; 
s
" Fernandez—Gutiérrez: Chile. In: Rowley-Mendelsohn (ed.): Arbitration World... op. 
cit. 55. 
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 See: Art 13 (2) of the Chilean law on arbitration. 
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 See: Art 13 (3) of the Chilean law on arbitration. 
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however, his decision can be appealed at the regional court. Provided the panel 
consists of more arbitrators, the decision is made by the tribunal excluding the 
arbitrator in issue. This decision is unappealable. It is worth mentioning that 
the arbitral procedure is not suspended, just before the award is made; however, 
the arbitrator in issue cannot proceed until the decision on the challenge.'"1 
It can be observed that the Chilean law is much more complicated concerning 
the domestic arbitration than the new rules on international arbitration. The new 
law on arbitration regulates the appointment and challenge of the arbitrators 
in such way that may create a framework for arbitration meeting the require-
ments of the parties participating and will ing to participate. According to 
Figureoa Valdes an important step of this process was the serious limitation of 
the role of the state courts concerning international arbitration. " 
With respect to the possibility of appeal concerning the composition of 
the arbitral tribunal, we should refer to paragraph four of Art 34 (2) a) of the 
Chilean law on arbitration. It provides that the competent court of appeal may 
declare the award null and void, provided the party filing the motion manage to 
prove that the composition of the panel (or the procedure) was not in compliance 
with the agreement of the parties, excluding the situation when this agreement 
breaches one of the cogent provisions of the law. Provided the parties did not 
conclude an agreement on the procedural rules, the invalidation of the award 
may be initiated if the composit ion of the panel (or the procedure) breaches 
the provisions of the Chilean law on arbitration. It shall be emphasized that 
invalidation may also be initiated-besides the above-mentioned cases-if the 
composition of the panel (or the procedure) breaches the law on arbitration 
as such. 
One of the most important arbitral organizations is the Court of Arbitration 
at the Santiago Chamber of Commerce. The Santiago Arbitration and Mediation 
Center was founded in 1992.42 This Court of Arbitration has its own rules of 
procedure, which offers to the parties to call upon the Chamber of Commerce 
to appoint the arbitrators. Challenge of the arbitrators appointed by the Chamber 
of Commerce is also possible. Parties have six days from the appointment to 
file a motion of challenge. The motion is judged by the Council of the Chamber. 
Provided both parties agree on the challenge of an arbitrator, the exclusion 
90
 For a summary see: Kleinheisterkamp: International Commercial Arbitration... op. 
cit. 210. 
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 "At the same time, the unquestionable restriction in judicial intervention of Ordinary 
Tribunals ensures the well functioning of the international arbitral system in Chile" See: 
Figueroa Valdes: The New Chilean Law... op. cit. 
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takes places automatically, without the substantial examination of the motion. 
If one of the parties does not agree, the Council makes the decision after holding 
an oral bearing. This decision of the Council is unappealable.4 3 In my view, 
the rules of procedure of the Court of Arbitration at the Chilean Chamber of 
Commerce essentially respect the autonomy of the parties. 
The Arbitration and Mediation Center of the Chilean-American Chamber 
of Commerce plays also an important role in Chile. The rules of procedure of 
this arbitral organization contain also important rules on the challenge of the 
arbitrators. Art 11 provides that parties may file motions of challenge if they 
obtain knowledge about concerns related to the impartiality or independency 
of an arbitrator. The deadline for this motion is 15 days from the appointment 
of the arbitrator.44 
D) Mexico 
Similarly to many Latin American countries, the Calvo Doctrine also played an 
important role in the development of the Mexican commercial arbitration.45 
Not surprisingly, serious changes of the system of the 19-20 l h centuries took 
place in the 1990's. One of the essential reasons of this phenomenon i s -
similarly to many other Latin American countries-the ratification of different 
international conventions. Mexico ratified the New York Convention in 1971 and 
it also became a member of the Panama Convention. In 1986 Mexico joined 
the Montevideo Convention. As it is already mentioned, Mexico is an observer 
state of the MERCOSUR. The importance of the free-trade agreements 
concluded by Mexico in the development of the Mexican law on arbitration 
shall also be noted. Special emphasis shall be laid on The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), whose members include Mexico. The Agreement 
provides that an investor of a member may initiate arbitral procedure directly 
against a member state. (Mexico has this rule in several other f ree- trade 
agreements also.)4" 
'' For all these rules see Art 8 -10 of the rules of procedure: hltp://www.camsantiago. 
com/html/english/index.htm. 
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 See in this regard: http://www.amchamchile.cl/node/1456;http://www.amchamchile. 
cl/node/1108. 
18
 For a good summery on the Mexican arbitration law in Spanish see: Uribarri 
Carpintero, G.: El arbitraje en Mexico. Mexico City, 1999. 
Wobeser, С. V.: Mexico. In: Rowley, J. W.-Mendelsohn, Mc. B. (ed.): Arbitration 
World. Jurisdictional Comparisons. London, 2006. 2. edition. 206. 
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The US-Mexico Conflict Resolution Center plays very important role in the 
development of the arbitration practise in Mexico. This non-profit organization 
was founded in 1994 at the State University of New Mexico. The organiza-
tion was founded in order to contribute to the development compliant with the 
international trends of the Mexican-American arbitration practise.47 
The fundamental rules on arbitration are included in the code of commerce 
(Código de Comercio). The code was amended by a regulation promulgated on 
4th January, 1989 with a new Chapter four of the Fifth Book regulating arbitra-
tion.42 In spite of the fact that these rules already fol lowed the provisions of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, they were substantially amended in 1993. The 
regulation promulgated on 22nd July 1993 provided rules on arbitration being 
much more flexible to the parties. A novelty being important for the topic of 
the present essay provides that the parties are free to choose the language of 
the procedure different f rom Spanish; also the location of the arbitration and 
they are also free to define the number of the arbitrators.44 
The Mexican law differentiate between the arbitrators proceeding based on 
statute law, the arbiter de jure (derecho) and the arbitrators deciding on the 
basis of fairness, the arbiter ex aequo et bono (de conciencia).11111 The provisions 
concerning the appointment and challenge of the arbitrators are included in Art 
1426-1431 of the Mexican Código de Comercio. According to these rules, 
the parties are free to choose the number of the arbitrators. If such an agreement 
does not exist, a sole arbitrator proceeds. The legal practise requires that the 
number of the arbitrators shall be odd (numéro non), in order to create a 
functioning panel."" The law does not provide any limitation regarding the 
nationality of the arbitrators. The parties are free to def ine the procedure of 
appointment. Provided the parties are unable or unwil l ing to agree on this 
issue, the law provides subsidiary rules. The sole arbitrator is appointed by the 
judge of the state court if the parties cannot agree on his appointment. If the 
panel consists of three arbitrators, each party appoints one arbitrator, and the 
17
 See: www.nmda.nmsu.edu. 
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 See in this regard: Hoagland, A. C.: Modification of Mexican Arbitration Law. 
Journal of International Arbitration, 7 (1990) 91-100. 
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Liberalize Arbitration Law". http://faculty.smu.edu./pwinship/arb- 17.htm. About the amend-
ment of 1993 see further: Drafting and Enforcement oflnternational Arbitration Clauses in 
Mexico and the United States. See: www.mexicolaw.com/LawInfo01.htm. This article 
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third (the chair) is appointed by these two arbitrators. Provided a party does 
not appoint an arbitrator within 30 days af ter the call for doing so, or the two 
arbitrators-appointed by the parties-are unable to appoint the third arbitrator 
within 30 days, it is the state court that is going to appoint the chair of the panel 
on a motion of a party. If the parties reached an agreement on the procedure 
of the appointment; however , one of the parties, or the already appointed 
arbitrators, or a third person-including institutions-did not complete his duties , 
the court m a y interfere in the procedure according to the purpose of the 
procedural order. 
In spite of the fact that one of the aims of the amendment of the Mexican 
law on arbitration was the diminution of the role played by the state courts,1"2 
we should refer to the fact that there is no appeal against the above-mentioned 
decisions of the judge of the state court. According to the law, the judge-when 
appointing an arbitrator-has to take into consideration the necessary qualifica-
tion of the arbitrator and any other circumstances that are capable of assuring 
the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator. Despite the fact that the 
law explicitly provides that anybody-irrespective of his nationality-may be 
appointed as arbitrator,"11 in case a state j udge decides on the appointment, he 
shall appoint an arbitrator having different nationality from the parties. While 
the aim of the previous rule is to provide freedom to the parties concerning 
nationality of the arbitrators, the purpose of the latter is to provide that the 
arbitrator having dominant position is impartial and independent 
It can be observed in the above-mentioned rules that the Mexican law does 
not require any specific qualification for the arbitrators; however, the certain 
person has to be of full age and have full capacity. We should mention here 
that in some other Latin American countries the legislature explicitly includes 
specific requirements for becoming arbitrator in the law concerning the 
appointment o f the arbitrator. For instance, second paragraph of Art 480 of 
the Uruguayan Code of civil procedure in force (Ley N. 15982 Codigo Gerenal 
del Proceso) provides explicitly that arbitrators shall be over 25 and have full 
104 
capacity. 
Certain international convent ions-a lso ratified by Mexico-may provide 
further requirements concerning the qualification of the arbitrators. The North 
11,2
 See: ITA NEWS & NOTES ,. Mexican Commercial Code... op. cit. 
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 See: Art 1427 of the Codigo de Comercio. 
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 See: Ley N. 15982 Codigo General del Proceso, Art. 480 (Arbitres): „2. Puede ser 
arbitre toda persona mayor de veinticinco aiios de edad. que se halle en el pleno goce de 
sus derechos civiles." These requirements (age 25, full civil capacity) are explicitly 
included in the part concerning the appointment of the arbitrators. 
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American Free Trade Agreement - for instance-requires that the arbitrator 
proceeding in disputes between an investor and a member state has to be 
familiar to international law and investment affairs. '"7 
Concerning the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator, the Mexican 
code strictly follows the relevant provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law;106 it 
provides that the arbitrator has to disclose any information before the appoint-
ment that may raise concerns regarding his impartiality or independence. Af te r 
the appointment, the arbitrator still has to disclose any such information, until 
the end of the procedure-if the parties did not obtain knowledge of the given 
fact. If the party appointed an arbitrator or took part in the appointment, he 
may file a motion of challenge against this arbitrator based only on grounds he 
noticed after the appointment. 
The challenge may only be initiated in the existence of facts rais ing 
grounded doubts concerning the impartiality or independence of the arbitrator; 
or, provided the arbitrator does not have qualifications having been required by 
the parties. The interpretation of this ru le-which follows the provisions of the 
Model Law-leads to an interesting question: what is the procedure to be 
followed if a qualification is required by an international convention but the 
parties did not include such rule in their agreement. However, we will not f ind 
explicit answer in the law; presumably challenge may be initiated based on the 
above-mentioned provisions. 
Similarly to the appointment of the arbitrator, the parties are free to def ine 
the procedure of the challenge of the arbitrators. In case such an agreement 
does not exist, the party initiating the challenge shall tile a motion of challenge 
in writing at the panel within 15 days after he obtained knowledge on the 
composition of the panel or the ground for challenge. If the arbitrator does not 
renounce or the other party does not accept it, it is the panel itself that decides 
on the challenge. The party filing the motion may appeal against this decision at 
the court within 30 days. The court makes an unappealable decision on this issue. 
The arbitral procedure is not suspended by the procedure of the court; the 
arbitrator in issue may also participate; moreover, even the award may be given. 
This provision follows the Model Law; however, the latter is substantially 
105
 See: Wobeser: Mexico... op. cit. 209-210. 
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 For the relevant parts of the commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law see: 
Binder: International Commercial Arbitration... op. cit. 116-117. 
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different concerning the fac t that in the Model Law, it is not only the court that 
may decide on the appeal.11,7 
Art 1457 of the Mexican law regulates the nullification of the award. We 
should emphas ize the rule which provides that such procedure may also be 
initiated on grounds that the composition of the panel (or the procedure) did 
not comply with the agreement of the part ies; excluding the situation when this 
agreement breached one of the cogent provisions of the law. Provided the 
parties did not conclude an agreement on the procedural rules, the invalidation 
of the award may be initiated if the composition of the panel (or the procedure) 
breaches o n e of the rules of Art 1457. "IS W e should refer here to the judgement 
of the 25th Civil Court of the Federal District on 12th June, 2001.11,9 The plaintiff 
initiated the nullification of an award of the ICC Court of Arbitrator, based o n -
ititer alia-certain concerns regarding the impartiality of the arbitrator. The 
Mexican c o u r t dismissed the case. It reasoned that the ICC had a l ready 
dismissed the motion of challenge filed during the arbitral procedure, and the 
plaintiff did not appeal this decision at the state court, in spite of the fact that 
such option was granted by Art 1429 of the Mexican Code of Commerce 
(following the Model Law).1 1 0 
I presented certain essential features of the law concerning arbitration of the 
Latin American states, with special emphasis on the appointment and challenge 
of the arbi t rators . It can be observed that—until the recent pas t -many fac tors 
"' See: Binder: International Commercial Arbitration... op. cit. 124. The evident 
purpose of the above-mentioned distinctions is to ensure the applicability of the Model 
Law in different legal families. 
11,8
 We should emphasize the difference between the solution for legal remedy and the 
concept of amparo. The amparo is a constitutional appeal that may be filed at the federal 
court against a judgement of a state court in a nullification or enforcement procedure, if the 
judgement breaches a personal right protected by the constitution. See: Wobeser: Mexico, 
op. cit. 217. 
"" The judgement is: http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/ arbitration/arb/counlry/ 
Mexico.asp. 
"" Art 1429 of the Mexican Code on commerce-following the Model Law-provides that 
the party filing the motion of challenge are given 30 days after receiving the refusal of Iiis 
motion to appeal at the state court. The decision of the court shall not be appealed. The 
arbitral procedure is not suspended by the procedure of the court; the arbitrator in issue 
may also participate; moreover, even the award may be given. 
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( including political ones) contributed to the regulation and practise of com-
mercial arbitration. (I did analyze in details the Calvo Doctrine in this regard.) 
The striking influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 is obvious in the 
recent legislation of the states of the region. 
The new laws and drafts based on the UNCITRAL Model Law faced (and 
still face) different challenges due to-besides the above-mentioned political 
fac tors - the legal traditions. One of these challenges is the still existent dif-
ferentiation between the domestic and international arbitration. The duality 
of the arbitration clause and the arbitration agreement (the clausula cornpro-
misoria and the compromiso arbitral) and the efforts to put an end to this duality 
in order to facilitate the arbitral procedure are also important. The principle 
according to which arbitrators are appointed jointly and not independently by 
the parties has also traditional basis. The rules governing the appointment 
and challenge of the arbitrators are determined by the dichotomy of the arbiter 
de jure and the arbiter ex aequo et bono. The efforts of the legislatures to 
unify the law on arbitration have to face these phenomena also. The fact that 
rules concerning the appointment and challenge of the arbitrators, moreover 
the possible legal remedies are still different to some extent in the region (i.e. 
in the countries examined in the present essay) shows that the process of 
creating a uniform system for arbitration has not reached an end yet. 
In conclusion, it can be established that the efforts to unify the law on arbi-
tration-that have already materialized in the laws, the legal practice and the 
completed drafts-substantially contributed to create a more coherent legal frame-
work concerning international arbitration. Due to this process, international 
commercial arbitration, as an alternative dispute settlement system became 
popular among domestic and foreign investors in the region.1" 
111
 It is interesting to mention that the spread of the arbitration in the Latin American 
region also resulted in the formation of an infonnal, but well-known "Arbitration Bar", 
including lawyers and law firms from the region and also from Europe and the United 
States. In Brazil the activity of the Brazilian Arbitration Committee ("CBAr") should be 
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New Functions of Hungarian Civil Law Notaries 
Abstract . In Hungary the codification of the civil law is just now progressing; the National 
Assembly is currently debating the Proposition for the new Civil Code replacing the Code of 
1959. The Bill also affects the Hungarian notariat, which proudly looks back to a past of 700 
years, and is conferring several new powers on the organisation. 
In the medieval Hungary the activities requiring public authenticity were performed by 
two types of institutions, the locus aulhenticus operated by the Church and the secular civil law 
notary. The loci authentici were succeeded by the Latin type of notarial in 1875. Following the 
1948 Communist takeover, the Latin type of notariat fell victim to the transformation of the 
justice system after the Soviet model. It was not until after 1991 that the private type of notarial 
in harmony with the Hungarian traditions could resume its operation in the end. 
At present two main groups of cases fall within the competence of the civil law notaries: 
conducting certain non-litigious proceedings, and preparing notarial deeds. The new Civil 
Code would refer several new non-litigious proceedings to the competence of the civil law 
notaries, for example keeping the register of the matrimonial and conjugal property contracts, 
conducting divorce upon the agreed request of the parties, as well as the dissolution of 
common law marriage upon the agreed request of the parties. In conclusion the codification 
enlarges the sphere of tasks of the notariat in the territory of non-litigious proceedings, thus 
wishing to strengthen the Hungarian Notariat's official character. 
Keywords: civil law notary, notary public, civil law codification. Civil Code, civil procedure 
law, register, payment order, non-litigious proceeding, deed 
Introduction 
The idea of the codification of private law in Hungary was first raised at the 
time of the 1848 Revolution. After the suppression of the war of independence 
(1849), however, there was no opportunity for carrying out such a large-scale 
legislative work for a long time. The first comprehensive Draft-Code was 
completed in 1900, but the Motion for the Act on the Code of Private Law 
(hereinafter: ACPL) was tabled to the National Assembly only af ter World 
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War I, in 1928, which mostly adopted the solutions of the German, the Austrian, 
and partly, the Swiss Codes. Although, the standard of ACPL was highly reputed, 
it was not adopted for political reasons. 
It is interesting to note that it took place right in the darkest era of communist 
dictatorship (between 1953 and 1959) that the codification of Hungarian private 
law was resumed and successfully completed: effective until this day, Act 4 of 
1959 on the Civil Code (hereinafter: CC) relying on ACPL and according to 
the limitations set by the socialist economic system aspired to comply with 
professional expectations to the greatest possible extent. By reason of taking 
account of the changes in the economic structure, CC was amended several 
times in the years of socialism; among these the most remarkable one was the 
Amendment of 1977. Following the 1990 change of regime and the transition 
to market-economy, the enactment of a new Code became imperative. 
In 1998, the Hungarian Government passed a resolution about the urgent 
need of a comprehensive reform of civil law and to that effect, it established the 
High Committee for the Codification of Civil Law and the Redaction Committee 
for the Codification of Civil Law. The first one was primarily constituted by 
state leaders and heads of professional bodies, while the other consisted of 
scholars and practising lawyers, i.e., experts. Professor Lajos Vékás was invited 
to be the President of the High Committee. The Draft-Bill for debate was 
prepared in 2 0 0 6 by the Redact ion Committee, however, it was taken over 
in 2007 for fur ther legislative work by the Ministry of Justice and Law En-
forcement. The National Assembly of the Republic of Hungary is debating the 
Draf t Bill reviewed and completed by the Ministry right now.' 
The proposal for the new Civil Code provides an all-embracing regulation 
for the entire scope of private law except for company law, thus, the legislation 
process is of outstanding importance for all fields of law, including the functions 
o f civil law notaries. Hungarian notaries, the functions of which proudly date 
back to a past of several centuries may acquire several new competences due 
to the new Code, which may substantially transform its present functions. We 
wish to provide an outline of the history of Hungarian notaryship as well as of 
the impact of current civil law codification on the functions of notaries in the 
following. 
1
 Vékás L. (ed.): Szakértői javaslat az új Polgári Törvénykönyv tervezetéhez (Expert 
proposal to the Draft of the New Civil Code). Budapest, 2008. 53- 57. 
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I. Historical Overview 
1. The Hungarian notaryship celebrated the 700 th anniversary of its establish-
ment in the previous year. Namely, when Charles Robert, or Carobert of Anjou-
Naples (reigned between 1308-1342), was elected to be the King of Hungary 
on 27th November, 1308, two civil law notaries, Johannes de Pontecurvo and 
Guilelmus de Sanguitneto were delegated to Hungary under the escort of Cardinal 
Gentilis, the Papal Legate, authorized with their powers by the Pope and the 
Emperor in order to prepare an attesting notarial document (attestation)" about 
the fact of the King 's election. And unlike foreign civil law notaries, who had 
operated until then only with a temporary character in the country, they settled 
down in Hungary and practised their profession with a permanent character 
later on. 
In medieval Hungary, peculiar parallelism had emerged in respect of the 
activities related to public authenticity. It was as early as in the last third part 
of the 12th century that the so-called locus authenticus et credibilis (hereinafter: 
authentic places) had appeared, which had discharged a kind of notarial, in-
vestigational and legal activity in the modern sense of the word, mainly within 
the structure of the ecclesiastical organs (chapters, convents). Authentic places 
were established owing to a need for legal certainty, for putt ing private law 
transactions into writing, and taking into consideration the fact that in the 
Kingdom of Hungary only the ecclesiastical organs were in possession of the 
infrastructure, culture and influence necessary to perform this kind of activity, 
these powers were transferred into the jurisdiction of the church. If we take the 
Western-European development into account, the role of notaries in respect 
of the activities related to public authenticity had not been exclusive in our 
country. The system of authentic places, unparalleled in Europe, consisted of 
about 80 such bodies in Hungary in their prime time, i.e., in the 15th century. It 
is important to point out, however, that the usability of the deeds prepared by 
authentic places was limited: interestingly enough, they did not have probative 
force just before the ecclesiastical courts, only the worldly courts accepted 
The instrument was published in Latin: Codex diplomaticus Hungáriáé ecclesiasticus 
ac civilis I-XI. Cura et studio Georgii Fejér. Budae, 1829-1844. VIII/1. 264-269. (selection) 
and the instruments originating from the legation of Cardinal Gentilis in Hungary (1307-
1311). Hungarian Instruments Record in the Vatican I. 2. Budapest, 1885. 155-199. The 
instrument is published in Hungarian: Kristó Gy.-Makk F. (eds.): Károly Róbert emlékezete 
(In Memóriám to Charles Robert). Budapest, 1988. 79-82. as well as in: Rokolya G. (ed.): 
700 éves a közjegyzőség Magyarországon (Notaryship Celebrates its 700th Anniversary in 
Hungary). Budapest, 2008. 
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them.1 In the country torn into three parts after the Battle of Mohács (1526), 
and particularly in the territory under the occupation of the Ottoman Empire, 
the conditions for the operation of authentic places became much worse. The 
authentic places underwent a unique way of development in the Principality of 
Transylvania (the eastern part of the former Kingdom of Hungary, relatively 
independent between 1541 and 1690), which was under the influence of Reforma-
tion: even if individual solutions were rather random, it can be stated in general 
that the secularisation of the Transylvanian authentic places was implemented.4 
In the 18lh century- thanks also to the regulation of the relations of land prop-
erties-authentic places played an important role for a short time subsequently, 
since they were exclusively entitled to issue official copies of the documents 
made or stored by them, and these official copies had a prominent function in 
the territories recaptured at the end of the 17th century in the restoration or the 
earlier relations of land properties. In the 18th century, it could be noticed in 
the whole country that the role of authentic places was slowly, but surely taken 
over by the County Assembl ies and Free Royal City Councils, i.e., by the 
organs of public administration - implying that their time was over.7 
In connection with the activities related to public authenticity in the Middle 
Ages, the civil law notary played another crucial role in Hungary. The institution 
of notaryship originates in the tabellio familiar in Roman law, which revived 
in Lombardy after the period of the Great Migration: it spread in Italy, in the 
Southern French territories, which applied the written law, and in Dalmatia, 
which belonged to Hungary after 1105. The institution was introduced into 
German legal territories, as well, but in the north of the Alps, notarial docu-
ments could only be used before ecclesiastical courts. The first civil law notaries, 
who operated with the authorisation of the Pope and the Emperor, appeared 
in Hungary in the 13th century, typically under the escort of some papal legate, 
but upon the completion of their mission, they immediately left the country 
along with the Legate. The civil law notaries delegated to Hungary together 
with Cardinal Gentilis in 1307, however, operated for quite a long time in the 
country, and with their appearance, the operation of civil law notaries became 
Kőfalvi T.: A hiteleshelyek mint a magyarországi közjegyzőség előzményei (Locus 
Authenticus as the Predecessor of Hungarian Notaryship). In: 700 éves a közjegyzőség 
Magyarországon, op. cit. 12-25. 
1
 Bogdándi Zs.: Az erdélyi hiteleshelyek a szekularizációt követően (Locus Authenticus 
in Transylvania following the Secularisation). In: 700 éves a közjegyzőség Magyarországon, 
op. cit. 41-53. 
5
 Homoki-Nagy M.: Megjegyzések a magyar királyi közjegyzőség történetéhez. In: 
700 éves a közjegyzőség Magyarországon, op. cit. 74-86. 
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permanent in the Kingdom of Hungary. It is important to underline that the 
competence of civil law notaries departed from that of the authentic places. While 
the documents of the authentic places could mainly be used before the secular 
courts, notarial documents carried a probative fo rce before the ecclesiastical 
courts under the Decree of 1405 issued by King Sigismund. Therefore, notarial 
documents were issued first of all for the attestation of legal transactions 
relating to matr imony, community property, inheritance and ecclesiastical 
property." The institution of civil law notaryship, however, did not prove so 
enduring, as the network of the authentic places. Following the bane of Mohács 
( 1526), civil law notaries disappeared from the country without leaving a trace. 
2. The function of the civil law notary reappeared again after the suppression 
of the 1848/1849 war of independence in the country. The force of the Austrian 
Civil Code (ABGB) was extended to Hungary according to the written order of 
the Emperor dated November 29, 1852, and also by means of a written order 
issued in 1858, Austrian notarial regulations were introduced in Hungary, as 
well. The Hungarian National Judicial Commission of 1861 reluctantly abolished 
these modern legal rules, which were introduced definitely by force, but the 
days of authentic places were already numbered.7 Following the Compromise 
between Austria and Hungary (1867), eventually, Article 35 of 1874 introduced 
the Latin type of notaryship as a result of a long-lasting preparation, the 
quintessence of which is that a private person vested with official powers pro-
ceeded, who was entitled with the competence of editing deeds. In lieu of the 
French model, which confers general competence upon civil law notaries in 
non-litigious proceedings (iurisdictio voluntaria in Latin), the legislator fol-
lowed the more moderate German pattern, which referred some special non-
litigious proceedings and the preparation of documents to the competence of 
civil law notaries, without the application of documentary force. It was in 1875 
that the organisation of royal notaryship was established and the scope of 
authority of civil law notaries was extended with a new type of action, i.e., 
the probate proceeding. This marked the first step of the process, according to 
which the non-litigious proceedings of the courts were transferred to notarial 
powers. 
The Latin type of notaryship became a stable part of the domestic legal 
system and of the institutional system of the civil law procedure in a quarter of a 
century and it could operate in a suitable framework until the end of World War II. 
6
 Csukovits E.: Közjegyzők a középkori Magyarországon. In: 700 éves a közjegyzőség 
Magyarországon, op. cit. 54-73. 
7
 Tóth A.: A magyar közjegyzőség gyökerei dióhéjban (The Roots of Hungarian 
Notaryship in a Nutshell). Közjegyzők Közlönye (The Gazette of Notaries), 12 (2008) 3. 
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3. After the communist takeover (1948), the Latin type of notaryship fell 
victim to the transformation of the just ice system according to the Soviet 
pattern. The state clerk notary replaced the private civil law notary in 1949, 
several prominent civil law notaries were discharged from the profession for 
political reasons and the notarial community was forced into the organisation 
of local courts. The state clerk notary could boast with much less prestige than 
its Latin type predecessor, which is attributable not only to the then negligibly 
small public prestige of the profession, but also to the fact, that in the business 
world of the socialist regime there was much less demand for deeds (notarial 
documents) than in the civil era. Following a forced intermission of 40 years, 
the institutional system of the Latin or private type of civil law notaryship 
corresponding to Hungarian legal traditions was again reinstated in 1991. 
II. The Situation of Hungarian Notaries in our Days 
1. Act 41 of 1991 On Civil Law Notaries (hereinafter: ACLN) reinstated the 
Latin type of notaryship. Accordingly, civil law notaries appointed by the 
Minister of Justice shall be organised in a chamber-system under the law. The 
legislator justified this provision in the Preamble to the Act as follows: "As the 
State and the society are equally interested in the proper operation of the self-
employed notarial institution and in the adequate exercise of public powers 
conferred upon notaryship by law, civil law notaries shall be organised into a 
chamber structure according to the Proposal, and the Chambers shall discharge 
the tasks related to inner administration, scilicet, the supervision of the per-
formance of state duties shall be ensured by mandatory membership. That is 
the reason why the civil law notary shall not yet be entitled to practise the 
profession, before gaining chamber membership, because chamber member-
ship shall be established upon the appointment of the Minister of Justice. The 
continuous and ongoing performance of the official administration of justice 
assigned to civil law notaries and the interest of the citizens necessitates the 
restriction of the number of notarial positions, which justifies the fixed character 
of their seats and territorial jurisdiction."8 The organisation of Hungarian civil 
law notaries based upon the above consists of five regional chambers,' ' i.e., the 
s
 The Preamble of the Minister to Act 41 of 1991 on Civil Law Notaries. Complex 
DVD Jogtár. 
4
 See, Section 39 of Act on Civil Law Notaries. 
"There are 5 territorial chambers operating in the territory of the Republic of Hungary: 
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Hungarian National Chamber of Civil Law Notaries is constituted by regional 
chambers. These chambers qualify as public bodies under Section 65 (2) of 
Act 4 of 1959 on the Civi l Code (CC), but their pr imary task shall be the 
exercise of the rights of the notarial self-government. 
A civil law notary may perform his/her activity individually (as a private 
entrepreneur) or as a notarial office. The provisions of Act 4 of 2006 on Business 
Associations concerning limited liability companies shall be applicable to the 
establishment, inventory, operation, control, termination and members ' re-
sponsibilities of notaries' offices.10 Civil law notary candidates and substitute 
civil law notaries shall replace the outgoing members of the body of civil law 
notaries. The civil law notary shall employ the civil law notary candidate and 
the substitute civil law notary. Upon the instruction and according to the 
responsibility of the civil law notary, the substitute civil law notary may settle 
notarial matters on his own , with the exception of attestations, the notarial 
deeds made out by the substitute civil law notary shall not be valid and he shall 
not issue official or duplicate copies without the counter-signature of the civil 
law notary." 
By virtue of Section 12 of ACLN, the jurisdiction of civil law notaries is 
usually the same as the area of jurisdiction of the local court that operates at 
the seat of the civil law notary, however, taking into consideration the peculiar 
situation of the capital, the jurisdiction of civil law notaries operating in Buda-
pest shall encompass the territory of the capital. Nevertheless, as the provision 
sets forth: "the jurisdiction of civil law notaries in the seat of which there is no 
court operating shall be defined by a decree of the Minister of Justice", which 
refers to the exception f rom the court organisational system.12 At present, 313 
civil law notaries operate in Hungary, which is almost the triple of the number 
a) the Budapest Chamber of Notaries Public: operating in the jurisdiction of the Budapest 
Municipal Court, Komárom-Esztergom, Nógrád and Pest County Courts, 
b) the Győr Chamber of Notaries Public: operating in the jurisdiction of Győr-Moson-
Sopron, Vas, Veszprém and Zala County Courts, 
c) the Miskolc Chamber of Notaries Public: operating in the jurisdiction of Borsod-
Abaúj-Zemplén, Hajdú-Bihar, Heves and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Courts, 
d) the Pécs Chamber of Notaries Public: operating in the jurisdiction of Baranya, Fejér, 
Somogy and Tolna County Courts, 
e) the Szeged Chamber of Notaries Public: operating in the jurisdiction of Bács-Kiskun, 
Békés, Csongrád and Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok County Courts". 
10
 See, Section 31/A (3) of Act on Civil Law Notaries. 
" Sections 25 and 29 of Act on Civil Law Notaries. 
12
 IM Decree 15/1991. (XI. 26.) Minister of Justice, on the Number and Seats ofNotarial 
Positions. 
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of local courts. In most sett lements with a seat of a civil law notary, more 
than one civil law notaries work, therefore, in general it can be stated that 
the access to notarial services is easier than to courts. 
The fees of civil law notar ies- taking into account the off icial activities 
performed by them-is regulated by decree and they are divided into two 
elements: a fee and a cost-refund.1 3 Contrary to the public belief, notarial fees 
are much lower than lawyers ' (uncontrolled price) fees, in addition to that, 
notarial fees have not risen for more than a decade (for instance: their basic 
hourly payment is fixed at HUF 1500 (EUR 5)-against the hourly wages of 
HUF 10.000-20.000 of lawyers (which is considered an average amount in 
their circles). 
Right after the reinstatement of the Latin type notaryship in 1992, Hungarian 
notaryship joined as a member the U.I.N.L., scilicet, The International Union of 
Notaries, which is the framework of Latin type notaries' offices, then, following 
the accession of Hungary to the European Union, Hungary became a member 
of the C.N.U.E., i.e., the Council of Notaries ' Offices of the European Union. 
2. Further to the competence of civil law notaries, Section 1 of ACLN is of 
crucial significance. The Section declares with a principal force the following: 
"(1) The act confers public authenticity upon civil law notaries, so that 
they shall provide impartial legal services to the parties, in order to avoid legal 
disputes. 
(2) The civil law notary shall prepare public documents (deeds) about 
contracts and facts of legal significance, keep legal documents, accept money, 
valuables and securities at the order of the parties in order to transfer them to the 
obligee, shall help the parties with the exercise of their rights and the fulfilment 
of their obligations upon instruction, while assuring equal opportunities for all 
parties. 
(3) The civil law notary shall conduct probate action and other non-litigious 
proceedings assigned to its powers. 
(4) Acting within his powers defined by law, the civil law notary shall 
perform official administration of justice as a part of the justice system of the 
state." 
"By virtue of the respective Decisions of the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court, [ . . . ] the civil law notary shall belong to the jus t ice system of 
the state under public law, it may act solely witbin its powers as defined by 
law. The whole scope of its activity is regarded exclusively as official activity. 
Performed in the name of the state, under the authorisation arising from public 
law, the official notarial service aims to avoid legal disputes on the one hand, 
13
 IM Decree 14/1991. (XI. 26.) Minister of Justice, on the Fees of Notaries. 
N E W FUNCTIONS OF HUNGARIAN CIVIL LAW N O T A R I E S 221 
and to facilitate due process on the other hand. The two means ordered to reach 
these above-mentioned goals are the preparation of public documents (deeds) and 
the conduct of other non-litigious proceedings assigned to notarial powers."'4 
a) The notarial non-litigious proceedings, the number of the cases of which 
was 125,000 in 2007, ended much earlier than court proceedings. In 2007, 79 
p.c. of the cases were completed within three months, a fur ther 14 p.c. within 6 
months, while the proportion of the matters lasting longer than one year 
represented 1 p.c. '8 This statist ics is enviable also for the cour t s dealing with 
similar type of non-litigious proceedings. The scope of non-litigious proceed-
ings of civil law notaries consists of the fol lowing groups of cases: 
Proceeding in Probate Actions,"' which is the longest-standing non-
litigious proceeding in notarial competence. Its speciality is that the major part 
of the cases is instituted ex off ic io , if the testator had an inland real estate. 
- Conduct of Proceedings on the Destruction (since 2009 Annulment) of 
Securities and Documents instituted at request with the purpose to deprive lost 
securities (documents) of their legal effects.17 
- Maintaining the National Register of Wills, which has been in operation 
for a longer period of time, but its application has only been mandatory since 
2007 in respect of last wills and testaments made out as notarial deeds and 
other legal statements containing orders for the case of death and private wills 
deposited at civil law notaries. The goal of the register is to ensure that the 
testator's last will or testament shall be enforced, even if the inheritors have 
adverse interests and it is to be feared that the last will or testament might be 
concealed. Therefore, Section 135 (4) of ACLN provides that the civil law notary 
proceeding in a probate action shall be obliged to consult the National Register 
of Wills with the purpose to enquire about the potential existence of the last 
will and testament of the testator. 
- Since 1997, for the creation of an equitable mortgage on movable assets, 
the mortgage contract should be documented in front of a civil law notary and 
mortgage should be registered in the National Register of Mortgages. The 
14
 Anka T.: A közjegyzői nemperes eljárások (Notarial Non-Litigious Proceedings). 
Közjegyzők Közlönye, 12 (2008) 3. 
15
 Preamble of the Minister to Act 45 of 2008 on Certain Notarial of Non-Contentious 
Proceedings, in Complex DVD Jogtár. 
16
 IM Decree no. 6/1958. (VII. 4.) Minister of Justice on Probate Actions. 
17
 Sections 40-M5 of the MT Decree no. 105/1952. (XII. 28.) of the Council of Ministers 
on the Provisions Necessary to the Enactment of Act 3 of 1952 on the Code of the Civil 
Procedure as of January I, 2009, Sections 28-36 of Act 45 of 2008 on Certain Administrative 
Non-Contentious Proceedings. 
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priority objective of this Register is to attest the existence of the mortgage with 
public authenticity.15 
- As of 2009, the scope of the duties of notaries shall be extended with two 
new powers, on the one hand with preliminary evidence, which was already 
subject to notarial competence before 1992 [see, Sections 207-21 1 of Act 3 of 
1952 on the Code of the Civil Procedure (hereinafter:CCP)], on the other hand, 
with the non-litigious proceeding directed to order expert evidence (which was 
an effective type of court proceeding since 2005). Act 45 of 2008 on Certain No-
tarial Non-Litigious Proceedings (hereinafter: ACNNP) assigned both proceed-
ings to notarial powers with the purpose of the avoidance of later action or its 
expedition, if possible. In the previous proceeding, a record of evidence 
qualifying as a public inst rument shall be issued, whereas , in the latter case 
an expert opinion shall be issued, which may be used in a court proceeding. 
- It is important to point out here that recently it has been raised to introduce 
and to assign to the competence of civil law notaries the so-called register of 
general authorisations or powers of attorney (both in case of concluding 
contracts/transactions and proceeding in law-suits) as well as the procedure 
for the order of payment regulated under Chapter 19 of C C P from the extremely 
overloaded courts. 
In general it may be concluded as regards these proceedings that they cover 
the exercise of typical official powers of administration of justice described 
under AB Decision no. 1/2008 of the Constitutional Court as the so-called "non-
contradictory type of the administration of justice", which are subject to strict 
jurisdictional rules. 
b) The other important part of notarial functions da t ing back to a lmost a 
thousand years ' history is the drafting of instruments. Notarial deeds may be 
divided into two categories: 
- Instruments for legal transactions shall attest with publ ic authenticity the 
fact that the party expressed his will to conclude legal transactions (for instance: 
contract, agreement, last will or testament). The preparation of the instruments 
of legal transactions may be interpreted as instrument-drafting. 
- As to instruments for attestations, the civil law notary shall certify with 
public authenticity the facts of legal significance in the form of records or clauses, 
for instance: that the copy is identical with the document presented to him, 
the translation is correct, the signature and the initials are genuine, but shall also 
certify the date of the presentation of a document, the communication of a statement 
or notification, consultation and resolution, other facts of legal significance, the 
, s
 Section 262 of Civil Code. 
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protest against non-payment of promissory notes, cheques and other securities, 
the contents of public authenticity records.14 
The common feature of notarial deeds is that both types qual ify as public 
documents and the presumption of authenticity is attached to them under Section 
195 of CCP, that is, as public documents , they shall fully prove as notarial 
documents the measure or decision in it, together with the authenticity of the 
data and facts certified by the documents, making declarations contained by 
the documents in line with their t imes and manners . The presumption of 
authenticity also means that the person whose name is indicated in that form in 
the instrument shall be considered as the issuer of the document, until the 
contrary is proved. The reversal o f the burden of proof might be of decisive 
significance in an action. In addition to the fact that private documents never 
prove the authenticity of the facts included in them, the great difference between 
public and private documents is that while the presumption of authenticity is 
attached to public documents, it is exclusively the presumption of genuineness 
that is attached to private documents, i.e., the text preceding the signature shall 
be considered unchanged and not forged. Thus , even in case of a private 
document with full probative force, the party proving with the instrument must 
prove that the instrument derives f r o m the person indicated as the issuer of the 
instrument, if this is disputed by the opposing party or the court raises doubts 
as to its authenticity.2" 
It follows from the probative force of public documents and the public trust 
surrounding them that notarised documents are deemed immediately en-
forceable,21 therefore, in case of the non-performance of an obligation included 
in a notarised document, protracted litigation shall be avoidable. 
What is important to mention as regards the differences between the 
regulation of instrument-drafting and non-litigious proceedings is that concerning 
instrument-draft ing, ACLN does not specify grounds for jurisdict ion, thus, 
the parties can take benefit of the services of any civil law notary. This almost 
creates a competition situation among civil law notaries with one major point 
of departure, that the fees are relatively fixed. 
c) In addition to the above-mentioned two main case-groups, civil law 
notaries are also vested with other authorities, which are specifically connected 
with the confidential nature of the notarial service. Accordingly, the civil law 
notary shall be entitled to taking any instrument, data-medium into custody, 
and money, valuables and securities in public circulation into entrusted custody 
19
 Chapter 9 of Act on Civil Law Notaries. 
20
 See, Section 197 of the Code of the Civil Procedure. 
21
 See, Section 21 of Act 53 on Judicial Enforcement. 
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from a party.22 Since 2009, this group of cases has been extended with a new 
service: at the request of the party, the civil law notary shall deposit the 
notarised copy of the document included in the request in electronic custody.23 
The aim of the procedure is to ensure that the notarised copy of the party's 
important document could be stored in an electronic form, in case the original 
document is contingently destroyed. 
3. Following the accession of Hungary to the EU in 2004, however, several 
problems arose in respect of the competences, the organisational rules and the 
fees of civil law notaries. 
Namely, the instrument-drafting process could just as well operate on the 
basis of free market principles and formally it does not differ from the document-
drafting activity of lawyers-at first sight. But-as I have already mentioned above-
the instrument prepared by the civil law notary is a public document, and as 
such, it is immediately enforceable, which implies a great advantage against 
the private documents. After the accession of Hungary to the EU, the European 
Commission (Directorate General for Competition) formed his informal opinion 
concerning instrument-drafting, precisely that as regards the number of positions 
and the fees of civil law notaries, the free-market principles should be confirmed 
and he also considered to institute an action at the European Court for this 
reason. The grounds of this deliberation are to be found primarily in the Anglo-
Saxon (not Latin type) way of thinking. In common-law countries, the Latin 
type of notaryship (i.e., the civil law notary) is not familiar, since in Anglo-
Saxon states the notary public mostly discharges certifying activities and does 
not prepare instruments. It is worth mentioning as a point of interest that among 
continental countries, only the Netherlands abolished the system of fixed fees 
and of fixed number and seat positions, which resulted in catastrophic results: the 
price of notarial services soared up in the country and the territorial position 
fulfilment rate badly declined, because civil law notaries moved to large cities 
in the hope of a better life there. Since that time, the Netherlands has taken serious 
efforts to reinstate the system of fixed fees and of position number and seats. 
In regard of EU-related matters, we have to underline the so-called citizen-
ship action, which was instituted by the Commission versus several Member 
States (Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, France), because the law of 
these states prohibits persons holding foreign citizenship to discharge notarial 
functions in the respective countries. Since this proceeding had started before 
2004, and considering that Hungarian law also prohibits foreign citizens to 
pursue notarial activity in the country, Hungary is also involved in the case as 
22
 Sections 158-165 of Act on Civil Law Notaries. 
23
 Section 171/A of Act on Civil Law Notaries. 
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an intervening party not simply as a party. In the citizenship action, the argument 
of the Member States is based on the fact that the civil law notaries discharge 
public duties. 
III. The Transformation of the Role of Notaryship in the Future 
The role of Hungarian notaryship-also by reason of EU-related legal problems 
described above- is undergoing transformation at the moment , as well. The 
notarial functions mainly based upon document-drafting activities until now 
will be replaced by notarial functions based upon powers embracing non-
litigious procedures of clearly official character. This trend has already been 
heralded by ACNP described earlier, but even more peculiar instances are the 
proposal concerning the new Civil Code (hereinafter: Draf t CC) and the draft-
law on the Enactment of the new CC (hereinafter: DECC), which would transfer 
new powers into the competence of civil law notaries. 
The Draft CC would entrust civil law notaries with the responsibility of 
maintaining some further new registers. Thus, under Version 'A ' of Section 
3:65 of the Draft CC: "the Hungarian National Chamber of Civil Law Notaries 
shall keep the Register of Community Property Contracts. The Hungarian 
National Chamber of Civil Law Notar ies shall provide information at the 
request of the parties on whether the contract of a married couple is included 
in the register. Concerning the contents of the contract, information cannot be 
furnished, unless upon the presentation of the written authorisation of either of 
the spouses or for authorities, so that they can fulfil their tasks as defined by 
the law."24 Although, the draft-law submitted to Parliament does not mention 
notaryship as such in most of the places and refers the assignment of the tasks 
related to the maintenance of registers to the purview of separate laws, it 
becomes clear from the preamble to the Draft CC that according to the intent 
of Government, the responsibility to keep the new registers proposed under the 
Draft CC shall be assigned to the Hungarian National Chamber of Civil Law 
Notaries.25 Accordingly, the civil law notary shall keep the register of common-
law spouses' common property contracts,2 ' ' in addition to the register of marital 
'
A
 The text of the Draft Civil Code submitted to Parliament for official administrative 
discussion (1RM/PJKNMFO/2007/356.) by the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement 
on 29th October, 2007. 
25
 See, 407 of the Preamble to Civil Code. 
2I
' Section 3:66 applicable under Section 3:89 ( 1 ) c) of the Draft Civil Code. 
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community property contracts, the register of the so-called preliminary legal 
statements,27 and moreover, the records of general authorisations,27 as well. 
The responsibility to keep these registers is by all means connected with the 
notarial function of public authenticity and enhances the role of the notaryship 
as part of the public power. With regard to the authentic registers, the marital 
and common-law spouses' community proper ty contracts are of a declarat ive 
type,24 whereas, the register of preliminary legal statements and the records of 
general authorisations are of constitutive force, thus, the entitlements entered 
into the register are established upon the entry. 
Furthermore, the Draft C C directed at the out-of-court, peaceful settlement 
of legal disputes in order to relieve the overloaded courts shall establish a new 
non-litigious procedure, scilicet, the termination of the matrimony or conjugal 
community relationship (of registered common-law spouses) by the civil law 
notary. By virtue of Sections 3:21 (1) and 3:25 of the Draft CC, the civil law 
notary shall dissolve the marriage, and taking into consideration Section 3:89, 
the conjugal community relationship upon the agreed request of the parties, if 
requested by the spouses (registered common- law spouses) jointly and wi th-
out influence, if the spouses (registered common-law spouses) do not have a 
common minor child, or a child entitled to maintenance, or , if the spouses 
(registered common-law spouses) agreed in the alimony according to law 
burdening them against one another, in the use of the common apartment with 
the exception of the termination of the joint property on the real estate. T h e 
issue of the distribution of the joint properties shall be laid down in a notarial 
document or in a private document counter-signed by a lawyer. At the same 
time, the dissolution of matr imony or of conjugal community shall not be 
27
 According to Section 2:16 of the Draft Civil Code: "a major person may make a 
preliminary legal statement-even if restricted or deprived of his disposing capacity in the 
future in the event of a possible reduction of his mental ability-in the interest of the 
settlement of his property relations and certain personal relationships. The precondition of 
the validity of the preliminary legal statement is to have it recorded in accordance with the 
provisions of separate law." Based on the previously said, the preliminary legal statement 
may be regarded as a last w ill or testament for case of life. 
By virtue of Section 5:59 of the Draft Civil Code: "the right of representation may be 
granted (general authorisation) in the scope of certain cases not defined in advance for a 
definite or indefinite period of time. General authorisation becomes valid only, i f i t is laid 
down in a private document of full probative force or in a public document. General 
authorisation shall be established upon recording it in the electronic registry kept as 
specified under a separate act on general authorisations."-It is to be noted that general 
authorisation may be valid or invalid right before it is established. 
29
 Section 3:66 (2) of the Draft Civil Code. 
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possible, if the disposing capacity of either of the spouses (registered common-
law spouses) is limited in respect of making legal statements concerning 
his/her financial situation, or, if the invalidity or non-existence of matrimony 
or conjugal community must be declared. 
Conclusions 
In a nutshell, the Draft CC enlarges the scope of the authority of Hungarian 
notaries and at the same time, it would clearly transfer it closer to the activities 
of public power, ensuring on the one hand the job-security of the notarial 
community, on the other hand, that the notaryship as to its functions and 
organisational structure will not be challenged by the law of the EU. 
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Nótári Tamás: A salzburgi historiográfia kezdetei (The Beginnings of Histo-
riography in Salzburg). Szegedi Középkortörténeti Könyvtár 23. Szeged, Szegedi 
Középkorász Műhely, 2007. 342 pp. 
Tamás Nótári ' s diverse erudition is now proved again af ter several occasions 
by the work that processes the historiography of early medieval Salzburg, 
presents and explains the Latin sources of the period. The results of the philol-
ogical analysis of the sources processed provide useful additional information 
not only for legal historians on the law of Salzburg in the 8th—9th c.; readers 
interested in politics and ecclesiastical history will also find in it public history 
background information important to them, which has not been published in 
Hungarian so far. This review will primarily focus on the key results of the work 
in terms of legal history; deliberations on philological subjects will be touched 
upon only to the extent that they bear major significance in legal history. 
The monograph is arranged around Libellus Virgilii, Gesta Sancti Hrodberti 
confessoris, Liber confraternitatum, Notitia Arnonis, Breves Notitiae, the so-
called Carmina Salisburgenia and Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, that 
is, the seven, or six-as Libellus Virgilii has been left to us as part of Breves 
Notitiae-most important sources from Salzburg in the 8th and 9th c., following 
the chronology of the woks listed. 
On the one hand, the historiography of Salzburg-interpreting this term in an 
extended form Nótári ranks hagiography, having value of historic source and 
itself presenting historical facts, estate registers and carmina here-is outstand-
ingly rich compared to Bavarian source materials of the period since, albeit, 
hagiographie works, estate registers and letters were produced also in Freising, 
Regensburg and Passau, yet, it is only Salzburg that can be proud of Conversio 
Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, this peculiar Salzburg genus mixtum so much 
typical of Salzburg.1 On the other band, a f te r the dethronement of the last duke 
of the Agilolfing dynasty, Tasilo III by Charlemagne and the winding up of the 
independent Bavarian Dukedom, Regensburg was lo longer to be the d u k e ' s 
seat, and the Bishopric of Salzburg having been raised to the state o f arch-
1
 Lhotsky, A.: Quellenkunde zur mittelalterlichen Geschichte Österreichs. Graz—Köln, 
1963. 155. 
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bishopric in 798 had undoubtedly attained primacy by the late 8th c. over the 
rest of the Bavarian ecclesiastical centres. That is, by then it become de iure 
the centre of power in Bavaria-so, the emphatic analysis of these sources is 
justified by the historical/political importance of their place of origin. Further-
more, the late 9th c. sources of Salzburg enrich us with information of unique 
importance on the history of the Carpathian Basin, the Avars . 
The title "The beginnings of the historiography of Salzburg" is expla ined 
by the author as follows. Most of the sources that constitute the subject o f the 
analysis were written not primarily with historiographie aim: they consti tute 
records of dispute on estates in the a protocol form, cosmography, legend 
written under pseudo names with a periodic overtone, list of names, estate and 
donation catalogues that united Christianity in the community of prayer, poems 
meant to serve as epitaphs, accompanying letters, or practicing style, the bill of 
indictment or legitimating material of lawsuits to defend the (alleged or real) 
jurisdiction of the diocese. All of them contain the historiographie element, but 
their objective is often, in addition to (or by) recording events taken place, is 
practical, legitimating-oriented, pragmatic: to determine, record the place, role, 
significance of Salzburg that had turned f r o m a modest locus the intellectual, 
secular and ecclesiastical centre of Bavaria in the flow of politics having ca lmed 
into history. 
The present Salzburg became the centre o f provincial Norica, the new unit 
of the Roman Empire under the name Iuvavum during the reign of emperor 
Claudius (41-54) , and it was during the rul ing of Antoninus Pius that it saw its 
fully blooming period of its dynamic development. Already at this point, the 
author raises the issue of the continuity of the town and Christianity exist ing 
here; he emphasises the circumstance that no written sources have been left to 
us on the period between the evacuation of Noricum ripense in 488 and the 
arrival of Rupert at the end of the 7th c. The author highlights Rupert, because 
his person is of key importance in the history of Salzburg, and the chapter about 
Gesta (Vita) Hrodberti confessoris," which treats the Rupert legend, is involved 
in the volume. 
In the analysis of the sources-primarily in the examination of Gesta sancti 
Hrodberti confessor is and t w o noti t iae-Nótári finds out what explains the 
changing of the name of the town from Iuvavum to Salzburg. The Bavar ians 
took under their control the salt exploitation in the vicini ty of the t o w n , 
Reichenhall, which, commenced in the t imes before R o m a n epoch though , 
2
 See also Nótári, T.: Gesta Hrodberti. In: Classica-Mediaevalia-Neolatina. Ed. L. 
Havas et E. Tegyey. Debrecen, 2006. 131. sqq.; On Bishop Virgil's Litigations in Bavaria. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica, 48 (2007) 49. sqq. 
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terminated in the 2nd c. (The simultaneously existing names of Reichenhall in 
Latin and German: Salinae and Halla, which were supplemented by the name of 
the river running nearby: Salzach and resulted in the change of name.) Salt 
exploitation was recommenced in the early 8th c. but salt wells (putea) were 
already very deep; it was possible to lift salt only with proper scooping instru-
ments, and this required a huge volume of wood, which were floated down the 
river Salzach next to Salzburg to the salt wells, and to the lead pans suitable 
for boiling salt. Referring to the archaeological sources, and the simultaneous 
use of the Latin and German terminology examined by him, the author d raws 
the conclusion that as early as in the period of the Agilolfingers Salzburg had 
an industrial type of salt exploitation and in this economic development the 
monasterium sancti Hrodberi had an outstanding part.' Before characterising 
the years Rupert spent in Salzburg, Nótári makes a detour to tell that it was 
after extended diplomatic negotiations that Rupert left his bishop's seat, 
Worms and went to Bavaria at the invitation of Duke Theodo. One of the most 
interesting sections of the work is from which readers learn of the reasons for 
his leaving Worms: he belonged to the kinship of the Merowing dynasty and the 
"opposition nobility" of the Carolingians. The wife of Theodo of Agilolfing origin 
was a Merowing princess; so, being herself an ardent enemy of the Carolingians 
she found that bishop Rupert was a political ally. Rupert reorganised the Christian 
community, and in 798 Salzburg became an archbishopric, which was not 
received with uniform appreciation among Bavarian bishops; so, there was an 
increased need for legitimising the primacy of Salzburg by Rupert. He founded 
churches and monks' communit ies (e.g., cella Maximiliani and the nuns ' 
cloister in Nonnberg); yet, before his death he left for Worms where he died at 
an uncertain time, in 715, as Nótári dates the event. 
Notitia Arnonis is the record of Arn, bishop of Salzburg, which contains 
the list of the estates and donations obtained earlier by the bishop's diocese 
from the years approx. between 788 and 790. This "assets inventory" was made 
in order for the new ruler, Charlemagne ascending the throne to confirm the 
donations. Without having knowledge of the political situations evolving in the 
background the bishop's records would be "up in the air". The author, however , 
fills this gap; the chapter depicts a new and exciting historical conflict: the 
reader can learn of the dramatic conflict between the last ruler of the Bavarian 
Dukedom, Tasilo III and the Frankish king: Nótári provides an insight into the 
details of the show trial and dethronement of the duke in 788 in Ingelheim. 
And how is bishop Arn related thereto? In the political isolation of Tasi lo by 
Cf. Nótári T.: Salzburg neve a kora középkori forrásokban (The Name of Salzburg in 
Early Medieval Sources). Colleget, 2005/1. 48. sqq. 
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Charlemagne, in addition to the Bavarian "opposit ion nobi l i ty" , bishop o f A m 
played an outstanding part too. The ant ipa thy against Tas i lo was aroused by 
the fact that the oath of al legiance made by Tasilo, who had been " re l eased" 
from the guardianship to his uncle, Pippin, formed the basis of "a personal 
relation of dependence ra ther than a relation manifested on the level of publ ic 
law, but was far from being a vassal's relat ion", and he w a s not willing to keep 
to his oath o f allegiance even after having made hostages, including his o w n 
son, to Char lemagne. The Bavarian secular and ecclesiastical dignitaries a lso 
cast it in T a s i l o ' s eyes that following his w i f e ' s advice, w h o in order to t ake 
revenge for her father's dethronement u rged her husband to turn against the 
Franks, entered into alliance with the Avars , who were located outside the ius 
gentium boundar i e s of the Christ ians of t he time, and, therefore , Tasilo w a s 
also considered one who tu rned against the Christian wor ld . All this did not 
amount to suff ic ient accusat ion for dethronement: he was accused of h a v i n g 
committed har is l iz too; which meant arbitrarily leaving the royal army, and the 
Bavarians c la imed that Tas i lo fled from the combat against Aquitania in 757 ; 
referring to his illness he re turned to Bavaria f rom the theatre of war.4 
The au thor asserts that it is beyond d o u b t that the displacement o f the 
Agilolftng dynas ty was not legally wel l - founded. He also examines, howeve r , 
to what extent the judgment passed on Tas i lo can be considered lawful, and 
how the accusat ions against h i m can be g rouped and qual i f ied. It raises d o u b t 
regarding the lawfulness of the dethronement of the dynasty, points out Nó tá r i , 
that Charlemagne was forced, years after the decision was passed, to have Tas i lo 
taken out f rom the monastery and have him resign from d u k e d o m in 794 at the 
council in F rankfu r t in the name of h i m s e l f and all o f his descendants . 5 
Consequently, it was not in the theatre of w a r but through the instrument o f 
iurisdictio that Charlemagne obtained power over Bavarian land; it was on the 
occasion of seiz ing power that the bishopric had to make "an inventory o f 
donat ions" and have it a p p r o v e d by the k ing . That is h o w the record o f t he 
bishop of Arn is connected wi th both the ecclesiastical and public history o f 
Salzburg, which record contains the donations granted by dukes , noblemen a n d 
4
 Krawinkel, H.: Untersuchungen zum fränkischen Benefizialrecht. Forschungen zum 
deutschen Recht, 11/2. Weimar, 1937. 47. sqq. 
5
 See Nótári T.: III. Tasziló trónfosztása - adalékok egy koraközépkori koncepciós per-
hez (Tassilo Ill 's dethronement—remarks on an early-middlc-age show trial). Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 2005/12. 503. sqq.; Tassilo Ill 's dethronement - remarks on an early-middlc-age 
show trial. Publicationes Universitatis Miskolciensis. Sectio Iuridica et Politico, 23 (2005) 
65. sqq.; Infidelitas and Harisliz-On the Dethronement of Tasilo III. Jogelméleti Szemle, 
2008/1. 
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other persons in chronological and geographical order. This source is signifi-
cant not only in terms of legal history, since it provides an enumeration of land 
register nature on the conditions of estates of the period, it is unique also in 
linguistic terms: f rom among the texts examined by the author "this is the text 
that bears the signs of grammatical and stylistic deterioration before the period 
of the Carolingians."6 
Breves Notitiae are also connected with Arn, and also contain the enumera-
tion of the estates ad donations obtained; albeit, they come from a later period, 
the years between 798 and 800. The enumeration was produced due to the fact 
that the Bishopric of Salzburg was raised to the state of archbishopric in 798; 
Pope Leo III granted pallium to Arn, thereby making him the leader of the new 
archbishopric. In Breves Notitiae (Brief records) the author does not confine 
himself to making the estate register public; he gives a profound description of 
the events that had preceded the process of the town becoming an archbishopric. 
Salzburg was raised to the state of archbishopric in the years after Tasilo's 
dethronement, at Charlemagne's request. Nótári provides an overview of the key 
points of the relations between bishop of Arn, Charlemagne and the papacy; 
and their political/historical significance in the process of Salzburg being 
raised to the state of archbishopric. From among these events the presentation 
of the following are especially exciting, and explored in-depth by the author: 
the assassination against Pope Leo III in 799; the precedents, circumstances and 
consequences of the meeting between the people and the king in Paderborn. 
Referring to the fact that Charlemagne did not take any firm action against the 
opponents of the Pope, the author makes it probable that the king was in some 
form involved in the assassination. 
Contrary to Peter Classen's opinion 7 -who c la ims that after the assassina-
tion the Pope and the king spent several months together-Nótári deems it is 
expedient to deliberate, and supports it with Einhard ' s records, that Leo III 
must have stayed only for a few days in Paderborn, but-the author makes it 
probable-that during this time they negotiated on the establishment of the 
empire, then, accompanied by bishop Arn, the Pope continued his journey to 
Rome. Arn was still in Rome (as a member of the entourage of Charlemagne) 
6
 Cf. Nótári, T.: Remarks on the 8th Century Registers of Salzburg. Novy Sad Faculty 
of Law. Collected Papers 2008/3. 401. sqq.; Jogtörténeti adalékok a VIII. századi salzburgi 
(birtokjjegyzékekhez (Legal and Historical Remarks on the Registers of Salzburg from 8th 
Century). Állam- és Jogtudomány, 49. 2008/1. 99. sqq.; Personal status and social structure 
in early medieval Bavaria. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 50. 2009/1. 85. sqq. 
7
 Classen, P.: Karl der Große, das Papsttum und Byzanz. Die Begründung des karolin-
gischen Kaisertums. Sigmaringen, 1985. 42. sqq. 
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when in December 800 Leo III was forced to take a ceremonial cleansing oath. 
The author points out that Arn enjoyed the trust of Charlemagne much more 
than the rest of the Bavarian bishops, which was even more reinforced by Arn 
assuming commitment in the events preceding his crowing emperor in 800.x As 
the Bavarian bishoprics subjected to Salzburg did not agree with Arn having 
become archbishop and Salzburg having been made archbishopric, Salzburg 
attempted to support the disputed primacy; as part o f t h a t they relied on the 
Rupert tradition and the estate register at that time no longer supplemented 
merely by duke's donations. It is in this point Nótári sees the key difference 
between Breves Notitiae and Notitia Amonis. Breves Notatiae, however , differ 
from the record by Arn referred to in the previous chapter not only in this 
respect: Breves Notitiae is not merely a list of donations but a peculiar "genus 
mixtum", namely, the enumeration contains narrative, historical passages too, 
and so becomes similar to Vita Hrodberti and Epistola Theotmari.4 
Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantoanorum (The conversion of the Bavarians 
and the Carantanians) written in 870 might have been sent by Adalwin, 
archbishop of Salzburg to Louis the German.1 '1 As a precedent to the written 
pleading, the author mentions the missionary activity perfonned by Constantine 
(Cyrill) and Methodius considered the apostles of the Slavs on the territory of 
Moravia and Pannónia in the 860's; the judgment passed on Methodius at the 
Council of Regensburg held in 870 by archbishop Adalwin and his bishops. As 
the archbishop and his diocesan bishops felt that the missionary activity 
carried out by Methodius on the territory of Pannónia injured the jurisdiction 
s
 See also Wavra, В.: Salzburg und Hamburg. Erzbistumsgründung und Missionspolitik 
in karolingischer Zeit. Berlin, 1991; Abel, S.-Simson, В.: Jahrbücher des fränkischen 
Reiches unter Kar! dem Großen I-II. Berlin, 1883. II. 163. sqq.; Nótári T.: III. Leó pere és 
az Salzburgi Érsekség megalapítása (Trial of Pope Leo III and the Foundation of the 
Archbishopric of Salzburg). College, 2005/4. 55. sqq. 
" Losek, F.: Notitia Arnonis und Breves Notitiae. In: Quellen zur Salzburger Früh-
geschichte. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 44, 
Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde, Ergänzungsband 22. Hrsg. v. 
Wolfram, H. Wien-München, 2006; Nótári T.: Két forrás a kora középkori Salzburgból, 
Notitia Arnonis - Epistola Theotmari (Two Sources from Early Medieval Sources: Notitia 
Arnonis - Epistola Theotmari). Aetas, 2004/2. 72. sqq. 
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 Wolfram, H.: Salzburg. Bayern, Österreich. Die Conversio Bagoariorum et 
Carantanorum und die Quellen ihrer Zeit. Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische 
Geschichtsforschung, Ergänzungsband 31. Graz-Wien-Köln, 1995. 193; Losek, F.: Die 
Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum und der Brief des Erzbischofs Theotmar von 
Salzburg. MGH Studien und Texte 15. Hannover, 1997. 6; Nótári T.: Conversio Bagoa-
riorum et Carantanorum. Aetas, 2000/3. 93. sqq.; Nótári, T.: Show Trials and Lawsuits in 
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Salzburg had exercised for seventy-five years; in accordance with the judgment 
they held him in custody for two and a half years, and he was released merely 
owing to the Pope's intervention. The text analysed by the author was generated 
as a bill of indictment or a document to serve the subsequent legitimating of 
the lawsuit- that is, as deeds to legitimate claims of Salzburg in Moravia and 
Pannónia; which "conceal undesirable and 'dangerous' connections and facts 
and relate events far from each other with a considerable amount of cunning."" 
Before expounding the accusations formulated in Conversio, Nótári outlines 
the development of the mission among the Carantanians and in Pannónia; then, 
gives an overview of the activity performed by Constant ine and Methodius 
on these territories. He makes a detour to describing br ief ly the missionary 
activities performed by the Pope, the basileus and the eastern Frankish ruler in 
Bulgaria in order to make the historic background complete, and so that the reader 
could become familiar with the circumstances of the lawsuit of Methodius held 
in Regensburg. The background of the accusations and the further progress 
of Methodius ' s teachings are expounded by the author in the mirror of the 
political conditions of the papacy, the Frankish kingdom and the Moravian 
duke. This Latin text is highlighted among the Bavarian sources presented in 
the volume owing to the fact that it comes from the period preceding the 
migration of nations and our conquest of key importance in Hungarian history, 
and-using the words of Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss-"the Avar Chaganat was a 
forerunner of the later Hungary".1 2 
It should be pointed out that the public interested in Bavarian ecclesiastical, 
legal and political history has already had the opportunity to become familiar 
with the translations of the early medieval sources into Hungarian, published 
in the au thor ' s former vo lume for the first time;13 and in this monograph, by 
analysing, in addition to the sources translated earl ier , several other early 
medieval texts he introduces the reader to the history of early medieval Bavarian 
historiography and legal history. 
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 Nótári T.: Források Salzburg kora középkori történetéből (Sources from the History 
of Early-Medieval Salzburg). Szeged, 2005. passim 
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C S A B A V A R G A * 
Legal Philosophy, Legal Theory -
and the Future of Theoretical Legal Thought 
Abstract. Surveying the ways-along with the whys and hows-of connecting law and 
philosophising, as contrasted to the appearances of modem formal law, it is concluded that in 
the final analysis law is a façon de parler a specific communication, or game carried out 
in an open scene , an actual event, if one played by humans practicing whilst simultaneously 
referencing it. The contemporary outcome of reflection upon its developments is (I) the 
reduction of legal philosophising to discourse-reconstruction, in terms of which instead of the 
issue of "what is it?", "all that notwithstanding: how can it be achieved?" is usually raised; (2) 
the unresolved enigma of natural law, calling for axiology to define at least some foundational 
standards as stepping stones (albeit without a claim that any statement has genuinely concluded 
from them or been subordinated to them, as in the classical era when natural law and positive 
law were at odds); and (3) positive law without legal positivism, according to which a new 
synthesis and correlation amongst humans' natural, societal and intellectual worlds is expected 
to be reached. At the same time, flourishing at the peripheries, a genuine foundation is coming 
to the fore, in order to suitably respond to global challenges. 
Keywords: modem formal law, legal complexity, ontology of law; natural law, legal positivism, 
globalisation 
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1. Law and Philosophy 
It is our comprehension that originates the legal phenomenon. It is our com-
prehension that locates and presents law in a given f o r m of phenomenon. The 
same comprehension that lets us perccive law in our social milieu at a given 
level and in a given way will let us perceive legal philosophy at another level 
and in another way. This law and this legal philosophy may then enter into 
communication with o n e another at levels and in w a y s according to their 
relationship. 
1.1. Connections 
Conceiving the world as the outcomc of conscious planning, we may indeed 
declare (following the Evangelist of the New Testament who expressed it in 
unique conciseness) that "In the beginning was the Word" . 1 On the other hand, 
relying on a rationalist explication founded on the mere empiricism of the laity 
of scholarship, on the basis of everyday experience we can contemplate a 
constantly renewing proccss of transforming our environment into increasingly 
complex structures through a scries of self-organising artificial constructions. 
In theology, on the one hand, law can from the outset be conceived of in the 
spirit of the human fulfilment of the work of Divine creation, as its application to 
human dimensions in implementation of the potentialities ordained by it. Or, we 
might even say that it is this theological philosophy itself that generates the 
law, by highlighting the former 's values when defining the various paths that 
may equally be followed within it. 
However, on the other, approaching the issue from the opposite side, viewing 
it as one of the homogenisations necessarily arising on the terrain of the hetero-
geneity of our everyday existence, we obviously have to sec in the development 
of legal homogeneity, in its strengthening and achieving social autonomy in 
more than one respect, some kind of a basically praxis-bound process, within 
which the piece of knowledge that reveals itself to those involved in general 
theoretical investigations directed at law is to embody the continuous ration-
alisation of the practical responses given to timely challenges. In the beginning, 
this rationalisation is probably only subsequent to actual developments at the 
most. However, after legal homogenisation is accomplished, it is certainly parallel 
to them, and when, with conscious social planning and engineering (in brief: legal 
voluntarism), it comes to the fore and becomes exclusive, it is of a determining 
force as well. 
' <http://scripturetext.com/john/l-l ,htm>. 
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Ever since humans started philosophising about their world, they have also 
been reflecting on its order, on the lat ter 's potentialities and limits. In this sense, 
legal philosophy is of the same age as human societal self-reflection. It by no 
mere chance that reasoning retrospectively, Greek philology has ever set the 
task for itself to reconstruct semant ica l ly-among others-the s igns referring 
to the presence of some kind of law or legally relevant phenomena in the 
classical age, and designating them in one way or another, from the tcxtuality 
of the available body of epic poems and from the mass of scattered linguistic 
fragments, in order to reconstruct those signs as contcxtualised by the 
contemporary worldview and underlying philosophy." And since the time that 
all human endeavours have been added up to form some kind of formal l aw-
whose archetypes can be encountered back in early legal formalisms (i.e., 
initiatives in the ancient Middle East and antique Greece and Rome, regarded 
today as primeval and analysed in modern reconstruction for the first time by 
Sir Henry Maine), albeit it began to achieve the level of its present-day domina-
tion f rom the reception of Roman L a w , done first in Bologna, and in its most 
developed form as methodologically rigidified into doctrines, from the age of the 
codification of national laws in the 1811 to 19n centuries —, the positivity ot the 
law (coming forward with a demand for acknowledgement of the law's reality 
as a fact) apparently conceals the underlying circumstance that behind the law 
as a reified structure functioning, so to speak, with a mechanical automatism, 
there arc real human beings operating it, conditioned by their everyday lives, 
who have to assume this thoroughly responsible and responsive moral task with 
the strength of all their faculties and capacitics.4 
At the same time, a more or less regular "maintenance" is needed to make 
this everyday operation possible, which includes the law's cleaning (of useless 
parts and waste) and improvement (according to operational concepts and the 
Cf., by the author: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, 9 
et seq. 
3
 Cf., by the author: Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. Budapest, 1991. 
4
 In an own explication, spanning between the two end-poles of the evolvement of my 
personal line of thought from problem pereeplion to a systematic explanation, cf., by the 
author. Chose juridique et réification en droit: contribution à la théorie marxiste sur la base 
de l'Ontologie de Lukács. In Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 25. Paris, 1980, 385-41 1, 
on the one hand, and Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, on the 
other. See also, in an American context starting from leftist critical deconstructionism of 
the Critical Legal Studies, by Conklin, V. A.: Human Rights, Language and Law: A Survey 
of Semiotics and Phenomenology. Ottawa Law Review, 27 (1995-1996) 129 and The 
Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse The Judicial Production and the Disclosure of 
Suffering. Aldershot, 1998. 
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need to prevent its degeneration into social dysfunction), and also the constant 
clarification of the foundations required for its long term Strategie further 
development. It is in the fulfilment of this latter function that the theoretical 
thought directed to law bccomcs visible to us again. 
1.2. Appearances of Modern Forma! Law 
Regulation by law always takes place with the aim of pre-defining an unspecified 
and unforeseeable future and, thus, in view of granting itself an eternal validity. 
We know, nevertheless, that the routine arising f rom this is always temporary: 
after a certain period of time, the rules will inevitably be surrounded by a 
divergence from the rules (in form of exceptions), which sooner or later results 
in the formulation of new, more detailed rules. Behind the relative permanence 
of the legal form, there arc opposing interests pressing against each other, to 
be squeezed into, whi le being solved in, it. They continuously address-while 
questioning-the given fonn. Meanwhile, they render it liveable, by re-assessing 
its contents through its practical interpretat ion-extending, narrowing, or just 
re-shifting its scope. Or, jurists must reason in terms of alternativity, searching for 
a suitable form, while the due form eventually found, crystallised as adjusted 
to the given task, becomes itself a donné for the next challenge, to be further 
formed and, thereby, also to be transcended, albeit at the same time it remains 
the basic assurance of the continuation of the same cultural framework for legal 
problem-solving, that is, of the continued respect for traditions in patterning 
and being patterned alike. 
We might say that, firstly, positive regulation, secondly, the Rechtsdogmatik 
(elaborating conccptual contexts based on the generalisation of past practice 
and, thereby, demarcating its ways open towards the future) as well as, thirdly, 
doctrine (laying the theoretical foundations of the given branches of regulation) 
collectively constitute only a few fundamentals for legal practice. O f course, 
all this is scarcely visible in those thoroughly tcchnicised and profoundly 
reified cultures in which law is rigidificd into routines (as enclosed in) to the 
extent of becoming alienated itself; where a mass o f juridified relationships, 
procedures and activities may require the intervention of professional manage-
ment by legal technicians on a mass scale; and when our whole lives arc almost 
entirely surrounded and mediated by various agencies of enterprise, trade and 
traffic, with standards reproduced in mass proportions. Well, such cultures arc 
permeated with a constantly growing mass of formulas and thesauruses that 
have been generated, which then come to be broken down to procedural moduses, 
and subsequently generalised into blocks of schemes, only to be ultimately 
overfilled by interpretations interpreted and comments incessantly commented 
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upon. As is well known, all this takes place in view of the advancement of 
standardisation, implying extension to new fields, expansion in depth and 
details, as well as both application to relations altered in the meantime and, as 
a feed-back, re-consideration of the ratio underlying the given regulation. In 
our modern formal culture, it is all this that constitutes the medium of law-
application, providing its standard framework and serving as its unceasing 
renewal, that is, a constant Aufhebung [transcendence in preservation) of this 
unbroken process.5 
These reified structures suggest an approach in terms of language use and 
communication, that is, an autotclism and a self-propelling mechanism that, in 
a constantly broadening way, reproduce earlier well-devised potentialities and 
paths covered as practices, or forms, of human activity, definitely specified. 
For their phenomenal form-namely, the conceptualisation of their culture-docs 
conceal the creativity of human intellect, while still, nevertheless, operating in 
it, that is, the practical aspiration to respond to new challenges at any time 
and, thereby, of course, also the need for a humane coverage behind the human 
response and the irrevocable responsibility to be borne for the consequences as 
well. 
The object of theoretical jurisprudence seems to have become invisible 
meanwhile, in this enchantment. But it is certainly there, in a three-fold sense 
at least. Firstly, it presents itself evidently in strategic planning and decision-
making, when we search the future or change this conceptualised culture as a 
result of new situations or modified recognitions. For intellectual constructions 
as considerations behind the formalist ic pillars maintaining the appearance of 
routine need to be re-activated when, due to actual imperfections in regulation 
(even if with the appearance of formalistic automatism preserved), an original 
evaluation is taken in the form of a decision-cither so gaps can be filled in law 
or in the classical cases of discretion. Secondly, germs of theoretical thinking 
are actuated non-evident/y in everyday routine when we conceal our consequence-
oriented practical reasoning by seemingly un-problcmatic sequences of derivation 
in legal decision-making, leaving the job to a subsequent analytical reconstruction 
that reveals that nothing but a choice between alternatives was actually to take 
place. And thirdly, naturally, we cultivate theoretical jurisprudence and use its 
results when, applying it to our situation, we offer a scholarly explanation of 
our societal world. 
5
 Cf., by the author: Doctrine and Technique in Law. lustum Aeqiuim Salutare, 4 
(2008) 23. & <http://www.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ias/20081sz/02.pdf>. 
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1.3. Differentiation in Complexity 
The natural, societal and intellectual worlds of man constitute a kind of unity 
and continuity. Our natural environment is given even if we have altered it. 
The societal milieu around us has been brought about by the endless series of 
conventionalisations through generations (so we arc, in fact, socialised to it as 
to something readily given, even if we constantly re-form it by our rcconven-
tionalising contributions). At an intellectual level, w c approach these at a critical 
distance but with our specific judgement added. In the final analysis, there are 
tendential correlations prevailing in the triad of humanity 's natural, societal 
and intellectual worlds, as the most varied impulses and recognitions, creative 
efforts and practical feedbacks that flow incessantly, arc to bring about a state 
of equilibrium in any society, if viewed from a historical perspective. Anything 
that can be formed will eventually be formed in fact. This applies equally to 
our natural world and our concept of it,6 the way our social institutionalisation 
works by fulfilling its function, and also to our intellectuality in all of this, 
forming them and being formed by our experience day to day. Neither a value 
judgement nor any approval is involved, only that a fact is established if wc 
ascertain now that the complexity of our social existence has brought about a 
compound, internally so articulated in historical t ime, also that a process of the 
Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts has taken placc in it, in the major part of 
civilisations and cultures at least. Our social objccts , reified practices and 
alienated products arc all embodied by objcctivations that we have to considcr-
nolens, volcns-as part of our societal world, to be treated as independent subjects 
of cognition. 
Law? This is something prevailing and operat ing, with a place firmly 
demarcated by universally shared social conventions in our everyday life. 
Apparently, it separates from anything else solidly like a rock, and only a 
theoretically deconstructive reconstruction can prove after the fact that, in the 
ultimate analysis, law is hardly more than a manner of speech, specific communi-
cation or a game collcctively played. This is all that can be taken as real-
'' John Lukács mentions a noteworthy example in his At the End of an Age [2002] (in 
Hungarian translation Egy nagy korszak régén. Budapest, 2005, 128, note 80), related to 
the change of the cultural landscape of the Swiss mountains, describing how it developed 
from bleakness too dreary lor life to a serene charm of prosperity, which the author attributes 
to the change in human understanding in the meantime and lo their human habitation, 
based first of all on societal adaptation to the milieu. 
Cf. Niklas Luhmann Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts Beiträge zur Rcchtssoziologie 
und Rcchtstheorie. Frankfurt ant Main, 1981. 
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inasmuch as it is actually used as a basis o f reference.8 However , according 
to the law's own rules of the game, such a specific (legal) communication 
presupposes from the outset that such references are actually made at every 
major crossroads and at each new start. And the extent to which such references 
can be made at all is delimited by so-called validity in that order of speech. 
And validity covers the field generated according to this very rule of the game.9 
2. Conclusions 
First of all, two substantial conclusions ensue from all this. Both might have 
already been obvious decades ago. However, they are elucidated with proper 
sharpness only because our age involves so many dangers and threats. Finally, 
a third conclusion can also be drawn from these, based on some tendencies 
already visible in our present. 
2.1. Legal Philosophising Reduced to Discourse-reconstruction 
As can be seen, legal theorising starts above all by rendering problematic that 
which may appear unproblematic in everyday life, that is, when wc quest ion 
the seemingly self-evident, notably, the w h y and wherefore of the judic ia l 
routine's alleged rule-conformism-with proper impoliteness and irreverent 
disrespect of tradition. Well, it is th is -namely , the systematic cultivation of 
heretical incredulity that may in principle arise in any participant of the so-
called judicial event, if organised into a grand-thcory-that goes on nowadays 
mostly under the aegis of professional legal theorising. What 1 have in mind 
here is a kind of contrast. For, just a few decades ago, wc inquired-solemnly 
and seriously-into the "epistemology and methodology of law", the " theory 
of jural relations" and the law 's voluntary nature, as well as all kinds of other 
labels and features attributed or related to law; just as, first , the biophysicist, 
then, the biochemist approach the (animal/human) body, only to hand over 
their symbolic lancet to the anatomist, and finally to the pathologist, enabl ing 
s
 As known, Scandinavian legal realism did the most for having this realised. Cf., e.g., 
Visegrády, A. (ed.): Scandinavian Legat Realism. Budapest, 2003 and, as a background, 
by the author: Skandináv jogi realizmus [Scandinavian legal realism] in: Varga Cs. (ed.): 
Jogbölcselet XIX-XX. század: Előadások [Leetures on 19 to 2 0 " century philosophy of 
law], Budapest, 1999, 81. 
9
 Cf., by the author: Validity. Acta Juridica Hungarica. 41 (2000) 155 & 
http://www.siluation.ru/app/j_art_724.htm & <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ 
klu/ajuh/2000/00000041/F0020003/00383612>. 
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cach of them to cut out what they need—with the presumption that all we had 
thought about it also had to be seen in both the living and the dead. In such a 
corporeal view of law, muscles may have crcakcd and sinews and bones rubbed 
at the most; still the body as such could function. Wel l , in contrast to the 
forceful articulation of such a splendid simple-mindedness-sancta simplicitas-, 
what wc do today is at the most to break forms and differentiate according to 
qualities related or ascribed to law in our specch acts. For what wc do here is 
analysis; w c operate concept with concept and lift it (as latter-day followers of 
baron Munchausen) out of what is itself, in order to f inally placc it back into 
what is again just itself. Instead of the old-fashioned, static dissection of the 
law's allegedly discrete (i.e., separately examinable) composing parts, wc now 
make a theory out of what we oncc were prudently reluctant even to notice. As 
a somewhat bizarre example, this is as if, in athletics (and due to some strange 
motive), wc suddenly started to conccntrate-instead of on efforts or the implied 
aesthetics-on the body's urinary output or perspiration curves, that is, on the 
so-far concealed problem of how the j udge can proceed by means of steadily 
manifesting the appcarancc of being logical when the inference that is practical 
anyway is anything but logical. 
This change in charactcr shows clearly that we are more fashion-conscious 
than wc had thought ourselves to be, at least in one sense of the word. Notably, 
our interest in any given subject (including the underlying selection made) is 
also promoted by the trends of the age. Today, the question is raised not in terms 
of "what? " but in terms of "in spite of all that: in what way? " For, we do not see a 
naturally given donné in the subject but a virtual construction to be decon-
structed. In reality, wc cut pieces from our subconscious under the microscope. 
Wc boast of being quite detachcd in scholarship while wc have become 
narcissistic self-dissectors in practice. T h e spirit of our age focuses as to 
contemporary theoretical jurisprudence not only on the issue of "how? but has, all 
of a sudden, created a human reflex or conceptual relation out of yesterday 's 
interconnection of independent entities. So, wc do search for phrases and fre-
quency in linguistic practice (i.e., the preliminaries supposed to be sensible of 
a seemingly sensible statement) in the law-instcad of inquiring as to its "real i ty" 
earlier believed to exist.10 
All this is not turning grey but is a projection of, or mental reaction to, the 
change of the very subject o f cognition as a socially generated objectivation. 
" As a background, cf., by the author: Theory and Practice in Law: On the Magical 
Role of Legal Technique. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 47 (2006) 351 & <http://www.akadémiai. 
com/content/j4k2u58xk7rj6541/fulltext.pdf>. 
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2.2. The Query for Natural Law Unresolved 
The other conclusion relates to the prerequisite of such a practice, to the 
question of whether or not the law has the exclusive criterion of a validity 
exhausted by formal procedurality (preconditioned by some factually empirical 
and quantifiable efficiency), and whether or not any other factor (aspect or 
feature) can have any similar criterion-setting role. Providing that the law of our 
modernity has indeed developed in this way (i.e., in autonomous disconnection 
from other factors of social complexity, resulting in the law's separation f rom 
its framework environment basically defined by theologicum and ethicum, 
permeating and eventually also dominating all forms of human attitude within 
the ordo of our social milieu), then obviously the social complexi ty 's qualities 
and imperativum, having once constituted the sine qua поп condition of their 
minimum contents, also will vanish from what can by now be rightly called 
modern formal lawf In this case, what is left of the feasibility of an axiological 
approach to law? It would be too little comfor t to say that value-dependent 
approaches are unchangingly given free scope in legal policy [Rechtspolitik] and 
the theory of legislation [Gesetzgebungslehre] as well as in the doctrine of 
law-application [Rechtsanwendungslehre], re-arranging tbc alternative options 
(implying the moment of an independent decisio) into a unidirectional logical 
sequence of inference both verbally and culturally (as the latter does not 
necessarily raise awareness of the discretionary power that is made to work 
there by decision-makers anyway). 
Regarding the, so-to-speak, permanent conflict between natural law and 
legal positivism,12 we can only ascertain that the former is increasingly losing 
ground up to the point that we cannot now think of this opposition otherwise 
than as the symbolic expression of the challenge since classical times ( f rom 
ancient Greeks, via Romans and the Medievalists, to early modernity) to break 
away from the one-time role of ancilla theologiae to achieve the renaissance 
of human quality, practically transplanted onto our earthly order as well . 
Otherwise speaking, the respect for human interests (with sheer utility in focus) 
in praxis has found a most promising terrain in the meantime. And irrespective 
11
 Cf., by the author: Moderne Staatlichkeit und modernes fonnales Recht. Acta Juridica 
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 26 (1984) 235 and The Basic Settings of Modern 
Formal Law in: Gessner, W.-Hoeland, A. -Varga , Cs. (ed.): European Legat Cultures. 
Aldershot-Brookfield USA-Singapore-Sydney, 1996, 89. 
12
 See, e.g., Szabó, M. (ed.): Natura iuris Természetjogtan & jogpozitivizmus & ma-
gyar jogelmélet [Natural law & legal positivism & Hungarian legal philosophy!. Miskolc, 
2002. 
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of whether there is still monocracy or representative democracy has already 
been invented, the law itself has f inally bccome optional, scarcely differing 
from the characterisation set out in the Communist Manifesto one and a half 
ccnturics ago: a will made dominant through having been wrapped into state-
controllcd formalities.1 ' And, thereby, the desirability of linking the quality of 
right with the right14 is smoothly transferred into an issue of mere intellectuality 
and only for highbrows' use. In other words, having arrived at modernity, our 
societal world has also separated from our intellectual world. For, in a criterion-
like way, the law itself has become value-free (or, properly speaking, value-
neutral), not followed (or only hesitatingly followed) due to lawyers' professional 
ideology itself having bccome value-free or even cynical.'5 
We know from the research of a Hungarian-American Benedictine friar 
science historian"' that the history of science can explain the separation of 
Christianity and Islam (with the evolutionary ability of the very idea of scientia 
emerging exclusively f rom the former ' s culture) by the fact that theological 
debates after the turn of the First Millennium had already declared the chance 
of our fallibility on earth, that is, that our Earth has indeed been made our 
possession, and our actual life our eventual fate, as Divine Providence is not to 
interfere with either the laws created in our world or our irrevocable choices 
between good and bad. Or, neither genuine ontology nor human anthropology 
(with the chance of humanity 's fall into sin) is excluded by far as true schol-
arly fields. Thereby, it is possible to formulate repetitive regularities as laws, 
and human striving for their cognition and honest actions within their terms 
arc not faint-heartedness but rather the fulfilment of an assignment f rom the 
Creator. On the other hand, this awareness, born in Europe around the 1 l l h to 
13th centuries and which allowed us to live happily in our world and ensured 
the subsequent renaissance-that is, the relative separation of the spiritual from 
the natural world-has not been repeated so obviously in societal and intellec-
tual aspects. 
Cf., e.g., by the author: Marxizmus in Jogbölcselet [note 6], 24. 
" See Sebastiäo Cruz lus. Defectum (Directum) Dereito (derecho, diritto, droit, dircito. 
Recht, right, etc.) 7.a ed. Coimbra, 1986, and Lalindc Abadia, J.: Las culturas represivas 
de la hitman idad (H. 1945) I—II. Zaragoza, 1992, as well as Kovács, F.: A magyar jogi ter-
minológia kialakulása [The evolution of Hungarian legal terminology]. Budapest, 1964. 
15
 For its ontological and epistemological interrelations, see, by the author. The Place 
of Law in Lukács' World Concept. Budapest, 1985. 
"'Jáki, Sz.: A természettudomány eredete [Lecture on the origin of natural science]. 
Győr, 1993 and Jaki, S. L.: The Origin of Science and the Science of its Origin. Edinburgh, 
1978, & The Road of Science and the Ways of God. Edinburgh, 1978, as well as his Jesus. 
Islam, Science. Pinckney, Mich., 2001. 
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Just to refer to some great decisive events: for example, the great classical 
periods of natural law became, as it moved towards modernity, replaced by new 
constructs. However, the long-standing requirement of justification by natural 
law, on the one hand, and the fr ightening dcsolateness of the gap left after it 
was ousted from the proper terrain of law (with its space filled only by legal 
voluntarism), on the other, prevented the issue from being closed down entirely 
forever.17 
The lack of a theoretical response re-appeared in a new light when, within 
the critical perspective of the Social Doctrine of the Church in the immediate 
present, the classical spiritual power raised its voice at last and started to speak 
up against the dehumanising dysfunctionali ty of the social and economic 
arrangements of the Western world. For it is obvious that the Gospel does have a 
message in general, but the question of what the indubitability of natural law 
(to the extent it can be so characterised) really means for positive law has not 
been answered reassuringly ever since the age of Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
Anyway, the commitment of our life on Earth does not allow us to handle 
ourselves, our societal surroundings or the order to be made on earth with the 
indifference characteristic of laws built into physicality and with a demand for 
total autonomy. As is well known, the social teaching of the Church obviously 
derives its arguments from the Gospel, but it does so through interpretation 
embedded into theological hermeneutics of the ages given at any time, combined 
with a striving to give a temporal answer adjusted to the situation hie el nunc, 
i.e., with a kind of optimisation of the expectations (conceived of as best) of 
the society and culture behind the actual teaching.18 
Finally, the barbarity of the last century, then the debasement of person against 
person followed by the technocratic emptying of our future, accompanied by the 
unlimited exploitation of our planet 's reserves, that is, the icieocracy of socialism 
being replaced by the all-covering pragmatic homogenisation through globalism-
17
 In his oeuvre, Michel Villey analysed the process repeatedly in his Leçons d'histoire 
de la philosophie du droit nouv. éd. [1957]. Paris, 1962, Seize essais de philosophie du 
droit dont un sur la crise universitaire. Paris, 1969 and Critique de la pensée juridique 
moderne. Paris, 1976, as well as in his magisterial lecture notes on La formation de la 
pensée juridique moderne rév. Stéphane Riais, Paris, 2003. 
18
 The author referred to in the previous note struggled with the issue recurrently. He 
concluded that Saint Thomas Aquinas had already considered the very notion of practice-
bound secular laws as something separate , considering the fact that neither the Gospel nor 
any conception of natural law would be capable (or competent) to cover it throughout and 
directly. See Michel Villey Questions de Saint Thomas sur le droit et la politique ou le bon 
usage des dialogues (Paris) 1987, as well as, as fragments from him, éd. Frison-Roche, M.-
A.-Christoph, J.: Les Carnets Réflexions sur la philosophie et le droit (Paris) 1995. 
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along with the general mood of some ultimate scenario of finita la commedia/'9-
have sincc World War II repeatedly raised the query of how to render the law 
autonomous. Well, the legal accountability for Nazi-type depravity (the so-called 
Radhruch-formula), the possibility to rebuild civil conditions in relative freedom 
from codai restrictions ("die Natur der Sache"), then, most pressingly nowadays, 
the unsolved issue of Latin American and other disintegrating failed societies, 
the squandering of our Planet's resources using up humankind's future, the anti-
human usability of the possibility of immeasurable manipulation generated by the 
newest technologies, the ultimate degradation of the Western world through 
an internal moral split of dual standards, enforced by diverging interests, and 
last but not least, the destructive dysfunctions arising from the universalisation 
of the Atlantic legal mind and US state-craft (as extended especially to the 
Eastern European regions and so-called developing societies, exposed to the 
imperialism of the American movements of Law & Modernisation and Law & 
Dcvclopmcnt)-al l these call for some kind of external objective measure.20 
Albeit we have to know that a revival of natural law in our day cannot target 
more than the expansion of sensitivities and the extension of the range of topics 
and aspects of investigation, with their re-integration into our culture. Other-
wise speaking, it cannot claim a new deduction [Ableitung] or subordination 
[subordinatio], as this would lead back again to a pre-scientism. Therefore, the 
question is partly open, waiting for both a response and a foundation in theory. 
2.3. Positive Law - Without Legal Positivism? 
As was pointed out earlier, things arc mostly interconnected, and it is only due 
to a lack of perspective if we cannot perceive latent correlations for the time 
being. Well, our earlier thesis on the change of focus of theoretical legal thinking 
in the past few decades was largely due to the metamorphosis of our world-
view in the philosophy of science, a circumstance that may explain the tendency 
of law to have become increasingly immaterial, to be taken as hardly more 
''' "The show's over." 
" Some cardinal aspects are analysed in a pathbreaking concise overview by the 
present pope, then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger. in his Crises of Law [an address delivered 
on the occasion of being conferred the degree of Doctor Honoris Causa by the LUMSA 
Faculty of Jurisprudence in Rome on November 10, 1999 in <http://www.ratzinger.it/ 
conferenze/crisideldiritto_eng.htm>. As to actualities in the region, cf., by the author: 
Transition to Rule of Law On the Democratic Transformation in Hungary (Budapest) 1995. 
and Transition? To Rule of Law? Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice Challenged in 
Central & Eastern Europe. Pomáz, 2008. 
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than a discursive process within the f rame of specific communicat ion2 ' -such a 
thesis by no means supplies a sufficient (let alone exhaustive) explanation. It has 
been discernible in both the description of the Western European and Atlantic 
legal world"" and the design of the common codification of private substantive 
and procedural law in the European Union23 (requiring Hungarian participation 
as well from now on) that-start ing f rom the era of Western rebuilding after 
the Second World War 2 4- i t is the resolution of the exclusivity of the law's 
positivity (or being posited) that has been increasingly reckoned with. All this 
is palliated with fashionable liberal catch-words, labelled as démocratisation, 
participation, or multi-factoralisation of the legal process. If, and insofar as, this 
resolution becomes dominant (as prognosticated by American macro-sociological 
grand-theories for decades now25), it will also obviously increasingly eliminate 
the alienating effect of the special modes of speech and culture of communi-
cation that may still have made the impression of being self-propelled in law 
and that have successfully ousted both pragmatic and evaluative reasoning from 
routine procedures, reducing them to mere pattern-following. 
Accordingly, philosophical reflection on law with expectations of theory-
building is anything but a memory of the past. It is by far more an agenda 
addressing the future. Legal philosophising is going to become part of such a 
legal culture in constant formation.2 ' ' That is, what wc will then call law will 
21
 See para. 2.1. 
"" E.g., by the author: Meeting Points between the Traditions of English American 
Common Law and Continental-French Civil Law (Developments and Experience of 
Postmodcrnity in Canada) Acta Juridica Hungarica, 44 (2003) 2 1. 
" 'E.g., by the author: La Codification à l 'aube du troisième millénaire. In: Mélanges 
Paul Amselek org. Cohen-Jonathan, G.-Gaudemet, Y.-Hertzog, R.-Wachsmann, P. 
Waline, J.: Bruxelles, 2004, 779 & Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millennium. 
Ada Juridica Hungarica, 47 (2006) 89. & <http://www.akademiai.com/conlent/cv56l9l505 
t7k36q/fulltext.pdfi>. 
24
 In an edifying comparison with Central and Eastern European peripheries, see, above 
all, Kühn, Z.: Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial Culture at the Onset of 
the European Enlargement. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 52 (2004) 53 I. 
" First of all, e.g., Nonet, P.-Selznick, P.: Law and Society in Transition. Toward 
Responsive Law. New York, etc., 1978. and Mangabeira Unger, R.: Law in Modern Society. 
Toward a Criticism of Social Theory. New York, 1976. As a contemporary reflection on 
these, see, by the author: Átalakulóban a jog? [Law in transition?] Allatn- és Jogtudomány, 
23 (1980) 670. 
2<
' Albeit "cultural lags" arc too well known here as well. Cf., e.g., by the author: What is 
to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates Revolving around the Topic of 'The 
Judicial Establishment of Facts ' . In: Atienza, M.-Pattaro, E. Schulte, M.-Topornin, В.-
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define or demarcate its objcct together with what we think of it with good 
reason and conclusive force. We shall presumably remember legal philosophy 
up to the end of the 20th century as an interesting but mostly dated preliminary 
that undertook the task of founding (at a mega-level of science philosophy and 
science methodology) the science of the law that, in addition to positive analyses 
of a Rechtsdogmatik, dissected the law into parts-as a researcher examines an 
insect on his table or liquids in retorts, to be able to inspect each of its 
methodically separated components individually. It is conceivable that-as u s u a l -
primarily those moments f rom this philosophising that might have contributed 
to the precise transcendence of this all will survive memorably for posterity. 
The triad of the Hegelian thesis / antithesis / synthesis may prove to be rather 
too attractive. All that notwithstanding, I cannot ignore, by formulating my 
suspicion, that it will be a kind of repeated encounter, moreover, a reunification of 
the societal and the intellectual (referred to already several times) that will 
again re-occur in the legal philosophy of the near future. The aforementioned 
catch-words of the resolution (or dissolution) of the law's positivistic self-
definition themselves seem to refer to something like this. The realm of values 
behind the law, demanding their re-integration in transcendence, also suggests 
something similar. Man is to return to himself (as I formulated somewhat 
lyrically in conclusion to my treatment of the law's paradigms twenty years 
ago"7), and theoretical thinking built on philosophical reflections may be the 
most adequate avenue to bring this about. 
Wyduckel, D. (Hrsg.): Theorie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Werner 
Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin, 2003, 657. 
" "We followed a path that led to law from the paradigms of legal thinking, and from 
the self-assertion of legal formalism to its overall cultural determination. Yet, our human 
yearnings peeked out from behind the illusory reference of our security and we could discover 
reliable, solid grounds only in the elusive continuity of our social practice. In the meantime it 
proved to be a process which wc had thought to have been present as a material entity and 
what we had believed to be fully built up proved to build continuously from acts in an 
uninterrupted series. What we have discovered about law is that it has always been inside 
of us, although we thought it to have been outside. We bear it in our culture despite 
our repeated and hasty attempts at linking it to materialities. We have identified ancient 
dilemmas as existent in our current debates as well. We have found long abandoned 
patterns again. We have discovered the realisations of common recognitions in those 
potentialities and directions in law which we believed to have been conceptually marked 
off once and for all. / However, we have found an invitation for elaboration in what has 
revealed itself as ready-to-takc. Behind the mask, and in the backstage, the demand for our 
own initiation, play, role-undertaking and human responsibility has presented itself. We 
havebecome subjects from objects, indispensable actors from mere addressees. And, we can 
be convinced that despite having a variety of civilisational overcoats, the culture of law is 
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W e l ive in a d a n g e r o u s age . T h e s e dange r s i n c l u d e the s a t u r a t i o n of o u r 
e n v i r o n m e n t with p o i s o n s , both in n a t u r e and in o u r societal wor ld , as much as 
in o u r in te l lcc tua l i ty- f rccd of s tandards , endanger ing menta l survival itself. Forces 
r e a d y to act are n o w a d a y s m a k i n g e x p e r i m e n t s b y e rec t ing a n e w and idea-
c o n t r o l l e d b rave n e w w o r l d , and o u r perennia l c u l t u r a l d ivers i ty , h o m o g e n i s e d 
in a g loba l v i l lage , is b e i n g v i s u a l i s e d by some a s a l r eady a c c o m p l i s h e d . 2 8 In 
o n e o f t he r ichest ( y e t in m a n y r e s p e c t s most i n n o c e n t ) parts o f t h e wor ld , the 
f u t u r e is feared as b r i n g i n g wi th it c o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n of legal e d u c a t i o n and 
s c h o l a r s h i p , wi th t h e resul ts o f l ega l research b e i n g o rdered in a d v a n c e as 
r e a d y c l i chés to j u s t i f y w h a t e v e r po l i c i e s arc d e s i r e d . Such a r e s igna t ion to 
p r edes t i na t i on by f a s h i o n a b l e g l o b a l pol ic ies m a y e m e r g e that f i n a l l y w e shall 
s ink into, d r a g g i n g l ike s u p e r a n n u a t e d sp ins ters , a wre t ched l i fe , d r a w i n g on 
w h a t it m a y have l e f t . 2 4 
T h e r e are severa l s igns ind ica t ing that s i tua t ions are a lways d o u b l e - f a c e t e d . 
N o w w e cannot c o n c l u d e m o r e f r o m such a t h r e a t than that it c an also be 
b e n e f i c i a l to be a loca l on the p e r i p h e r i e s . 
still exclusively inherent in us who experience it day by day. We bear it and shape it. 
Everything conventional in it is conventionalised by us. It does not have any further 
existence or effect beyond this. And with its existence inherent in us, we cannot convey 
the responsibility to be borne for it on somebody else either. It is ours in its totality so 
much that it cannot be torn out of our days or acts. It will thus turn into what we guard it to 
become. Therefore, we must lake care of it at all times since we are, in many ways, taking 
care of our own." Varga: Lectures... [note 2 {first Hungarian ed. in 1997{], ch. 7, p. 219. 
"
s
 C.f., e.g., in representation of two poles, Zum 80. Geburlstag von Hermann Klenner. 
Berlin, 2006. [Joachim Herrmann, Gerhard Sprenger & Hermann Klenner, 1-55], on the 
one hand, and The Governance of Globalisation. The Proceedings of the Ninth Plenary 
Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (2 -6 May 2003). Vatican City, 2004. 
For example, according to the cry for help by an author not inclined to pessimism 
otherwise, "L'enseignement sera une marchandise." There may scarcely be other chance 
than "se vendre pour rester des facultés de droit dignes de ce nom, ou refuser de se vendre 
et vieillir comme des vierges stériles." ( 16) "[L]e travail scriptuaire universitaire [. . .sera.. .] 
se concrétiser comme »fournisseur de prémisses« justifiant toujours une quelconque politique 
ou une orientation idéologique" (17). The perspective therefore is hardly more than 
"l'exploitation de la recherche [ . . . ] pour obtenir une légitimation, une justification des 
politiques étatiques ou de l'industrie." (18) Melkevik, B. Scolies sur le futur des facultés 
de droit. Le verdict Audi alteram partem. Journal de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université 
Laval, Québec, 4 (2005) 14. 
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Profiling by law enforcement agencies has become one of the most widely 
researched and debated questions in legal discussions relating to ethnic and 
racial discrimination in the criminal justice system. The term refers to the law 
enforcement practice of using racial, ethnic or religious stereotypes when making 
decisions on whose documents to verify, whom to stop, search, arrest or detain, 
on whom to mine databases, gather intelligence and employ other techniques. 
The policy assumes that these characteristics will help predict which people will 
be involved in particular crimes. Some commentators emphasize that ethno-
racial profiling is in principle unacceptable. The result, according to these 
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c r i t i c s , is the h a r a s s m e n t o f t he i n n o c e n t m i n o r i t y m i d d l e c l a s s , wh ich is 
s u b j e c t e d to a k ind o f " rac ia l t a x " tha t a f f ec t s all a s p e c t s of p e o p l e ' s lives. A 
f u r t h e r unwan ted resul t is the s t r eng then ing of rac ia l / e thn ic csscn t ia l i sm, reduc-
t i o n i s m to b lack a n d w h i t e / M u s l i m and n o n - M u s l i m / R o m a a n d n o n - R o m a / 
immigrant and non- immigran t , etc. Another , s t ra ight forwardly p ragmat ic criticism 
h a s been ca l l ing a t t en t ion to the p rac t i ca l i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of rac ia l prof i l ing : 
i n h e r e n t in the p r i m a fac ie p l a u s i b l e r e a s o n i n g b a s e d on s ta t i s t ics there is a 
p r o f o u n d (and p r o v a b l e ) e r ror , s i n c e racia l p ro f i l e s a r c bo th o v e r - i n c l u s i v e and 
under- inclus ive: over- inc lus ive in the sense that m a n y , indeed most , o f the peop le 
w h o fit into the c a t e g o r y a re e n t i r e l y innocen t , a n d u n d e r - i n c l u s i v e in the 
s e n s e that many o t h e r t y p e s o f c r i m i n a l s or t e r ro r i s t s w h o do not f i t t he prof i le 
wi l l t h e r e b y e s c a p e po l i c e a t t en t ion . 2 E i the r way , t he re s eems to be a c o n s e n s u s 
that p rof i l ing is a f o r m of d i sc r imina t ion and is c o n s e q u e n t l y u n l a w f u l acco rd ing 
to international and European law. A n u m b e r of o rgan iza t ions such the C o m m i t t e e 
f o r t he E l imina t ion o f Racial D i sc r imina t ion , the C o u n c i l o f E u r o p e C o m m i t t e e 
o f Min is te r s , E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n aga ins t Rac i sm and In to le rance ( E C R I ) , the 
E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t , the O S C E H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r on Na t iona l Minor i t i e s , 
and the E U N e t w o r k o f I n d e p e n d e n t Expe r t s on F u n d a m e n t a l R igh t s ' h a v e made 
See for example Banks, R.: Racial profiling and antiterrorism efforts. Cornell Law 
Review, 89 (2004) July, Harris, D. A.: Racial profiling revisited: "Just common sense" in 
(he fight against terror? Criminal Justice, Summer 2002, Bygravc, L. A.: Minding the 
machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated Profiling. Computer 
Law & Security Report, 17 (2001 ), Cucllar, M.-F.: Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National 
Origin and Race. Harvard Latino Law Review, 6 (2003), Davics, Sh.: Reflections on the 
Criminal Justice System after September 1 1, 2001. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 1 
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r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s to legislators , p o l i c y - m a k e r s a n d law e n f o r c e m e n t execu t ive s 
to c o m b a t racial p r o f i l i n g . 
In l ine with t h e s e e f fo r t s , in t h e past years , t h e H u n g a r i a n He l s ink i C o m -
m i t t e e ( H H C ) , has b e e n act ive in b o t h m a p p i n g o u t pa t terns o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y 
p r a c t i c c s and f o r m u l a t i n g r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r leg is la t ive a m e n d m e n t s a n d 
po l i cy deve lopmen t . 4 In the f o l l o w i n g , we will h igh l igh t the f i n d i n g s of a recen t 
p i lo t r e sea rch p r o j e c t 3 that f o c u s e d on pol ice s t o p and s e a r c h p rac t i ccs and 
the i r d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e f f e c t s on H u n g a r y ' s largest e t h n i c m i n o r i t y , the Roma . 
S i n c e p rev ious r e s e a r c h has s h o w e d that d i s c r i m i n a t o r y I D c h e c k m e t h o d s 
a re r e l evan t to the d i f f e r en t i a l t r e a t m e n t of the R o m a , " S t r a t eg ie s fo r E f f e c t i v e 
P o l i c e S top and S e a r c h ( S T E P S S ) , an in t e rna t iona l project s u p p o r t e d by the 
A G I S P r o g r a m o f t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n a n d the O p e n S o c i e t y Ins t i tu te 
a n d o r g a n i z e d by t h e O p e n S o c i e t y Just ice In i t i a t i ve was l a u n c h e d to c h a n g e 
p o l i c e s top and s e a r c h pol icy a n d pract ice. In H u n g a r y , a r e sea r ch / ac t i on 
on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counterterrorism, law enforcement, immigration, 
customs and border control. Rapporteur: Sarah Ludford., 30.9.2008, DT\745085LN.doc 
PE413.954v02-00, EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights on ethnic 
profiling. Opinion 2006/4, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Recommenda-
tions on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies, February 2006. 
1
 Research by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee in 2002-2003 concerning discrimi-
nation against Roma in the Hungarian criminal justice system exposed direct racial profiling 
by the police. By scrutinizing court files, the researchers found that Roma offenders and 
suspects were significantly more likely to have been identified via police stops while 
non-minority suspects were mostly caught in the act. One good source for the difference, 
explained the researchers, might be the police stop practices. On average, one-fifth of 
researched court cases involved individuals identified by police stops. See Farkas, L. 
Kézdi, G. Loss, S.-Zádori, Zs.: A rendőrség etnikai profilalkotásának mai gyakorlata (The 
Current Police Practice of Ethnic Profiling). Belügyi Szemle (Interior Affairs Review) 52 
(2004). 
For the full report see: Kádár, A.-Korner, J . -Moldova, Zs.-Tóth, В.: Control(led) 
Group. Final Report on the Strategies lor Effective Police Stop and Search (STEPSS) 
Project, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Budapest, 2008. The report is available ont he 
Helsinki Committee's website: http://helsinki.hu/dokumcntum/MHB_STEPSS_US.pdf 
6
 In 2005, a research carried out under the aegis of the Open society Justice Initiative 
found that the Roma are indeed discriminated against in the context of ID checks by the 
police. Discrimination was especially conspicuous in the practice of stopping pedestrians, 
with Roma pedestrians disproportionately stopped are more likely to experience disrespectful 
treatment. See: Pap, A. L.-Miller, J.-Gounev, P.-Wagman, D.-Balogi, A.-Bczlov, T . -
Simonovits, B.-Vargha, L.: Racism and Police Stops-Adapting US and British Debates 
to Continental Europe. European Journal of Criminology, 6 (2008) 161; and Pap, A. L.: 
Police ethnic profiling in Hungary-Lessons from an international research. Regio, 10 
(2007) 117. 
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approach was used in the development of new practices in pilot sites. For the 
purposes of the research, for the first time in Hungary, broad-spectrum data 
collection on the ethnic aspects and general efficiency of ID checks has been 
conducted. (As for the action element, not discussed in this paper, officers 
were trained on the definition and relevant aspects of ethnic profiling.) 
Research Design 
The project involved the close cooperation of the HHC, the National Police 
Headquarters (NPH), the Hungarian Police College (HPC) and selected repre-
sentatives from the Roma community who performed the internal monitoring 
of the project. The research was carried out for six months in three pilot sites 
across Hungary: Budapest ' s 61'' District, Szeged and Kaposvár. These three 
locations represent a broad range of different police districts with differing 
populations, crime profiles and resources. Budapest 's 6lh District covers a 
busy city-center area and includes the capital 's main railway station. Szeged, 
with a population of 200 000, is a medium-sized district on the Romanian 
border. Kaposvár is a relatively rural police district with 120 000 inhabitants. 
The project design was approved by Hungary's two Parliamentary Com-
missioners, a specialized ombudsman for ethnic and national minority rights 
and the Data Protection Commissioner. His involvement was required because 
according to the Data Protection Act, data related to ethnic affil iation or 
origin are regarded as sensitive data which can only be lawfully processed if 
an Act of Parliament permits, or the person concerned gives his/her written 
consent to processing the data." As such, police officers were not, and are not 
authorized by law to process data of ethnic origin during the coursc of conducting 
ID checks, and it would not have been practically feasible for the police to ask 
for consent during the stop. Thus, off icers were asked to record the perceived 
ethnicity of the person stopped on a separate and anonymous "STEPSS form". 
These forms were to be stored separately from the standard ID check forms 
that the police have a legal obligation to complete. After each shif t , the 
off icers who performed ID checks handed over the "STEPSS forms" they had 
filled out to the appointed contact person who at the end of each week 
7
 Act LXII1 of 1992 on the Protection of Personal Data and Publicity of Data of 
Public Interest. 
8
 Articles 2 ( 1 ) and 3(2) of the Data Protection Act. 
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forwarded them to the NPH, f rom where it was sent to the HHC, where 
following data analysis, the forms were destroyed.4 
The forms were designed to detect any disproportionate treatment in stops 
of minority citizens, chart how stops are being used by officers (reasons for 
stops, suspicion, location, outcomes), and provide a tool for enhanced supervision. 
Questions concerning the result of the ID check, where aimed at showing 
whether the stop was followed by further police measures, such as the arrest of 
a person under an arrest warrant, the short-term arrest of the person checked, 
or the initiation of petty offense proceedings. 
Research Findings 
I. The Number of Stops 
During the six months of data collection (17 September 2 0 0 7 - 1 7 March 
2008), the three Hungarian police units participating in the project performed 
altogether approximately 36 939 ID checks. Of these stops, 22 375 were 
recorded on the fo rms developed as part of the project. Overall, the numbers 
represent a decrease in the number of ID checks from the previous year. In 
Budapest, there was a drastic, 75 .3% decrease in ID checks compared to the 
same period in the preceding year (14 362 to 3538). In Szeged, the total 
number of such measures dropped by 17.5% compared to the same period in 
the previous year (16 724 to 13 786), while in Kaposvár there was a slight 
(4.7%) increase (24 606 to 25 770). The decrease in overall stop numbers may 
have several reasons. One of these is the general loss of self-confidence on the 
4
 The form contained the following data: time and place of ID check, gender and age 
of person stopped, grounds for the stop, results of ID check, perceived ethnicity of the 
person stopped, as established by the officer, and the civil monitor's remark. The list of 
typical reasons for ID cheeks was prepared by the NPH, and included the following: 
possession of a suspicious object (the officer has to state the reasons for her assumption); 
intensive control (ID checks carried out for this purpose do not needed to be justified, 
since this raid-like action includes everyone in the area); traffic control: security measure 
(this measure is applied against persons posing danger to the public or themselves, the 
situation needs to be described) finding a wanted person (along a reasoning for believing 
why the individual was the suspect); suspicion of a crime or a petty offense (along proper 
reasoning for the suspicion); prevention of an act endangering public order (along with 
the description of the event); possession of an illegal object (along with proper reasoning 
for the suspicion); other reason, namely (the officer has to explain the actual, alternative 
reason). 
258 ANDRÁS KÁDÁR ANDRÁS L. PAP 
part of the police, which, according to a number of officers participating in the 
projcct, started with the widely publicized instances of excessive use of force 
during the Budapest riots of Octobcr 2006. As a result, there has been a 
decrease in police activity throughout the whole country. Tbc decrease may 
also be caused by the increased administrative workload on tbc officers (i.e. 
the filling out of the form). This is substantiated by the fact that in Budapest, the 
decrease was radical (over 70%) compared to the same period in the previous 
year, but after the monitoring phase was over, the monthly average of ID checks 
increased by 25%. Curiously, when asked about the possible explanation for 
the trends and numbers, none of the interviewed police officers mentioned the 
January 2008 amendment of the Police Act, which set forth a more stringent 
framework for performing ID checks. Overall in Budapest, there were 93 ID 
checks per 1000 people, in Kaposvár 353, and in Szeged 147.10 To put this 
into an international context, the police in the UK conducted 59 stops (stop 
and search plus stop and account measures) per 1000 people during the years 
2006-2007 . " The average annual number of stops per 1000 people in the three 
Spanish project sites was even less: 16. Thus, ID checks play a much more 
important role in the Hungarian pol ice 's relations with the general public than 
it is the case in other European countries. 
2. The Effectiveness of the Stops 
The effectiveness of ID checks can be determined by examining what percentage 
of ID checks are followed by further police measures (such as arresting a 
person based on a warrant, initiating criminal or petty offense proceedings, 
etc.). This is often referred to as the "bit" or "success" rate. The project identified 
three main types of follow-up procedures (i.e. positive results proving that the 
check was well-grounded): (a) arrests, (b) short-term arrests and (c) petty offense 
procedures initiated (including on-the-spot fines).12 
"These involve not only discretionary stops on the street of those suspected of 
committing a crime, but also checks of people that witness crimes and accidents, report 
something to the police or ask for help, etc. When asked about the approximate proportion 
of such checks (i.e. checks not initiated by the police), different estimations were given by 
the competent police officers: 10% in Kaposvár, 20% in Szeged and 30% in Budapest. If 
we adjust the above numbers using this data, we still get very high numbers: 65 checks per 
1.000 people in Budapest, 325 in Kaposvár, and 93 in Szeged. 
" Jones, A.-Singer, L.: Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System - 2006, 
London, 2008. 
It is important to note that in a large number of cases, ID checks form an inevitable 
part of the petty offense procedure and arc not necessarily the starting point. For example, 
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Overall, including traffic related checks, only 1% of ID checks led to an 
arrest, 2% led to a short term arrest and 18% to petty offense procedures. Put 
simply, out of every 100 persons ID checkcd, only two were taken into short-
term arrest, and only one was arrested. If ID chccks related to traffic offenses 
are removed, the remaining checks result in 2% arrest, 3% short-term arrest, 
19% petty offense procedure and 76% no further action taken. For comparison, 
in the UK nationally 10-13% of stop and searches lead to ar res t . " On the 
whole, it appears that the police use of ID checks is ineffective; large numbers 
of people are being inconvenienced with little result. This data refutes the 
argument that extensive chccks are an efficient tool against criminality, and 
highlights the sheer amount of police time wasted conducting stops. 
This conclusion is further substantiated by the local data the participating 
headquarters provided after the monitoring phase was completed: in Kaposvár, 
where the number of ID chccks increased during the project period compared 
to the same period in the previous year, the results were not any better. In 
contrast, although the number of chccks dropped during the project period in 
both Szeged and Budapest, efficiency did not decrease (and even increased in 
some respects). 
As mentioned above, in Kaposvár a slight (4.7%) increase in the total 
number of ID checks (24 606 to 25 770) was detected compared to the same 
period in the previous year. However, the increase in the number of stops did not 
bring about an increase in follow-up procedures. In fact, there was a 42% drop 
in the number of persons with outstanding arrest warrants who were identified 
and taken into custody during the project period ( 104 to 58), and a 30% decrease 
in short-term arrests (601 to 408). This again refutes the idea that more ID 
checks necessarily lead to more tangible results, which is substantiated by our 
own research results. 
In Szeged, while the total number of ID chccks dropped by 17.5% ( 16 724 to 
13 786) when compared to the same period in the previous year, overall efficiency 
actually seems to have increased. Although less petty offense proceedings 
were initiated (3 036 instead of 3 361 ) and less fines were imposed on the spot 
if an officer is witness to a breach of law, she needs to establish the identity of the 
perpetrator in order to impose an on-the-spot fine on the perpetrator or initiate a petty-olTense 
proceeding. In this case the result (the proceeding) is not generated by the ID check (as 
opposed to the identification of a person subject to an arrest warrant, where the result, the 
identification and arrest of the person, is the result of the check). It was not possible, 
however, to distinguish between these two forms of ID checks within the framework of 
the project, thus all ID checks coming out of petty offense procedures were considered as 
positive results. 
13
 See: Jones-Singer: op. cit. 
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(2 718 as opposed to 3 630), the number of short-term arrests and the number 
of persons with an outstanding warrant who were identified and taken into 
custody slightly increased (605 to 61 1 and 148 to 163, respectively). The Head 
of the Department for Public Order attributed the increase in the number of 
wanted persons taken into custody to the setting up of a specialized search unit 
whose sole purpose is to find and arrest wanted persons. The unit is not using 
ID checks as a general screening method; instead it applies checks in a strictly 
targeted manner. This methodology seems to be a much more efficient use of 
police time and energy, and also creates less tension by inconveniencing fewer 
people. 
As for the 6 lh District of Budapest, there was a drastic, 75.3% decrease in 
ID checks compared to the same period in the preceding year (14 362 to 
3 538), however, this radical drop in the number of checks did not bring about 
a similar decrease in the results. During the project 's span, 2 242 petty offense 
proceedings were initiated, as opposed to 977 such measures for the same 
period in the previous year. In other words, although the number of ID checks 
dropped by over 50%, more than twice as many checks were fol lowed by petty 
offense proceedings. The number of short-term arrests remained approximately 
the same, representing a statistically insignificant increase relative to the same 
period in the previous year: during the project period, 692 persons were taken 
into custody, compared to 683 in the same period of the preceding year. The 
only area where a drastic decrease in the number of checks seems to have 
resulted in a decrease in effectiveness is the identification of persons subject to 
an outstanding arrest warrant. During the project period 284 such persons were 
identified and arrested, as opposed to 317 in the previous year, equivalent to a 
10% drop. 
In sum, the decrease in the number of ID checks in Szeged and Budapest 
did not result in a significant decrease in efficiency (there was a decrease in 
relation to some of the follow-up measures, whereas in relation to other 
measures, the levels remained the same or even increased). At a minimum, wc 
can conclude that the data does not substantiate a correlation between the 
number of checks and the measurable success of police work (which is the 
argument most often used to justify the current practice of extensively checking 
people). 
It is noteworthy that there is significant variation in the rate of efficiency 
depending upon what ground was recorded as the basis for the ID check.14 
14
 Since 1 January 2008, under Article 29 of Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, a 
police officer may check the identity of any person whose personal identity needs to be 
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Most ID checks, 37%, took place during the course of t raf f ic controls. A 
relatively high proportion of checks, 19%, were based upon the suspicion of a 
petty offense, 8% of all checks were pursuant to intensive controls, and only 2% 
of checks were related to the suspicion of a criminal act. ID checks recorded 
under the "other" category make up a third of all stops; this proportion rises to 
50% when we removed traffic control stops from the data. Examining the 
efficiency rate of the ID checks relative to their different grounds, wc see that 
the most frequently quoted grounds are the least efficient. 
Arrests and significant percentages of short term arrests only followed 
those ID checks that were related to the suspicion of a crime, petty offense or 
finding a wanted person. Out of these latter cases, however, only those checks 
that were initiated due to the suspicion of a petty offense made up a substantial 
portion of all the checks. Overall , traffic control constituted the largest reason 
for the ID checks, though in 84% of these cases no further action was taken. 
Two very important conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, intensive control 
seems to be very inefficient. As mentioned above, intensive control refers to 
checks that arc not based on an officer 's own discretion, but rather upon an 
order from a superior who def ines the permissible parameters. The aim of ID 
checks under intensive control may be to arrest a criminal suspect, or prevent 
or frustrate an action or incident posing a threat to public safety. ID checks in 
established. The provision lists the legally permitted aims of the measure: protection of 
public order, public safety, crime prevention and crime detection, establishing the lawful 
stay of the concerned person in Hungary, protection of the rights of the person checked 
and of other natural or legal persons. The concept of "ID cheeks" covers an extremely 
wide range of activities, as not only those measures are included which arc carried out for 
the explicit purpose of establishing a person's identity, but almost every single act where 
an officer comes into direct contact with a citizen. The proportion of such non-autonomous 
ID checks ranges between 10-30% according to the estimation of police officers partici-
pating in the project. Such non-autonomous ID checks arc carried out for instance in the 
course of searching for witnesses. In such cases, ID checks are complementary to other 
police measures. The vast majority of ID checks, however, arc autonomous measures in 
the sense that they are carried out for the sole purpose of identifying an individual. For 
example, ID checks can also be carried out in the course of traffic control when the 
existence of the aims listed above is not a precondition for lawfully applying an ID check. 
Based on the wording of Article 44 of the Police Act, traffic control can be performed in 
order to establish whether the driver has a driving licensc or whether she is in lawful 
possession of the car, thus in these cases the officer does not need to ascertain suspicion 
for the stop. Also, under Article 30 of the Police Act, the head of a police unit may order a 
so called "intensive control" in order to arrest a criminal suspect, or prevent or obstruct a 
threat to public safety. In such cases, within the defined territory, everyone may be lawfully 
ID checked even lacking the reasons outlined in Article 29. 
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such cases are limited to checking persons who arc at, or who arc entering into 
a certain area or publicly accessible place. Only 6% of checks performed on 
the basis of an intensive control order were followed up by any measure. The 
second area of concern involves ID checks conducted based on the "other" 
ground, which has an overall hit rate of 9% (0.6% arrest, 2% short term 
arrest, and 7% petty o f fense procedure). When asked to provide a specific 
reason or suspicion for checks falling into this category, many officers failed to 
articulate any concrete grounds for the check. In 64% of these cases, officers 
provided no information at all, and in 20% of all the cases the information 
provided was regarded as unsatisfactory (in a lot of cases, for instance, the officers 
indicated "general ID check" as the actual reason, which actually amounts to a 
violation of the Hungarian Police Act, which requires all ID checks to have a 
specific identifiable purpose). In only 16% of the checks based on the ground 
"other" did the acting off icers provide information that the analysts found 
acceptable, such as for example "the suspect seemed disturbed when sensing 
police presence".15 
Since the majority of the chccks (outside traffic control) belonged to the 
"other" category, it can be concluded that those eheeks which do not have any 
particular, specific grounds arc at the same time the most inefficient ones with 
very poor hit rates. This refutes the thesis that it is worth putting police time 
and work into performing ID chccks on a random basis. If we calculate five 
minutes per ID check on average, the 1.4 million independently initiated 
chccks performed annually (as reported by national police statistics) amount to 
approximately 233 400 working hours (since regularly not only one, but two 
police off icers carry out the ID chccks), adding up to 29 1 75 working days per 
year. On the basis of the average monthly salary of police officers (HUF 
242 500, approximately 800 Euros gross), this means that the time spent on ID 
checks is worth over H U F 335 million H U F and I.I million Euros annually. 
With a hit rate of about 20%, the mass use of ID checks seems to be an 
inefficient use of human and financial resources. 16 
""Acceptab le" does not refer to the assessment of whether the reason given is in 
accordance with the law. Instead, the degree of the specificity or concreteness of the 
grounds for police action is scrutinized. 
"' A number of officers mentioned raised that when examining the effectiveness of ID 
checks, it also must be taken into consideration that chccks have a general preventive 
effect, and may in specific cases even be suitable for preventing specific criminal offenses. 
If. for instance, someone is preparing to commit a burglary, and is stopped and checked by 
the police, she will most probably give up on the plan, as the fact that the police will know 
where the given person was at a particular time, significantly increases the chance of being 
identified. The officers acknowledge that this impact may not be measured as accurately as 
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3. The Ethnic Disproportionality of the Stops 
Based on the data collected, it appears that the majority of ID checks take 
place on public premises (streets, parks and roads account for 78%), while 
relatively few checks are performed in pubs, discos or similar places (6%). 
The temporal distribution of the checks is relatively even, with 21% occurring 
in the morning (from 6 a.m. till noon), 29% in the afternoon (from noon till 6 
p.m.), 30% in the evening (from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m.), and the remaining 20% at 
night. 
Police officers stop and check more inen than women (75% and 25% 
respectively), and in line with international trends, young people arc more 
likely to be checked. Individuals belonging to the age group 14-29 represent 
43% of all checks, whereas their ratio within the population is 22%.17 Based 
on the overall data collected, police in Hungary arc most likely to check young 
men between the ages 14-29. 
The data also shows that Roma are disproportionately targeted for ID 
checks. Disproportionality in ID checks refers to the extent to which police 
powers arc applied to different ethnic/nationality groups out of proportion 
with their relative ratios in the wider population. The data provides evidence 
of disproportionality in stops by comparing the rate at which people from 
different ethnic or nationality groups are stopped in comparison to members of 
the majority group. Within the framework of the project, 22% of all persons 
checked by the police were of Roma origin (according to the assessment of the 
the number of follow-up measures (since il is not possible lo measure how many offenses 
were nol committed), but they insist that this effect shall be taken into account when we 
speak about efficiency. It needs to be pointed out that the preventive effect of ID checks 
has never been measured and proven in Hungary. According lo international research 
on the issue, the potential perpetrator, even after being stopped, will most likely not 
completely abandon the plan of committing a crime, she will only modify it, change the 
location or postpone it. A comprehensive British research into stop and search measures 
established that such police action decreases the number of offenses by only 0.2-2.3%, and 
no close correlation may be substantiated between the number of checks and the number of 
those types of offenses that may in theory be influenced by checks. Miller, J. Bland, N. 
Quinton, P.: The Impact of Stops and Searches on Crime and Community. Police Research 
Series, 127, 2000. Also, even if we may presume the existence of a preventive impact of 
stops in relation to petty theft and trafficking in drugs, it is almost inconceivable in 
connection with white-collar crime, thus its preventive value only applies to a limited 
range of criminal activity. 
17
 Based on the figures of the 2001 census, see: www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek 
/18/tables/loadl 12.html. 
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officer performing the check), as opposed to 75% being identified as "white."'* 
The remaining 3% were identified as "black", "Asian", "Arab" or other. According 
to reliable sociological research, the estimated proportion of Roma people 
within the total Hungarian population (of 10 045 000) is approximately 6.2% 
(i.e. their actual number is around 620 000).19 Thus, Roma arc more than three 
times more likely to be stopped than their percentage of the general population 
would indicate.20 
18
 The results were further refined to remove stops conducted for the purpose of traffic 
control on the assumption that it is more dit Heult to make racially grounded distinctions 
when police officers stop cars on the road. With traffic stops removed, the percentage of 
Roma is somewhat higher (25%), but the difference is not statistically significant. The 
reason for this may be that since there are types of cars that are typically driven by Roma, 
ethnic profiling is not necessarily impossible during traffic stops. Due to lack of reliable 
data, the attempt to verify whether the type and age of a vehicle may also have influenced 
the choices of police officers was not successful. However, data provides evidence that 
such profiling may exist. The examination of the percentages of Roma and non-Roma 
among those chccked during traffic controls show that the percentage of Roma within this 
sample was 17%. This is below the 22% level of over-representation within the full 
sample, but still significantly exceeds the national ratio of Roma within Hungary. It also 
needs to be taken into consideration that car ownership is likely to be rarer among the 
Roma due to their indigence and marginalized position in society. Thus, while the level of 
profiling is lower when traffic stops are performed (probably due in part to the fact that it 
is more difficult to make racial distinctions in such a situation), a certain disproportionality 
may still be observed. This also explains why the differences between results with and 
without traffic stops are smaller than previously expected. 
1
 ' Hablicsek, L.-Gyenci. M. Kemény, I.: Kísérleti számítások a roma lakosság területi 
jellemzőinek alakulására és 2021-ig történő előrebecslésére (Experimental estimates on 
the territorial dispersion of the Roma population until 2021). 63. See: hltp://www.nepinfo. 
hu/index.php?p=605&m= 1003 (hereafter: Hablicsek). 
""There has been some variation among the three pilot sites in terms of dispropor-
tionality. In Budapest, one third (33%) of the persons checked were identified as Roma; 
they were approximately 3.3 times more likely to be stopped and ID checked than non-
Roma. Of those who were stopped in Szeged during the project period, 7% were identified 
as Roma, while, according to the local police chief, the percentage of Roma within the 
total population of the covered region is only 3%. This means that a Roma person is 
approximately 2.3 times more likely to be stopped and ID checked than a non-Roma. In 
Kaposvár, 29% of those ID checked were identified as being of Roma origin, whereas, 
according to minority community leaders, the percentage of Roma within the total 
population of the region is 15%. This means that a Roma person is approximately twice as 
likely to be stopped and ID checked than a non-Roma. The results are worse when we 
exclude traffic controls from the results: the percentage of Roma among those who were 
ID checked subsequently rises to 36%; meaning that a Roma is 2.4 times more likely to be 
stopped and ID checked than a non-Roma. 
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The results show that Roma youth are especially likely to be targeted for 
ID checks. The proportion of Roma youth between age 14 and 16 who were 
stopped and checked during the project period was significantly higher than 
the already high general representation of Roma within the sample (32% as 
opposed to 22%). In interpreting the data, wc have to take into consideration the 
fact that the Roma population profile is younger than that of the wider Hungarian 
population. The age group 15-19, for instance, is estimated to represent 10.3% 
of the total Roma population, as opposed to 6.4% within the total population.21 
The data also shows considerable differences regarding the grounds based 
on which ethnic groups arc stopped. It is worth noting that in the category of 
"other ground" the proportion of Roma is higher (28%) than in the general 
sample (22%). Disregarding traffic stops, this difference is even bigger, as the 
proportion of Roma persons in the "other" category increased to 30%. It is 
obvious that, owing to its lack of concrctcness, this is one of those categories 
under which officers have the most discretion to act on stereotypes, thus the 
level of over-representation in this category gives rise to serious concerns. 
Similarly, the over-representation of Roma among persons ID checked 
due to the suspicion of a criminal act significantly exceeds their level of over-
representation in the general sample. If, however, we look at how efficient these 
checks are, we can conclude that, despite the commonly held beliefs among 
officers, it is not more productive to stop and check Roma at greater rates than 
non-Roma. The data in the research shows that ID checks of Roma arc no 
more likely to yield results than measures enforced in relation to non-Roma. It 
is often argued that a disproportionate targeting of ethnic minority groups is 
justified by differential rates of criminal involvement. The hit rate of police 
checks, however, shows no significant differences by ethnic group. Put simply, 
if Roma were more likely to be involved in criminal activities then non-Roma, 
ID checks performed on them would have to lead to follow-up measures more 
often than the checking of non-Roma. 
Roma are disproportionately subjected to ID checks, yet the data shows that 
they are no more likely to be involved in illegal activities than ethnic Hungarians. 
On a national level, 78% of ID checks involving Roma were "unsuccessful" in 
the sense that no further measure was required after the check. For non-Roma 
this ratio was 79%. The percentage of checks followed by a petty offense 
proceeding for Roma and non-Roma was 19% and 18%, respectively. Rates of 
21
 See Kemény, I.: A magyarországi cigány népesség demográfiája (The demography 
of Hungarian Roma population). http://www. demografia.hu/Demografia/2004 3-4/ 
Kemeny%201stvan_kozl.pdf 
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arrests and short-term arrests arc practically the same within the Roma and the 
non-Roma sample. 
Furthermore, when ID checks arc initiated upon the suspicion of a criminal 
offense (where in fact the hit rate is rather high), a significantly higher proportion 
of Roma arc stopped without a suff icient ground than non-Roma (37%, as 
opposed to 25%).It needs to be noted that tbc country 's capital, Budapest: 80% 
of the checks of Roma did not require any further police action, whereas the 
same proportion for non-Roma was 59%. If we compare this with tbc fact that 
33% of all the persons checked are of Roma origin (which is a serious over-
representation relative to their proportion of 5 -10% in Budapest), we can see 
that the problem is more acute in Budapest than in the other pilot sites. 
Research Conclusions 
In Hungary, the annual number of ID checks (per 1,000 people) is high when 
compared with other nations in Europe. The police practice behind this result 
is based on the conviction that randomly initiated ID checks constitute an 
efficient crime prevention and detection strategy. However, in the sample, only 
approximately 20% of the ID checks were followed up by any measure, and of 
these measures, 18% merely involved the initiation of a petty offense proceeding 
(i.e. proceedings launched due to transgressions of minor significance). Arrests 
followed only 1% of the checks in our sample. The research showed that those 
types of ID checks that arc responsible for the majority of the measures (and 
which arc not based on concretely identifiable facts, such as intensive control, 
traffic control and the as mentioned above illegal "general checks") are the 
least efficient. The case of the Szeged Police Headquarters is particularly telling: 
during the project period, the number of ID checks somewhat decreased, while 
the number wanted and arrested actually increased. Instead of trying to identify 
and arrest wanted persons by carrying out mass ID checks, the department 
chose to set up a specialized unit performing targeted checks based on 
intelligence. This increased efficiency while decreasing the number of checks. 
Another important conclusion of the research is that Roma are dispropor-
tionately targeted by ID checks. Even though their proportion of the general 
population is only between 6 and 8%, persons perceived to be of Roma origin 
by the acting officers constituted 22% of those who were ID checked. The research 
also refuted the ostensibly rational argument that is frequently presented to 
justify disproportionality; namely that the Roma are over-represented among 
offenders, therefore the practice of checking them more often is objectively 
reasonable. Research results showed that there is no difference in the efficiency 
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of checks targeting Roma and non-Roma (nationally 22% of the checks on 
Roma and 21% of chccks targeting non-Roma arc followed by some further 
measure). In cases where ID checks were initiated due to the suspicion of a 
criminal offense, checks performed on non-Roma are, in fact, significantly 
more efficient: 76% of the stops led to further measures for non-Roma as 
opposed to 63% for Roma. It can therefore be concludcd that the efficiency of 
disproportionately checking Roma people is a myth and ethnic profiling by the 
police in Hungary is an existing problem that must be acknowledged. 
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Review of "Right to Communicate": Universal 
Recognition under Trend of Telecommunications 
Development 
Abst rac t . From a historical perspective, the "right to communicate" is based on human instinct 
and is also one of the fundamental human rights. The right to communicate relates to the 
fundamental freedoms and values of contemporary societies and represents the affirmation and 
expression of the most essential rights for human dignity. With the creation of new technolo-
gies of communication such as cellular phones, tele-facsimile and the Internet, it is dear that 
readily available access to telecommunication is highly important for our daily life. However, 
due to differences in economic development and resources distribution, there is still a big gap 
between industrialized and developing countries in access to basic telecommunications. Since 
everyone should have the equal right to communicate, it is the global aim to assist people 
living in remote and rural areas to gain basic telecommunications to access and connect with 
the outer world. The main aim of this article is to examine this innate right as it emerges from 
historic human rights legal documents and international agreements and to emphasize the 
equality of rights concerning access to telecommunicat ion between industrialized and 
developing countries. 
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I. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
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t h e o p p o s i t e s i d e - a n d t h a t i s s o c a l l e d " c o m m u n i c a t i o n " . B y c o m m u n i c a t i o n , 
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F i n a n c i a l a n d E c o n o m i c L a w , T a i c h u n g T a i w a n . 
E-mai l : j a s o l i n 6 2 6 @ y a h o o . c o m . t w 
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scientific and civilization history. Nowadays, telecommunications are develop-
ing and increasing with high-speed and have become one of the essential 
components in our daily life. New communication tools such as cellular phones, 
telefacsimile, and the Internet have changed human's lifestyle and brought to 
light several legal problems of domestic and international levels. 
From historic views, "the right to communicate" is one of human's instinct 
and also one of their fundamental human rights. The right to communicate, 
relating to the fundamental freedoms and values of contemporary societies, 
represents the affirmation and expression of the most essential rights for human 
dignity.' With the creation of new technologies, it is believed that readily 
available access to telecommunication is so important for our daily life. How-
ever, due to the differences of economic development and resources distribution, 
there is still a big gap between industrialized and developing countries in access 
to basic telecommunications. Because everyone should have the equal right to 
communicate, it is the global aim to assist people living in remote and rural areas 
to gain basic telecommunications to access and connect with the outer world. 
The topic of the right to communicate is wide and contains many legal issues 
such as the history of Free Speech, personal freedoms versus national security, 
privacy and confidential protection, and the new technology and encryption, 
etc. In addition to providing a general description of the right to communication, 
this article will focus on the relationship between the right to communicate and 
global telecommunication development. As mentioned above, many people still 
lack the basic telecommunications access such as basic telephone lines to 
connect the outer world. It is believed everyone has the equal right to communi-
cate, to use public services, and to enjoy the benefits of the new technologies. 
This is the main issue that will be discussed in this article. 
II. The Right to Communicate 
/. Introduction 
"The right to communicate" contains broad ranges and comprises multitudinous 
aspects. This right is one of legitimate rights so that human beings could contact 
and exchange with each other. Many social scientists have long recognized that 
communication is on the basis of many societies or groups of human beings, and 
' Trudel, P.: Le role do droit dans les politiques de communication, The Virtual 
Conference, Overview of Communication Law in the Context of Communication Rights; 
see http://commposite.uqam.ca/videaz/does/pitren.html. 1998. 
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the history of humanity is an inextricably linked with communication.2 The 
right to communicate relates to basic individual and collective freedoms, thus 
this right should be defined as a basic and inalienable human right as the right 
to food and life. As same as the saying of L. Ron Hubbard, "perhaps the most 
fundamental right any being is the right to communicate. Without this free-
dom, other rights deteriorate".1 
2. Historic Overviews 
Reviewing the history of human rights, "the right to communicate" can be 
tracked back to the 18 century. Both "the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen" announced in 1789 and the US Constitution First 
Amendment entered into force in 1791 mentioned about "free speech" that is 
considered the early description of the right to communicate. 
a) French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen ( 1789) 
In August 1789, the French people overthrew the old Empire and pronounced 
the well-known revolutionary manifesto "Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen".4 Article 11 of the Declaration stated, "The free communi-
cation of ideas and opinions is one of the most prccious of the rights of man. 
Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall 
be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law." In the 
Declaration, it recognized that "the right to communicate" is one of the most 
precious rights of human beings and such right was defined as free communi-
cation of ideas and opinions. Under the Declaration, people had such freedoms 
to speak, write and print. By speaking, writing and printing, people can express 
their ideas and opinions and communicate with each other in ways that cor-
responded to the meaning of free communication. Obviously, Article 1 1 of the 
Declaration contains certain principles of fundamental human rights including 
free speech, freedom of press, freedom of expression and freedom of infor-
mation. Under this Declaration, the right to communicate and free specch were 
not unlimited and unrestricted. On the contrary, abuses of such rights and 
ITU: Proposal to establish an ACC intcr-agency project on universal access to basic 
communication and communication and information services. p3. 
3
 See http://www.freedommag.org/25thanni/express.htm. 
4
 Lewis, G.: The People' and the French Revolution (The French Revolution, 1787-
1799). http://www.warwiek.ac.uk/fac/arts/History/teaching/french-rev/people.html 
272 CI I UN HUNG LIN 
freedoms were prohibited by this Declaration and should be defined by laws, 
and people shall be responsible for their opinions and ideas. 
At that moment, the Declaration was linked to the political issues. During 
the monarchic and autocratic period, French people were not allowed to hold 
anti-government opinions and would be punished for exchanges of prohibited 
information. Dissatisfied with such a condition, people struggled for more 
freedoms and rights. Some historians thought the Declaration had great influences 
on political thoughts, and several constitutional declarations of European 
states in the 19th century such as the Constitution of the Weimar Republic of 
Germany.5 Many scholars recognized the Declaration as a product of the Age 
of Enlightenment. The Declaration was very important not only because it 
established some doctrines of basic human rights at its earliest historic status, but it 
also brought the new ideas for modern democracy. It also stressed a reasonable 
and legal basis of rights and freedoms that was defined under Article 4. It stated 
that "Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one 
else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except 
those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the 
same rights. These limits can only be determined by law." 
b) US Constitution First Amendment and Free Speech ( 1791 ) 
As in France, US Congress also passed the Constitution Amendments, known as 
"Bill of Rights" in September 1789 and entered in force in 1791. The US Con-
stitution First Amendment states "Congress shall make no law respecting ... 
or abridging the f reedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances." With First Amendment, several basic human rights were raised 
and protected: such as free speech, freedom of press, freedom of religious, right 
to assemble, and right to petition. Unlike French Declaration, the First Amend-
ment docs not mention the restriction and limitation of free speech and freedom 
of press. In other words , at the time Congress passed the First Amendment it 
basically did not limit or abridge free speech. Free speech is absolutely protected 
in the US Constitution, and it was delivered by the framcrs and had been 
preciously guarded.6 At the beginning, many people strongly advocated that 
freedom of spcech enshrines, more than any other freedom, the liberty of the 
individual and it is manifes t in the constitutional protection under the First 
Sec http://fLinkandwagnalls.eom/encyclopedia/low/articles/d/d00600326f. htm I. 
6
 Kairys, D.: The History and Current Retrenchment of Free Speech. Political and 
Civil Rights Law Review, 73 (1994). 
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Amendment7 and rooted in natural law.8 However, some scholars have criticized 
that the right of free speech should be accompanied by a responsibility4 and it 
is an important part to protect the right in a constitutional democracy."' 
Under the First Amendment, f reedom of speech is no doubt the first 
freedom mentioned. However, the rights of First Amendment historically have 
come under huge pressures. During the Red Scare of the early 1920s, many 
people were deported for their political views.11 At the time of McCarthy period, 
the infamous blacklist ruined lives and careers.12 Until now, the creators, 
producers and distributors of popular culture arc still being blamed for causing 
social problems in the United States. At the early establishment of US, most 
courts usually ignored the First Amendment rights of political minorities and 
free speech issues did not even reach the Supreme Court. Until 1919, the Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld the conviction of a Socialist Party member for 
mailing anti-war leaflets to draft-age men.11 A few months later, in the case 
of Abrains v. US,14 the defendant's conviction under the Espionage Act for 
distributing anti-war leaflets was upheld, but two dissenting opinions were 
formed and deeply influenced current applications of the First Amendment. Two 
Justices, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis, argued speech could 
only be punished if it presented "a clear and present danger" of imminent harm. 
Ultimately, these justices were able to convince a majority of the Court to 
adopt the "clear and present danger test". 
Nevertheless, until the 1950s, the Supreme Court still held the opinion that 
speakers could be punished if they advocated overthrowing the government 
7
 Gunther, G.: Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doetrine: 
Some Fragments of History. Stanford Law Review, 27 (1975) 719. 
8
 Thomas, C.: The Highter Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 12 (1989) 63; also 
see Hamburger, Ph. A.: Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitution. Yale 
Law Journal, 102 (1993) 907. 
4
 Trakman, L. E.: Transforming Free Speech: Rights and Responsibilities. Ohio State 
Law Journal, 56 (1995) 899. 
10
 See Chafee, Z.: Freedom of Speech in War Time. Harvard Law Review, 32 ( 1919) 
932. 
" See http://www.scsd.kl2.ny.us/alex/coldwar/redscare.htm 
See http://www.scsd.kl2.ny.us/alex/coldwar/hunt.hlm 
13
 See Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Baer v. Same, Nos. 437- 438, decided on 
March 3, 1919. Also see http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcasc.pl?court=US&vol= 
249&invol=47 
14
 See Abrains v. US, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Abrains el al. v. United States, No. 316, 
decided on Nov. 10, 1919. Also see http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl7courH 
US&vol=250&invol=616 
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even if the danger of such an occurrence were both slight and remote. This 
recognition seriously weakened the "clear and present danger" test and many 
political activists were prosecuted and jailed simply for advocating communist 
revolution. On the other hand, loyalty oath requirements for government employ-
ees were upheld and thousands of Americans lost their jobs merely based on 
flimsy evidence supplied by secret witnesses.15 Finally, in 1969, in the case of 
Brandenberg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court struck down the conviction of a Ku 
Klux Klan member and established a new standard to apply. The new standard 
set up that speech could be suppressed only if it is intended, and likely to 
produce, " imminent lawless action". Otherwise, even speech that advocates 
violence is protected. The Brandenberg standard still prevails even now."' The 
First Amendment exists precisely to protect even the most offensive and 
controversial speech from governmental suppression. By imposing "time, place 
and manner" restrictions, government can limit some protected speech. It is mostly 
commonly done by requiring permits for meetings, rallies and demonstrations. 
However, a permit cannot be unreasonably withheld, nor can it be denied based 
on content of the speech. That will constitute "discrimination" and is also uncon-
stitutional. Therefore, the best way to counter obnoxious speech is opening 
more speech, by persuasion, not coercion.1 
3. Review of Some International Agreements 
Although the declarations and legislation concerning the right to communicate 
had been established at its earliest time in many industrialized countries, 
numerous developing countries and remote areas in the world still lack related 
announcements and standards. Because the right to communicate is rooted by 
a natural instinct of mankind, a general and wide-based agreement should be 
agreed to promote into the international community. With regard to the right to 
communicate, proclamations arc set by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and several U N E S C O Resolutions. 
1
 ' See http://comm I.uwsp.edu/121 /lectures/1 stamen/tsldO 12.htm 
16
 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), Appeal from the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, No. 492, Also see http://casclaw.lindlaw.com/egi-bin/getcasc.pl?court=US&vol= 
395&invo!=444 and http://comml.uwsp.edu/121/lectures/lstamen/tsld013.htm 
1
 See http://www.aclu.org/issues/freespeech/isfs.html 
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a) Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
On Dec. 10, 1948 the General Assembly of UN proclaimed the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights.17 Article 19 of the Declaration states "Everyone has 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, rcccive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Article 19 of Universal 
Declaration is clearer than French Declaration and the First Amendment 
concerning the definition of the right to communicate. Under Article 19 of 
Universal Declaration, the right to communicate includes freedom of opinion, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of information that have been protected. 
Considering phraseology, speaking is one kind of expression of human 
beings. Not only speaking, but also writing, printing and acting should be 
protected. Those protections are within the scopc of f reedom of expression. 
Moreover, expression is only a single side of "communication", and the other 
side is the role of receiver, listener, and reader. Including freedom of infor-
mation that contains free seek, free receive, free impart information, the right 
to communicate can be well established. Also, those rights and freedoms should 
be "without interference" and "through any media and regardless of frontiers". 
Considering rapid changes of télécommunications, these two provisions 
correspond to the requirement of the modern information society. 
In addition. Article 21 (2) states "Everyone has the right of equal access to 
public service in his country." The "service" mentioned here should include 
"universal service" defined thereafter as everyone's equal right to use basic 
telecommunication tools to connect the outer world. Article 2 of Universal 
Declaration also states that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Déclaration, without distinction of any kind, such as racc, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other s ta tus . . . " Thus the right to communicate is already 
recognized as a legalized and fundamental right under international law. 
b) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Article 19 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:1'' 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
18
 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), Dec. 10, 1948; see htlp://www.un. 
org/Overview/rights.html 
19
 U.N.T.S. No. 14668, vol 999 (1976), p. 171; see http:www.tufts.edu/departments/ 
fletcher/multi/texts/BH498.text 
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2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include f reedom to seek, receive and impart information and idea of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, ci ther orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries 
with its special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to 
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as arc provided by law and are 
necessary: 
(a) For respect of the r ights of reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public 
health or morals. 
Basically, Article 19 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
advocates f ree expression and free information defined under Universal Declara-
tion. The difference between them is International Covenant regulates the 
restriction and limitation of such rights in Article 19 (3). It stresses the exercise 
of such rights should accompany with "special duties and responsibilities". 
Under Article 19 (3), f reedom of expression and freedom of information should 
not be "absolutely protected" and should have some "demarcation lines". 
To maintain the interests of the public and to limit the abuses of personal 
rights, several exceptions of freedom of expression and information are regulated 
under International Covenant including (1) respect other peoples' rights, (2) 
respect other peoples' reputations, (3) national security, (4) public order, (5) 
public health; and (6) public morals. It is a dilemma to balance interests between 
personal r ights and public order. Any unbalanced action between them will 
cause either abuses of personal rights or excess of governmental power. Hence, 
how to establish the "demarcation lines" and to confirm the "special duties and 
responsibilities" should be well established and clearly defined. Article 19 (3) 
provides two measures: "legal basis" and "necessary" to set up the standard of 
reasonable personal f reedoms and rights. Out of the "demarcation lines", such 
freedoms will be considered as abuses of rights and will not be protected by law. 
c) Convention on the International Right of Correction 
Unlike Universal Declaration and International Covenant, the goal of the Con-
vention on the International Correction likely focuses on the freedom of press. 
Nevertheless, f rom several articles of the Convention, the tracks of freedom 
of expression and freedom of information can be found. Article 1 I of Conven-
tion on the International of Correction states "Recognizing that the professional 
responsibility of correspondents and information and information agencies 
requires them to report facts without discrimination and in their proper context 
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and thereby to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to 
further international understanding and cooperation and to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, Considering also that, as a matter 
of professional ethics, all correspondents and information agencies should, in 
the case of news dispatches transmitted or published by them and which have 
been to be false or distorted, follow the customary practice of transmitting 
through the same channels, or publishing corrections of such dispatches, . . ." - 0 
d) Some Resolutions of UNESCO (United Nation Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization) 
The Constitution of UESCO stresses the need for information and communi-
cation within and between states. In accordance with the provisions of Article 
1.2 (a) of the UNESCO's Constitution, it regulates "the work of advancing the 
mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass 
communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as 
may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image". Since 
1945, UNESCO has set up its action plans in the field of communication and 
information for decades to "promote the free flow of ideas by word and image". 
The purpose is to prevent wars and construct the defense of peace by "advancing 
the mutual knowledge and understanding of people" in spite of the "ignorance 
of each other 's way and lives, suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of 
the world".21 Within UNESCO Resolution 3.2 of 1983, and UNSCO Resolution 
4.1 of 1991 on the Right to Communicate,22 and the 1991 UNESCO Declaration 
of Windhoek, "the right to communicate" and freedom of information also had 
been reaffirmed to participant countries concerned and is expected to reduce 
disparities in information flow between developed and developing countries, 
international and national levels as well as the public and private sectors. 
III. Applications and Restrictions of the Right to Communicate 
"The right to communicate" is linked to several fundamental human rights such 
as freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of information, and media 
rights, etc. From several historic declarations and international agreements, the 
211
 Convention on the International Right of Correction, 435 U.N.T.S. 191, entered into 
force Aug. 24, 1962; see http://wwwl.umn.edu/humants/instree/ulcirc.htm 
21
 See http://www.unesco.org/webworld/unescojolicies.html 
22
 See http://rrr.dds.nl/pcc/nl/annexe.html 
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right to communicate has been affirmed. To balance personal rights and public 
interests, some restrictions and limitations should be poured into considered 
within the scope of "the right to communicate". Thus, how to protect personal 
rights relating to the right to communicate and properly safeguard access to 
information services concerning privacy and national security is an important 
issue. Following the creation of new technologies and the Communication 
Revolution, some new problems concerning the intellectual property right, 
encryption and privacy have been raised. 
1. Freedom of Expression 
As mentioned above, freedom of expression is affirmed both in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Both o f them state that everyone has freedom of opinion, freedom of 
expression, and freedom to hold opinions without interference. The right to 
express one's thoughts and to communicate freely each other affirms the 
dignity and worth of every member of societies, and allows each individual to 
realize his or her full human potential. Thus free expression is an end in itself 
and as such, deserves society's greatest protection."' 
In the US, the purported basis of the doctrine of freedom of expression is 
the First Amendment.24 Under the First Amendment, the protection of free speech 
is not limited to "pure speech" such as books, newspapers, leaflets, and rallies. 
It also protects "symbolic speech" like nonverbal expression whose purpose 
is to communicate ideas. The word "speech" under the First Amendment has 
been extended to a generous sense of "expression" including verbal, non-
verbal, visual, and symbolic. In 1969, in the case of Tinker v. Des Moines, the 
Court recognized the right of public school students to wear black armbands in 
protest of the Vietnam War. The wearing of armbands with a peace symbol 
w a s protected as symbolic speech protected under the First Amendment.2 5 
Later on, in the case of Texas v. Johnson of 19892f' and U.S. v. Eichman of 
' See http://www.aelu.org/library/pbplO.htnil 
1
 Perry, M. J.: Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine. Northwestern 
University Low Review. 78(1983) 1 137. 
25
 Sec Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, (1969). 
26
 Sec Texas v. Johnson, 49! U.S. 397, (1989), Certiorari to (he Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Texas, No. 88-155. Also see hltp://caselaw.Iindlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pi? 
court=US&vol=491 &invo!=397 
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1990, the Court struck down government bans on "flag desecration".27 Other 
examples of protected symbolic speech include works of art, T-shirt, slogans, 
political buttons, music lyrics and theatrical performances. Protected expression 
now includes such non-verbal expressions as wearing a symbol on one's clothing, 
dance movements, or a silent candlelight vigil. Recently, Justice David Soutcr 
listed some of the forms of expressions protected under the First Amendment 
that have been recognized by the US Supreme Court such as painting, music, 
poetry, motion pictures, dramatic works, radio and television entertainment, 
drawings, and engravings.28 
The English philosopher .John Stuart MilI (1806-1873) articulated what 
might be called the "liberal" or (better) the "libertarian" position on freedom 
of expression in his 1859 book "On Liberty"24 His test for appropriate govern-
ment interference with human liberties is his well-known "harm" principle.30 
This basic principle provides an excellent rulc-of-thumb for approaching 
issues of freedom of expression. Most of the classic exceptions to freedom of 
expression, as established by the US Supreme Court, arc consistent with this 
harm principle. Contemporary philosophers like Joel Feinbcrg" and Carl Cohen32 
following Mill 's approach have summarized the exceptions to freedom of 
expression established by the US Supreme Court. Critics of Mill 's approach to 
freedom of expression generally accept the harm principle as a justification for 
suppressing speech, but claim that additional reasons are sufficient to suppress 
speech. For example, Patrick Devlin and Edmund Pincoffs believed that the 
government should enforce morality and should legislate morality, suppressing 
27
 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, (1990), Appeal from the District Court 
for the DC, No. 89-1433. Also see hUp://casclaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court= 
US&vol=496&invol=310 
28
 See NEA v. Finley, No. 97-371, (1998). 
29
 J.S. Mill (1956), On Liberty, Currin V. Shields, ed., New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, originally published 1859. Also see http://wiretap.spies.eom/flp.items/l.ibrary/ 
Classic/liberty .jsm 
111
 Ibid., see Chapter 1, Introductory: " . . . the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant"; 13. 
'" Feinbcrg, J.: Limits to the Free Expression of Opinion. In: Fcinberg, J.-Gross, H. 
(ed.): Philosophy of Law. Belmont, California, 1995. 
32
 Cohen, C.: Free Speech and Political Extremism: How Nasty Are We Free to Be? 
1992. Law and Philosophy (1989) 263-279. Adams, D. M. (ed.): Philosophical Problems 
in the Law. Belmont, California, 257-265. 
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speech to f u r t h e r that g o a l . 3 1 Unt i l n o w , m a n y exceptions concerning free 
expression h a v e been d e c i d e d by the cour t s , i n c l u d i n g d e f a m a t i o n , 4 sed i t ion , 3 5 
breach of t he peace , i n c i t e m e n t to c r ime , " f i g h t i n g w o r d s " , '' c a u s i n g pan ic , 3 7 
a n d o b s c e n i t y . 3 8 Thus the r i g h t to f r e e d o m o f e x p r e s s i o n is res t r ic ted w h e n 
exp re s s ions c a u s e harm to a n o t h e r person . 
2. Freedom of Information 
Simi la r to f r e e d o m of e x p r e s s i o n , f r e e d o m o f i n f o r m a t i o n is a l so e n d o r s e d 
bo th in the U n i v e r s a l D e c l a r a t i o n of H u m a n R i g h t s and In t e rna t iona l C o v e n a n t 
o n Civil a n d Pol i t ical R i g h t s . M e a n w h i l e , f r e e d o m o f i n f o r m a t i o n c o m p r i s e s 
f r e e d o m to s e e k , receive, a n d impa r t all k i n d s o f i n f o r m a t i o n and ideas w i t h o u t 
in t e r f e rence . T h e right to c o m m u n i c a t e c o n t a i n s the r ight t o f r e e acces s to the 
essen t ia l s e r v i c e s th rough t h e r ight to the u s e of i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e r ight o f 
a c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i o n tools shou ld be app l i ed w i t h o u t 
res t r ic t ions at b o t h ind iv idua l a n d co l l ec t ive levels . T h e r igh t to c o m m u n i c a t e 
c o n c l u d e s b o t h the right to i n f o r m and the r igh t to be i n f o r m e d . 
" Pincoffs, E.: "The Enforcement of Morality", from Philosophy of Law: A Brief 
Introduction. Belmont, California, 1991. 131-141; Devlin, P.: The Enforcement of Morals. 
Oxford, 1965. 
34
 Sec Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association. 745 E.Supp. 130, S.D.N.Y. (1990). 
"Although not without controversy, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld statutes that 
prohibit the advocacy of unlawful conduct against the government or the violent overthrow 
of the government. As with prohibitions discussed earlier, the expressions in question are 
assessed according to the circumstances. Academic discussion of the theories of, say Karl 
Marx presumably would not be prohibited under such a test, especially in this post-Soviet 
era. The theoretical consideration and even endorsement of these views could not remotely 
be considered to be reasonable expectations of the actual overthrow of the government. 
But it is possible that an artist might develop a project, perhaps guerrilla theater or an 
exhibit that urged the destruction of the United States (the "Great Satan") by extremist 
religious groups. The likelihood of success by the latter group would seem as improbable 
as the likelihood of success by contemporary Marxists. See http://www.csulb.cdu/~ 
jvancamp/intro.html 
"'See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568-572, (1942). The U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the First Amendment does not protect "fighting words-those which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peacc." 
7
 Sec Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, (1919). This classic exception is credited 
to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting lire in a theatre and causing a panic." 
38
 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 14, (1973). The U.S. Supreme Court established a 
three-pronged test for obsccnity prohibitions that would not violate the First Amendment. 
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In the US, the federal and state governments have enacted laws concerning 
freedom of information that guarantee the right of the public access to govern-
mental documents. The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was passed 
by US Congress in 1966 and amended in 1974. The FOIA creates procedures 
whereby citizens may obtain the governmental agencies ' records. Also, the 
federal Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 mandated 
that the federal government's electronic records arc public to the same extent 
as their paper counterparts.39 Although US Supreme Court has recognized the 
First Amendment right of access to governmental records in some limited 
situations, and a few states have enshrined a right of access in their state constitu-
tions, statutes and the common law are more frequently invoked to create a 
presumption of openness.4" 
The FOIA directs government agencies to disclose certain types of records 
and describes the manner of disclosure required.41 Under FOIA, some records 
that must be published in the Federal Register include description of the 
agency's organizational structure, description of the procedures that arc set up 
to give the public access to the agency records, general description of how 
the agency functions and its decision-making process, the agency's rules of 
procedure, and the agency's general policies.42 Some records that must be made 
available for public inspection and copying include final decisions in particular 
administrative cases, policy statements that the agency uses but has not 
published in the federal register, internal manuals written for the agency's staff 
that affect members of the public, and an index of the kinds of information 
that must be made public.43 Besides, Courts have reserved the right to interpret 
provisions broadly to achieve the goal of Congress of full disclosure.44 
Although the goal of FOIA is full disclosure of governmental records, US 
Congress concluded that some confidentiality is necessary for governments ' 
administrative goal. The federal agency can refuse to release certain types of 
information. There arc nine legal categories that are exempted under the law of 
the FOIA including national security, internal agency rules, governed by other 
statutes, business information, internal government memos, private matters, law 
enforcement investigations, regulation of financial institutions, and information 
34
 http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/viewpage.cgi70901 
40
 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Montana, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota and Tennessee are among those states whose constitutions 
recognize a right of access to government documents. 
41
 See Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Section 552 (a). 
42
 See FOIA Subsection (a) (1) lists. 
43
 See FOIA Subsection (a) (2) lists. 
44
 See FOIA Subsection ( 1 ) (3). 
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concerning oil well locations.47 The FOIA requires an agency to provide a "rea-
sonably segregation" port ion of a record and cannot withhold an entire 
document merely because some portions of the document arc exempt. The ex-
emptions of FOIA are not mandatory, but discretionary. That means an agency 
can choose to release records even after it has determined the records fall 
within one or more of the above exemptions. In most states, there arc only a 
few specifically designated types of records that arc required to be kept secret. 
3. Public Order and National Security 
Article 19 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that the 
exercise about "the right to communicate" may be subjected to certain restrictions, 
but those restrictions shall provide by laws and arc necessary for the protections 
of national security or of public order. In the name of national security, many 
governments have frequently used it as a pretext to violate fundamental human 
rights and civil liberties. For example, the US government had historically 
overused the concept of "national security" to shield itself from criticism, and 
to discourage public discussion of controversial policies or decisions. In the 
US history, President Jefferson countenanced internment camps for political 
dissidents; President Wilson authorized the round up and deportation of many 
foreign-born suspected "radicals" during the Palmer Raids,46 and President 
Franklin Roosevelt interned Japanese Americans in World War II. During the 
period of Cold War, the US government also adopted some measures against 
free spccch such as loyalty oaths, blacklisting and travel restrictions. 
Additionally, the US government attempted to censor the "Pentagon Papers" 
in the Vietnam War era.47 In 1971, the New York Times Corporation published 
and disclosed the "Pentagon Papers"47 to the public, and that caused the 
conflicting claims between the rights of the First Amendment and national 
security. Meanwhile, the New York Times ignored the government's ban to 
cease publication; and the US government then took juridical actions against 
the company and the stage was set for a Supreme Court decision. The Supreme 
Court had ruled that the government could not, through "prior restraint", 
obstruct publication of any material unless it could prove that it would surely 
45
 Sec FOIA Section 552(b). 
See hltp://chnm.gmu.edu/courses/hist409/red.html 
47
 See http://www.aclu.org/issues/security/isns.html 
17
 The Pentagon Papers is a secret history and analysis of the US's involvement in 
Vietnam and the contents arc some classified studies that entitled "History of U.S. 
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." 
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result in "direct, immediate, and irreparable harm" to the nation. The US govern-
ment failed to prove and the public was given access to vital information.44 
The US Supreme Court has recognized the governmental interest to keep 
some information secret such as wartime troop deployments. The Court has never 
actually upheld an injunction against speech on national security grounds.50 As 
the Pentagon Papers case shows, the government's claims of "national security" 
must always be closely scrutinized to make sure they are valid.71 Besides, 
"national security" is also one of the legal exemption categories that limit the 
public 's right of free information in USA. Under FOIA, it regulates if showing 
governmental records would reasonably expect to cause damages to "national 
security", government agencies can refuse to disclose records. Those include 
military plans, weapons, scientific and technology data that relate to national 
security, and CIA records.52 
Due to national security and public order, most governments reserve the 
right to limit and restrict ci t izens ' exertion in free expression and free infor-
mation in order to achieve higher national interests and administrative goals. 
In other words, freedom of expression and freedom of information basically 
arc not unlimited and should be regulated to avoid the damages of national and 
public interests. On the other hand, the rights to know and to communicate arc 
essential in modem democratic systems and should not be violated arbitrarily 
by the name of national security or public order. Therefore, it is necessary to 
define the detailed scope of the free expression and free information by laws 
and due process. 
4. Confidentiality and Privacy 
Confidentiality and the right of privacy should be taken into consideration 
within the scope of the right to communicate. Through the new télécommuni-
cation technologies created, personal information and data arc more easily 
available and could be unjustly obtained by anyone than ever before. It is 
possible to collect and gather personal information and computer data through 
new telecommunication tools such as telephone wiretaps, photographic and 
video cameras, microphones and amplifiers, as well as the Internet. Unlike many 
49
 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for The Second Circuit No. 1873. Also see http://caselaw. 
findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pI?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=403&page=713 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 See http://www.aclu.org/Iibrary/pbplO.html 
52
 See FOIA Section 552(b). 
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legal concepts, the right of privacy has only recently recognized by law and 
still continues to establish its legal basis.53 Following the introduction of the 
new technology such as telephones, telefacsimiles, and other many electronic 
telecommunication tools, the legal recognition of privacy as a fundamental 
right has been gradually established.54 Some articles and judicial decisions 
believe privacy is accompanied by the right "to be let alone".55 
In the US, the law regulates that people should be protected by privacy 
when they "believe that the conversation is private and can not be heard by 
others who are acting in an lawful manner".5 6 People have the right of privacy 
for contents of mail envelopes, telephone conversations, telegraphic messages, 
and electronic data by wire.5 ' Additionally, confidential personal information 
such as contents of email in public system, bank records, library records, and 
student records is also considered as one kind of personal privacies and should 
be protected."5 The right of privacy is also linked to some professional ethics, 
such as confidentiality of disclosures between attorney and client, physician 
and patient, as well as priest and penitent. Violations of such confidentiality 
will constitute a form of tort.54 
Based on this recognition, people not only own the basic right to commu-
nicate but also their communications should be protected, not unjustly or illegal 
occupied. As the Fourth Amendment states "The right of people to be secure 
in their persons, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated.. ." There arc many pending cases and petitionary activities 
concerning protections of the privacy of personal computer files and commu-
nications by using the encryption technology. Encryption is a technology that 
encodes computer file and communications, much like a combination lock 
secures a filing cabinet. '" Certainly, the government has this duty to secure 
citizen's privacy by adopting laws and regulations to protect its people against 
" W a r r e n and Brandeis: The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review 4 (1890) 193; 
Presser: Privacy. California Law Review, 48 (I960) 383, and the Second Restatement of 
Torts § 652A-Í) 6521. 
54
 Standler, R. В.: Privacy Law in the USA. see http://www.rbs2.com/privacy.htm. 1997. 
55
 Ibid.; also see Coolcy, T. M.: A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1888) 29, 2d ed.; 
Wheaton v. Peters (1834) 33 US 591. 634 and Olmstead v. US (1928) 277 US 438. 478. 
56
 American Jurisprudence, (1974). Telecommunications § 209. 
57
 See Ronald; 18 USC § 2510 et seq.; 18 USC § 1702; 39 USC § 3623. 
58
 Sec Ronald; also see 18 USC § 2702(a); 12 USC § 3401; 20 USC § 1232g.; NY CPLR 
§ 4509. 
59
 Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Orgeon ( 1985): 696 P. 2d 527 
60
 Americans for Computer Privacy: US Policy on Encryption Should Protect Our 
Right to Privacy; see http://www.eomputerprivacy.org/about/. 
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invasion of their information and data. The government should formulate 
related policies controlling the use of electronic recording of personal infor-
mation and data for privacy protection. The governments also should enact 
laws and regulations to protcct the interests of users, creators, producers and 
distributors. Only through legislative protections, the true meaning of the right 
to communicate can be achieved. 
IV. Universal Access and Global Telecommunication Development 
1. Scopes of Universal Access and Services 
Universal service is defined as a telephone in every household and universal 
access is defined as being within easy reach of a telephone.'1' Universal acccss 
to basic telecommunications has already been emphasized for decades in the 
20th century. To make universal access affordable enough to address everyone 's 
basic right to communicate gradually plays a vital role in international télé-
communication cooperation. For most developing countries, universal acccss 
is more relevant than universal service. The policy of universal access has been 
drawn through provisions of public telephones, at least installing one public 
telephone in every village. Although the cost of providing telecommunication 
services in rural areas is quite high, the impacts on cultural, social, educational, 
and economic development are obvious and considerable.62 A large portion of 
populations of developing countries lives in rural areas, and those areas arc 
often lacking communication tools to connect with the outside world. Making 
telecommunication and information accessible and available is essential and 
important for them. In other words, achieving universal access and services not 
only realizes everyone's basic right to communicate, but also has a great influence 
to the right to know, right to print, right to education, ctc. 
2. Teledensity-the Differences of Telecommunication Development between 
Industrialized and Developing Countries 
There is a big gap between industrialized and developing countries in tclcdcnsity. 
The most common measure of telecommunication acccss is teledensity, the 
61
 BDT: Asia and Pacific Telecommunication Trade and Finance Colloquium, New 
Delhi, India, Nov. 3 -5 , 1997; see http://www.itu.int/ITU-D-Finance/linance/Conclusions/ 
asia.htm; 4. 
62
 Ibid. 
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number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. In the richest countries, 
there are 45 or more phone lines for each 100 people; however, there is less 
than one in the poorest countries mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. Many developing 
countries in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe are somewhere in 
between.61 The gap between industrialized and developing countries, the "infor-
mation haves" and "information have nots" lasts for many years and continues 
to increase. Compared to all people in the world, the inhabitants that belong to 
"information haves" merely make up a very small proportion, and the major 
population in developing countries still belongs to "information have nots" that 
even do not even have the basic telecommunication tool- the telephone-in their 
daily life. For example, sub-Saharan Africa has fewer telephone lines than the 
city of Tokyo, while about 12 million telephone lines serve more than 700 million 
Africans. The biggest challenge for African countries is how to overcome the 
limited f inance available for infrastructure provisions.64 The big gaps existing 
between industrialized and developing countries relate to distribution of access, 
resources, and opportunities in the information and communication fields. 
Thus, it is extremely important to heighten the tclcdcnsity in remote areas. 
People l iving in the industrialized countries have easier access to telecom-
munications than those in developing countries. In many developing countries, 
it is estimated probably more half of the population has no access to even simple 
telecommunication services such as te lephones and telegraphs. '0 This is one 
kind of pover ty , information poverty that appears in many lower-developing 
countries. M a n y developing countries, especially the least developed countries 
arc not sharing the benefits of the communication revolution. Many of them 
lack financial support, suitable policies, technical skill, and trained manpower 
to develop, maintain and provide the basic telecommunications service. The 
telecommunication infrastructure is really fragile in most developing countries. 
The lowest-income countries that account for about 56% of the world's population 
share only 7% of the world 's telephone mainlines. Excluding China (PRC) and 
India, a total o f 57 lowest-income countries that account for one-fifth of the 
world's population has only one-hundredth of the global telephone mainline.66 
Additionally, those lines arc limited to major cities, the waiting lists for basic 
M
 ITU: Intcr-Agency Project on Universal Access to Basic Communication and Infor-
mation Services, see http://itu.int/acc/rtc/acctref/acctref.htm 
' 'Agence France-Rressc, (May 4, 1998): Mandela says business must fuel Africa 's 
information age; Johannesburg. 
63
 See the ITU report. 
" ITU: ACC Statement on Universal Access to Basic Communication and information 
Service; sec http://www.itu.int/acc/rtc/acc-rep.htm. 
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telecommunication tools are still long, and there is no indication showing that 
the situation will improve soon. Without basic telecommunication services, 
information and knowledge cannot easily reach these areas and will impair 
their fundamental human rights concerning the rights to plant, shelter, health, 
medicine, education and development. 
For developing countries, basic telecommunication development also brings 
problematic issues including nationwide availability, non-discriminatory access 
and widespread affordability. Considering economic, social, geographic, local 
demand, a telephone should be within a reasonable distance for everyone. The 
distance depends on the coverage of the telephone network, the geography of 
the country, and the density of the population and the spread of habitations in 
the urban and rural areas. It also can reflcct the different policies such as pro-
viding a telephone to every village.67 On the other hand, in industrialized 
countries, universal access is considered elementarily achieved, that the majority 
of the population already has the basic telecommunication - telephone in use.68 
The goals of developed countries will gradually focus on telecommunication 
market liberalization, higher quality, and more advanced telecommunication 
tools introduced such as cellular phones, pagers, the Internet, and satellite 
connections, etc. The poor telecommunication infrastructure in developing 
countries will also impact the telecommunication development and its accessi-
bility in industrialized countries. Due to lacking of basic and reachable tele-
communications, the people living in developing countries cannot connect 
with people living in industrialized ones, to know their cultures, and to pro-
mote future cooperation in telecommunications. The mutual understanding 
and assistance between developing and industrialized countries arc necessary 
for global peace and development. Therefore, developed countries have the 
obligations to assist telecommunications-lacking countries and decrease the 
gap in teledensity. 
3. Role of International Télécommunication Union (ITU) 
Founded in 1865, the former ITU, the International Telegraph Convention was 
operated for solving problems of messages transmitted and transcribed across 
two or more countries caused by the different telecommunication systems. After 
the mid-20th century, following the participation of more and more developing 
countries into the ITU, the missions of ITU have been broadened from inter-
67
 See ITU: World Telecommunication Development Report (March 1998); 4 th edition, 
also see http://www.itu.int/ti/publicalions/WTDR.98/index.htm. 
68
 Ibid. 
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national telecommunication cooperation to telecommunication developmental 
assistance for developing countries. 
a) The Constitution of ITU and the Right to Communicate 
Providing technical assistance to developing countries in order to make tele-
communications available universally is one of important missions of ITU. 
Under Article 1.1 (b) of the Constitution of ITU, the ITU should "promote and 
offer technical assistance to developing countries in the field of telecommuni-
cat ions. . ." It is one of major purposes of ITU to reduce the differences and 
distances of tclcdcnsity between industrialized and developing countries. Article 
1.1 (c) states the ITU should "promote the development of technical facilities 
and their most efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of 
telecommunication services.. . so far as possible generally available to the 
public." Also, Article 1.1 (d) states the ITU should "promote the extension of 
the benefits of the new telecommunication technologies to all the world's 
inhabitants." Obviously, the ITU stresses télécommunications should be available 
to the public and everyone should enjoy the benefits of the new telecommuni-
cations. In addition, the ITU promotes everyone's equal right to telecommuni-
cation. Under Article 33, every state should "recognize the right of the public to 
correspond by means of the international service of public correspondence. 
The services, the charges and the safeguards shall be the same for all users in 
each category of correspondence without any priority or preference." The ITU 
also reserves the right to each state to stop or cut off telecommunications 
services due to national security, public order, and domestic legal requirement 
and decency.''4 
b) Efforts of ITU in Global Telecommunication Development 
For many years, the ITU has promoted the right to communicate as a basic 
human right. Under the aegis of UN ' s Administrative Committee on Coordi-
nation, a project is under implementation on Universal Access to Basic 
Communication and Information Service. The project is designed to reduce the 
information gap between the developed and developing countries and make 
telecommunication and information services accessible easily. In 1984, the 
Maitland Commission recommended that by the year of 2000 everyone in the 
' ' See Article 34.1 of the Constitution of the ITU: "Member reserve the right to stop 
the transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security of the 
State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency.. ." 
REVIEW OF "RIGI IT TO COMMUNICATE" 289 
world should have ready access to at least basic telephone service. This goal 
has not yet been reached; however, access to basic telephone services for the 
inhabitants in low-developing countries is rapidly increasing.70 An inter-agency 
UN project on universal access to basic communication and information 
service-"the right to communicatc"-was created at the initiative of Dr. Pekka 
Tajanne, former Secretary-General of ITU.71 
At the beginning of the new millennium, the duty of ITU is to make 
telecommunications available to all of the world's inhabitants, at prices that 
arc affordable to all. In addition, to strengthen the multilateral foundations of 
international telecommunications and to promote universal access and global 
connectivity should quickly be embarked.72 With the pilot and support of ITU, 
there are several Action Plan Programs planned and proceeding such as the 
Buenos Aires Action Plan and the Valetta Action Plan Program, etc. In 1998, the 
ITU held the World Telecommunication Development Conference in Malta 
and 143 participatory countries adopted the Valletta Declaration and Action 
Plan. 3 The Valletta Declaration underlines the importance of translating the 
indisputable potential of telecommunications into tangible results to improve 
the lives of all people of the world, especially those in developing countries. '4 
The ITU encourages and supports universal service, global access and fair 
pricing and give special attention to the least developed countries. Those actions 
and programs are designed to develop best-practice, sustainable and replicable 
models of ways to provide access to modern telecommunication facilities and 
information services, especially to people living in rural and remote areas. The 
final goal of those programs and plans is universally accessible telecommuni-
cations to the whole of humanity. In the prevailing environments of converging 
technologies and globalization, it is the time to structure the telecommunication 
sector in order to stimulate public and private sectors ' investments and 
accelerate the pace of expansion and modernization of telecommunication 
networks in developing countries. To the end, it will benefit everyone to provide 
basic telecommunication services and assist necessary technical skills in rural 
and remote areas. 
7
" ITU: Proposal to Establish an ACC Inter-Agency Project on Universal Access to 
Basic Communication and Information Services; see http://www.itu.int/acc/rtc/acetorl.htni 
1
 "The Right to Communication: A New Declaration is Born." ITU News, 1997. No. 
6; see http://www.itu.int/acc/rtc/acc-rep.htm 
" H. 1. Toure (Director of Telecommunication Development Bureau of the ITU): BD I 
Director Message, sec http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/bdtint/Director /messdir.htm 
73
 M2 Presswire (Apr. 20, 1998): ITU: ITU World Telecommunication Development 
Conference adopts Valletta Action Plan, Valletta, Malta. 
74
 Ibid. 
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V. Conclusion 
With the creation of new technologies, the manners of telecommunication have 
changed with high-speed. The world is in the midst of the communication and 
information revolution, and a new lifestyle accompanied with modern telecom-
munication tools gradually has been formed. The new information highway 
will change the lifestyle of the people. Many services will be provided by new 
systems such as tclcwork, telecommuting, teleservices, tclemedicine, teleeduca-
tion, teleshopping, telebanking, etc. Under this new trend, physical location is 
becoming irrelevant to the ability to deliver or receive services and goods. The 
rapid explosion of the Internet and World Wide Web have provided a more 
convenient way for communication interface linking with computers in global 
communications, information and data exchanges for those who need it, look 
for it, and can download it whenever they want. With the rapid coming of the 
electronic f low of information across the whole world, the role of telecommuni-
cation has changed from a voice communications network to a component that 
underpins many economic activities. With the further development of new 
telecommunication technologies, the right to communicate should take on a 
more energetic role. 
With the invention of new telecommunication tools and information tech-
nologies, several legal problems also arise. For example, should the doctrine of 
free spcccli be applied to new communication tools such as pagers, facsimiles, or 
Internet communications? Due to new high-speed technologies, it is easier to 
gain personal data and national secrets via cyberspace and multimedia. Does 
the government already establish a series of measures and regulations to 
protect the right of privacy and public interests? As mentioned above, the so-
called "Encrypt ion" software was invented to protect national confidentiality 
and personal privacy. However, some people criticize that such measures may 
be overused to violate the basic right to communicate, such as free expression 
and free information. "The right to communicate" is one of natural and funda-
mental rights aff i rmed by numerous historic legal documents and international 
agreements. Thus , even new communication tools that have been continually 
created should be freely used and protected by the name of free speech and 
f ree information. The legal standards to balance between these freedoms and 
national security or between freedoms and privacy also should be applied. In 
addition, the scope of universal access should be extended to include the 
Internet and o ther new electronic tools to support the effective use to achieve 
democratic ends. 
Wc use the basic telecommunication tool, the telephone, to communicate with 
our family, friends, coworkers, and deal wilh thousands of business affairs every 
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day. We receive, listen, watch and arc informed of daily news via broadcasting 
and television. Recently, we can even attend classes, transact stocks, and send 
emails through the Internet. However, there are still many people lacking the 
basic telecommunication access. Considering the principle of equal rights, it 
is necessary for developed countries to assist developing one to promote basic 
telecommunication services. As Dr. Tarjannc, the former Secretary-General 
of ITU said: "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out the rights 
and freedoms that people everywhere should be able to enjoy. It is the best 
definition the world community has so far been able to develop of the common 
elements of humanity shared by all people." For all to enjoy these rights, they 
must have access to basic communication and information services. He warned: 
"Without action on the part of the world community, there is a very real 
danger that the global information society will be global in name only; that the 
world will be divided into the ' information rich' and the ' information poor ' ; 
and that the gap between developed and developing countries will widen into 
an unbridgeable chasm." 5 
The relation between universal access and the right to communicate is very 
intimate. By liberalization and establishment of telecommunications, this rela-
tionship will achieve a great deal and prove widely beneficial. The developments 
of advanced telecommunication technology will quickly bring numerous 
benefits to everyone and everywhere. When the information society becomes a 
reality, electronic communications are becoming an ever more important tool 
in promoting the international communications and media regime. Access by 
individuals, and by collective groups such as governments, organizations, and 
enterprises, global telecommunication, will continue to inspire development 
and assistance for developing countries, and will make the information society 
come true and promote fundamental human rights for everyone. 
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 See ITU News, 1997. No. 6. 
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I. Enca Silvio Piccolomini, in chapter sixty-five, book twenty on Carinthia of 
his work entitled De Europa written in 1458, tells an interesting story defined 
as a legend in terms of genre about a duke called Ingo, who lived during the 
reign of Charlemagne. This narrative claims that in 790 dux gent is Ingo held a 
feast for the inhabitants o f his province where food was served to the peasants 
allowed to appear before him in golden and silver bowls, while to the dignitaries 
standing further away f rom him in bowls made of clay. To the question why 
he acted like that lie answered that the soul of simple people living on the land 
and in huts but cleaned in baptismal water was white and clean, while the soul 
of dignitaries living in palaces but adoring idols was dirty and black; and he 
arranged the feast as the cleanness of the soul required it. The noblemen so 
ashamed teamed to get baptised, and led by the bishops of Salzburg, Virgil and 
Am soon all of them took baptism.' 
The researchers' attention is deservedly raised by the query how come that 
this parabolical story with biblical tone was included in Enea Silvio's work; 
i f i t had been borrowed w h o the auctor might have been he borrowed it from. 
The answer seems to be very simple: f rom the Conversio Bagoariorum et 
Carantanorum drafted regarding the lawsuit proceeded against Methodius, 
papal legate and archbishop of Sirmium at the Council of Rcgensburg held in 
the presence of Louis the German in 870, with the assistance of Adalwin, 
archbishop of Salzburg and his bishops-ci ther as a bill of indictment or to 
legitimate the lawsuit subsequently, it cannot be clarified. That work also contains 
a narrative with Ingo holding a feast as the protagonist.2 
1
 En ее Silvii Piccolominei posted Pii PP. //. De Europa 65. (Ed. Heck, A. van. Città 
del Vaticano, 2001.) Fama est anno septiingentesimo nonagesimo post Christi Salvatoris ortum 
imperante Carolo Magno ducem gentis, Ingonem nomine, ingens convivium provincialibus 
praeparas.se et agrestibus quidem, ad conspectum suum intromi.ssis, in vasis aureis atque 
argenteis, nobilibus vera ae magnatibus, procul ab oculis eolloeatis, fictiHbus ministrare 
iussisse. Interrogation, cur ita faceret, respondisse non tarn mundos esse, qui urbes el 
alia palatia quam qui agros et Inimités casas colerent. Rusticis, qui Christi evageliiun 
accepissent, baptismatis unda purificatis Candidas et nitidas esse animas; nobiles ac 
potentes, qui spurcitias idoloruin sequerentur, sordidas ac nigerrimas. Se vero pro animarum 
qualitatibus instru.xis.se convivium. Casigatos ea re nobiles catervatim sacri baptismatis 
itndani quaerentes brevi tempore sub Vergilio et Arnone iuvavensibus episcopis universes 
Christi /idem accepisse. 
Conversio Bagoariorum el Carantanorum 7. (Ed. Losek, F. Monumenta Germaniac 
Historica (MGH ) Studien und Texte 15.1 lannover, 1997.) Simili modo etiam Arn episcopus 
successor sedis luvavensis deinceps curant gessit pastoralem, undique ordinans presbyteros et 
mittens in Sc/avinam, in partes videlicet Quarantanas atque inférions Pannoniae, Ulis 
ducibus atque comitihus, sicut pridein Virgili us fecit. Quorum un us Ingo vocabatur, multum 
cams popul is et ainabilis propter suant prudentiam. Cui tant oboediens fuit omnis populus, 
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II. E n e a S i l v io P i c c o l o m i n i 3 w a s born in 1405 as a ch i ld o f an i m p o v e r i s h e d 
nob le f a m i l y in C o r s i g n a n o c l o s e to S iena . He c o m p l e t e d h i s s tudies in S i e n a 
and F l o r e n c e , at the C o u n c i l o f Base l ( 1 4 3 1 - 1 4 4 9 ) he a c t e d as the s ec r e t a ry o f 
D o m e n i c o C a p r a n i c a and o t h e r c h u r c h d i g n i t a r i e s until 1435 . He was c r o w n e d 
poeta laureatus by F r e d e r i c k III ( 1 4 4 0 - 1 4 9 3 ) , and was o f f e r e d a s e c r e t a r y ' s 
o f f i c e at the Imper ia l C h a n c e l l e r y , w h i c h he accep ted . In 1447 he h a d h i m 
o rda ined a pr ies t , and f r o m then on he a s c e n d e d fast in t h e c h u r c h ' s h i e r a r c h y : 
in 1447 h e b e c a m e the b i s h o p of T r i e s t e , in 1450 of S i e n a ; in 1456 h e w a s 
o rda ined ca rd ina l ; a f t e r t h e d e a t h of P o p e C a l l i x t u s III ( 1 4 5 5 - 1 4 5 8 ) in 1 4 5 8 he 
was e l ec t ed the p o p e - a s pontifex maximus h e took the n a m e Pius II. A s a p o p e 
he d e e m e d his key e r r a n d w a s to o r g a n i s e the c r u s a d e aga ins t the T u r k s ; 
h o w e v e r , h is p lans f a i l ed . ( T h i s t ight r e p r e s e n t e d a p e c u l i a r s tage in his c a r e e r , 
bea r ing w i t n e s s of li t t le po l i t i ca l r ea l i sm t h o u g h ; he w a n t e d to stop the I s l a m 
th rea ten ing Chr is t iani ty t h r o u g h peacefu l negot ia t ions : in 1461 he wrote a le t te r 
lit, si cuique vel carta sine litteris ab illo directa fuit, nullus ausus est suum negl egere 
praeceptum. Qui etiam mirabiliter fecit: Vere servos credentes secum vocavit ad mensam, 
et qui eorum dominabantur in/ideles, Joris quasi canes sedere fecit ponendo ante illos panem 
et carnem et fusca vasa cum vino, ut sic sumerent victus. Servis autem staupis deauratis 
propinare iussit. Tunc interrogantes primi deforis dixerunt: 'Cur facts nobis sic?' At il le: 
'Non estis digni non ablutis corporibus cum sacro Jbnte renalis communicare, sed Joris 
domum ut canes sumere victus. ' Hoc facto Jide sanda instruct i certatim cucurrerunt 
baptizari. Et sic deineeps religio Christiana succrescit. 
3
 About life and work of Enea Silvio see Voigt, G.: Enea Silvio del Piccolomini als 
Papst Pius der Zweite und sein Zeitalter l-lll Berlin, 1856-1863; Pór A.: Aeneas Sylvius-
Pius pápa. (Aenea Sylvius-Pope Pius) Budapest, 1880; Boulting, W.: Aeneas Sylvius, orator, 
man of letters, statesman and pope. London, 1908; Ady, С. M.: Pius II. (Aeneas Silvias 
Piccolomini), the humanist pope. London, 1913; Hocks, E.: Pius II. und der Halbmond. 
Freiburg im Breisgau, 1941; Papparelli, G.: Enea Silvio Piccolomini. Biblioteca di cultura 
moderna 481. Bari, 1950; Biirck, G.: Selbstdarstellung und Personenbildnis bei Enea Silvio 
Piccolomini (Pius II.). Basler Beiträge zur Geschichtswissenschaft 56. Basel-Stuttgart, 
1956; Mitchell, R. J.: The Laurels and the Tiara, Pope Pius II. 1458-1464. London, 1962; 
Gebei, D.: Nikolaus von Kues und Enea Silvio Piccolomini Bilder der außereuropäischen 
Welt als Spiegelung europäischer Sozialverhältnisse im 15. Jahrhundert. Hamburg, 1977; 
Blusch, J.: Enea Silvio Piccolomini und Giannantonio Campano - Die unterschiedlichen 
Darstellungsprinzipien in ihren Türkenreden. Humanistica Lovaniensia 28 (1979) 78-138; 
Weining, P. J.: Aeneam suseipite, Pium reeipite. Die Rezeption eines humanistischen 
Schriftstellers im Deutschland des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts. Wiesbaden, 1998; Nótári T.: 
Szemelvények Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomnini Európa című müvéből. (Fragments from "De 
Europa" by Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini) Documenta Historica 42. Szeged, 1999; Nótári 
T.: Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini szónoki művészete. (Rhetorical art of Aeneas Sylvius 
Piccolomini) In: Középkortörténeti tanulmányok. (Studies on Middle Ages) Szeged, 2003. 
103-112. 
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to Mohamed II calling the sultan to leave his faith and become Christian.4 His 
deteriorated health prevented him from leading the slowly gathering armies as 
he had wanted to: in 1464 he died in Ancona. 
His works on history (História Austrialis, 1453/58; Germania, 1457; História 
Bohcmica, 1458; De Europa, 1458; De Asia, 1461)5 produced a great impact 
on the evolving historiography of the modern age. His wok entitled De Europa 
has been bequeathed to us in codices usually under the title Gesta sub Federico 
III, or De gestis sub Federico III; it was given the title De Europa known today 
in the first printed publications (Memmingen, 1490; Venice, 1501; Paris, 1509). 
Enea completed De Europa when lie was a cardinal in 1458; inconsistent 
references here and there and disproportionate parts of the structure that occur 
on and off can be attributed to bis not having time and opportunity as a pope 
to edit the book to be published more precisely. 
III. The protagonists of the Slavonic (and Avar) mission in the 9th century 
were the Byzantine Empire, on the one hand, and the Frankish Empire, which 
relied on the Archbishopric of Salzburg and the Patriarchy of Aquilea 
pursuing fairly independent politics, on the other;'' this balance was disrupted by 
the papacy, which was ga in ing strength, taking firm steps with independent 
mission policy against the power of the Carolingian dynasty. This thrcefoldness 
provided the background of the activity of Methodius known as the Apostle 
of the Slavs and of his confl ict with the Archbishopric of Salzburg and its 
diocesan bishops. At the Counci l of Regensburg held in the presence of Louis 
the German in 870, Adalwin, archbishop of Salzburg and bis bishops passed a 
judgment on Methodius, a missionary from Byzantium, then papal legate and 
archbishop of Sirmium, s ince they deemed that by his missionary activity 
pursued in Pannónia Methodius infringed the jurisdiction of Salzburg exercised 
over this territory for seventy-five years, and after that they held him in captivity 
for two and a half years. It was this lawsuit regarding which the Conversio 
Bagoariorum et Carantanorum1 was drafted cither as a bill of indictment or to 
4
 About litis letter see Toffanin, G.: Pio II. (Enea Silvio Piccolomini): Lettera a Mao 
melto (Epistula ad Mahumetem). Collczione umanistica diretta da G. Toffanin 8. Napoli, 
1953. 
Cf. Buchwald, W.-Hohlweg, A. Prinz, О.: Tusculwn-Lexikon griechischer und 
lateinischer Antoren des Altertums und des Mittelalters. München, 1963. 406. 
'' Reindel. K.: Politische Geschichte Bayerns im Karolingerreich. In: v. Spindler, M. 
(Hrsg.): Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte I., München. 1981". 249sqq. 
Löwe. H.: Der Streit um Methodius. Quellen zu den nationalkirchlichen Bestrebungen in 
Mähren und Pannonién im 9. Jahrhundert. 1948. 3. sqq.; Ziegler, A. W.: Methodius auf 
dem Weg in die schwäbische Verbannung. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue 
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l eg i t ima te the lawsui t s u b s e q u e n t l y , it c a n n o t be c la r i f ied . T h e t endency o f t h e 
p r e sen t a t i on o f the Conversio has been c h a r a c t e r i s e d qu i te t o the point by K a h l 
as f o l l o w s : "I t p lays a b r a v e g a m e on the v e r g e of truth; i ts s t a t emen t s a r c j u s t 
u n a t t a c k a b l e f o r w e l l - i n f o r m e d readers , a n d it leaves o p e n , what is m o r e , 
sugges t s s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t pos s ib i l i t i e s o f c o m b i n a t i o n f o r u n i n f o r m e d o n e s ; 
be ing f u l l y a w a r e of the f a c t s a n d his task t h e au tho r c o n c e a l s undes i r ab l e a n d 
' d a n g e r o u s ' c o n n e c t i o n s a n d fac t s and r e l a t e s events fa r f r o m each o the r w i t h 
a c o n s i d e r a b l e a m o u n t o f c u n n i n g " . 7 
T h e Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, that is, "The Conversion of 
the Bavarians and the Carantanians ", h i g h l y a c k n o w l e d g e d in his c o m m e n t s 
Folge 1 (1953) 369. sqq.; Hauek, A.: Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands II. Berlin-Leipzig, 
1954s. 724; Bosl, K.: Probleme der Missionierung des böhmisch-mährischen Herrschaftrau-
mes. In: v. Hellmann, M.-Olcsch, R.-Stasiewsqi, B.-Zagiba, F. (Hrsg.): Cyrillo-Methodiana. 
Zur Frühgeschichte des Christentums bei den Slaven 863-1963. Graz, 1964. 1. sqq.; Schell-
horn, M.: Erzbischof Adalwin von Salzburg und die Pannonische Mission. Mitteilungen 
der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landesgeschichte 104 (1964) 104. sqq.; Richter, M.: Die 
politische Orientierung Mährens zur Zeit von Konstantin und Methodius. In: v. Wolfram, 
H.-Schwarz, A. (Hrsg.): Die Bayern und ihre Nachbarn I. Veröffentlichung der Kommis-
sion für Frühmittelalterforschung 8. Wien, 1985. 283. sqq.; Dopsch. H.: Slawenmission 
und päpstliche Politik - Zu den Hintergründen des Methodios-Konfliktes. In: v. Piffl-Percc-
vic, Th.-Stirnemann, A. (Hrsg.): Der heilige Method, Salzburg und die Slawenmission. 
Innsbruck-Wien, 1987. 307. sqq.; Fggers, M.: Das Erzbistum des Method. Lage, Wirkung 
und Nachleben der kyrillomethodianischen Mission. Slavistisehe Beiträge 339. München, 
1996. 19; Nótári T.: Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum. Aetas 2000/3. 93. sqq.; 
H. Tóth I.: Cirill-Konstantin és Metód élete, működése (Life and Work of Cirill-Constantine 
and Methodius). Szeged, 20031. 96. sqq.; Nótári T.: Források Salzburg kora középkori 
történetéből (Sources from the History of Early-Medieval Salzburg). Szeged, 2005; Nótári Г.: 
A salzburgi historiográfia kezdetei (The Beginning of Historiography in Salzburg). 
Szeged, 2007; Nótári, T.: Show Trials and Lawsuits in Early-Medieval Bavaria. Rechts-
geschichtliche Vorträge 53. Budapest, 2008. 
8
 Kahl, H.-D.: Virgil und die Salzburger Slawenmission. In: v. Dopsch, H. Juffinger, R. 
(Hrsg.): Virgil von Salzburg - Missionar und Gelehrter. Salzburg, 1985. 112. Was da getrieben 
wird, ist nichts anderes als ein waghalsiges Spiel dicht an der Grenze der Wahrheit, gerade 
noch unanfechtbar für den, der Bescheid weiß, dem Unkundigen jedoch abweichende 
Kombinationen offenlassend, ja nahelegend, die den Zwecken der Denkschrift ungleich 
besser entgegenkamen. Man ahnt einen wohlunterrichteten Gewährsmann, der jedoch sehr 
wohl weiß, was er will, was nicht, und man bedauert, daß er von seinen Kenntnissen 
keinen besseren Gebrauch gemacht hat. Raffiniertes Versc hweigen unerwünschter oder gar 
„gefährlicher" Zusammenhänge und Fakten, ähnlich raffinierte Zusammenziehung von 
Ereignissen, die womöglich weil auseinanderlagen - das sind auch sonst die Hauptmittel, die 
der Verfasser für seinen Zweck einsetzt. 
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by Alphons Lhotsky,4 is wor th drawing the attention of research in Hungary 
since, among other things, it belongs to the texts in Latin, in addition to 
Eugippius's Vita Sancti Severini and Iordanes 's Getica, which give a more 
coherent relation from the age following the great migrations and preceding 
the conquest by Árpád on the territory of the later Hungary, and so it has out-
standing significance among the sources of 9th c. Avar history. The importance 
of the history of the Avars in terms of the history of Hungary following it has 
been summed up quite to the point by Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss: "... in the 
course of history known from written sources it was during the age of the 
Avars that the western and eastern part of the Central Danube Basin became 
a formation permanently belonging together for the first time (Pannónia and 
Dacia of the Roman empire were separated by the Sarmatian Barharicum 
lying between them). In this sense the Avar Chaganate was a forerunner of the 
later Hungary. "'" 
In his 1979 edition, Herwig Wolfram, on the grounds of the relevant sentence 
in chapter fourteen of the Conversio1 1 accepted A.D. 871 as the year of drafting;12 
in his monograph in 1995, however, he modified his position, and based his 
determination on the medieval form of calculation, which demands that the 
year indicated in the text should be added to the years passed; accordingly, he 
finally declared that A.D. 870 was the year of drafting;1 ' in his edition Fritz 
Losck shares this position.14 Regarding the person of the author deductions 
can be made only from some references made in the work; however, it is not 
possible to identify him with absolute certainty. Wolfram deems it is probable 
that archbishop Adalwin himself might have been the auctor, but he phrases 
Lhotsky, A.: Quellenkunde zur mittelalterlichen Geschichte Österreichs. Graz-Köln, 
1963. 155. Die Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, das Haupt- und Glanzstück der 
ruhmvollen Salzburgén Historiographie. ... eine merkwürdige und in ihrer Ar! schöne Schrift. 
10
 Szádeczky-Kardoss S.: Az avar történelem forrásai 557-től 806-ig. (The Sources of 
the Avar History from 557 to 806) Budapest, 1998. 9. 
" Conversio 14. A tempore igitur, quo dato et praecepto domini Karott imperatoris 
orientális Pannoniae poputus a Iuvavensibus regi coepit praesulibus usque in praesens 
tempus sunt an ni LXXV... 
'"Wolfram, I f : Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum. Das Weißbuch der Salz-
burger Kirche über die erfolgreiche Mission in Karantanien und Pannonién. Wien-Köln-
Graz, 1979. 15; 141. 
" Wolfram, H.: Salzburg, Bayern. Österreich. Die Conversio Bagoariorum et Caranta-
norum und die Quellen ihrer Zeit. Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichts-
forschung, Ergänzungsband 31. Graz—Wien-Köln, 1995. 193. 
14
 Losek. F.: Die Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum und der Brief des Erzbischofs 
Theotmar von Salzburg. MGH Studien und Texte 15. Hannover, 1997. 6. 
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his v i ew ra the r caut ious ly . 1 7 O n the o ther hand , it can be a sce r t a ined with u t m o s t 
p robab i l i t y f r o m a p a s s a g e in the f i rs t p e r s o n s ingu la r w h i c h can be read in the 
fifth chap te r that the au thor c a m e f rom Salzburg , Bavaria.1 6 A rchb i shop A d a l w i n ' s 
authorship might be suppor ted by the f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : ano the r f o r m u l a -
t ion in t h e f irst pe r son s i n g u l a r d i r ec t ly f o l l o w s the p o i n t o f the text w h e r e 
A d a l w i n is n a m e d ; so the w r i t e r migh t h a v e n a m e d the p e r s o n w h o o r d e r e d the 
w r i t i n g . ' 7 S imi la r ly , o n e c a n p o n d e r o v e r the fac t that the a t t r i b u t e p i i s s i m u s is 
used in the text of the Conversio as the ep i the t o f on ly t w o pe r sons , a n d t h e y 
are A d a l w i n 1 8 and L o u i s t he G e r m a n : 1 4 p o s s i b l y the a u t h o r and the a d d r e s s e e 
of the w o r k . 2 " 
IV. I n g o f i rs t a p p e a r e d , a s a n o b l e m a n , m o r e spec i f i ca l l y , a s the first d u k e o f 
C a r a n t a n i a , in Liber certarum historiarum f r o m the p e n o f abbot I o h a n n e s 
Vic tor iens i s , w h o died in 1345 /47 . 2 1 
In add i t ion to the s to ry o f Ingo, I ohannes Vic tor iens is ( J o h a n n von V i k t r i n g ) 
b o r r o w e d C h a r l e m a g n e ' s mi s s iona ry c o m m i s s i o n given to Arn 2 2 and the e v e n t s 
s u r r o u n d i n g M e t h o d i u s ' s a p p e a r a n c e on the scene 2 3 f r o m the Conversio;24 h o w -
15
 Wolfram: Salzburg, Bayern, Österreich... op. cit. 197. 
16
 Conversio 5. ... orta seditione, quod cannula dicimus. Cf. Schwind, E. v. (ed.): Lex 
Baiuvariorum 2, 3. MGH LL nat. Germ. 5, 2. Hannover, 1926. Si quis seditionem 
excitaverit contra ducem suum, qtiod Baiuvarii carmulum dicunl. 
17
 Conversio 9. ... et adhuc ipse Adalwinus archiepiscopus per semetipsum regere 
studet illam gentem in nomine Domini, sicut iam midtis in Ulis regionibus claret locis.; 
Conversio 10. Enumeratis ilaque episcopis luvavensium conamur, prout veracius in 
chronicis imperatorum et regum Francorum et Bagoariorum scriptum repperimus, scire 
volentibus manifestare. 
Is
 Conversio 9. ... anno nativitatis Domini DCCCXXI Adalrammus piissimus doctor 
sedem luvavensem suscepit regendam. 
14
 Conversio 12. Pervertit ergo ad notitiam Hludowici piissimi regis, quod Priwina 
benivolus fuit erga Dei servitium et suum. 
20
 Losek: op. cit. 6. 
21
 Iohannes abbas Victoriensis, Schneider, F. (ed.): Liber certarum historiarum 2, 13. 
MGH SS rcr. Germ. 1909. "Nam anno Domini septingentesimo nonagesimo sub Karola 
imperatore et Ingone duce et Vergilio et Arnone episcopis luvavensibus Ingo dux nobiles 
terre et servos eis subiectos ad convivium invitavit et nobiles quidem tamquam canes et 
immundos deputavit et pane et carnibus Joris ab ocidis suis pavit et vinum in vasis Juscis 
propinavit, servos vera vasis splendidis et deauratis in sua presencia collocavit. Et dum 
quererent nobiles, quid in hoc pretenderet, respondit lias simplices et fideles, mundos et sacro 
baptismale confirmâtes, eos autem immundos atque indignes sine sacri fonds ablucione 
existere etfedatos. Qui audientes certatim ad baptismum cum fervorefidei cucurrerunt ... ". 
22
 Conversio 8. 
23
 Conversio 12. 
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ever, this borrowing was mostly limited to elements of content; in its language 
and style the relevant parts of Liber certarum historiarum are highly independent 
of the Conversioл Marcus Hansiz identified Ingo with Carantania 's legendary 
duke, Domitianus.26 The legend tells that the heathen duke Domitianus cruelly 
persecuted Christians; then, through God's mercy he was converted. He himself 
thrust pagan idols to the bot tom of the pond, and finally became Carantania 's 
duke leading the life of a saint . - 7 The historical existence of Domitianus, who 
is usually referred to the realm of legends,28 might be supported by the fragment 
of an inscription, presumably from the 9th c., found in the monastery of 
Millstatt;2" due to the difficulty to date the inscriptio exactly and the contradicting 
tendency of other sources, Herwig Wolfram righteously warns researchers to 
be cautious.30 An interesting aspect should be added here: Eisler, who took a 
stand in favour of the historical authenticity of Domitianus and acted with 
great zest to attain canonisation, alleged to find the original form of the name 
Domitianus in the Slavic Domizlaus, and called the attention to the possible 
relation between the legend of the duke hurling down pagan idols and the 
etymology of Millstatt implying statues (mille statuesJ.31 
Modern research has most ly accepted duke Ingo as a historically authentic 
person,32 and attempted to identify the bearer of this German but not Bavarian 
name with a historical person who occurs in a tradition co-existing with the 
Conversio. Michael Mittcrauer, for example, identifies him with Etgar, a provably 
existing Carantanian duke, w h o appears in chapter ten of the Conversio.33 As 
a further hypothesis it is worth mentioning that Ingo is also identified with the 
Slavic Voinimir (Wonomyrus Sclavus), who attacked the Ring in late autumn 
24
 Lholskyo/x cit. 293. sqq. 
Losek 1990. 52; Fichtenau, H.: Herkunft und Sprache Johanns von Viktring. 
Carinthia I. 165 ( 1975) 25. sqq. 
2<
' Hansiz. M. Germania Sacra II. 1729. 104. 
" Fisler, R.: Die Legende vom heiligen Karantanenherzog Domitian. Mitteilungen des 
Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 28 ( 1907) 91. sqq. 
28
 Nikolasch. F.: Domitian von Millstatt - eine Erfindung des 12. Jahrhunderts? Carinthia 
I. 180 (1990) 253. sqq. 
" Glaser, F.: Fine Marmorinschrift aus der Zeit Karls des Großen. Carinthia I. 183 
(1993) 303-318. 
'" Wolfram: Salzburg. Bayern, Österreich... op. cit. 289. 
31
 Fisler: op. cit. 90. 
'" Ingo mentioned as comes - see Hauck, A.: Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands. Berlin 
Leipig, 1954s. II. 480. 
13
 Mittcrauer. M.: Slawischer und bayerischer Adel am Ausgang der Karolingerzeit. 
Carinthia I. 150 (1960) 695l8. 
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or early winter in 795 on the orders of Erich, duke of Friaul;34 however, only 
guesses can be made as to in what rank and position Voinimir served the 
duke.35 It is another interesting, albeit, hypothetical attempt to identify Ingo 
with Unguimeri, who figures in Rhythmus de Pippini regis victoria Avarica;'' 
in 796 (when the Frank/Langobard/Bavarian army led by Pippin was nearing) 
Unguimeri augured meeting with a treacherous end for the chagan and his 
chief wife, the chatun).37 Unguimeri's name is usually identified with the name 
of the German duke, Inguiomer(us), referred to several times in Taci tus 's 
Annales'5* on the grounds thereof Unguimeri is customarily considered one of 
the Gepids who continued to live in the Avar empire.34 Walter Pohl deems it is 
more probable that Unguimeri made it to the Avars as a Langobard emigrant.40 
Others risk making the assumption that Unguimeri might be identical with the 
aforesaid Slavic Voinimir.41 
In his 1979 edition and 1995 monograph Herwig Wolfram takes the poisonous 
tooth of the question out as follows. Ingo as a duke is to thank his existence 
merely to an interpretation/translation error which allowed room for schema-
tism as the first word of the sentence "Quorum unus ... ", the relative pronoun, 
was improperly related, instead of the missionaries sent by Arn4 to Carantania 
and Pannónia Inferior, to the dignitaries living there (whom and their people 
the missionaries had to convert).43 Since the phrase Ulis ducibus atcpie 
34
 Kurze, F. (ed.): Annales regni Francorum a. 796. MGFI SS rcr. Germ. 6. Hannover 
1895. 
35
 Pohl, W.: Die Awaren - Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa 567-822 п. Chr. München, 
1988. 319-320; Szádeczky-Kardoss: Az avar történelem... op. cil. 286. sqq.; Wolfram, FL: 
Die Geburt Mitteleuropas. Geschichte Österreichs vor seiner Entstehung. 378-907. Wien 
1987. 258. 
36
 Dümmler, E. (ed.): Rhytmus de Pippini regis victoria Avarica ce. 6. sqq. PP I. MÜH 
Berlin, 1881. 
37
 Szádeczky-Kardoss: op. cit. 293. 
38
 Borzsák, I. (ed.): Tac. ami. 1, 60. 68; 2, 17. 21. 45. 46. Leipzig, 1991. 
39
 Cf. Lakatos, P.: Quellenbuch zur Geschichte der Gépidén. Szeged, 1973. 1 15. sqq. 
40
 Pohl: op. cit. 230. sq. 
41
 Lésny, J.: Unguimer. In: Halvík, L.: (red.) Lexicon Antiquitatum Slavicarum VI. 
Wratislawiae, 1977. 264. sq.; Magnae Moraviae Fontes Historici l-IV. Praha-Brno, 1966— 
1971. (Brno, 1967.) II. 14; (Brno, 1969.) III. 305. 
42
 About Arn see Demmelbauer, G.: Arno, der erste Erzbischof von Salzburg 798-821. 
Wien, 1950; Niederkorn-Bruck, M.-Scharer, A. (Hrsg.): Erzbischof Arn von Salzburg. 
Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, Ergänzungsband 
40. Wien-München, 2004. 
43
 Wolfram: Conversio... op. cit. 96. sqq.; Wolfram: Salzburg. Bayern, Österreich... 
op. cit. 288. sq. 
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comitibus in d a t i v e is c lo se r t o the end o f t h e sen tence than presbyteros in 
accusa t ive , w h i c h is the o b j e c t o f the s e n t e n c e , t he sub jec t o f the next s e n t e n c e 
w a s g r a m m a t i c a l l y and l og i ca l l y i m p r o p e r l y r e l a t ed not to the ac tua l ob jec t . 4 4 
In A r n ' s t i m e it w a s the duces, tha t is, the C a r a n t a n i a n duces a n d the comités, 
t h e agents r e p r e s e n t i n g the F r a n k i s h / B a v a r i a n rule w h o a d m i n i s t e r e d th i s 
te r r i tory ; th is l o c u s of the Conversio is m e a n t to unde r l ine tha t the m i s s i o n a r y 
m e t h o d s a p p l i e d by Virgi l t o C a r a n t a n i a w e r e a d o p t e d a l s o by Arn w i t h 
r e spec t to P a n n ó n i a . Just as R u p e r t had n e v e r g o t to P a n n ó n i a In fe r io r , 4 5 Virgil 
w a s unab le t o o r g a n i s e the c o n v e r s i o n o f t h i s t e r r i t o r y - t h u s , t he s e n t e n c e 
b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e phrase "Simili modo ... " is m e a n t to e m p h a s i s e A r n ' s ac t 
o f sending p r i e s t s to P a n n ó n i a . 4 6 
This a r g u m e n t seems to b e suppor t ed a l s o by Excerptum de Karentanis, 
w h i c h lists all t h e n a m e s r e l a t ed to the C a r a n t a n s that occu r in the Conversio, 
e x c e p t for p r i e s t s and d e a c o n s , bu t says n o t h i n g about any m o n a r c h or d u k e 
cal led Ingo. Excerptum de Karentanis was d ra f t ed at the turn of 12th and 13th c.4 / 
Bas ica l ly it c o n t a i n s the n a m e s o f key s e c u l a r and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l l e ade r s 
k e e p i n g up r e l a t i o n s with the C a r a n t a n s ; t he i r list w a s c o m p i l e d by the a u t h o r 
44
 The question, whether "units " belongs to the presbyteri, the duces or the comités 
arose in a study by Jaksch - see Jaksch. A.: Fredegar und die Conversio Carantanorum 
(Ingo). Mitteilungen des instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 41 (1926) 44. 
sqq. 
8
 Levison, W. (ed.): Conversio 1; Gesta saneti Hrodberti confessons 5. MGH SS rer. 
Merov. 6. Hannover-Leipzig. 1913.) About Rupert and the Gesta Hrodberti see Beumann, 
H.: Zur Textgeschichte der vita Ruperti. In: Festschrift für H. Heimpel. Veröffentlichungen 
des Max-Planck-lnstituts für Geschichte 36. 1972. 166. sqq.; Baitl. H.: Zur Datierungfrage 
des hl. Rupert. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung 
61 (1975) I. sqq.; Reindel. K.: Die Organisation der Salzburger Kirche im Zeitalter des 
hl. Rupert. Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landesgeschichte 115 (1975) 88. 
sqq.; Wolfram. H.: Der heilige Rupert in Salzburg. In: v. Zwink, L. (Hrsg.): Frühes 
Mönchlinn in Salzburg. Salzburger Diskussionen 4. Salzburg, 1983. 84. sqq.; Schmitt, F.: 
Zur Vita Ruperti. In: Frühes Mönchtum in Salzburg. Salzburger Diskussionen 4. Salzburg, 
1983. 96. sqq.; Jahn, J.: Ducatus Baiuvariorum. Das bairische Herzogtum der Agilolfinger. 
Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters 35. Stuttgart, 1991. 54. sqq.; Forstner, K.: 
Quellenkundliche Beobachtungen an den ältesten Salzburger Güterverzeichnissen und an 
der Vita s. Ruperti. Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landesgeschichte 135 
( 1995) 473. sqq.; Wolfram: Salzburg. Bayern, Österreich... op. eil. 228. sqq. 
4ft
 Wolfram: Conversio... op. cit. 97. 
47
 Excerptum de Karentanis 2. Tempore Dagoberti regis Francorum preerant 
Karentanis dux Satno, post quem Boruch, post quem Karastus et post hunc Chenmarus, et 
post hunc Waltunc. Item sub Karolo et eins successoribus Priwizlauga, Cemicas, Zpoitnar, 
Etgar. 
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from the relevant sentences and phrases of the Conversio. (Proper names are 
written slightly differently in the Excerptum than in the Conversio.) Returning 
to enumerating the grammatical arguments commenced: if we take sides with 
the "... presbyteros ... Quorum unus ... " interpretation, then we need to attempt 
to prove the existence of a presbyter Ingo in Arn's t ime on the strength of 
sources f rom Salzburg. An entry from the age of Arn in the Liber confra-
ternitatum refers to a presbyter named Ingo.47 Its is worth adding that apart 
from the Ingo mentioned in the Liber confraternitatum and the Conversio, we 
have no knowledge of any person bearing this name in this period in 
Bavaria.44 The relevant locus of the Liber confraternitatum lists Ingo as the 
first item in the register of fourteen ecclesiastical persons, and each of the 
fourteen names is followed by the entry presbyter (contrary to the lines 
surrounding this entry). Most probably, Ingo was the head of the group of 
missionaries sent by Arn to Carantania; the activity of this group can be dated 
to the period between 785 and 799 since in the year fol lowing the year he was 
promoted to the office of archbishop Arn ordered a wandering bishop, episcopus 
chori, called Theoderich to the territory of Carantania.7" Consequently, Ingo 
headed the mission in Carantania for almost fifteen years, and prudentia 
required in this position bestowed high esteem on him, which is confirmed by 
several examples referred to in the Conversio,7i Herwig Wolf ram's above 
described argument has been mostly accepted in the literature: his view was 
shared by Karl Schmid in his study on Liver confraternitatum 52 and was also 
accepted by Fritz Losek in his 1997 edition. 7 
V. In the case narrated in the Conversio Ingo sent a charter or much rather a 
parchment without any writing, or letters on it (carta sine /Uteris), which 
provided his legate with sufficient authenticity to demand obedience f rom the 
48
 Herzberg-Fränkel, S. (ed.): Liber confraternitatum sancti Petri Salisburgensis vetustior 
48. MGH Necr. 2. Berlin, 1904; Forstner, К. (ed.): Das Verbrüderungsbuch von St. Peter 
in Salzburg. Codices Selecti 51. Graz, 1974. 
44
 Wolfram: Conversio... op. cit. 98. 
50
 Conversio 8. 
81
 Wolfram: Conversio... op. cit. 99. 
52
 Schmid, K.: Das Zeugnis der Verbrüderungsbücher zur Slawenmission. In: v. Piffl-
Percevic, Th.-Stirnemann, A. (Hrsg.): Der heilige Method, Salzburg und die Slawenmission. 
Innsbruck-Wien, 1987. 188. 
53
 Losek: op. cit. 112. 
304 TAMÁS NÓTÁRI 
people. Although the carta as a fully conclusive deed"4 was transplanted by 
the Germans f rom the Romans into their legal system, the carta did not obtain 
absolute respect among the Germans who did not know either the Latin of charters 
or the art of writing and reading; therefore, simultaneously with adopting this 
institution the process of refusing, rc-cvaluating it began.55 Concerning this 
fact it can be stated that the lack of writing on the carta sent by Ingo cannot be 
considered surprising for another reason either: the newly converted Slavs and 
Avars were also illiterate as it was highlighted in the minutes of the Conventus 
episcoporum ad ripas Danttbii held in 796.56 
The Frank, Bavarian, Alemannian and Burgundián legal practice worked 
out a rather unique form of documentary evidence. The charter , that is, more 
specifically, the parchment yet blank, which would become a carta through 
writing the text on it, became a symbol similar to the rod in assigning real 
estates:5 in the legal transaction it was placed on the ground; then, the person 
issuing the writing lifted it f rom the ground, and handed it over to the scrivener 
while making the proper statement of will. (Regarding the provision requiring 
the parchment directly touching the ground, as a parallel, it is worth underlining 
the peculiar feature of mancipatio and legis actio Sacramento in rem known 
from Roman law that the parties had to touch the subject of the transaction and 
the lawsuit with the rod simultaneously. The act of touching was meant to 
advance not only more exact determination, since the act of unambiguous 
pointing at would have been sufficient: the act of touching, a practice containing 
religious/magic elements applied in archaic legal systems maintaining direct 
relation with the realm of the sacred, "created" the possibility of closer attach-
54
 As analogy from the history of the stipidatio from the postelassical age of Roman 
law Földi, A.-Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói. (History and Institutions of 
Roman Law) Budapest, 2 0 0 8 1 5 9 . 
5
 Kos, M. Carta sine litteris. Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichts-
forschung 62 (1954) 98; Fichtenau, II. Das Urkundenwesen in Osterreich vom achten his 
in das dreizehnte Jahrhundert. Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichts-
forschung, Ergänzungsband 23. Graz-Wien-Köln 1971. 56. sqq. 
56
 Zagiba, F.: Die Missionierung der Slaven aus "Welschland" (Patriarchat Aquileia) 
im 8. und 9. Jahrhundert. In: Werminghoff, A. (ed.): Cyritto-Methodiana. Zur Früh-
geschichte des Christentums hei den Slaven 863-1963. Graz, 1964. 280; Conventus 
episcoporum ad ripas Damtbii MGH Cone. 2, 1. Hannover-Leipzig, 1906. 174.) Haec 
autem gens bruta et inrationabilis vet certe idiotae et sine litteris ... 
About the rod and the staff as legal symbols see Nótári, T.: Festuca autem utebantur 
quasi liastae loco. Acta Facultatis Politico-Iuridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Buda-
pestinensis de Rolando Fötvös nominatae 41 (2004) 133-162; Nótári, T.: The Spear as the 
Symbol of Property and Power in Ancient Rome. Acta Juridica Hungarica 48 (2007) 231-257. 
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ment, transmission of will.5*) Sometimes, the parchment had been completed 
using a formula in advance but the witnesses' seal and the scrivener's signature 
and the date were affixed to it only latcr-consequently, de iure it was deemed 
unwritten since it failed to have the necessary accessories of validity.8'' Some-
times the symbolic nature of the carta was reinforced also by placing the ink 
pot and the pen beside the parchment on the ground, and the person issuing the 
charter had to lift them together with the parchment, and hand it over to the 
scrivener while making the statement of will."" On the other hand, Wolf ram 
raises the question whether a blank parchment, like the one mentioned in 
Ingo's story, had sufficient demonstrative force, and if it bore some kind of 
signs (signa), or seal."1 Ignoring the seal of the duke and bearers of dignities 
was, otherwise, sanctioned by both the Alemannian and Bavarian law."2 
The object, the symbol, the unfilled out parchment, which was therefore 
not considered a carta indeed, counted more than the validly issued charter, 
which, anyhow, very few people would have been able to read. What the 
narrative in the Conversio specifically reveals is that the sheer act of sending 
the parchment, which could become a charter only subsequently when legally 
issued, was sufficient to produce the required effect. It is perfectly in line with 
this that the validity of the assignment of property was established not by the 
carta but the ceremony performed simultaneously with making the statement 
of will where the parchment placed on the ground was lifted and handed over 
to the scrivener."3 Among people unable to read, the object , the parchment, 
which constituted the basic material of the carta, had sufficient demonstrative 
force just as the seal by itself "spoke" in a language understandable by every-
body without being able to read what was written on it."4 In Milko Kos ' s 
formulation carta sine /Uteris meant: "Ingo sent me, obey my orders, "—as an 
88
 See Nótári, T.: Jog, vallás és retorika (Law, Religion and Rhetoric). Szeged, 2006. 
51. sqq.; Hägerström, A.: Der römische Obligationsbegriff I. Uppsala, 1927. 
4
 Redlich, О. Privaturkunden des Mittelalters. In: Erben, W.-Schmitz-Kallenberg, L. 
Redlich, O.: Urkundenlehre III. Münchcn-Berlin, 191 1. 47. sqq.; Goldmann, E. Cartam 
levare. Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 35 ( 1914) 3. sqq. 
60
 Kos:
 €
p. cit. 99. 
61
 Wolfram: Conversio... op. cit. 199. 
62
 Lehmann, K. (ed.): Leges Alamannorum 22, 2. MGH LL nat. Germ. 5, 1. Hannover, 
1888; Lex Baiuvariorum 2, 13. 
63
 Kos: op. cit. 99; Fichtenau: op. cit. 57; Redlich, O.: Über bairische Traditionsbücher 
und Traditionen. Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 5 ( 1884) 6. 
M
 Redlich: op. cit. 108. sqq. 
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analogy he refers to the inscription on the seal of Otto von Trixen "Oit de 
Trussen me misit "'' from the late 12th c.66 
In view of the above, it is more or less irrelevant whether the act of 
sending the parchment by Ingo is seen as a historical fact or a parable merely 
symbolising his authority s ince the clement of carta sine litteris somehow had 
to be in line with 9th c. real i ty, or else it would not have been comprehensible 
to the addressee, or other readers of the Conversio. It can be attributed specifically 
to the difficulties in interpretation that later ages faced that the element of 
carta sine litteris, which wou ld have required knowledge of contracting and 
charter practices of German laws (Volksrechte) in the early Middle Ages to 
become understandable, was not an instructive material for later authors to be 
transplanted into their works. So, for example, it was not included in Enea Silvio 
Piccolomini's De Europa cither, contrary to the narrative on Ingo's feast. 
VI. In terms o f genre, Ingo ' s feast can be classified a Christian parable; its 
build-up fol lows the structure of biblical parables: it intends to present the 
success of the mission in Carantania as an image to those already converted. 
The host favours Christians (even if they arc serfs) with golden bowls; however, 
the unbelievers (no matter that they arc lords) arc forced to eat from dirty bowls 
before the doors like dogs. The message of Ingo's story clearly corresponds 
with the narrative in the Gospe l of Matthew on the royal feast where those 
w h o appear in improper garments , that is, with unclean body, using the phrase 
o f the Conversio, are cast out into the dark outside where there is crying and 
gnashing of the teeth.'' Christianity, thus, makes serfs noble too; lack of faith, 
however, makes noblemen infer ior and dirty.68 Ingo's parable is far from being 
unique: a similar story has been left to us on heathen duke, Borivoj, who lived 
in the court of Svatopluk in Moravia;6 ' also, Arnold Jaksch has demonstrated 
that the story in the Conversio has links with a locus of Fredegar 's Chronic.70 
Jaksch, A.: Monumenta historica ducatus Carinthiae 111. Klagenfurt, 1904. Nr. 
1413. 
66
 Kos: op. cit. 100. 
67
 Matth. 22, 1 -14 . Cf. Matth. 15, 26; 2. Tim. 2, 20; Apoc. 22, 15. 
Wolfram: Conversio... op. cit. 100. 
64
 Magnae Moraviac Fontes Historici Brno, 1969. III. 305. Aboul possible connections 
between this legend and the Conversio sec Pekar. J.: Die Wenzels- und Ludmilla-Legenden 
und die Echtheit Christians. Prag, 1905. 92. 
" Jaksch: op. cit. 154. 
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It is worth adding that this is not the only link between Fredegar's Chronica 
and the Conversio. The section on Samo in chapter four of the Conversio71  
amply draws on Fredegar's opus.72 The cited loci clearly reveal that the story on 
Samo left to us by Fredegar presents aspects of the events basically different 
from the Conversio. Fredegar claims that in 623/24 Samo of Frankish origin 
went to the Slavs as a trader of arms and perhaps as the delegate of King 
Dagobert I (623-639) to support their efforts to become independent. Making 
use of the collapse of the first Avar Chaganate shaken by the unsuccessful 
siege of Constaninoplc in 626,72 Samo became the ruler of a Slavic state in 
Central Europe established by him. It was this state that Dagobert I wanted to 
wind up, but in his efforts he failed, and Samo's country ceased to exist only 
after Samo's death in approx. 658. The Conversio asserts, however, that Samo 
was a dux gentis of Carantanian origin, and the armies of Dagobert I success-
fully beat the Slavic rebels. When writing this version of the story the author 
of the Conversio used instead of Fredegar 's Chronica the work entitled Gesta 
Dagoherti I. regis Francorum which drew on it, and created his own version 
by making Samo, who figured there as the duke of the Slavs, Slavic too; and 
identified the Slavic state attacked by the Franks and the Langobards jointly 
with Carantania.74 
71
 Conversio 4. Temporibus gloriosi regis Francorum Dagoherti Samo nomine quidam 
Sclavus manens in Quarantanis fuit dux gentis illius. Qui venientes negotiatores Dagoherti 
regis interficere iussit et regia expoliavit pecunia. Quod cum comperil Dagobertus rex, 
misit exercitum suum et damnum, quos ei idem Samo fecit, vindicare iussit. 
72
 Vö. Fredegar, Chronica 4, 48. (Ed. Krusch, В. MGH SS rer. Merov. 2. Hannover, 
1888.) Anno XXXX regni Clothariae homo nomen Samo natione Francos de pago Senonago 
plures secum negutiantes adcivit, exercendum negucium in Sclavos coinomento Winedos 
perrexit.; 4, 68. Eo anno Sclavi coinomento Winidi in regno Samone négociantes Francorum 
cum plure multetudine interfecissent et rebus expoliassint, haec fuit inicium scandali inter 
Dagobertum et Samonem regem Sclavinorum. ... Cum haec Dagoberto nunciassit, Dagobertus 
superveter iubet de Universum regnum Austasiorum contra Samonem et Winidis movere 
exercitum.; Gesta Dagoherti I. regis Francorum 27. (Ed. Krusch, B. MGH SS rer. Merov. 
2. Hannover, 1888.) Eo igitur anno Sclavi cognomento Winido, quorum regnum Samo 
tenebat, negotiatores Francorum cum plurima multitudine interficiunt et rebus expoliant. 
Cumque haec Dagoberto regi nuntiata fuissent, ilico iubet de и ni verso regno Austrasiorum 
contra Samonem et Winidos movere exercitum. 
73
 About the sources see Szádeczky-Kardoss: op. cit. 171. sqq. 
74
 Cf. Pohl: op. cit. 256. sqq.; Losek 1997. 31. sq.; Göll, J.: Samo und die karan-
tanischen Slaven. Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 1 I 
(1890) 443. sqq. 
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Both in the narrative on Ingo's feast and in Fredegar 's description pagans 
not baptised yet are called dogs.75 In Fredegar's work Sicharius, the delegate 
lodging a complaint because of massacring the Frankish legates tells Samo 
that "non est possebelem, ut christiani et Dei servi cum canebus amiciciam 
conlocare possint "; in turn using the same phrases Samo replies: "Si vos estis Dei 
servi, et nos Dei canes, dum vos adsiduae contra ipsum agetis, nos permissum 
accepimus vos morsebus lacerare. " On the other hand, at this point the author 
of the Conversio knowing and using Fredegar 's works switches aspects in the 
narrative quite peculiarly; while in the Conversio Ingo orders unbaptised lords 
to the door, in Fredegar ' s work Samo, the duke has the Frankish legate, the 
Christian Sicharius cast out: "Aegectus est Sicherius de conspectum Samonis. " 
Without continuing to investigate préfigurations, the Ingo story narrated in 
the Conversio can be confidently considered, as it were, a part of the missionary 
catechism drafted as the product of the policy of Christianising the Slavs and 
the Avars in the age of the Carolingians.76 In this form it continued to exist for 
centuries, and was adopted by Iohanncs Victoriensis in 14th c. and Enea Silvio 
Piccolomini in 15th c., who appreciated it as representative example of early 
medieval mentality. 
VII. f h e original source of the narrative on duke Ingo described in chapter 
sixty-five of De Europa by Enea Silvio Piccolomini is chapter seven of the 
work entitled Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum written in 870. Enea 
Silvio most probably knew and used the Conversio since in his work entitled 
História Bohemica he refers to Mcthodius 's operation in Moravia in such form 
that presumes knowledge of chapter twelve of the Conversio written with quite 
peculiar (tendentious) depiction, f h e author of this paper has been able to 
" Fredegar, Chronica 4, 68. Eo anno Sclavi coinomento Winidi in regno Samone 
négociantes Francorum cum pitire multetiidine interfecissent et rebus expoliassint, haec 
fuit inicium scandali inter Dagobertinn et Samonem regem Sdavinorum. Dirigensque 
Dagobertus Sycharium legatarium ad Samonem, paetens, ut neguciantes, quos sui 
interfecerant out res inlecete usorpaverant, cum iusticia facérét emendare. Samo nolens 
Sicharium vedere, пес ad se eutn venire permitteret, Sicharius vestem indutus ad instar 
Sclavinorum, cum suis ad conspectum perven it Samonem ... Sicharius dicens: 'Non est 
possebelem, ut christiani et Dei servi cum canebus amicicias conlocare possint. ' Samo a 
contrario dixit: 'Si vos estis Dei servi, et nos Dei canes, dum vos adsiduae contra ipsum 
agetis, nos permissum accepimus vos morsebus lacerare. ' Aegectus est Sicharius de 
conspectum Samonis. 
' Löwe, H.: Die karoiingische Reichsgründung und der Südosten. Studien zum Werden 
des Deutschtums und seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Rom. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und 
Geistesgeschichte 13. Stuttgart, 1937. 1 19. sqq.: 170. sqq. 
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establish that Ingo was referred to in the Conversio not as a duke; and both the 
grammatical analysis of the text and the relevant entry in the Liber confratern-
itatum of Salzburg allowed to draw the conclusion that Ingo was the head of 
the missionaries in Carantania commissioned by Arn in the period between 
785 and 799. His "existence" as duke was owing to a translation/interpretation 
error, which can be found first in Iohannes Victoriensis 's Liber certarum 
historiarum written in the early 14th c.-later, this erroneous interpretation was 
borrowed by the literature for several centuries, and led to attempts to identify 
duke Ingo with some known historical person. 
f h e story of Ingo 's feast, beside biblical parallels, shows similarity, among 
others, with Fredegar 's Chronica; however, the author of the Conversio was 
not an obedient copier of Fredegar; he integrated the sample borrowed from 
him resourcefully in the series of parabolic catechisms of missions created as 
the product of the policy of the Christianisation of the Slavs and the Avars of 
the period, f h e fact that Enca Silvio also writes about Ingo as the duke of 
Carantania/Carinthia can be probably attributed to the knowledge and adoption 
of the tradition kept up by Iohannes Victoriensis, and to the interpretation of the 
text of the Conversio on the grounds thcrcof-therc is little chance for a 
humanist from Italy to come to the same erroneous interpretation independently 
f rom the author from a period more than a century before; therefore, he must 
have known Iohannes Victoriensis's work, f h e difference in value of unbelievers 
and believers appears unambiguously in all of the narratives as the duality 
between outdoors and indoors, being admitted and cast out. f h e reference to 
dogs can be no longer found in Enea Silvio Piccolomini 's and Iohannes 
Victoriensis 's works; although in Fredegar 's work it can be identified, it is not 
related to the parable of the feas t - f rom among the texts included in the scope 
of this investigation, these motifs are united only in the Conversio. 
f h e sentence in the Conversio giving account of the people obeying Ingo, 
who enjoyed great authority, even if he had sent them no more than a blank 
parchment, or unfilled out charter/charter sample (carta sine I Uteris) might have 
posed problems of interpretation to Enca Silvio and Iohannes Victoriensis since 
it organically related to early medieval German legal pract ice-that is why 
this element was not included in either in De Europa, nor Liber ceratrum 
historiarum. f h e findings so made might to a modest extent contribute to a 
better understanding of the use of sources by the great humanist, Enca Silvio 
Piccolomini on the one hand; and to exploring the history of impacts produced 
by early medieval texts in the Age of Humanism, on the other. 
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Law is Hell: Death and the Afterlife 
in American Lawyer Jokes 
"The first thing we do. let's ki l l all the lawyers." 
( William Shakespeare. Henry VI. Part 2) 
1. Introduction 
a) Background of Research 
In the early 1980s, a new joke cycle appeared in the USA, and has continued 
to flourish ever since. This is a lawyer joke cycle. Lawyer jokes have been 
published in book form,1 and have also been displayed on various American 
websites. According to a 1997 Internet search by a legal journalist 3 473 
sites were devoted to lawyer jokes,2 while only 17 sites displayed jokes about 
salesmen, 39 sites accountant jokes, and 227 sites doctor jokes. Theo Meder 
explains the sharp increase of lawyer jokes in recent years by the high legali-
zation of American society. He stresses: "the quantity of lawyer jokes equals 
the rise of the number and the social status of lawyers, the excessive wages 
of top-lawyers and their sky-high compensation claims."3 According to his 
opinion, this cannot be the only reason for such an expansion of lawyer jokes. 
Dr. univ., PhD, habit., Professor, Center of Foreign Language Teaching, Tomori Pál 
College, 6300 Kalocsa, Szent István király út 2—4.. Hungary 
E-mail: litovkin@terrasoft.hu 
1
 To name just a few, see Wilde, L.: The Official Lawyers' Joke Book. New York, 
1982; Knott, В.: Truly Tasteless Lawyer Jokes. New York, 1990. 
2
 Yas, D. L.: First Thing We Do Is Kill All the Lawyer Jokes. Massachusetts Lawyers 
Weekly. 1997, 20 October, 11. 
3
 Meder, Th.: Tales of Tricks and Greed and Big Surprises: Laymen's Views of the 
Law in Dutch Oral Narrative. Humor-International Journal of Humor Research. 21 
(2008) 448. 
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"There are feelings of discontent about the impenetrable logic of justice, but 
above all the dominant 'vulture culture' of suing, claiming and cashing, as 
exposed in the news media."1 Christie Davies even goes further, stating: 
America is government not by men but by lawyers. . . Lawyers lie at the 
very heart of American society. American lawyers are the most American 
of Americans, and they represent the central American values of social 
mobili ty-as opposed to entrenched and inherited distinctions-and entail-
due process and procedure as opposed to personal discretion and, of course, 
the pursuit of money. The lawyers are the very essence of what it means to 
be an American.5 
As Marc Galanter points out, before 1980, the vast majority of jokes about 
lawyers dealt with topics such as "lawyers corrupting discourse, fleecing clients, 
fomenting strife, fraternizing with the devil, and compromising justice."6 The 
jokes which have added to the corpus since 1980 were joined by "a new set of 
themes - jokes about lawyers as morally deficient, as betrayers of trust, as 
objects of scorn, and as desirable candidates for extermination."7 According to 
Galanter, almost two thirds of the jokes which have added to the corpus since 
1980 belong to these "new wave" categories.* 
The aggressive tendency in jokes has been known of at least since publica-
tion of Sigmund Freud's essay, "Wit and Humor in the Unconscious"4 in 1905, 
and has also been discussed by many humor researchers. Hostility towards law 
and lawyers has been a widespread phenomenon for a long time throughout the 
world. Grant Gilmore in "The Ages of American Law" stresses: "In most 
societies at most periods the legal profession has been heartily disliked by all 
non-lawyers: a recurrent dream of social reformers has been that the law should 
be (and can be) simplified and purified in such a way that the class of lawyers 
can be done away with. The dream has never withstood the cold light of waking 
reality."1 0 The book entitled "Devi l ' s Advocates: The Unnatural History of 
Lawyers"" has shown a terrible scorn heaped on lawyers throughout human 
4
 Ibid. 449. 
Davies, Ch.: American Jokes about Lawyers. Humor... op. cit. 373. 
6
 Galanter, M.: The Great American Lawyer Joke Explosion. Humor... op. cit. 390. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. 
4
 Freud, S.: Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. New York, 1960 [1905]. 
111
 Gilmore, G.: The Ages of American Law. New Haven, 1977, 
11
 Roth, A.-Roth. J.: Devil's Advocates: The Unnatural History of Lawyers. Berkeley, 
1989. 
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history, and has even questioned the reasons why civilization lias put up with 
lawyers at all. This compilation of negative anecdotes about lawyers from early 
times to the present includes numerous passages from the Bible, from literature, 
and, moreover, f rom the mouths of lawyers themselves. In 1911 the following 
humorous definition of a lawyer appeared: "LAWYER, n. One skilled in 
circumvention of the law."12 This definition has been quoted in many legal 
books. The famous quotation "The first thing we do, let 's kill all the lawyers" 
by William Shakespeare1 ' has provided fruitful soil for endless transformation, 
as in the titles of newspaper articles about lawyers, e.g. "First Thing We Do Is 
Kill All the Lawyer Jokes",14 "Modest Alternative to Killing All Lawyers",15 
The hostile titles of some books of jokes or cartoons about lawyers also speak 
for themselves, e.g., "Dead Lawyers and Other Pleasant Thoughts";" ' "Truly 
Tasteless Lawyer Jokes".17 The perennial criticism of attorneys is illustrated 
as "amoral f...| guns for hire".18 
Why is it the lawyer, and not the representative of any other profession or 
occupation, who is permanently made fun of in so many American jokes? 
What are the dominant stereotypical traits of a lawyer? What negative features 
is he hated for? Does the lawyer's stereotype in American lawyer jokes contain 
any truth? These and many other questions could be asked in the regard to 
American lawyer jokes. 
b) Organization of the Study 
The present study focuses on two large segments of American lawyer jokes: 
jokes dealing with lawyers' extermination; and the place where lawyers go 
after they die. The study is divided into two parts. The first part of the study 
makes an attempt to analyze jokes, the butt of which is lawyers as candidates 
for removal f rom society or, more frequently, extermination. Different ways 
through which such extermination can be reached are discussed and exemplified. 
The second part of the study examines Hell as a place lawyers generally go to 
12
 Bierce, A: The Devil's Dictionary, 1911, see http://www.dict.org/bin/Dict 
13
 William Shakespeare: Henry VI, Part 2. 
14
 Yas, D. L.: First Thing We Do Is Kill All the Lawyer Jokes. Massachusetts Lawyers 
Weekly, 1997, 20 October, 11. 
15
 Miller, R. R.: A Modest Alternative to Killing All Lawyers. Wall Street Journal, 
1991, 28 October, p. A16, Col. 3. 
16
 Miller, D. W.: Dead Lawyers and Other Pleasant Thoughts. New York, 1993. 
17
 Knott, В.: Truly Tasteless Lawyer Jokes. New York, 1990. 
18
 Horrigan, В.: Adventures in Law and Justice: Exploring Big Legal Questions in 
Everyday Life. Sydney, 2003. 
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after their death. All the jokes quoted and discussed in the study can be found 
with references to their Internet sources. The vast majority of jokes were 
collected from hundreds of websites in spring 2009. 
2. Ways of Exterminating of Lawyers 
The focus of our attention in this part of the study is on jokes which offer to 
remove lawyers f rom society, or even more frequently, to exterminate them. 
Different ways of such eradication will be discussed and exemplified here. 
Quite a lot of texts suggest drowning as the proper fate of lawyers: 
"Do you know how to save a drowning lawyer?" 
"No." 
"Good!"1 9 
If a lawyer and an 1RS20 agent were both drowning, and you could only save 
one of them, would you go to lunch or read the paper?21 
What do you call 5000 dead lawyers at the bottom of the ocean? 
A good start!" 
How do you save a drowning lawyer? 
Take your foot off his head.21 
14
 http://www.ravnwood.com/archives/005647.php 
" International Revenue Service (1RS) is the United States government agency 
responsible for tax collection and tax law enforcement. 
http://jokes.smashits.com/view-6697-if_a_lawyer_and_an_irs_agent_werc_both__ 
drowning_an.html 
Many of the question-answer American lawyer jokes quoted in this study have taken 
patterns from American racist jokes. Observe just two examples: 
What do you call 20,000 black people at the bottom of the ocean? 
A good start, (http://www.blaekjokes.net) 
How do you get a black man out of a tree? 
A: Cut the rope, (http://www.blackjokes.net) 
" http://www.funnyandjokes.com/lawyer-q-and-a.htrnl 
' http://www.momsofteo.com/jfile/lawyers.txt 
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Drowning lawyers is not the only way to exterminate them: American lawyer 
jokes suggest that there is more than one way to kill a lawyer. Let's observe 
some texts suggesting hanging or cutting attorneys: 
How do you know if a lawyer is well-hung? 
When you can't fit your fingers between the rope and his neck.24 
What ' s the difference between a lawyer and an onion? 
You cry when you cut up an onion.25 
Another popular way of lawyers' removal from society is killing them in a 
road accident. They might be run over and hit by a car or bus: 
How many lawyers does it take to stop a moving bus? 
Never enough."6 
What do you do if you run over a lawyer? 
Back over him to make sure. Then, make another notch on the steering 
wheel.27 
As hard as it might be to imagine lawyers walking down the road, it is almost 
impossible to imagine lawyers taking a bus, but anything might happen in a 
joke. Therefore, the following two texts describe lawyers' deaths while taking 
a bus. In the first one a bus load of lawyers runs off a cliff: 
Good News: A busload of lawyers ran off a cliff. The bus was destroyed 
and there were no survivors. 
Bad News: There were three empty seats."x 
The second joke shows a slightly different way of exterminating lawyers. First 
of all, a bus load of lawyers runs off the road and crashes into a tree, causing 
the death of many lawyers. Moreover, the lawyers who were not killed in the 
crash are buried alive. Besides containing a clear anti-lawyer sentiment and 
hostility towards attorneys (what can be more cruel and inhuman than burying 
"
4
 http://www.lawsongs.com/lawyerJokes.html 
25
 http://www.swapmeetdave.com/Humor/Lawyer.htm 
26
 http://www.kaila.pl/humor/lawyers.htm 
27
 http://jokeparty.com/ 
28
 http://www.terry.co.uk/jokesOl.html 
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someone alive?!), the fol lowing joke also stresses the idea that all lawyers are 
inveterate liars, and, therefore, they should not be believed or trusted under 
any circumstances: 
A bus load of attorneys were driving down a country road when all of a 
sudden the bus ran off the road and crashed into a tree in an old farmer ' s 
field. The old farmer, a f t e r seeing what happened, went over to investigate. 
He then proceeded to dig a hole and bury the attorneys. 
A few days later, the local sheriff came out, saw the crashed bus, and 
then asked the old farmer, "Were they all dead?" 
The old farmer replied, "Well, some of them said they weren't, but you 
know how them attorneys lie."24 
Here is one more joke about burying attorneys alive: 
What do you have if three lawyers are buried up to their necks in cement? 
Not enough cement. '" 
Lawyers could also be exterminated by being eaten, as the following two texts 
recommend. The anti-lawyer joke below expresses the fantasy of eliminating 
lawyers by feeding them to a pet, and employs a very popular technique of 
eliciting humor in jokes, punning, by playing on two different connotations of 
the word "serve":3 1 
A man wa lks into a bar with a crocodile and asks "Do you serve Lawyers 
here?" 
"We sure do", the bar tender answered. "Good", the man says "I ' l l have 
a beer and my croc will have a lawyer".32 
When the man from the text above entering the bar with a crocodile asks if they 
serve lawyers, we interpret his question as if lawyers, similarly to people of 
other professions and occupations, are allowed to consume in the bar; and we 
might even presume that he is a lawyer himself. And the bartender, naturally, 
24
 http://www. 101funjokes.com/attorney-jokes.htm 
http://www.answerbag.com/q_view/307855 
" This kind of punning is ta i led homonymy. The word "serve" according to Webster 
Dictionary has more than twenty different meanings, see Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary. Deluxe 2nd ed., 1983, 1658. 
" http://www.fords-solicitors.со.uk/solicitors/news.cfm?ID=6 
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gives him a positive reply. He obviously thinks the word "serve" is used in the 
following connotation: "to provide (customers or users) with goods or services"." 
Indeed, why should there be any discrimination of lawyers? Why shouldn't 
they be served? When we hear, however, the response of the customer ordering 
a lawyer for his crocodile, we realize that he is not a lawyer; contrarily, he 
hates lawyers, and what he means by his question is not whether lawyers are 
allowed to consume in the bar, but whether lawyers (as a meal) are served there, 
i.e., the word "served" is used in a different meaning: "to prepare and offer (food, 
etc.) in a certain way to others".24 
One could also get rid of lawyers by shooting them, as the following two 
jokes (or variants of the same joke) suggest. 
In the first text we are recommended, while stranded on a desert island, to 
shoot a lawyer twice instead of shooting Adolph Hitler and Attila the Hun: 
If you are stranded on a desert island with Adolph Hitler, Attila the Hun, and 
a lawyer, and you have a gun with only two bullets, what do you do? 
Shoot the lawyer twice ." 
Thus, the joke above states that the lawyer is more dangerous than Attila the 
Hun (the Emperor of the Huns from 434 until his death in 453 remembered in 
much of Western Europe as the epitome of cruelty and rapacity) and Adolph 
Hitler (one of the most brutal and devastating leaders in the history of the world, 
on the soul of whom there were endless atrocities and crimes, including the 
genocide of six million Jews). 
The second text, although in a slightly different setting, and with different 
personages (a room instead of a desert island, and instead of some of the most 
dangerous and brutal people in the history of the world the personages are a 
tiger and a rattlesnake), contains similar anti-lawyer sentiment, and fol lows a 
similar scenario. In the same vein as the previous text, this joke also recom-
mends shooting the lawyer twice, and draws a parallel between the lawyer and 
the rattlesnake (a venomous snake, the bites of which are very often fatal) and 
the tiger (one of the largest predators in the world). According to the text, the 
lawyer is considered to be even more dangerous than the tiger or the rattlesnake, 
animals very few people would like to be anywhere near: 
33
 This connotation is listed in Webster under N 7, see Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary: Deluxe 2nd ed., 1983, 1658. 
34
 This connotation is listed in Webster under N 9, see ibid. 
35
 http://www.funnyandjokes.com/lawyer-q-and-a.litml 
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You're trapped in a room with a tiger, a rattlesnake and a lawyer. Your gun 
has only two bullets. What should you do? 
Shoot the lawyer. Twice.3 6 
The following text suggests lawyers should be exterminated by being used in 
medical experiments instead of rats. Similarly to the ra t -a vicious, unclean, and 
parasitic animal,37 spreading disease, and associated in people 's minds with 
aggression, war, and death, a pest which has to be exterminated-the joke ' 8 
below suggests that lawyers should also be in need of eradication: 
The National Institute of Health has announced that it will no longer be 
using rats for medical experiments. In their place, they will use lawyers. 
They have given three reasons for this decision: 
1. There are now more lawyers than there are rats. 
2. The medical researchers don't become as emotionally attached to the 
lawyers as they did to the rats. 
3. No matter how hard you try, there are some things that rats won' t 
do.3 9 
The fact that in deciding which (lawyers or rats) should be used for medical 
experiments (that is, be vivisected), clear preference is given to lawyers, 
indicates that similarly to rats lawyers are just pests which American society 
should remove. The three reasons4" for such a preference are quite forthright, 
and don't need to be further explained. The joke is also a clear manifestation of 
the retaliation of doctors (as well as scientists, and laboratory workers involved 
in medical experiments). One of the reasons for such revenge might be the fact 
that in American society, doctors are nowadays frequently sued by attorneys 
(for malpractice). 
In the same vein as the famous anti-lawyer statement, "The first thing we 
do. let's kill all the lawyers",41 the following two texts also have fantasies about 
destroying all lawyers in the world. The first text suggests that they could find 
' http://wilk4.com/humor/humorm353_lawyers.htm 
1
 For more on the lawyer as animal in American lawyer jokes, see T. Litovkina, A.: 
The Lawyer as Animal in American Lawyer Jokes. Ügyészt'к Lapja, 16 (2009) No. 3 - 4 (in 
press). 
8
 One can find dozens of variants of this joke on different websites. 
http://www.terry.co.uk/jokes01 .html 
411
 Some websites give even more reasons for such preferences. 
41
 William Shakespeare: op. cit. 
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their end on the equator, merely being laid there, "end to end". No violence is 
needed, but the heat and the Sun will do their duty: 
If you laid all of the lawyers in the world, end to end, on the equator - It 
would be a good idea to just leave them there.42 
Another way of exterminating every lawyer in the world, through removing 
their kidneys, even at the expense of one 's own health (losing one kidney), is 
clearly expressed in the following text: 
A man walking along the beach found a bottle. When he rubbed it, lo and 
behold, a genie appeared. 
"I will grant you three wishes," announced the genie. "But there is one 
condition. 1 am a lawyer's genie. That means that for every wish you make, 
every lawyer in the world gets the wish as well-only double." 
The man thought about this for a while. "For my first wish. I would like 
ten million dollars," he announced. 
Instantly the genie gave him a Swiss bank account number and assured 
the man that $10 000 000 had been deposited. "But every lawyer in the 
world has just received $20 000 000," the genie said. 
"I 've always wanted a Ferrari," the man said. "That 's my second wish." 
instantly a Ferrari appeared. "But every lawyer in the world has just 
received two Ferraris," the genie said. "And what is your last wish?" 
"Well ," said the man. " I ' ve always wanted to donate a kidney...".43 
The joke below recommends getting rid of lawyers by defenestration: 
A Russian, a Cuban, an American and a Lawyer are in a train. The Russian 
takes a bottle of the Best Vodka out of his pack, pours some into a glass, 
drinks it, and says: "In USSR, we have the best vodka of the world, nowhere 
in the world you can find Vodka as good as the one we produce in the 
Ukraine. And we have so much of it, that we can just throw it away...". 
Saying that, he opens the window and throws the rest of the bottle thru it. 
All the others are quite impressed. 
The Cuban takes a pack of Havana's, takes one of them, lights it and 
begins to smoke it saying: "In Cuba, we have the best cigars of the world: 
4 :
 http://www.jk9.com/lawyer_humor.htm 
41
 http://www.resourcesforattorneys.com/lawyersgeniejoke.litml 
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Havana, nowhere in the world there is so many and so good cigar and we 
have so much of them, that we can just throw them away...". 
Saying that, he throws the pack of Havana 's thru the window. One more 
time, everybody is quite impressed. 
At this time, the American just stands up, opens the window, and throws 
the Lawyer through it...44 
As we know from our life experience, the more you have something, the less 
you appreciate it. And in case of American lawyers, their high quantity naturally 
leads to the wish to get rid of them, as the joke above suggests. Similarly to the 
enormous amount of vodka Russians might boast about, or the excess of cigars 
Cubans are proud of, Americans might brag about the abundance of lawyers 
they have. Interestingly, everybody in the joke above is quite impressed when 
the unfinished bottle of the Best Vodka, or the unfinished pack of Havanas 
are thrown away, but nobody shows any surprise, sorrow or sympathy for the 
lawyer, when he is thrown away through the window. For the American 
passenger it is not even necessary to boast about the best lawyers in the world 
or about their great numbers. He assumes that everyone is familiar with these 
facts. He simply throws the lawyer through the window: no explanation is 
needed. Indeed, as statistics show, during 1980s the US experienced not only a 
dramatic increase in the number of lawyer jokes, but also in the number of 
lawyers. Thus, the number of lawyers in the United States has grown from 
285 000 in 1960 to over one million at the beginning of the 2U1 century.4 ' Even 
before the American lawyer jokes ' explosion in the eighties, it was observed: 
"We already have at least 10 times as many lawyers as any rational society can 
tolerate, which doubtless accounts for the triumph of irrationality in American 
, • „ 4 6 
life. 
As we know from our real life, terrorists often threaten to kill hostages. In 
the text below, however, their threat is quite opposite: to "release one lawyer 
every hour". Naturally such a statement can be a real threat only because there 
are too many lawyers in America, and they are the object of great scorn: 
A group of terrorists burst into the conference room at the Ramada Hotel 
where the American Bar Association was holding its Annual Convention. 
44
 http://www. 101 funjokes.com/funny_lawyer_jokes_4.htm 
45
 Carson, C. N.: The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National 
Survey. Chicago, 2004. 
4
" Baker, R.: Terminal Jurisprudence. New York Times. 1977, 20 March, sec. 6, 12. 
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More than 500 lawyers were taken as hostages. The terrorist leader announced 
that, unless their demands were met, they would release one lawyer every 
hour.47 
There is a group of lawyer jokes which are about lawyers' deaths, but don't 
mention what has been the reason of it, as in the texts below. The following 
text stresses that lawyers are such desirable persons to kill that even a criminal 
who has murdered a lawyer is given only three days of prison sentence for his 
crime (quite a symbolic punishment for a murder!): 
Two prisoners are talking about their crimes: 
George: "I robbed a bank, and they gave me 20 years." 
Herman: "Hmm. I killed a man, and I 'm here for 3 days." 
George: "WHAT??? I rob a bank and get 20 years; you kill a man and get 3 
days???" 
Herman: "Yeah, it was a lawyer."4* 
Mr. Spenser, in the text below, is so happy and excited to hear the news about 
the death of his ex-wife ' s lawyer (one can imagine how outrageous and 
devastating someone 's hatred towards one 's ex-spouse's lawyer might be in 
America!) that he wants to hear this 'wonderful ' piece of news repeated, 
calling a law firm reception again and again: 
A law firm receptionist answered the phone the morning after the f i rm's 
senior partner had passed away unexpectedly. "Is Mr. Spenser there?" asked 
the client on the phone. 
"I 'm very sorry, but Mr. Spenser passed away last night", the receptionist 
answered. "Can anyone else help you?" 
The man paused for a moment, then quietly said, "no" and hung up. 
Ten minutes later, he called again and asked for Mr. Spenser, his ex-
wife 's lawyer. The receptionist said, "You just called a few minutes ago, 
didn't you? Mr. Spenser has died. I 'm not making this up." The man again 
hung up. 
Fifteen minutes later, he called a third time and asked for Mr. Spenser. 
The receptionist was irked by this time. "I 've told you twice already, Mr. 
Spenser is dead. He is not here! Why do you keep asking for him when I 
say he's dead? Don't you understand what I 'm saying?" 
47
 http://wilk4.com/humor/humorm353_lawyers.htm 
48
 http://www.ahajokes.com/law067.html 
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The man replied, "I understand you perfectly. I just like hearing you say 
it over and over."44 
When in the joke below a report of a lawyer 's death in a local newspaper 
appears to be a mistake, such piece of news is corrected later with the greatest 
expression of sorrow. The sorrow, however, refers not to the fact of printing 
false information of the death of the town's oldest practicing lawyer, but to the 
fact that the news of bis death was a mistake (quite a big difference!): 
A local newspaper mistakenly printed an obituary for the town 's oldest 
practicing lawyer. He called them immediately and threatened to sue unless 
they printed a correction. 
The next day, the following notice appeared, "We regret that the report 
of Attorney Critchley's death was in error."511 
According to a number of jokes, the cemetery is one of the best places a lawyer 
might be found: 
Where can you find a good lawyer? 
In the cemetery.5 ' 
Why should lawyers be buried 100 feet deep? 
Because deep down, they're really good people.52 
Many more jokes containing further fantasies about dead lawyers, or about 
their eradication from society could have been discussed here, and exemplified 
by hundreds of jokes, but we have to make a point here. 
As Davies states: "Lawyers are very rarely attacked by clients or those they 
encounter in their work; the risks they face on a daily basis from the violent 
and the hostile are far less than those encountered by police officers, firemen, 
social workers, school teachers, and doctors and nurses treating accident and 
emergency cases."53 According to his opinion, attorneys' chances of being 
persecuted or dispossessed in America are simply zero; "the existence of such 
jokes in widespread circulation in America is an indication of how safe 
44
 http://www.comedy-zone.net/jokes/laugh/lawyers/law007.htm 
http://www.swapmeetdave.com/Humor/Lawyer.htm 
" http://www.wakelydam.com/lawyers.html 
http://www.ncrdtests.com/jokes.php'?id= 1621 
" Davies: American Jokes about Lawyers. Humor... op. it. 382. 
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American lawyers are, for the jokes neither evoke the general unease nor the 
hysterical accusations of bad taste that would be aroused if American lawyers 
really were hated and menaced".54 Jokes such as the ones quoted and analyzed 
in this part of the study are "a perfect example of how jokes that seem to 
have a viciously hostile content can be full of sound and fury yet signifying 
nothing".55 
Fred Rodell calls the law "an unnecessary and expensive nuisance".56 He 
also points out: "The answer is to get rid of the lawyers and throw The Law with 
a capital L out of our system of laws".57 Negative feelings against the legal 
profession are also epitomized by the following quotation: "If all lawyers were 
hanged tomorrow ( . . . ) , we'd all be freer and safer, and our taxes would be 
reduced by almost a half".55 Galanter states that the wish to live in a world 
without attorneys is "an enduring dream of making language transparent, 
eliminating ambiguity, and dispensing with the need for interpretation".54 
I would like to finish the first part of my study with Galanter's words: 
Americans, who regard the rule of law as a defining and essential quality of 
their society, don ' t want to be rid of law, but of "lawyers' law"-of formal, 
complex, "artificial" law that only lawyers can understand. If only, it is 
fondly believed, we were rid of these lawyers we could return to a better 
law-simple, natural, direct and understandable. Lawyers are seen as obstacles 
interposed between us and harmonious natural state of social order.60 
3. After Death, Lawyers Go to Hell 
While the first part of the study has discussed the different ways of extermi-
nating lawyers offered in American lawyer jokes, the second part of the study 
focuses on the following question: What awaits lawyers after they die? The 
vast majority of jokes treating the lawyer 's end sarcastically show that, after 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Rodell, F.: Woe Unto You. Lawyers! New York, 1939, 245. 
57
 Ibid. 249. 
58
 tl. L. Mencken, quoted in Rodgers, M. E. (ed.): The Impossible H. L. Mencken. New 
York, 1991, 286. 
59
 Galanter: op. cit. 404. 
60
 Ibid. 403. 
324 ANNA T. LITOVKINA 
death, lawyers go to Hell. Some lawyer jokes on various websites are even 
grouped under the heading "Lawyers in Hell".61 This is consistent with some 
old English legal proverbs, sayings and comparisons: "Lew lawyers die well", 
"Fair and softly as lawyer go to heaven", "The devil makes his Christmas pies 
of clerks' f ingers and lawyers' tongues", etc.6" A very frequent scene of lawyer 
jokes is at the entrance to Heaven, a place where almost no lawyers get accepted, 
due to their plentiful sins. In spite of this, some lawyers try to get entrance to 
Heaven, and attempt to negotiate with St. Peter, but they almost never succeed. 
The joke below takes place at the entrance to Heaven. A dead lawyer is 
treated by St. Peter with seemingly great respect and warmth. The lawyer can't 
really understand why all the attention and warm greeting is given to him. The 
punch line of the joke, St. Peter 's reply ("Well, I 've added up all the hours for 
which you billed your clients, and by my calculation you must be about 193 
years old!"), however, makes us understand the reason for such ' respect ' . 
Without any doubts, this lawyer, for all his cheating, a stereotypical trait63 of 
lawyers in jokes will not get admittance to Heaven either: 
A lawyer died and arrived at the pearly gates. To his dismay, there were 
thousands of people ahead of him in line to see St. Peter. To his surprise, 
St. Peter left his desk at the gate and came down the long line to where the 
lawyer was, and greeted him warmly. 
Then St. Peter and one of his assistants took the lawyer by the hands 
and guided him up to the front of the line, and into a comfortable chair by 
his desk. 
The lawyer said, "I don' t mind all this attention, but what makes me so 
special?" 
St. Peter replied, "Well, I 've added up all the hours for which you billed 
your clients, and by my calculation you must be about 193 years old!"64 
Again, it is the lawyer who goes to Hell in the following joke. The setting of it 
is also at the gate to Heaven. A lawyer who has committed hundreds of sins in 
his life, nevertheless, wants to get acceptance to Heaven: 
61
 As for example, on the following site: http://www.lifeisajoke.com/miscellaneousl7_ 
html.htm 
'" For more on English legal proverbs, see Bond. D. F.: English Legal Proverbs. 
Publications of the Modern Language Association. 51 (1936) 921-935. 
63
 See T. Litovkina. A.: Greed. Lies and Negotiable Justice: Stereotyped Lawyers in 
American Lawyers Jokes. Acta Ethnographien Hungarica, 55 (2010). 
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A lawyer is standing at the gates of Heaven and St. Peter is listing his sins: 
1. Defending a large corporation in a pollution suit when he knew the 
company was guilty. 
2. Defending an obviously guilty murderer because the fee was high. 
3. Overcharging clients. 
4. Prosecuting an innocent woman because a scapegoat was needed in a 
controversial case. 
The list goes on for quite a while. The lawyer objects and begins to argue 
his case. He admits all these things, but argues, "Wait, I've done some 
charity in my life also." St. Peter looks in his book and says, "Yes, I see. 
Once you gave a dime to a panhandler and once you gave an extra nickel to 
the shoeshine boy, correct?" The lawyer gets a smug look on his face and 
replies, "Yes!" St. Peter turns to the angel next to him and whispers, "Give 
this guy 15 cents and tell him to go to Hell."65 
Despite hearing all his sins listed by St. Peter, the lawyer tries to negotiate and 
argue (we know that lawyers are good negotiators!). He says that he has done 
some charity in his life as well, and he hopes it will help him lo get acceptance 
to Heaven. When, however, St. Peter f inds in his book the amount of money 
the lawyer gave to charity (a dime to a panhandler and a nickel to a shoeshine 
boy!), we cannot keep our laughter. To call a dime or a nickel 'charity'? Only 
a cynical lawyer could name such breadcrumbs "charity". Measure for measure: 
in return for his two extremely 'generous' deeds, the lawyer is given his money 
back (15 cents), and afterwards is sent to Hell. 
Hell turns out to be fairly conventional setting for showing lawyers after 
their death. The following joke shows how some ' lucky ' lawyers might be 
'tortured' in Hell: 
A man was sent to Hell for his sins. 
As he was being taken to his place of eternal torment, he saw a lawyer 
making passionate love to a beautiful woman. 
"What a rip-off," the man muttered. "I have to roast for all eternity, and 
that lawyer gets to spend it with a beautiful woman." 
Jabbing the man with his pitchfork, the escorting Satan snarled: "Who 
are you to question that woman's punishment?"66 
http://www.jacksonlawoffices.com/Jokes 
http://www.lectlaw.com/files/fun09.htm 
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While the beautiful woman is being punished for some terrible sins (maybe for 
adultery or fo r promiscuity?!) by an eternal torment-to have sexual intercourse 
with a lawyer, such punishment, however, might be quite a delight and not a 
torture for the lawyer (sic!). Naturally, if tortures like this are what is expected 
in Hell by lawyers for their sins, no wonder they commit so many sins.67 
Jokes might simply allude to Hell, without even mentioning the word. 
Although the scene of the following joke is a hospital ward and not Hell, 
nevertheless it might be proper to quote and analyze it here: 
As the lawyer woke up after surgery, he asked, 'Why are all the blinds 
drawn?' 
The nurse answered, "There 's a big fire across the street, and we didn't 
want you to think the operation was a failure."' '8 
The lawyer waking up after an operation is surprised to see the blinds are 
drawn. At first we might not understand why the nurse would care about the 
big fire outside, as well as its relevance to the patient. The nurse's answer, 
however, a l ludes to a popular belief that for their numerous sins, after death 
lawyers go to Hell. And since lawyers themselves, better than representatives 
of any other profession, know about their miserable fate, therefore, the operated 
patient should not be frightened by seeing the big fire outside. If he saw it 
upon waking up after the operation, he would think that his operation has not 
succeeded and, therefore, he has died and is in Hell. Thus, proper precautions 
have been made by the nurse, i.e., the blinds have been drawn. Although a 
great number of American jokes demonstrate the permanent fight between 
lawyers and doctors (as well as other medical personal including nurses and 
medical researchers), in this joke , on the one hand, the thoughtful nurse tries to 
save her pa t ient ' s life, and on the other hand, her answer, in a hidden form, 
still shows a popular belief that Hell is the place where lawyers go after they 
die. Thus, this joke pours more oil on the fire of hatred and scorn directed 
towards lawyers. 
According to a number of American lawyer jokes, lawyers associate with 
the Devil. It would be very hard for God, in the following joke, to find a 
lawyer in Heaven, unless i t 's a decent, honest lawyer from the last joke in the 
study (the category which hardly ever exists, according to jokes' '4): 
h7
 See Litovkina: Greed, Lies and Negotiable Justice.. . op. cit. 
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God decided to take the devil to court and settle their differences once and 
for all. When Satan heard this, he laughed and said, "And where do you 
think you ' re going to find a lawyer?"70 
Many jokes discussed above point out that lawyers normally don't enter 
Heaven: after death they go to Hell. Exception, however, might only prove the 
rule. Let me finish the second part of the study with a joke about the first 
lawyer who has ever entered Heaven. It might be symbolic that the lawyer in 
the joke is accompanied by no-one else but by the Pope: 
Following a distinguished legal career, a man arrived at the Gates of 
Heaven, accompanied by the Pope, who had the misfortune to expire on the 
same day. The Pope was greeted first by St. Peter, who escorted him to his 
quarters. The room was somewhat shabby and small, similar to that found 
in a low grade Motel 6 type establishment. 
The lawyer was then taken to his room, which was a palatial suite 
including a private swimming pool, a garden, and a terrace overlooking the 
Gates. The attorney was somewhat taken aback, and told St. Peter, " I 'm 
really quite surprised at these rooms, seeing as how the Pope was given 
such small accommodations." 
St. Peter replied, "We have over a hundred Popes here, and we're really 
very bored with them. W e ' v e never had a lawyer."7 ' 
Undoubtedly, all decent lawyers who get further acceptance to Heaven will be 
treated by St. Peter with similar respect. 
4. Conclusion 
As it has been discussed in the first part of the study, quite a serious segment 
of American lawyer jokes express fantasies of lawyers being eradicated. There 
is more than one way to kill a lawyer in American lawyer jokes: dozens of ways 
have been demonstrated through which such extinction can be achieved, e.g., 
through drowning, burying alive, hitting by car or bus, running off a cliff, 
cutting, shooting, eating, using in medical experiments, laying on the equator, 
removal of kidneys, defenestration, and many others. In fact, many jokes also 
encourage killing lawyers by emphasizing that such murder will not be punished 
" http://www.scroom.com/SCROOMtimes/Humor/Lawyer.shtml 
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severely. The attorneys' sins discussed elsewhere72 contribute to the existence 
of quite a large segment of jokes about Hell as the only place lawyers go after 
death, which has been the topic of the second part of the study. Although quite 
a number of lawyers go to the entrance gates to Heaven and try to negotiate 
and argue with St. Peter, very few of them are accepted to Heaven. Those few 
who are lucky to enter Heaven are, however, carried in St. Peter's hands, and 
treated with the highest respect and admiration. 
Acknowledgement 
The idea to write the present study came to my mind af ter reading a book "A 
jog humora" [The Humor of the Law],71 as well as after preparing an interview 
with the editor of the book, associated professor of law, Hungarian lawyer 
Csaba Fenyvesi about humor in Hungarian legal system.71 I would like to express 
my thanks to Csaba Fenyvesi for such inspiration. I also owe much gratitude to 
David Karla for his f r iendly help in proofreading the study, his critical 
comments, and suggestions. 
2
 See Litovkina: Greed, Lies and Negotiable Justice... op. cit. 
' Fenyvesi. Cs.: A jog humora (The humour of law). Pécs, 2003. 
/J
 T. Litovkina, A.: Aki a humort szereti, rossz ügyvéd nem lehet'.' (Interjú Fenyvesi 
Csaba ügyvéddel A jog humora című kötetről) |Who lowes humor, cannot be a had 
attorney? (An interview with Csaba Fenyvesi attorney about the volume entitled The 
humor of law)]. Ügyészek Lapja, 16 (2009) 87. 
1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2009 Akadéiai Kiadó. Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
50. No 2. pp. 329-330 (2009) 
DOl: 10.1556/A J nr. 50.2009.2.6 
B O O K R E V I E W 
Boythci Györgyné (ed.): Versenyjogi jogsértések esetén érvényesíthető magán-
jogi igények (Private enforcement of competition law). HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 
2009. 329 pp. 
"Private enforcement" of competition law is generally understood to cover all 
the legal steps that a victim of an anti-competitive conduct (be it a world-wide 
market sharing cartel or an individual instance of unfairly high pricing by a 
dominant company) may take under civil law. The term, which is generally used 
as the opposing pair of "public enforcement" of competition law (namely the 
legal steps by public authorities to investigate and sanction anti-competitive 
conduct), has become a kind of a "philosopher 's stone" for those writing about 
current trends in competition law. One will find the phrase in almost every 
book, article or comment published recently on competition law matters: even 
competition agencies now regularly put a notice on private enforcement into 
their press releases about major decisions. 
Despite all these extensive efforts , there has been very few instanccs-
cspccially in the Hungarian legal literature and concerning Hungarian civil law - , 
where the reader (an academic or an attorney wishing to give up-to-date advice 
to its client) received a clear and instructive picture as to the legal situation 
concerning this important topic. This book was designed precisely to fill this 
loophole: its structure and method of analysis are perfectly fit to provide a 
comprehensive overview taking each of the most important issues in turn that a 
Hungarian civil lawyer may face when assessing a possible private enforcement 
claim in Hungary. The book is divided into nine chapters: in addition to the 
helpful introduction, it analyses, in particular, the following topics: what arc 
the possible civil law heads of sanctions? How can the claimant quantify the 
damages suffered? How will the causal connection be established between 
the infringing conduct and the damages suffered? Who can initiate a damages 
claim (individual parties or even consumers collectively)? These (and further 
equally relevant) questions receive an adequate and very well researched answer 
in each and every chapter. 
The book and its individual articles arc, however, not entirely without 
flaws. First, the book is also not entirely consistent as to the precise focus of 
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its analysis: the introductory chaptcr first discusscs-when delineating the subject 
of the book- thc "two ways of enforcing claims deriving from antitrust rules" 
(21.) (meaning private and public claims stemming from infringements of the 
prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and of the abuse of a dominant 
position), while the same chapter latter also brings the brcach of the rules of 
unfair competition (eg individual boycott) and the breach of the Hungarian 
Act on Commerce into the equation (29-31). In addition, Chapter 2 (under the 
title: "competition law infringement-civil law sanctions...") extensively deals with 
the unique and highly interesting subject of the enforcement of commitment 
decisions; even though, despite the title of the chapter, a commitment decision 
by an antitrust authority clearly docs not result in a finding of compétition law 
infringement by the authority. Second, although the quality of the articles is 
consistently very high, the depth and length of the legal analysis varies and 
in certain instances without due reason. Therefore, for example, the highly 
important and controversial topic of calculating the quantum of damages (that 
is highly relevant for any Hungarian lawyer or judge dealing with a future 
private enforcement case) receives less than half of the pages used for the issue 
of multiple damages in the USA. Although this latter topic may indeed be rather 
exotic, it is clearly the latter that would have deserved a better coverage from 
the perspective of the Hungarian reader [especially considering that multiple 
damages are not cxpcctcd soon in civil law system due to the deep rooted 
principle of prohibition of profiting from damages ("káronszerzés tilalma")]. 
Even with the minor shortcomings stated above, the new book on private 
enforcement can be considered as a pioneer in its genre. The collection of 
articles and essays provides immense value to the reader in all respects: it is 
extremely useful both for those wishing to merely to quickly look up a single 
practical aspect when they feel "lost" in the jungle of a private enforcement case 
and also for those who use the book as a basis for further research (especially 
in light of the consistent and detailed footnotes as well as the bibliography 
at the end of the book providing further stepping stones for law students, 
professors or researchers). Although the publication will ccrtainly not be sufficient 
in itself to create the philosopher's stone on the Hungarian legal market and 
turn the country into a virtual goldmine of private enforcement , it clearly 
seems that the authors have already mastered quite a number of important 
steps of alchemy towards the completion of the desired element. 
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DÁNIEL DEÁK* 
Conflicts between Hungarian Procedural Tax Law and 
Community Law-Case Studies 
Abstract. In this paper, the administrative law aspect of the compatibility of the Hungarian 
local trade tax will be discussed, based on the presumption that even if it has been declared 
that the Hungarian local trade tax cannot be considered inconsistent with the harmonised 
value added tax, Hungarian taxpayers may be hurt in their rights if they cannot get easy 
access to the clarification of the legal issue whether a national tax is consistent with 
Community law. 
Keywords: enforcement of compatibility with harmonised value added tax of Hungarian 
local trade tax; state liablity of the damage caused by wrong legislation; taxpayer claims based 
solely on the infringement of Article 10 EC 
In the f o l l o w i n g , p r o c e d u r a l t ax l a w i ssues wi l l be ra ised t h r o u g h case s t u d i e s . 
T h e i r s u b j e c t is t h e H u n g a r i a n l o c a l t r ade t a x . It was t e s t e d b e f o r e the E C J 
w h e t h e r t he H u n g a r i a n tax w a s n o t in c o m p e t i t i o n wi th t h e h a r m o n i s e d v a l u e 
a d d e d t ax . A n u m b e r o f H u n g a r i a n t a x p a y e r s c l a i m e d that it w a s not . A l t h o u g h 
the i r c l a i m s w e r e n o t a p p r o v e d b y the E C J , t h e ques t ion c a n n o t be c o n f i n e d 
to the s u b s t a n t i v e l a w issue . T h i s is b e c a u s e no t only t h e q u e s t i o n c a n b e 
f o r m u l a t e d if t he H u n g a r i a n t a x is c o n s i s t e n t w i th A r t i c l e 3 3 of the S i x t h 
C o u n c i l D i r ec t i ve ( n o w Ar t i c l e 4 0 4 of D i r e c t i v e 2 0 0 6 / 1 1 2 / E C ) , but a n o t h e r 
q u e s t i o n as we l l . T h e la t ter is o f p r o c e d u r a l l a w na tu re . T h e s m o o t h o p e r a t i o n 
o f t he h a r m o n i s e d v a l u e added t a x c a n be j e o p a r d i s e d not o n l y by i n t r o d u c i n g 
* Full Professor of Law, Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute of Business Law; 
Research Fellow, Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute, Monash University, Melbourne 
E-mail: daniel.deak@uni-corvinus.hu 
This paper was written within the framework of the project № NKFPG-00075/2005 
on "The effects of European Union's membership on Hungarian law and administration". 
The present article is part of a major study. Deák, D.: Az EU-csatlakozás hatása a 
magyar adóigazgatási eljárási jogra: jogbiztonság, egyéni jogvédelem és ekvivalencia-
követelmény az adózásban (The impact of the EU accession on the Hungarian procedural 
law of tax administration: legal certainty, individual legal protection and the standard of 
equivalence in taxation). In: Lőrincz, L. (ed.): Látleletek a magyar közigazgatásról 
(Findings on the Hungarian public administration). Budapest, 2007, 63-123. 
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taxes in competition with the value added tax as introduced by the Sixth 
Council Directive. It can also be an impediment to the smooth operation of the 
harmonised value added tax that taxpayers cannot easily clarify whether a 
national tax as introduced is consistent or not with the harmonised value added 
tax. Taxpayers may be compelled-as the case is in Hungary- to undertake to file 
tax returns with zero tax liability, and envisage the adverse tax consequences 
of identifying the unpaid tax, if they wish to express their doubts as to the 
national tax as introduced, whether it is compatible with the harmonised value 
added tax. This is because they do not have the right in Hungary to fi le tax 
returns with the right of reservation. This can be seen, taken by itself, as a 
breach of the loyalty principle as enshrined in Article 10 of the EC Treaty. 
In the following, the administrative law aspect of the compatibility of the 
Hungarian local trade tax will be discussed, based on the presumption that even 
if it has been declared that the Hungarian local trade tax cannot be considered 
inconsistent with the harmonised value added tax, Hungarian taxpayers may 
be hurt in their rights if they cannot get easy access to the clarification of the 
legal issue whether a national tax is consistent with Community law. First, the 
above question will be put in the context of a lawsuit of public administration, the 
subject of which is to examine whether the resolution of the local tax authorities 
on the imposition of the advance local trade tax is lawful. Secondly, the 
problem with the inconsistency of local trade tax with Community law will be 
extended to the possible delictual liability of the state for the damages caused 
by the introduction of tax not duly levied, that is, by the legislation not 
consistent with Community law. Again, even if the controversy on the 
compatibility of the local trade tax has been over, the question has remained 
open if the Republic of Hungary can be sued under certain conditions for 
compensating the damages caused by wrong legislation. 
I. Examining the legality of levying local business tax in the context of 
Community law 
1. Background 
According to one viewpoint, a legal case can be brought against the bureau 
chief of the Public Administrative Off ice of the County of Zala as defendant, 
petitioning the Court to review a decision he signed in 2005, which let stand 
a warrant for payment issued by the Mayor ' s Office of the Municipality of 
Zalaegerszeg. The applicant may contend that he was correct to petition the 
Court to declare that decisions produced by the defendant were violating the 
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law, because as of May 1, 2004, when the Republic of Hungary joined the 
European Union, Paragraph 129 (1) of Article 33 of the Sixth Council Directive 
77/388/EEC1 became directly available to the applicant, and thus the applicant 
had no liability for the relevant tax. Consequently, it was not in accordance 
with the law to prescribe the applicant the obligation to make an advance 
payment connected to the 2005 tax year. 
The applicant moved to initiate a preliminary ruling proceeding in front of 
the European Court of Justice, f o r - a m o n g other objectives-to get an interpre-
tation of whether the local business tax (in Hungarian: "helyi iparűzési adó") 
can be upheld following accession, or whether it conflicted with Article 33 of 
the Sixth Council Directive.2 Another issue that was raised was whether 3(a) 
[on Local authority f iscal aid] of Part 4 [on Competition Policy] of Appendix 
X of the EU Accession Treaty1 could be interpreted in such a way that the 
accession document granted a temporary waiver (i.e. one that is limited to a 
term of transition) to the Republic of Hungary, which would provide the 
option that Hungary may- i f it so chooses-derogate from the rule allowing 
only a single kind of turnover tax in any Member State-an otherwise mandatory 
requirement derived f rom Article 33 of the Directive. Following an appeal, the 
Zala County Court [of Hungary] referred to the European Court of Justice for 
a preliminary ruling, which was registered under C-283/06.4 Since another 
reference with similar aim and content was submitted by the Supreme Court 
1
 77/388/EEC, Official Journal L 145, 1977.06.13. 1 (amended multiple times). Without 
prejudice to other Community provisions, especially general Community provisions in 
force on the holding, transporting, and controlling of goods subject to excise duty, this 
Directive shall not prevent a Member State from maintaining or introducing taxes on 
insurance contracts, taxes on betting and gambling, excise duties, stamp duties and, more 
generally, any taxes, duties or charges, which cannot be characterized as turnover taxes, 
given that these taxes, duties, or charges do not trigger formal requirements in connection 
with the crossing of borders. 
2
 According to the ECJ, it cannot. The local business tax is this not in conflict with 
Community law. Joined cases C-283/06 Közgáz and C-312/06 OTP Garancia Biztosító, 
European Court Reports, 2007,1-8463. 
3
 Notwithstanding Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty, Hungary was allowed to apply, 
up to and including 31 December 2007, local business tax reductions of up to 2% of the 
net receipts of undertakings, grantable by a local government for a limited period of time 
on the basis of Articles 6 and 7 of Act С of 1990 on Local Taxes, as amended by Article 
79 (1) and (2) of Act L of 2001 on the Amendment of Fiscal Laws, as amended by Article 
158 of Act XLII of 2002 on the Amendment of Acts on Taxes, Contributions, and Other 
Budgetary Payments. 
4
 Official Journal С 212, 2006.09.02. 23. 
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of Hungary (which was registered under C-312/06), the president of the 
European Court of Justice ruled that the two cases be joined. ' 
Tax authorities that produced the original decisions generally prescribed in 
their warrant for payment that taxpayers make an advance payment of the 
local business tax administered via the taxpayers' local business tax account. 
The authorities generally founded their decisions on Paragraph (1) of Section 
39 and Paragraph (2) of Section 41 of the Local Taxation Act. The public 
administrative agencies of second instance handling the case on appeal let the 
original decisions s t and-as they were deemed to be correct in te rms of their 
substance-in all cases involving Hungary . The decisions produced in the 
appellate proceedings were supported by the reasoning that the [Hungarian] 
local business tax was examined in detail as part of accession talks, and Hungary 
could have received the right to uphold the waivers and allowances until 
December 31, 2007 as part of 3(a) [on Local authority fiscal aid] of Part 4 [on 
Competition Policy] of Appendix X of the EU Accession Treaty. Considering 
the fact that the accession document does describe the institution of the local 
business tax (tax base, taxation rate), the public administrative agencies of 
second instance hold that this tax should be considered as one that would be 
sanctioned by the European Union as well, taking into consideration that there 
is no Community norm that would render the levying of this kind of tax 
forbidden. 
Taxpayers can petition to have the official decisions changed or abrogated. 
They can rely on the argument that the decisions violate certain legal rules, as 
the obligation to pay the local business tax expired after April 30, 2004. 
Consequently, as of May 1, 2004 rules connected to the local business tax that 
are found in the Local Taxation Act can no longer be used, and in the absence 
of local business tax law liability, the taxpayer has no obligation to fde a tax 
report, make an advance or regular payment connected to this tax. The taxpayer 
applicants may also move for the proceedings to be suspended considering that 
for the petition to be adjudicated the interpretation of Paragraph ( 1 ) of Article 33 
of the Directive is necessary. The applicant may found his legal action that 
since the local business tax-which is regulated in the Local Taxation Act- is 
considered to be a form of turnover tax, its upholding by the Republic of 
Hungary has been in conflict with Paragraph (1) of Article 33 of the Directive 
since Hungary's accession to the European Union, i.e. since May 1, 2004, because 
the accession document did not contain any temporary waiver that would have 
enabled Hungary to maintain reliance on this form of tax. 
5
 Official Journal С 327, 2006.09.30. 6. 
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The interpretation of Community law is necessary, because if 3(a) [on 
Local authority fiscal aid] of Part 4 [on Competition Policy] of Appendix X of 
the EU Accession Treaty can be interpreted in such a way that the fact that it 
contains waivers connected to certain options of granting allowances related to 
the local business tax until December 31, 2007, then this may imply that the 
parties have also recognized the waiver to apply to the underlying institution 
of local business tax itself until that day. However, if the case is that the 
temporary waiver contained in the accession document does not in fact apply 
to the institution of the local business tax form itself, then it remains open to 
interpretation, whether- in light of the rule contained in Paragraph (1) of 
Article 33 -a tax is considered to be a forbidden form of turnover tax based on 
its relevant material characteristics, if its subject is the entrepreneur, if its scope 
covers all entrepreneurial activity (literally: conducting trade/economic activity, 
i.e. the literal meaning of the name of this tax is the tax levied on conducting 
trade/economic activity) conducted within the territory (i.e. jurisdiction) of the 
local government, in other words: all activities conducted by the entrepreneur 
in this particular capacity that is directed at acquiring profit or income. 
The questions raised (in case No. C-312/06) by the Supreme Court [of 
Hungary] are to be answered individually, one by one, in other words, the 
national judicature would definitely like to get an answer to the question if 
Article 33 of the Sixth Council Directive is in fact a block in the way of 
upholding the aforementioned national tax. The Metropolitan Court of Buda-
pest (in case No. C-447/06, which has by now been removed from the register6)-
similarly to the question raised by the Zala County Court-also determined a 
hierarchical order. Accordingly, the procedural law question could only be 
answered in light of the outcome of the derogation and substantive law delibera-
tions. This approach is questionable, because the procedural matter could be 
examined in and of itself. The reason for this-in our opinion-is that it can be 
considered a violation of Community law in and of itself if the public 
administrative authority handling the case refuses to examine whether the 
national tax is reconcilable with Communi ty law, thereby forcing the taxpayer 
to correct his/her tax return via self-auditing, i.e. indirectly prescribing him/her a 
more difficult task (because this task is laden with the threat of sanctions 
connected to the potential finding of delinquent taxes), thereby blocking the 
true coming into force of Community law. 
The finding of violation of procedural law may qualify as a violation of 
Communi ty law-and with it a connected finding of liability on part of the 
6
 Official Journal С 326, 2006.12.30. Removed from the register: Official Journal С 
096, 2007.04.28. 29. 
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Member State related to a violat ion perpetrated by way of legislation is 
possible-even if in terms of the substantive law issue (namely: "Is the local 
business tax reconcilable with the set Communi ty order of value added 
taxation?") we could determine no finding of violation of Community law. 
The issue of the possible lack of reconcilability can be raised not only in 
general terms, based on the requirement of loyalty contained in Article 10 of 
the European Community Treaty, as apparent f r o m the way the question was 
f ramed by the Metropolitan Court of Budapest. A violation of Community law 
on part of a national authority, or that of national law actually means the 
violation of Article 33 of the Sixth Council Directive, because the issue of 
reconcilability of national taxation with harmonized value added taxation can 
only be raised in a proceeding that by its nature presents a burden for the 
taxpayer. The prohibition contained in Article 33, according to which Member 
States are barred f rom introducing a national tax not reconcilable with hannonized 
value added taxation, can only be fully functional, if at the same time citizens 
are guaranteed the opportunity for Community law violations to be recognized 
(identified) without any disproportionate burden before national authorities, 
and similarly their connected rights are freely exercisable in actuality. 
2. Impediment to the enforcement of Community law 
The local business tax is of a hybrid nature: it is based on self-assessment tax 
payment [Paragraph (1) of Section 25 and Paragraphs ( l ) - (2 ) of Section 26 of 
the Act on the Rules of Taxation], but also has the proceeding of an official 
authority ending with a decision inserted into the process of self-assessment 
taxation. The warrant for payment describing the amount of tax advance to be 
paid is the product of an official proceeding, and according to Section 123 of 
the Act on the Rules of Taxation, the payment order qualifies as an authoritative 
decision, which produces a result directly connected to the significant material 
subject of the tax related case, therefore the opt ion of petitioning for a review 
of the legal issues connected to the case must be guaranteed for the client 
without any limitation. The authority of second instance violates the law if it 
declares that it has no capacity to rule whether the original mode of levying 
the tax was lawful or not. The fact that according to Paragraph (5) of Article 
41 of the Local Taxation Act7 the tax authority determines the amount of the 
tax advance to be paid based on the annual tax report filed by the taxpayer, 
does not lead to the conclusion that the tax authority is released from the 
7
 Tine tax authority issues a warrant for payment to communicate the amount of tax advance 
to be paid, determined based on the annual tax report or the reporting of projected tax. 
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obligation to examine the legal issues connected to producing a decision that 
declares the imposition of the tax. This is so, because Paragraph (1) of Section 
31 of the Act on the Rules of Taxation8 contains guidance relevant to the content 
of a tax report, according to which the document contains data necessary for 
both the determination of the tax, and that of the (legal) foundation of the 
budgetary support, and its sum. 
According to Paragraph (3) of Section 41 of the Local Taxation Act, if the 
base or rate of the tax changes due to a change made in a legal rule, then the 
public administrative authority must determine the new sum of the tax advance 
by taking into account the updated formula and/or rate of the given tax. In the 
previously mentioned litigation, this is exactly what was observed: a change in 
the legal rule occurred, effective on the day of accession, specifically: the 
incompatible Hungarian rule (requiring the payment of the local business tax, 
which is irreconcilable with the harmonized value added taxation system) was 
replaced directly by the Community legal rule, and in truth this should have 
been noticed by the public administrative authority handling the case, and 
accordingly, the authority should have declared the expiration of the obligation 
to pay this tax. 
Considering that the taxpayer applicant initiated legal proceedings directed 
at challenging the legality of the tax liability [citing Paragraph (3) of Section 
41 of the Local Taxation Act in support of applicant 's claim] and also 
challenging the base and rate of the tax [citing Paragraph (1) of Section 31 of 
the Act on the Rules of Taxation], the tax authority may not decline to take a 
position in the connected legal debate, which is an issue otherwise independ-
ent f rom the declarations provided by the taxpayer in taxpayer 's annual tax 
return. In this aspect it is also irrelevant that the production of the decision was 
not preceded by a tax administrative proceeding. If the tax authority becomes 
aware of the violation of Community law resulting f rom the change in the 
legal rule, it must initiate the abrogation of legal rules establishing the 
obligations connected to the local business tax. As a result of this, the taxpayer 
status in this respect will cease to exist, since the taxpayer is defined as the 
person who has a liability for tax, and this status is, on the other hand, def ined 
by a piece of legislation currently in force [namely: Paragraph (1) of Section 6 
of the Act on the Rules of Taxation], 
If the public administrative authority was to produce a decision only regard-
ing the numerical issue [of size], then there would not even be need for a 
decision that determines rights and obligations. However, as part of the process 
8
 The tax report contains data necessary for determining the identity of the taxpayer, 
the tax base, exemptions, reductions, and the amount and basis of budget support. 
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of producing a decision, the authority may not decline to take the responsibility 
of forming an opinion of its own regarding the legitimacy of the legal basis for 
levying the relevant tax, especially if such a close examination is expressly 
requested by the taxpayer. According to the law, the publ ic administrative 
authority is understood to be producing a fo rmal decision even by the mere act 
of exercising its power to issue an official certificate or identification/registration 
document, or when deciding as registrar to enter someone into an official 
registry under its administration. If the tak ing of responsibility for deciding 
underlying legal issues cannot be avoided even in these more routine and 
mundane situations, it is certainly unavoidable in cases connected to levying 
taxes, even if in this particular case we are only faced with the issue of f ixing 
the size of an advance payment of tax based on self-reporting. 
The position of the authority, according to which the decision declaring the 
levying of the tax contains no obligation beyond that of the numerical defini-
tion of the tax liability, can be considered erroneous. On the one hand, according 
to Paragraph (1) of Section 42 of the General Rules of State Administrative 
Procedure Act (Ae.) [no longer in force, as replaced by Ket.] or Paragraph (1) 
of Section 71 of Public Administrative Procedure and Services Act (Ket.), the 
authority produces a decision in cases of merit, on the other hand, the adjudica-
t ion of the meri ts of the case cannot happen without producing a decision. The 
decision produced by an authority has to contain not just the statements of facts, 
but has to also cover the legal foundation of the decision. When producing an 
authoritative decision, the publ ic administrative authority handling the case 
may not refuse to conduct the task of examining the lawfulness of setting an 
obligation contained therein. If the taxpayer chooses to challenge the public 
administrative decision declaring the taxpayer ' s obligation to be liable for 
taxes levied, then the lawfulness of the liability for taxes cannot be determined 
just by examining whether the taxpayer did in fact file a return and with what 
content, but in certain situations the review should also cover the examination 
of the question whether the legal rule supposedly serving as the foundation of 
the tax reporting is in fact val id or not. This latter examination is independent 
of the question of whether or not the taxpayer challenges the tax connected to 
his or her tax report. 
If the taxpayer applicant launches a legal challenge regarding the lawful-
ness of the liability for a given tax, then the taxpayer 's intention is not to 
minimize the risk of being in error, rather the taxpayer wishes to avoid the 
lack of the rule of law, without having to suffer certain adverse consequences 
(undue burden) should the decision in the case eventually go against him/her. 
But this is exactly the situation the taxpayer is forced to be faced with in such 
a tax administrative system, where one cannot file a tax report with reservation. 
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If the public administrative authority of second instance takes the position that 
it can only conduct an examination of the lawfulness of the local business tax 
if the taxpayer files a return in conjunction with the taxpayer claiming that the 
local business tax is not in harmony with Community law, then the authority 
forces the taxpayer to take the risk of initiating a legal challenge with the threat 
of sanctions hanging over his/her head connected to the possible finding of 
delinquent taxes. This conduct of the authority results in the taxpayer being 
seriously harmed in exercising his/her rights granted by Community law. 
The taxpayer applicant 's such conduct cannot be deemed unlawful nor can 
it he/she be considered to be acting in bad faith, and neither can the taxpayer ' s 
tax report be considered baseless, unless such circumstances are confirmed by 
a final ruling in the given case by a public administrative authority having 
appropriate power and jurisdiction. Since no such instance could be detected, 
there could be no doubt that applicant 's conduct concerning the matter forming 
the subject of the lawsuit was lawful . Had the defendant had certain questions 
about the lawfulness of the tax liability, then it would have had the chance to, 
for example, suspend the public administrative authoritative proceeding, and 
then it could have proceeded to resolve the underlying issue. Even though the 
applicant moved specifically requesting the authority to do just that, the 
defendant refused this motion. If the defendant simply takes, duly notes, and 
processes the applicant 's tax report without any special consideration, then the 
defendant 's conduct can be considered unlawful , if-at the same time-it fails to 
examine-even as a self-assigned task, by default, on its own voli t ion-whether 
the relevant legal rules are in fact in force, and whether the liability for taxes 
forming the basis for the tax report is in fact in accordance with the law. 
Naturally, the subject of the proceeding does not get rendered obsolete, nor 
can the proceeding be terminated even in the presence of the taxpayer 's such 
positive declaration, or similar positive act (as the filing of an annual tax 
report), which results in the actual payment of taxes. In a public administrative 
authoritative proceeding it is an obligation of the authority-either by request 
or in its official capacity, by defaul t - to guarantee lawful law application, and 
to support the enforceability of the law, including that of Community law. 
The authority's obligation to render an authoritative decision regarding the 
lawfulness of the liability for tax is prescribed by law, with no regard to the 
filing of a tax report for a given tax year. If the taxpayer chooses to challenge 
the public administrative decision declaring the taxpayer's obligation to be 
liable for taxes levied, then the lawfulness of the liability of taxes cannot be 
determined just by examining whether the taxpayer did in fact file a return and 
with what content, but in certain situations the review should also cover the 
examination of the question whether the legal rule supposedly serving as the 
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foundation of the tax reporting is in fact valid or not. This latter examination is 
independent of the question of whether or not the taxpayer challenges the tax 
connected to his or her own tax report. 
The defendant public administrative authority may argue that it had exam-
ined the legal issues raised by the taxpayer, and conclusions connected to the 
underlying legal issue were appropriately represented in the opinion. However, 
since the defendant public administrative authority of second instance took 
the position that the local business tax was in fact not irreconcilable with 
Community law, it ruled against the petitioner taxpayer. The public adminis-
trative authority merely mentioned in passing in its decision as a possibility, 
that the applicant taxpayer may correct his or her tax report via self-auditing (by 
submitting a zero return). If this in fact does take place, then the public 
administrative authority may conduct an examination in the form of a tax admin-
istrative proceeding that covers the lawfulness of the local business tax. How-
ever, in view of the defendant authority it (the public administrative authority) 
is bound during the review of the decision prescribing the payment of tax 
advance to the tax report f i led, and that is why it cannot declare, in contrast 
with the tax report, that the taxpayer has no liability for local business tax. 
Thus, in view of the public administrative authority, the opportunity is 
open to examine the question of lawfulness of the local business tax only if the 
taxpayer corrects his/her tax report by way of a self-audit (i.e. by filing a zero 
return). This is a procedure of the authority, which equals the violation of the 
taxpayer 's rights protected by Community law, and one that results in the 
authority blocking the taxpayer exercising his or her rights. Since as part of the 
review of the decision containing the payment order, the public administrative 
authority refused to examine the lawfulness of the local business tax in the 
way described previously, it was immaterial that, on the other hand, it did 
refer to the taxpayer 's argument as part of the opinion of the decision, and that 
it also included its related evaluative reasoning, these latter factors have no 
significance when examining the lawfulness of the authoritative decision. This 
is so because the authority based its reasoning on the assumption that it is tied 
by the tax report, and that is why it has no option to examine the lawfulness of 
the local business tax, and it cannot, by default, reach any conclusions that 
would be contrary to the tax report. Naturally, it is questionable, however, that 
the public administrative authority is in fact bound by the tax report, since a 
public administrative proceeding is inserted into the process of taxation, which 
produces an authoritative decision. Due to the fact that, as a result of the 
public administrative authori ty 's destructive stance, the authority's procedure 
blocks the taxpayer in exercising his/her rights relevant from the perspective 
of Community law, we observe a violation of Community law-a matter that is 
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to be examined in and of itself. Therefore, even if the substantive law rules of 
the local business tax were found to be in harmony with Community law by a 
national court or the European Court of Justice, the legal violation described 
above would be reason enough to find that the public administrative decision 
was unlawful. 
Another hypothetical question is raised by the fol lowing scenario: the 
taxpayer files a zero return, but pays the tax anyway, in order to avoid having 
delinquent taxes. This scenario, however, is not permissible by Hungarian law 
currently in force, because the correction of data provided regarding the tax or 
the tax base triggers the obligation to make a corresponding tax payment, since 
the corrected tax amount becomes due with the filing of the matching report 
[(1) of Section 51 of the Act on the Rules of Taxation].9 Thus, it is not possible 
that a tax payment obligation reported after a self-audit be separated in time 
f rom the actual payment becoming due. It is generally true of Hungarian law, 
that the filing of a tax report and the connected materialization of the obligation 
to make a tax payment is inseparable from this same obligation becoming due. 
It is true that overpayment is possible, and the taxpayer may-under certain 
c i rcumstances- requi re the re fund of the surplus payment [(6) of Section 43 
of the Act on the Rules of Taxation],1 0 in the albescence of such request, 
however , the tax authority may cancel the amount of overpayment acting in 
its own official capacity once the allotted time reserved for such claim has 
expired [(5) of Section 43 of the Act on the Rules of Taxation].11 When we 
claim that the obligation to pay tax becoming due is different from the 
materialization of the obligation, we are in other words saying that the f low 
" The amount of corrected tax, the budget support, and the assessed self-auditing extra 
charge is due at the time of their reporting. 
10
 If the taxpayer has no tax debt, the taxpayer may request repayment of the remainder 
amount. In absence of such express request, the tax authority will treat the excess amount 
resulting from the overpayment as credit, and will automatically use it toward settling 
taxpayer's future tax obligation. The local tax authority may return the excess amount only 
on condition that the taxpayer at the t ime has no unsatisfied payment obligation of any 
public charge collectible [to be collected] as tax in its records. 
" If the taxpayer or the person obliged to pay the tax [(2) of Section 35] paid an 
amount exceeding the amount that would have correctly been due for the given tax obligation 
(overpayment), the tax authority shall use the excess amount to settle other taxes due by 
the same taxpayer according to its records, provided that the taxpayer request such 
reassignment. Once the legally allotted time has passed for the taxpayer to request a refund, 
the tax authority automatically reassigns the remainder amount to settle other outstanding 
tax debt of the same taxpayer on its records, or in absence of such outstanding debt it 
officially removes it from its records. A tax payment made in error to the wrong bank 
account of the same tax authority is to be treated as a payment obligation satisfied. 
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itself of a tax payment and the materialization of the obligation to pay a tax do 
not necessarily coincide, similarly to how in economic life we see that acts of 
delivery (of goods) or rendering of services (i.e. e.g. one party fulf i l l ing its 
contractual obligations) do not necessarily have to coincide with payment 
becoming due. 
An overpayment can reduce the amount of delinquent tax (back tax) [(2) 
Section 170 of the Act on the Rules of Taxation],12 but it cannot, on the other 
hand, have an effect on the finding of tax discrepancy. The tax discrepancy-
i.e. the difference between the amount of tax to be paid according to the 
finding of the tax authority and the amount of tax reported, or the amount 
omitted f rom the tax return [3. Section 178 of the Act on the Rules of 
Taxation] 13-is the category, which has to be in sync with the materialization of 
the obligation to pay tax, independent of when the payment obligation becomes 
due, or how much tax had actually been paid already. Since according to 
Hungarian law currently in force, the reporting of liability for tax on part of 
the taxpayer cannot be separate f rom when the obligation to pay becomes 
due, there is no option to file a tax report without prejudice, furthermore, the 
taxpayer is even prohibited fonn exiting the domain of self-assessment taxation 
and instead request that taxes be assessed by the tax authority. Self-auditing 
can only be used in case the original tax return was not in accordance with 
some legal rule or contained erroneous figures or calculative errors. 
According to the solidified practice of the European Court of Justice, any 
legal rule or authoritative practice of national law that can have the effect of 
weakening the exercise of rights protected by Community law by taking away 
the liberty of the authority handling a case to do everything in its own power 
to facilitate the working of Community law, qualifies as a material violation of 
Community law.14 According to the view of the European Court of Justice, 
and the taxpayers registered in the United Kingdom, taxpayers cannot be law-
fully forced to request a tax exempt status in relation to the obligation to pay 
12
 A tax discrepancy assessed to the taxpayer is to be considered a tax shortfall, but in 
the case of self-assessment taxation this is true only if the amount of the tax discrepancy 
was not settled before the time it was due, or if the budget support was taken advantage of. 
An overpayment existing at the time of the original due date can only be considered as the 
meeting of the tax payment obligation, if the overpayment also exists on the day of 
commencement of the audit. 
13
 See "tax difference: the difference between tax reported, failed to be reported, or 
levied/assessed based on reporting, and tax or budget support subsequently determined by 
the tax authority; or tax revenue deficit found in the final judgement of the criminal court; 
or budget support taken advantage of without entitlement." 
14
 C- l 18/00 Gervais Larsy v. Inasti, European Court Reports 2001. 1-05063. 51. 
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the advance on corporate tax, triggering the likely reaction of the tax authority, 
which consequently finds the delinquent taxes and applies the connected 
sanctions [of penalties or added interest obligation]. While it is true that the 
decision containing the sanction can be challenged on appeal before a court of 
law, in view of the European Court of Justice it is a serious block in the way 
of exercising rights provided by Community law if the taxpayer has to face the 
probability of the negative decision of the tax authority.15 
The blocking of the effective use of rights protected in Community law is a 
serious legal violation in and of itself, therefore this issue can be adjudicated 
independently of the substantive law issue, moreover, the defendant can be 
found to be responsible for the violation even if otherwise the local business 
tax could not be proven to be irreconcilable with Community law. The reason 
for this is that as part of the original proceeding the applicant requested that 
the scope of the issues proposed for deliberation in connection with Article 33 
include not only the substantive law but the procedural law aspects as well, 
and found it necessary that the European Court of Justice declare its position 
regarding the procedural issue as well. 
II. Damages caused with legislation (by the local business tax, which 
violates Community law) 
1. Background 
According to one possible position based on Paragraph (1) of Section 339. of 
the Civil Code of the Republic of Hungary (Act No. IV of 1959 as amended; 
"CC" in the following) it is possible to bring legal action against the Hungarian 
State as defendant for damages caused with legislation. The applicant's damages 
equal the amount of local business taxes due since the May 1, 2004 accession 
of Hungary to the European Union, which were paid according to legally 
binding public administrative authoritative decisions in due course, but which 
the taxpayer would not have been obliged to pay had the Republic of Hungary 
not kept the legal rules in force mandating the payment of the local business 
tax violating Community law. 
The applicant can move to initiate preliminary ruling proceeding for the 
purpose-among other things-of interpreting if maintaining the local business 
tax is in conflict with Article 33 of the Sixth Council Directive after accession. 
The question had also been raised whether 3 a) of Part 4 of Appendix X. of the 
15
 Joined cases, Metallgesellschaft, Hoechst, 107. 
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accession document could be interpreted in such a way that it provides a 
temporary period of waiver for the Republic of Hungary f rom the obligation 
derived from Article 33 of the directive, to maintain only a single kind of tax 
based on turnover. Another issue raised in connection with the interpretation 
of Paragraph (1) of Article 33 was whether it is a possibility consistent with 
Community law that the public administrative authority of second instance 
declines to examine the reconcilability of the local business tax with Community 
law, unless the taxpayer files a tax return in such a way that it includes a 
reference to the supposed lack of valid tax payment liability, thereby taking on 
the risk of sanctions connected to the f inding of delinquent taxes. This is of 
importance because in this latter scenario the tax authority handling the matter 
is instrumental in setting the taxpayer on a course of a tax administrative 
proceeding with an uncertain outcome, which blocks the taxpayer from exercising 
his/her rights, and consequently impedes the actual functioning of Community 
law. According to the national court in charge of case No. C-447/06- the 
Metropolitan Court of Budapest- the applicant 's motion to initiate the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure (detailed above) had legitimate basis. (The case had 
been removed by the European Court of Justice from its records, due to the 
fact that the decision brought at the lower level was later changed on appeal.) 
2. Legal basis of the compensation claim 
Since the issue (of a compensation claim for damages caused with legislation 
by a Member State) raised by the applicant's original legal action is of a sort, for 
which the European Court of Justice has developed a separate standard practice, 
the need for interpreting Community law is presented by this particular case as 
well. Simultaneously with filing applicant's lawsuit, applicant first and foremost 
initiated that the national court produce a preliminary ruling on how to interpret 
Paragraph (1) of Article 33 of the Sixth Council Directive with respect to the 
question of whether or not the local business tax kept in force by Hungary 
following its accession is reconcilable with Community law. Applicant ' s 
damages are not only attributable to having had to pay the local business t a x -
in a way that violates Community law-, but is also connected to the fact that 
the Hungarian legal system in force failed to produce an environment, where 
the access to Community rights is not significantly burdensome. For the legal 
conflict to be resolved, it is necessary to call upon the European Court of 
Justice to provide an interpretation of Paragraph (1) of Article 33 of the Sixth 
Council Directive, which deals with harmonized value added taxation. With 
regard to this, we not only see the question raised whether or not the rules 
contained in Paragraph (1) of Article 33 of the Sixth Council Directive and 
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rules governing the local business tax (as per Chapter IV of the Local Taxation 
Act) are in harmony, but also whether the respondent 's position claiming that 
there is no possibility of changing or ending the obligation to make an advance 
payment on the local business tax until (and unless) the taxpayer f d e s a 
corrected tax report based on self-auditing is consistent with Paragraph (1) of 
Article 33. 
The liability of a Member State for damages can be connected technically 
with the "loyalty clause" of the European Community Treaty (Article 10.). 
This is exactly the root of the liability of a Member State for violating 
Community law. We should, at the same time, point out that compensation for 
damages is the most general form of sanction applied by the European Court 
of Justice. The reliance on this sanction has implications regarding the entirety 
of a national legal system, because it can be seen as the most appropriate tool 
of implementing rights enforcement in a rule-of-law environment and a market 
economic framework. This is because the prime importance of the sanction of 
compensation can be explained, first and foremost, by the fact that ci t izens ' 
rights are protected by law, and the violation of these rights can be interpreted 
as a financial matter. Consequently, a prerequisite of an compensation claim is 
the definition of damages in financial terms. The compensation claim is not 
primarily connected to harm caused to the property or financial holdings of 
citizens, rather it is viewed as the most generic tool of rights enforcement in 
case of rights violations. This has a signif icance in determining liability for 
damages in individual cases as well, since the civil court charged with protecting 
the existing legal order has the capacity to rely on the use of compensation 
claims in any case, in which the court finds the hanning of rights in connection 
with any legal relations. 
In connection with the delictual liability of Member States for the violation 
of Community law, the European Court of Justice has found in the Francovich 
case,16 that the comprehensive enforcement of Community legal rules would be 
impeded if private citizens could not have access to legal redress, if their harm 
was caused by a rights violation attributable to a Member State. According to 
the European Court of Justice, the principal, according to which a Member State 
is liable for damages caused to private citizens by a violation of Community law 
that is attributable to that state is rooted in the internal system of the Rome 
Convention. In consecutive years,17 the European Court of Justice further ref ined 
16
 C-6/90, C-9/90 Andrea Francovich, Daniela Bonifaci & others, combined case, 
European Court Reports 1991.1-5357, Para. 33. 
17
 C-46/93, C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, Factortame Ltd. & others, combined case, 
European Court Reports 1996.1-1029, Para. 51. 
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the criteria of f inding delictual liability for national legislation not consistent 
with Community law, which are the following: 
- the piece of Community law at issue was originally intended to give 
rights to individuals 
- he violation of Community law alleged to have been committed by a ber 
State is significantly harmful 
- here is a cause and ef fec t relation be tween the Member State's fa i lure 
fulfill an obligation and the harm. 
According to the solidified position of the European Court of Justice (C-
46/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, C-48/93 Factortame, Para. 74), the adjudication 
of the compensation claim is to be carried out by the national courts by way of 
applying the rules of national law, and the execution of the claim may not be 
burdensome (efficiency requirement), and the relevant legal rules may not be 
less favourable than other national legal rules relevant to the adjudication of 
other (types of) claims for damages (equivalency requirement).18 An alternative 
of the compensation claim can be the petition for a restitution claim (C-397/98 
Metallgesellschaft, C-410/98 Hoechst, Para. 77). When petitioning for a restitution 
claim, the applicant need not give proof of the existence of each prerequisite 
criteria of the compensation claim, and an additional concession providing a 
lower threshold is that in the context of Community law there is no need to 
give proof that the violation of Community law was significantly harmful (C-
46/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur, C-48/93 Factortame, 56-57). In contrast, however, 
the scope of the restitution claim is limited relative to that of the compensation 
claim, in that, for example, disadvantages connected to the harm caused (such 
as, for example, the weakened position of the enterprise affected by the national 
legal rule that violates Community law) may not be included in the restitution 
claim. In Hungarian law, the possibility of petitioning for a restitution c l a i m -
as a claim for damages-is possible by referencing Section 6 CC.14 
Generally, the European Court of Justice, when adjudicating a case, does 
not tend to get involved in deciding how the object of applicant 's petition can 
be categorized within civil law. This is due to the fact that according to the 
view of the European Court of Justice, it is a matter belonging to the scope of 
18
 See also: C-231/96 Edis, European Court Reports 1998. 1-04951, Para. 34. A Member 
State may reasonably determine a short period available for a [taxpayer] to enforce a claim 
for the refunding of a payment of a common charge that was assessed unlawfully, which, 
however, may not make the actual enforcement of rights guaranteed by Community law 
burdensome (Edis, Para. 35). 
14
 The court may oblige a person to pay damages in part or full, whose wilful conduct 
caused another person acting in good faith to perform an action with good reason that 
caused him or her harm through no fault of his or her own. 
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national law, if a particular case is based on an compensation or a restitution 
claim (C-397/98 Metallgesellschaft, C-410/98 Hoechst, Para. 81, C-446/04 
FII Group Litigation, Para. 20320). In any case, the applicant's demand may only 
legitimately include those particular damage items that are directly connected 
to the damage caused by the Member State 's violation of the law. Accordingly, 
for example, the forgoing of one special tax allowance (in connection with the 
taking of another tax allowance), or, for example, the paying of an increased 
dividends payment in order to compensate for the unavailability of a tax 
allowance are not sufficient grounds for requesting compensation for damages 
(C-446/04 FII Group Litigation, Para. 207). In the litigation concerning the 
local business tax, it is clear that the appl icant 's petition included a restitution 
claim, referring to the fact that all prerequisite criteria prescribed by Section 
339 CC in connection with the finding of liability for damages were present . 
Furthermore, applicant 's claim only covered damage items directly connected 
to the damage claim (as the applicant's claim covered only the amount paid in 
taxes that should not have been paid had the Republic of Hungary not demanded 
this payment in a way that violates Community law, plus the applicant 's claim 
obviously also covers the payment of interest on the amount that had actually 
been paid by the applicant). 
3. Unlawfulness and imputable conduct 
Based on the above, we believe that the f inding of liability for damages on the 
part of the Republic of Hungary is well founded. Based on Paragraph (1) of 
Section 339 CC, there is a legitimate claim against the Hungarian State for the 
compensation of damages caused by wrong legislation. The taxpayer applicant 's 
damages equal the amount of local business taxes that were due for the period 
following the date of accession, and which were paid according to the 
enforceable decision handed down by the authority, but which would not have 
had to have been paid had the Republic of Hungary not kept these legal rules 
on the local business tax in force after accession, which has been a violation of 
Community law. The Republic of Hungary committed a violation of Community 
law-therefore the liable Hungarian State's conduct is unlawful-by way of 
keeping in force certain legal rules on local business taxation as part of Chapter 
IV of the Local Taxation Act, that are not reconcilable with the Sixth Council 
Directive on harmonized value added taxation. The Republic of Hungary is 
culpable (her conduct is imputable) in causing the damages, because it failed 
20
 European Court Reports 2006. I-11753. 
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to request derogation regarding Article 33 of the Sixth Council Directive on 
the uniform structure of value added taxation, and additionally, because it 
failed to examine with due diligence, whether the maintenance of this tax will 
result in the violation of Community law fol lowing accession. 
International practice shows that immunity of the state in developed countries 
is understood to be a differential matter, where "iure imperii" and "iure gest ionis" 
of the state's jurisdiction are strictly separated. Considerations akin to these 
were driving the revision of the CC's rules concerning liability for damages, 
when following the political changes in 1990, rules protecting state immunity 
were abrogated.21 With regard to unlawful conduct, the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Hungary took the position in a case earlier this decade (Court 
Ruling 264/2002) that no civil law damage claim can be made in connection 
with liability connected to the act of passing legislation, because the cause-
and-effect relation between the erroneous legislation and the suffering of harm 
does not produce any detectable civil law relation between the legislator and 
those who are perceived to have suffered certain negative consequences. The 
civil court cannot find that the legislator committed unlawful conduct by 
failing to produce certain legislation, an act challenged for it being allegedly 
of negative consequences. The court must, however, change its juridical course 
after accession, since the clear practice of the European Court of Justice has 
shown that unlawful conduct is understood to be present, even if the violation 
of Community law occurs by way of legislation. 
The Supreme Court arrived at the posit ion (e.g. Court Ruling 312/1994) 
regarding the liability of legislators, that the damage connected to the enactment 
of the legal rule, that legislation as an act of producing general and abstract 
rules of conduct, and the connected liability are covered by the scope of public 
law, which according to Hungarian law guarantees immunity for the legislators. 
However, according to the practice of the European Court of Justice, the 
damage can be understood to be of an individual nature, and any subject of a 
national law has the capacity to petition for the compensation of damages caused 
by legislation violating Community law. Should there be no availability of a 
possibility to do so, this shortcoming of the national legal system would 
constitute a serious hindrance in the way of the practical enforcement of 
Community law. 
The practical workings of a democratic rule of law state has burst the 
traditional boundaries of the liability for damages of the state and the viability 
of connected claims, because according to the traditional framework, legal 
responsibility could only be found if 
21
 94/V/200. [Hungarian] Supreme Court decision, dissenting opinion. III. 3. 
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- the damage was caused by a publ ic administrator, by way of violating 
professional rules of conduct, or failing to fulfill responsibilities ascribed 
to him or her 
- the damage caused can be interpreted as the withholding of advantages 
available to (individually) separate third persons. 
According to Subsection (1) of Section 339 CC, the causing of damages is 
always unlawful, unless it is expressly lawful. This is a true statement inde-
pendently of the legal (subject) status of those who have caused the damage. A 
positive discrimination granted to the state by way of the legal system sanc-
tioning that the state need not necessarily act responsibly (i.e. allowing that it 
not be held responsible), is in conflict with Section 70/A of the Constitution 
[of the Republic of Hungary] prohibiting negative discrimination. In the given 
case we may also be able to infer the abuse of legislative power, the legal 
source of which is Subsection (1) of Section 2 of the Constitution. 
According to the practice of the European Court of Justice, if a Member 
State violates Community law by way of legislation, it cannot make its legal 
accountability conditional on the particularities of its division of branches of 
power. The state's liability for compensation cannot be limited to some state 
administrative act.22 In modern legal practice the state's liability for the violation 
of international or Community law must be perceived as a uniform whole, 
regardless of the fact whether the violation has occurred in connection with the 
legislative, the executive branch, or the judiciary (Brasserie du Pêcheur, Para, 
34). Citizens cannot be blocked in their ability to enforce their rights or have 
access to judicial redress if they reference Community law, even if the damage 
caused is attributable to national legislation violating Community law (Para. 35). 
Bringing the state to legal account in connection with damages caused by 
legislation is possible if 
- the legislator of the Member State had a wide range of evaluative 
(discretionary) power when it introduced the national legislation; there 
would have been a possibility to carve out individual rights based on 
the Community right violated, and the violation of Community right is 
significant; and 
22
 C-l79/94 Brasserie du Pêcheur, 33; С-188/94, С-189/94, C-l90/94 Erich Dillenkofer, 
Christian Erdmann, Hans-Jürgen Schulte, Anke Heuer, Werner, Ursula and Trösten Knor, 
European Court Report, 1996. 1-04845, Para. 29. The obligation of a Member State to 
indemnify a damage is valid even if the damage occurs because the national court brought 
a final judgement violating Communnity law, where Community law prescribes rights 
individually enforceable by citizens. C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler, European Court Reports 
2003. 1-10239, Para. 59. 
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- there is a cause and effect connection between the violation of the 
Community right and the damage caused to citizens. 
The responsible Member State must offer legal redress within the frame-
work of its own legal rules. However, these rules cannot be less favorable to 
the harmed party than those guaranteed in connection with legal violations by 
the internal rules (of the Community), and under no circumstances can the 
national rules make the enforcement of these rights disproportionately more 
difficult (Para. 74). 
Stockholm Lindöpark AB sued the Swedish State because until 1997 the 
latter kept in force a certain value added taxation rule in conflict with the Sixth 
Council Directive, according to which the lett ing of immovable property for 
the purpose of practicing sports is a service exempt from V A T - e v e n if this 
purpose is amateur sporting activi ty- , consequently the related ' transferred' 
tax cannot be deducted. When seeking damages, the taxpayer set its demand 
for compensation as being equal to the amount of ' t ransferred' tax (indirect 
tax shifted to the lessee) it could not deduct during the term between the date 
of accession of the Kingdom of Sweden (January 1, 1995) and the amendment 
of the relevant legal rule (January 1, 1997). The Court ruled that due to the fact 
that the Swedish legal rule was not in harmony with Community law in the 
two years following the country's accession, the Kingdom of Sweden committed 
a serious and obvious legal violation by infr inging Community law, which is 
sufficient grounds for finding the validity of the state's liability for compen-
sation.23 
The damage caused by way of legislation is chargeable to the person causing 
the damage, because the Republic of Hungary could have asked for the imple-
mentation of temporary rules in connection with Paragraph (1) of Article 33 of 
the Sixth Counci l Directive, by referring to the local business tax, which it 
failed to do, even though it did ask f o r - a n d was granted-derogation in 
connection with Paragraph (3) of Article 12 of the same directive (Para. 6 of 
Part 7 on Taxation of Appendix X. of the accession document). Since the legal 
debate concerning the local business tax was launched immediately following 
accession, the Republic of Hungary could have had the opportunity to request 
a preliminary investigation f rom the European Committee. However, the Hun-
garian State causing the damages failed to gather the necessary information, 
(and this is legally ascribable to it), thereby upholding a state that violates 
Community law, and has done nothing concrete anyway in order to resolve the 
issue. Regardless of this, according to the clear practice of Community law, if 
the condition is present that the damage caused by way of legislation is sig-
23
 C-150/99, European Court Reports 2001. 1-00493. 40. 
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nif icant-and in the Hungarian case this is naturally so- the state's liability for 
compensation for damages cannot even be made dependent on the examination 
of culpability according to the European Court of Justice (Brasserie du Pêcheur, 
Para. 80). 
Prior to May 1, 2004, the Republic of Hungary categorized the local business 
tax as a type of value added tax.24 Despite this fact, the Republic of Hungary 
failed to reconcile the relationship of the local business tax and the related 
Community law in any finite manner during accession talks. Hungary did not 
ask fo r -and therefore did not receive-derogation for the local business tax in 
connection with the Sixth Directive. Based on this, its action can neither be 
considered lawful, nor prudent, and neither can we determine that it was acting 
in good faith. 
The Republic of Hungary decreased the standard rate of the value added 
tax (áfa) from 25% to 20% by enacting Act No. XCVII of 2005 (see Section 1 ). 
However, in order to offset the budget deficit that would have been caused by 
the independent introduction of this measure, it decided to overrule its previous 
decision to end the institution of local business taxation. In formal terms this 
meant that the legislation abrogated Section 190 of Act No. XCIX of 2 0 0 5 -
which would have ended local business taxation as of December 31, 2007 -by 
enacting Section 236 of Act No. LX1 of 2006, which struck the legal rule that 
mandated the ending of local business taxation. Considering that the Republic 
of Hungary viewed the local business tax as one that could be used to supply 
revenue for the state, which could be expected to balance the budget in terms 
of the revenue lost due to decreasing the general rate of value added taxation, 
we may come to the conclusion that the value added tax is in fact comparable 
to the harmonized value added tax that exists in the European Community. 
4. Injury suffered 
Although it is normal that the burden of the local business tax, expressed in 
monetary terms, is passed on to the consumer (or client), this does not mean 
that the payment of the tax, which violates Community law, did not in fact cause 
damage to the applicant itself. This is because we must-on the one hand- t ake 
into consideration the fact that the financial advantage gained by passing on 
the financial burden of the tax is not demonstrable by exact calculations, 
cannot be represented in monetary terms,-and on the other hand-if in fact the 
tax is a cause of price increase, then this is a cause of decreased competitive-
24
 Opinion of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Hungary, May 30, 2002. (No. 
6479/6/2002.) 
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ness, since it is uncertain whether the taxpayer is capable of passing on the 
damage in a particular case, and if it can, then to what extent and with what 
conditions attached. Consequently, we cannot demonstrate a direct connection 
between the general trend of passing on the respective amount of the tax and 
the potential decrease of the damage on part of the taxpayer (i.e. we cannot 
come to a well-founded conclusion that the damage caused by the payment of 
the tax has potentially decreased). The passing on of the tax burden is condi-
tional on several factors, which cannot necessarily be connected to the passing 
on of the damage. Even if the passing on of the tax does in fact occur, there 
still remains a question as to what the passing on of the tax is attributable to, 
because the relevant circumstances can be different from one case to the next. 
What we can state as positive fact is that the tax had to be paid and the 
obligation would not have burdened the taxpayer had the Hungarian State 
been prudent in its course of action following accession, and thus would have 
brought its law in line with Community advancements. In this respect, we may 
also state that applicant 's damages are unconditional, singular and countable. 
It is certain that tax had to be paid. It is uncertain how this burden could have 
been passed o n - i f at al-, because it cannot be directly connected to a pecuniary 
advantage that can be defined in terms of civil law damage liability. This 
would only be possible, if the tax could in fact be listed as a line item on the 
invoice, and the tax burden could not be listed as expenditure on the books, (as 
is the case with the value added tax, where the tax to be paid is not considered 
to be revenue, and the deductible tax is not considered to be an expenditure). 
We could only make a well-founded and exact conclusion that the damage is 
being passed on from the fact that the tax is being passed on if the tax burden 
existed in a closed system. In this case, however, this is not so, since the 
calculation of the tax to be paid and the tax that can be deducted cannot be 
separated in book-keeping terms from how the financial results (revenues and 
expenditures) materialize. 
This latter circumstance does not, as a matter of fact, make it questionable 
that the tax is materially (practically) transferable to the client, and is thus 
functionally comparable to the [Hungarian] value added tax [áfa]. In a para-
doxical way, in order to compare with the harmonized value added tax, it is 
only necessary to show that the taxpayer is capable of passing on the tax 
burden to the consumer (or client)-so long as the base of the tax is the gross 
revenue-; however the financial advantage gained by the ability to pass on the 
tax can only be validly shown to exist, if the tax is separable from the system 
of revenues and expenditures, and can be listed separately on the invoice as 
well. As a point of fact, it follows from the functional approach to the local 
business tax that it is theoretically within the realm of possibilities to f ind the 
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irreconcilability of the local business tax with Community law even if the local 
business tax and the harmonized value added tax are not comparable in terms 
of the transferability of the tax. Consequently, the national court could even 
reach the conclusion that the local business tax is not transferable, neverthe-
less, it is not reconcilable with harmonized value added tax. In this case, 
however, the possibility of mitigating the damage connected to the payment of 
the tax does not even enter the picture. 
The European Court of Justice made a declaration of guiding importance in 
the San Giorgio case, according to which it is not consistent with Communi ty 
law-as it is an obstruction in the way of satisfying a damage claim-if a national 
legal rule contains such protections, or prescribes such rules of evidence, 
which-when applied-put the burden on the taxpayer to prove that the burden 
of paying a tax violating Community law could not be transferred to other 
persons." A national legal rule (necessarily) violates Community law, according 
to which the rules prescribing indirect taxation themselves could be bases for 
concluding that the tax is transferable, unless the taxpayer proves the opposite.2 6 
According to the European Court of Justice, the right to petition for the 
reimbursement of taxes paid based on taxes levied in violation of Communi ty 
law is a right organically and inseparably attached to substantive rights guaranteed 
by national or Community law.27 
Even if national law makes it possible to transfer (pass on) the burden of a 
tax (as an indirect tax) to the consumer-and there is in fact a trend to do so in 
commercial practice-, it is not necessarily possible to presume that this actually 
does take place in every case. Whether or not the partial or complete t ransfer 
does in fact happen can be conditional on a lot of different factors. Conse-
quently, the issue of transferability is an issue of fact, or more precisely the 
issue of whether the Member State causing damage by way of legislation 
25
 199/82, European Court Reports 1983. 3595, Para. 14. 
26
 C-343/96 Dilexport, European Court Reports 1999. 1-579, para. 54. 
27
 309/85 Bruno Barra, European Court Reports 1988. 355, Para. 17. The attempt to 
recover the amount of a tax payment made cannot be blocked b y - f o r example-requiring 
that the burden of proof rest with the taxpayer in absence of official book-keeping records 
prescribed by the Accounting Act. C-129/00 Commission v. Italy, European Court Reports 
2003. 1-14637, Para. 37. Similarly, the fact that a taxpayer commercial enterprise lists the 
amount to be recovered [via the refunding of tax | among redevables on its balance sheet 
in the tax year when it paid the tax demanded unlawfully, does not allow the conclusion 
that the enterprise did so because it passed on the relevant cost to the consumer (Para. 40). 
It is not reconcilable with Community law if the practice of the competent authorities of a 
Member State based on this or similar logic makes it burdensome to enforce a claim for the 
refunding of taxes paid based on an unlawful obligation (Para. 40). 
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violating Communi ty law is capable of successful ly exonerating itself.28 In 
contrast to the claim made by the applicant in the case being discussed, the 
European Court of Justice came to the conclusion that the taxpayer commercial 
enterprise could decide to bring proof that though the burden of the tax was 
transferable, yet the inclusion of the tax in the price could have led to the decrease 
of revenues, which could be considered as an actual loss of the taxpayer. The 
taking into consideration of this circumstance rules out the possibility of 
f inding financial gain without legal ground on the part of the taxpayer, which 
is relevant because this could otherwise be grounds for disallowing the 
execution of the compensation claim (Comateb, Para. 32). 
The claim that the size of the damage is equal to the amount of tax that 
would not have had to have been paid had the national taxation rule not 
violated Community law is accepted in Community law practice, and this is 
backed up by the decisions of the European Court of Justice. An analogous 
example is the decision handed down in the Lindöpark case (C-150/99). Here 
the Court ruled for the applicant, and decided that the taxpayer applicant 's 
legitimate claim for damages was equal to the transferred tax that could not be 
deducted in the period between the accession of the Kingdom of Sweden 
(January 1, 1995) and the amendment of the relevant legal rule some two years 
later (January 1, 1997). The reasoning was that this damage would not have 
occurred, if the tax would have been deductible, and had Swedish law been in 
harmony with Community law by allowing the deduction of the amount of 
transferred tax, as a result of officially recognizing the relevant taxable activity 
accordingly. The taxpayer's damages exactly equaled the amount of the non-
deductible transferred tax, which the taxpayer could have deducted had the 
Kingdom of Sweden harmonized its law with the Sixth Council Directive 
following her accession. Naturally, the damage claim extends to the interest 
amount as wel l (Para. 13). The occurrence of the damage- in contrast to 
applicant's posit ion-did not require further proof beyond the finding that the 
taxpayer could not take advantage of the possibility to deduct the amount of 
tax at issue. 
In the joined cases of Metallgesellschaft (C-397/98) and Hoechst (C-410/98), 
the foreign parent companies petitioned for compensation of damages, because 
dividends paid by their British subsidiaries were subject to the payment of 
Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) according to British taxation rules, which 
was in their v iew a discriminatory measure as the liability to pay the A C T did 
not exist for holding companies of domestic resident status (Paragraphs 27 and 
28
 Joined cases, C-192/95 and C-218/95 Société Comateb, European Court Reports 
1997. 1-165, Para. 25. 
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29). The damage caused was determined to be equalling the amount of the 
ACT deducted from the dividends payments, i.e. the pecuniary disadvantage 
resulting from the payment of the ACT. The European Court of Justice found 
for the applicant, providing the reasoning, among others, that the national 
courts could not have reasonably required as a prerequisite of adjudicating the 
damage claim that the taxpayer first follow through with its potential legal 
conflict with the tax authority, in case it chooses to take advantage of the tax 
allowance available in the domestic context, and turn to the courts for legal 
redress only if the public administrative proceeding resulting f rom the legal 
conflict had ended inconclusively (Para. 107). 
5. Direct causation between the conduct of a Member State violating 
Community law and the damages that have occurred 
Since the damage occurred as a direct result of having had to pay the tax, 
which would have been avoidable had the Republic of Hungary repealed the 
relevant tax law rules following accession, the damages that have occurred 
could be proven by the applicant presenting as evidence those tax reports that 
show the existence of the tax payment liability being challenged, as well as 
the connected proofs of actual tax payments having been made. There is no 
necessity for presenting separate tax authoritative decisions in connection to 
proving the existence of the liability for the tax. It is a separate issue that the 
taxpayer did question the legality (validity of the legal grounds) of the liability 
to pay the tax at issue, and therefore the taxpayer had challenged the decision 
of the tax authority prescribing the payment of a tax advance before the courts, 
petitioning for the dismissal of the tax authority's decision, claiming that it 
was unlawful. 
Naturally, the Hungarian State did not prescribe the applicant 's obligation 
to pay the local business tax, but this obligation could not have materialized 
had the relevant national rule not been created. Consequently, the direct cause-
and-effect relation between the conduct of the person causing the damage and 
the damage caused is obviously present, especially if we take it into account 
that in absence of the relevant [national] legislation violating Community law, 
the local governments [in Hungary] would not have been able to rely on this 
form of taxation. We would like to note here that in the applicant 's case all 
local governments involved did take advantage of the option to levy the local 
business tax without any exceptions. Consequently, the damages that have 
occurred were caused by the legislative act of the Hungarian State. The legal 
person of the local government could also be involved as co-defendant in the 
lawsuit (through its mayor's office), on the basis that naturally the municipali ty 's 
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decree mandating the payment of the local tax is itself in violation of 
Community law. This would however make no sense, because the capacity of 
local governments to issue decrees is based on legislative enablement, and the 
violation of Community law is an issue primarily connected to the erroneous 
piece of legislation. Action against the local government authority would also 
be appropriate, and in fact is expected of the taxpayer due to the obligation of 
the taxpayer to act to minimize the damage. The appropriate way to do this, 
however , is to petition for the review of the public administrative decision. 
This was in fact carried out by the applicant on every occasion. The basis for 
bringing suit against the Hungarian State is that taxpayer applicant 's damages 
occurred as result of the act of enacting legislation that violates Community 
law. Consequently, applicant cannot limit the applicant 's claim to just what 
would be damages caused while exercising public administrative power. While 
it is worth mentioning here that the applicant cannot rule out that the Hungarian 
State did not in fact cause damages while exercising state administrative 
power (and this is why we may cite Section 349 CC), nevertheless, the proper 
legal basis for the applicant 's claim is Section 339 CC. 
III. Concluding remarks 
Even though, fol lowing the EC J decision in C-283/06 Kögáz and C-312/06 
O T P Garancia Biztosító, it can be concluded that the Hungarian local trade tax 
cannot be considered inconsistent with Community law, the taxpayer 's rights 
are infringed, being compelled, as a result of the tax authori ty 's failure to 
interpret the Hungarian law on local trade tax in the light of the respective 
Community law, to enter into a burdensome procedure. In fact, for the lack of 
interpreting the Hungarian law on local trade tax in terms of dealing with an 
appeal the taxpayer made against the tax authority 's first-instance decision on 
the imposition of advance local trade tax. the taxpayer has to file a tax return 
with zero tax liability and assuming the risk that this return would most likely 
be challenged by the competent tax authority. 
Notably, the problem of Hungarian law has not to date recovered in the 
instance that the taxpayer is not granted to file tax returns with the reservation 
of his or her right to challenge the legal basis of the imposition of tax. Where 
under Hungarian law it is possible that the tax authorities avoid interpreting 
the compatibility of the Hungar ian law on local trade tax in the light of 
Community law in terms of an appeal the taxpayer may make against the tax 
authority's first-instance decision on the imposition of advance local trade tax, 
the question can be raised if the Republic of Hungary has infringed the loyalty 
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requirement of Article 10 EC by preventing taxpayers f rom the efficient en-
forcement of their rights. It is an open issue, however, if a claim against the 
national legislation of a Member State can be based solely on the infringement 
of Article 10 EC or, in addition to it, the claimant could be requested to show 
the infringement of some substantive provisions of national law in association 
with the alleged infringement of Article 10 EC. 
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Introduction: The Subject-Matter and the Method 
In this essay I intend to analyse the ideology underlying the slogan "Run like a 
business" admittedly with a critical sting. Anyone who has dealt with the issues 
of the state and public administration even if in an oscular manner during the 
recent two decades, has hardly been able to evade the encounter with the slogan 
above or the underlying movement of the so-called New Public Management. 
The essence of the New Public Management generally abbreviated as N P M is 
that the classical-bureaucratic method of the functioning of the state should be 
abandoned.1 Instead, the market mechanism and private companies constitute 
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1
 A detailed introduction of NPM is not feasible here. For further orientation: Hughes 
(2003) provides a typical practical summary of the application possibilities of New Public 
Management; whereas Perry [Perry, J. L. (ed.): Handbook of Public Administration, San 
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the ideal. According to the underlying philosophy: The market is always better 
and more efficient than the state, companies are always more efficient than 
public administrative organs. More market and less state are always more 
beneficial for the society. 
The recognition of more abstract theoretical approaches behind NPM as 
an applied theory pertaining to public administration is not difficult. N P M 
demonstrates an obvious relation to the conception of neo-liberal-neoclassical 
economics and generally to mainstream economics, which construes the market 
as an optimal society-organisational principle." It is the frame of reference and 
especially the methodological establishment of principles of this economics, 
i.e., the departure from the rationally acting individual maximising exclusively 
his/her individual profits that is applied by Public Choice theory, scilicet, the 
Public Choice Theory to the public sphere and the state. Public Choice has 
entailed a new approach in the analysis of political relations and within that of 
the functioning of the state and has reached several significant conclusions.3 
Of course, the departure principally destines the conclusion that the state is 
less efficient in comparison with the market. In his work quoted several times, 
Niskanen4 proved on the basis of the mathematical apparatus of economics that 
state services do not work efficiently, because they provide larger supply than 
the market opt imum. From a somewhat divergent (otherwise not proved) 
departure point, but with similar methods Migue-Belanger 5 reached the 
Francisco, 1989] is a scientific and huge volume, which examines all the relevant issues of 
public administration via the perspective of NPM. Pollitt-Boukaert [PolI itt. Ch.-Bouckaert, 
G.: Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis. Oxford, 2000] provides the 
comparative introduction, analysis and assessment of the public administrative reforms of 
the recent decades. A short introduction and assessment of NPM techniques is provided by 
Plajnal [Hajnal, Gy.: Teljesítmény-orientáció a közigazgatási reformokban. Nemzetközi 
tapasztalatok a második világháború utáni időszakban (Performance Achievement Orientation 
in Public Administrative Reforms. International Experience in the Period after World 
War II)]. Magyar Közigazgatás, 49 (1999) 289-299, 361-370, 426-435] and with a positive 
attitude by Horváth, M. T.: Közmenedzsment (Public Management). Budapest-Pécs, 2005. 
2
 Milton Friedman, the most famous economist of the era can be considered an 
emblematic figure of this approach. The lengthy entry of Wikipedia dealing with him 
provides a good summary of his work and thinking. 
A good summary in Hungarian is Johnson [Johnson, D. В.: A közösségi döntések el-
mélete (The Theory of Public Choice). Budapest. 1999.] In English Lane [Lane. J.-E. (ed.): 
Bureaucracy and Public Choice. London, 1987.] focuses expressly on the role of the state. 
4
 Niskanen, W. A.: Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago, IL, 1971. 
5
 Migue. J. L.-Belanger, G.: Toward the General Theory of Managerial Discretion, 
Public Choice, 1 7 (1974), 27-47. 
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conclusion that the quantity of state and public services is not , but their prices 
are higher than the market opt imum. That is, they agree that state and public 
services are not efficient, but they disagree concerning the question in what this 
manifests itself. In this essay, it is obviously impossible and unnecessary to 
enter into the introduction of neoclassical economics and Public Choice Theory. 
Flashing light 011 the ideal span ranging from theory to practice, from general 
to concrete state and public administration describable with the formula of 
"neoclassical economics —» Public Choice Theory —» New Public Management" 
(NPM) was necessary, since the ultimate measures of value and the claims of 
N P M basically fol low this span. The critique of ideology needs to examine not 
so much concrete techniques as the underlying „philosophy". 
The acknowledged method and style of this essay is a critique of ideology'. 
In this essay, I will examine and criticize the set of ideas underlying N P M . I 
will grasp this doctrine as an ideology, since I don ' t intend to deal with it as a 
scientific paradigm. Since, 011 the one hand, it is questionable for several reasons, 
whether it is a paradigm.6 Since, on the other hand, I do not intend to examine 
it as a scientific achievement. Namely, in this case generalising statements are 
always questionable, since differences among authors a lways obtain. How-
ever, I am exclusively interested in the foundational idea by reason of its effect . 
Namely, the market ideal has basically determined the mentality of recent decades. 
N P M has been a manifestation of the Zeitgeist with respect to the state. W e 
have witnessed the interesting, however, not unequalled case in history7 that 
the conceptions related to the management of the state were determined by an 
ideology sharply opposed to the state. 
The critical approach proceeds remarkably f rom my personal partiality. As 
a researcher of public administration, I am partial to the state and I consider its 
working necessary and useful. The method of ideology criticism, which is 
without doubt somewhat obscure and has a neo-Marxist overtone, seems to be 
adequate, since in this context my affirmative bias to the state rather reinforces 
than diminishes the capacity of the revelation of reality. Namely, following 
discursive logic, I will attempt below to expose the weak points of the v iew 
opposed to mine. 
6
 Gow, J. I . -Dufour, C.: Is the New Public Management a Paradigm? Does It Matter? 
International Review of Administrative Sciences (IRAS), 66 (2000) 573—597. 
7
 The short initial period of the communist attempt was characterised by such an 
ideological approach. 
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In the course of that, I will dwell on three main subjects', the idealisation 
of the market as a general social mechanism, the idealisation of the market as 
en economic mechanism and efficiency ideal, finally, the idealisation of the 
corporate as an efficient organisation. (Besides, i will roughly refer to the 
features of the prevalence of NPM in Hungary.) In the three cases (a) I will 
reconstruct the major claims of the ideology pertaining to the market and 
companies, (b) then I will examine the reality content of these claims in them-
selves (c) and how these correlate with the state and public administration. 
The Market as an Ideal Social Mechanism 
The myth of the market often reaches beyond economy in narrow terms. 
Below, I will survey these proposals. Such universal vir tues of the market are 
emphasised especially by the so-called Viennese economic school, which at 
the same t ime condemns the state-bureaucratic solutions. This circle includes 
Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and partly Joseph Schumpeter. The 
arguments for the market are summarised especially in the volume "Road to 
Serfdom" written by Hayek published in 1944. Besides, several neo-liberal 
economists f rame similar thoughts, such as Milton Friedmann. 
The market as an original human relation 
The funct ioning of the market is often regarded as a relation, which implies 
some primeval condition. The natural condition of rational individuals wishing 
to maximise their profits is competition, exchange and the surmounting market 
mechanism. In this constellation, the emergence of the state is some perversion, 
the occupation of an aggressive, but in fact negative entity on a more useful, 
primeval mechanism. 
It is not problematical to realise, however, that the most profitable activity 
in an economic competition not limited legally or by the state is the skinning 
of others, since this promises saliently high returns with low costs. From the 
robbed value, helpers can be hired, relying on whom even more people can be 
skinned. Therefore, this is the competition of robbers, which will shortly lead 
to an oligopolistic situation: the reign of some robber barons. If any of the 
robber barons grasps the power over the others, the state may be established. 
In this sense, theoretically we may infer that the market was the primary 
form. It is another issue that judging f rom history, ancient societies were not 
characterised by the endeavour to maximise individual profits. Instead, the 
behaviour was determined by the community and community norms, in which 
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s e l f - i n t e r e s t and c o m p e t i t i o n w e r e c o n s i d e r e d d e v i a n c e s d i s r e g a r d i n g rare 
e x c e p t i o n s . (On the n o n - m a r k e t l o g i c o f e x c h a n g e in p r e - m o d e r n soc i e t i e s : 
B o u r d i e u 8 . ) 
The myth of the invisible hand and the prisoner's dilemma 
A c c o r d i n g to the c o n c e p t i o n c lo se ly r e l a t e d to t h e a b o v e , the g e n u i n e great 
mer i t o f t h e marke t m e c h a n i s m is t h a t it c h a n n e l s t h e acts o f i n d i v i d u a l s 
i nev i t ab ly f o l l o w i n g t h e i r s e l f - in t e re s t a s a spec i f ic c o - o r d i n a t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m 
to a sor t o f social o p t i m a l i t y - b a l a n c e . It o f f e r s a s o l u t i o n for the c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
b e t w e e n ind iv idua l s e l f i s h n e s s and c o m m u n i t y w e l f a r e , w h i c h v a r i o u s Utopias 
d rawing pr imari ly on m o r a l s tried to so lve , each t ime unsuccess fu l ly . C o n c e r n i n g 
this a p p e a l i n g idea, d o u b t s arise with f u l l knowledge o f t he p r i s o n e r ' s d i l e m m a . 
Th i s t y p e o f s t ra tegic g a m e s , w h i c h h a s been in t h e c e n t r e of t he c o n c e r n of 
soc ia l s c i e n c e s du r ing t h e recen t d e c a d e s , de l inea tes t h e s i tuat ion, in w h i c h the 
d e c i s i o n s o f ra t ional p r o f i t - m a x i m i s i n g ind iv idua l s i n the i r sum l e a d to the 
w o r s t p o s s i b l e d i s e n t a n g l e m e n t on a c o m m u n i t y l eve l . 9 
8
 Bourdieu, P.: (ed.): A gyakorlati észjárás. A társadalmi cselekvés elméletéről ("Practical 
Thinking. On the Theory of Social Action"). Budapest. 2002. 
9
 See, e.g., Axelrod, R.: The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York, 
1984. In Hungarian: Hardin, R.: A kollektív cselekvés mint megegyezéses, N szereplős 
fogolydilemma (Collective Action as an Agreed Prisoner's Dilemma with N Participants). 
In: Csontos, L. (ed.): A racionális döntések elmélete (The Theory of Rational Decisions). 
Budapest, 1998. 191-207. 
The prisoner's dilemma pertains to the situation, when two criminals, who were once 
involved in a "make" together, but don't know each other, are arrested. Since without the 
confession of at least one of them, this crime cannot be proved, only a much lighter crime, 
the following choice is proffered to the two captives separately. If one confesses but the 
other does not, one will be released in the scope of plea bargain, whereas the other captive 
will be sentenced to 10 years ' imprisonment. If both captives confess, each will receive 7 
years. If neither of them confesses, each will receive 1 year. They are informed that the 
other party is presented the same conditions. The situation is illustrated by the following 
diagram: 
X - confesses (competes) X - does not (cooperate) 
Y-confesses (competes) 7 ( X ) - 7 ( Y ) 10(X) - 0(Y) 
Y-does not (cooperate) 0 ( X ) - 10(Y) K X ) - l ( Y ) 
It is demonstrable that whatever one of the parties chooses to do (whether confesses or 
not), the other party will be better off with confessing. Thus, this is the rational attitude for 
both of them separately. At the same time, this is the worst possible solution (adding up 
the received number of years). 
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It is a typical prisoner 's dilemma situation, when among market actors the 
question arises, whether they should cheat the other or not, taking into account 
that this question arises in the other party, as well . It can be easily understood 
that if we posit pure market relations, individual profits can be generally 
increased by cheating the other, therefore, the actors of the market will follow 
this path. (As we saw, robbing the other promises even more profits.) On a 
social level, however, this is not in the least optimal or efficient. We daresay 
this is the worst possible condition of a society. 
It is by no means certain that the social encounter of profi t maximising 
individuals will lead to optimality on a social level, but it may frequently launch 
contrary processes. These issues, primarily, the issue which factors lead to 
market optimality and which give rise to opposing tendencies are dealt with 
by Douglas North1 0 with convincing conceptual clarity. North claims that the 
prevalence of the negative consequences of the prisoner 's d i lemma situation 
is especially possible if (a) the participants do not "meet" generally and 
recurrently, (b) if the participants do not know the former behaviour of each 
other (in similar situations), (c) if the number of the participants is especially 
high. We can easily recognise that this description fits the ideal-typical market 
transactions. We can consequently infer that the market would be unable to 
function on its own. 
Indeed, the basic condition of the functioning of the market is that the state 
guaranteed the safety of property including the necessary keeping (e.g., real 
estate) the registers and the activities related to division and other transactions. 
Besides, the state is also necessary as the ultimate guarantor of compliance 
with contracts." 
Other "moral" advantages of the market 
The market is the field of f reedom, self-sufficiency, responsibility, but at the 
same time of equality, since it is not characterised by hierarchic arrangement, 
but by the exchange based on the f ree will of equal parties and by competition 
10
 North. D. C.: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, 
1990. mainly: 11-35. 
11
 The role of the state as a guarantor of the functioning of the market is more and 
more acknowledged, although not emphasised by neoclassical economic textbooks. E.g., 
the university textbook of Stone published recently and used widely, ranging up to 700 
pages, devotes a whole page to these two conditions, although with specific overtones 
(e.g.. individual ownership is better than community ownership, etc.). Stone, G. W.: Core 
Economics. New York, 2008. 83-84. 
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pursued with equal conditions. The enterprise is free. For the entrepreneur, 
the market is a field on which he can reach autonomous decisions and have 
them weighed in the balance. For the consumer, the market offers the oppor-
tunity of f ree choice as opposed to the bureaucratic-monopolistic state services 
(e.g., panel doctors, schools). The background to all this is the impersonal, 
thus unbiased market mechanism, which measures each party with the same 
standard. 
In fact, however, as the sharp criticism of Perrow12 demonstrates, in the 
market economy the overwhelming major i ty of people doesn' t work as an 
entrepreneur, but as an employee of a frequently huge organisation, in a stiff 
and sometimes rather relentless hierarchy, while s/he is existentially exposed 
to this organisation. 
It is worth mentioning that big companies determine the everyday lives of 
people to a rather great extent. We are exposed to monopolies (e.g., water, 
gas, electricity), banks, etc. The power of these market organisations can be 
greater than that of the state, and as such, they threaten individual freedom not 
less, than the state itself. However, while the liberal state and the Rechtsstaat 
has established the institutional guarantees (institutional structures, fundamental 
rights, publicity), which provide safeguards vis-a-vis the excessive power of 
the state, these guarantees are totally absent vis-a-vis the economic power of 
concentrated capital,13 which has gradually gained ascendancy over the state, 
as well. Later I will treat at length that choice on the part of the consumer is 
sometimes illusory, since the consumer does not have sufficient information 
to make a good decision and this is expressly impeded by market mechanism. 
An argument for the market is its impersonality, which eliminates personal 
dependence and defencelessness, as opposed to e.g., the decisions of the state. 
It is worth mentioning here that this is an impersonal mechanism, which today 
decides this way, tomorrow that way, and there is no appeal against its decisions 
as opposed to the decisions of the state. 
12
 Perrow, Ch.: Szervezetszociológia (Organisation Sociology). Budapest, 1994. 6 - 7 . 
13
 The "legal realist" movement recognised this in the USA as early as in the 1930s. 
Therefore, it assigned a greater role to the state as the factor that can rescue the individual 
from the reign of big companies. Gordon. R. W.: Willis' American Counterparts: The 
Legal Realists' Defence of Administration. University of Toronto Law Journal. 55 (2005) 
405-425. 
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The market and democracy 
The market is the world of equal and free people. Therefore, the market is also 
the basis of the democratic political order, so far as it trains people for self-
sufficiency, secures independence financially and intellectually, schools people 
in being equal with others, etc. The market is positioned opposed to the extremely 
hierarchic state-bureaucratic establishment, the dreadful examples of wh ich 
(e.g., in the age of Hayek) were the totalitarian states. 
The relation of economy and democracy has been raised by political 
scientists and political sociology, as well. Lipset1 4 examined the issue already 
since the 50s. Nevertheless, he did not mention the functioning of the market, 
he considered financial affluence and the absence of too great social differences 
much more important, while the latter is not the characteristic of the pure 
market. Whereas, the empirical research based on mathematical statistical 
procedures by Lane-Ersson15 examined the issue and the democratic establish-
ment demonstrated significant correlation not only with welfare , but with the 
functioning of the market. The correlation, however, does not refer to a cause 
and effect relation. It is easily conceivable that a third fac tor underlies both 
factors. (Weber, for instance, would possibly make a guess for the protestant 
ethic.) In a summary, we can state that empirical data by no means refute the 
supposition that the market is the basis of democracy, but they do not fort i fy it 
convincingly, either. 
Market Optimality 
Below, 1 will demonstrate wha t the optimality and the eff iciency of the market 
mean. This is interesting because their natures are generally unknown for experts 
dealing with the state and public administration (typically political scientists 
and lawyers) and for politicians, which gives rise to misunderstandings. Sub-
sequently, I will examine to what extent this notion of eff ic iency is applicable 
to the state and to its part, i.e., public administration. Eventually, I will p rove 
at relatively great length that the market does not funct ion according to its 
efficiency criterion, either. The the market ideal (as opposed to the state) is 
simply a myth. 
14
 Lipset, S. M.: Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics. Baltimore.1960. 2 7 -
63. 
15
 Lane. J.-E.—Ersson. S.: Democracy. A Comparative Approach. London. 2003. 
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Pareto optimality as an efficiency criterion 
When economists talk about the eff iciency and optimality of the market, they 
refer to a specific type, the so-called Pareto optimality.16 The Pareto optimal is 
the state, which cannot be changed without incurring that somebody's situation 
gets worse. Accordingly, the market is such a state. This is relatively easy to 
understand, since the market is established on the logic of exchange. It is 
worth exchanging for those concerned until they are better off with exchange 
and can increase their so-called utilities. Nevertheless, the exchange will not 
supervene, if it is not advantageous for any of the parties any longer. On the 
basis of the same logic, the consumer chooses f rom the competing products, 
and on the basis of the same logic, the manufacturer decides which product to 
manufacture with which input composition. 
Although, in case of the market a large number of actors exchange a large 
number of products, for the sake of perspicuity, the Pareto optimality is 
generally illustrated as a relationship of two actors. Diagram 1. demonstrates 
the Pareto optimality as a division between two persons. 
The diagram illustrates the potential manners of division between X and Y. 
The Pareto optimal points can be found on the curve delineated by points A -
E-B . This cannot be surpassed (since it would require e.g., more products to 
be distributed), therefore, Point D denotes an unfeasible solution. Whereas, a 
move f rom Point С is possible (upwards or to the right), so that it entailed the 
increase of efficiency, that is, it led to a better solution both for X and Z. 
16
 Below, I am obliged to venture into the area of economics, although 1 am not an 
economist. Let it be said in my defence that economists do the same, when they make 
statements concerning the state. Of course, I learnt economics and strove to get a grip of 
the related literature at least as an interested dilettante. The statements concerning 
neoclassical economic arguments draw primarily on Baumol-Blinder [Baumol, W. J . -
Blinder, A. S.: Economics. Principles and Policy. Dryden Press, Philadelphia, 1994] 
although, 1 have naturally surveyed other textbooks, as well [eg., Stone: op. cit.] In 
Hungarian the most often quoted volume is Samuelson-Nordhaus [Samuelson, P. A -
Nordhaus, W. D.: Közgazdaságtan (Economics). Budapest, 2005]. which is essentially the 
first comprehensive work introducing the neoclassical economic theory in Hungarian. 
Since then, several other books have been made accessible, some of them written by 
Hungarian authors. 
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Diagram 1. The graphie illustration of the Pareto optimality 
The consequences of the Pareto optimality 
Let's have a look at some characteristics of the Pareto optimality! 
As Diagram 1 demonstrates, each of the A, E and В points is Pareto optimal, 
that is, they comply with the concept of market optimality. However , at Point 
A this optimal state means that everything is owned by Y and X obtains 
nothing, whereas, at Point В the situation is jus t the opposite. Practically, at 
Point A Y prospers, while X simply starves to death. This is obviously a Pareto 
optimal solution, since Y will not change goods with X, because X has nothing. 
Our sense of justice obviously prefers Point E, at which the t w o parties are 
making similar use of the goods. However, f rom a Pareto optimal state, just 
because it is Pareto optimal, it is impossible to move towards another Pareto 
optimal state, at least not on the basis of the logic of market exchange. 
But what does it mean and why is it that Y owns everything, while X owns 
nothing? Well, this can occur because X cannot sell anything on the market, 
not even his labour, because, for example, he was born disabled. This example 
shows a further efficiency feature of the market, so far as it creates an optimal 
U
til
ity
 
o
f Y
 
ha
sz
no
ss
ág
a 
THE CRITIQUE OF THE IDEOLOGY UNDERLYING THE SLOGAN. 369 
balance between production and consumption: those who cannot appear on the 
market as sellers cannot appear as customers, either, thereby, complying with 
the criterion "who does not work, should not eat, either". It is another issue 
that the market mechanism is insensitive to such questions as why somebody 
doesn ' t work or why somebody doesn' t have rich parents. 
Let ' s now see another case! Suppose there is an opportunity to move f rom 
this Pareto optimal situation that the utility of a person decreases by a 
thousandth, while the affluence of all the other members of society (e.g., 10 
million) doubles. In other words, social welfare may double at the expense of 
the hardly discernible decrease of the af f luence of someone. However, this 
move is not possible, since it would mean a budge from the Pareto optimal 
situation. Indeed, why would the self-interested profit-maximising individual 
renounce any small extent of utility in favour of others, even if others' lives 
improved to a great extent owing to that? 
These two examples above may demonstrate that with respect to the modern 
state, the Pareto optimality is not only not optimality, but a pitfall, from which 
the society must be released. In my view, the crucial task of the state is to 
release the society from the trap of the Pareto optimality and engender a more 
optimal state for the whole community. 
In this context, it is worth mentioning that we know other optimality 
criteria and these coincide with our conceptions of the function of the state much 
more. Economic textbooks so far as they mention it, deal with these under the 
headword of social utility funct ions. Generally, three utility functions are 
specified.17 According to the utilitarian approach related to Jeremy Bentham, 
the total utility of the society needs to be maximised. Each member is equal 
and the extent of social welfare derives from the sum of the affluence of the 
members of the community. In a peculiar manner, positing equality is insensitive 
to inequalities. If a member of the society owns 6 million HUF, whereas, the 
other owns nothing, it is of importance as if both had three million HUF. The 
optimality connected with Rawls reflects a contrary view. According to Rawls, 
the welfare of the society can be defined exclusively by the position of the 
member of the community in the worst situation. The most accepted social utility 
function is positioned between the two approaches above. This, as sharply 
simplified, sets out from the fact that "the profi t of the rich individual needs 
to increase at a greater extent than the proportionate to compensate for the 
decrease of the profit of the poor individual."18 
17
 See, e.g., Stiglitz, J. E.: A kormányzati szektor gazdaságtana (The Economics of the 
Government Sector). Budapest, 2000. 121-133. 
18
 Stiglitz: ibid. 127. 
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It is apparent that optimality can have several other definitions apart from 
the Pareto optimality. While the Pareto optimality conforms to the market 
situation and the logic of the exchange, this does not jus t i fy , rather questions 
that we consider it a universal optimality concept, which can and must be always 
and everywhere applied. Although, we can hardly venture the definition of the 
function and the role of the state here, the society and the experts would basically 
agree that the role of the state is guaranteeing the wel fare of the community 
and the support of individuals, who got into disadvantaged and defenceless 
situations through no fault of their own, what is more, even the decrease of 
social inequalities. If we consider any of the functions of the state, the Pareto 
optimality as a standard with respect to the state is expressly inadequate. 
What optimality is in case of the market , it can be a phenomenon to be 
avoided and corrected in case of the state. 
The conditions of market optimality 
Market optimality and optimal functioning has several conditions to be inter-
preted at several levels and from several aspects. Without trying to systematise 
these, I will select some determining conditions and examine these below. 
Market failures 
In some cases economists themselves admit that markets don ' t function 
perfectly. Generally, however, they think that (a) this scope of imperfections 
can be precisely defined (these are market failures) and (b) in sum their 
importance is relatively low and affect only a minor part of the funct ioning of 
economy. The most important market fai lures are as fol lows: 
- The existence of public goods, when the enterprise is not interested in 
the production of the specific goods, since they cannot be sold as market 
products (e.g., defence, public roads) . 
- The existence of monopolies, which produce less more expensively than 
the market price. 
- Externalities, when the market pr ice does not ref lect the social value of 
the specif ic goods. A typical case of the negative externality is pollution 
of the environment, when the va lue of polluted natural resources does 
not manifest itself either among the costs or in the price. A positive 
externality is e.g., when the trees of the orchardist provide nourishment 
for the bees of the apiarist. 
- The so-called informational asymmetries, when the parties involved in 
the transaction are not equally informed primarily about the features of 
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the given product, e.g., the customer does not know all the essential 
features of the product. 
Further factors also emerge, which may divert the functioning of the market 
from the optimal. Stiglitz19 refers to the problems of the lack of balance, of the 
crises and unemployment, the frequent lack of the perfect competition and the 
queries of the rationality of actors. Weimer-Vining 2 0 mentions the issue of 
temporality: long-term agreements and insurances and generally uncertainty 
and its handling raise conceptual problems. 
In these areas neoclassical economists admit the imperfection of the market 
and perhaps, although not unconditionally, they approve of state intervention. 
Below, I will formulate doubts and questions beyond these. 
The rationality of the actor 
According to the departing standpoint of neoclassical economics, the acts of 
the actors proceeding in market economy is characterised-motivated by the 
individual endeavour to maximise profits, rational consideration and decision 
that most perfectly guarantee this. This can be partly valid for enterprises, 
since the market functioning systematically selects those who are not able to 
make average or higher profits. However, positing a rational, profit maximising 
actor can be challenged at several points. Largely in an order of importance, 
these are as follows: 
- preposterous. The informational asymmetries listed among market failures 
seem to be euphemisms. The essence of the problem is not uneven 
informedness, since if either the seller or the customer knows nothing 
about the product, there is no asymmetry, but there is no rational decision 
or market optimality, either. Namely, reaching a rational decision is possible 
in case of perfect informedness. Simon,21 however , in the theory of 
satisfycing decisions proved half a century ago that rational decision is 
not possible, and if it is, it is probably not rational, if we consider it 
from a higher level. (Namely, the collection of information incurs higher 
cost than the saving deriving from the better decision reached this way.) 
19
 Stiglitz: op. cit. 88-97. 
211
 Weimer, D. L.-Vining, A. R.: Policy Analysis. Concepts and Practice. Upper Saddle 
River, N. J. 1989. 78-93. 
21
 Simon, H. A. (ed.): Korlátozott racionalitás (Válogatott tanulmányok) (Limited 
Rationality. A Selection of Studies). Budapest, 1982. 
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- The decision of a significant part of the actors is not rational. The "end-
users" in the economy are simple average individuals, w h o are on the 
one hand determining parts of the economic system, on the other hand 
persons embedded in the fabric of society. It is a century-long debate, 
whether we are directed by profit-maximising reckoning or factors coded 
in social culture, briefly, by interests or values. A prominent figure of 
contemporary social science, Jon Elster,22 who is the follower of rational 
positing, demonstrates himself in how many manners the individual departs 
from the rational ideal. This is also supported by empirical research: the 
individual decision-maker, especially in so-called risk situations is almost 
unable to make actually rational decisions.23 It is doubtful what "utility" 
means, which the consumer maximises.24 
- The consumer is unable to make rational decisions. The consumer is most 
rarely aware of the actual features of the purchased product. A significant 
part of the goods, e.g., the so-called trust goods are expressly those the 
content of which cannot be summed up by the "customers". That is the 
situation in case of the overwhelming majority of services and the products 
that need expertise. The most typical example is healthcare, but we could 
mention the services provided by the lawyer, the accountant, the informa-
tion scientist, the electrician or the plumber. Even the relatively simple 
products are most rarely homogeneous (probably the products of the com-
modity stock exchanges are such), and the differences among them remain 
concealed before use. Besides the difficulties of natural knowledge, the 
manufacturers devote enormous energy to influencing the choice of the 
consumer and they do so according to the sense not via the improvement of 
the otherwise unknowable quality features of the product. Instead, they 
have recourse to the instruments of shaping brand faithfulness, wrapping 
techniques, advertisements, etc. All these "market" techniques intend to 
"
2
 In Hungarian: Elster. J.: Savanyú a szőlő (Sour Grapes). In: Csontos (ed.): A racio-
nális döntések elmélete, op. cit.: Elster, J.: A társadalom fogaskerekei (The Cog-Wheels of 
Society). Budapest, 1995: Elster, J. (ed.): Válogatás Jon Elster müveiből (A Selection of 
the Works of Jon Elster). Budapest. 2002. 112-153. 
23
 Hirshleifer, J.-Riley, J. G.: A bizonytalanságban hozott döntések elemei (The Elements 
of Decisions Reached in Uncertainty). In: Csontos (ed.): A racionális döntések elmélete, 
op. cit. 25-61.: Tversky, A.-Kahneman, D.: Kilátáselmélet: A kockázatos helyzetekben ho-
zott döntések elmélete (Prospect Theory: The Theory of Decisions Reached in Hazardous 
Situations). In: Csontos (ed.): ibid. 82-112. 
24
 Coase, R. H. (ed.): A vállalat, a piac és a jog (The Company, the Market and the 
Law). Budapest, 2004. 13. 
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divert the consumer (obviously with success) from the rational decision. 
The inherent element of the market competition is this intention to distort 
the competition. 
All this has a further impact on the functioning of the market . 
The market price reflects the social value 
The basic condition of the optimal functioning of the market is that the market 
price should reflect the social value. This is by no means so in the case of 
externalities. Although, the relation is somewhat more indirect, perhaps it can 
be understood that informational asymmetries also entail the deformation of 
the prices, especially in case of the problem described above, namely, when 
the consumer does not know what s/he buys. The myth that the price somehow 
mediates the social value, for me is undermined by a concrete example, the 
advertisement. Although, advertising experts endeavour "to sell" this activity 
as providing information, it is not difficult to understand that the information 
value of advertisements is rather low (so far as a happy family, a lovely 
pussycat and a beautiful young woman has information value in case of e.g., a 
mobile phone, a car and frozen dumplings), what is more, their role is often 
expressly misrepresentation. Nevertheless, billions are spent on advertisement. 
Is advertisement really one of the most socially valuable activities? The value 
of the advertisement is that by manipulating customers' preferences, companies 
may increase their profits at the expense of others via the detachment of 
consumption from market rationality. Le t ' s apprehend that market failures 
related to advertisements don ' t explain the difference between market price 
and social utility. This market segment with increasing share proves in itself 
the untenableness of the argument that " the price on the whole and in the long 
run reflects the social value". The price reflects merely the momentary market 
value and nothing else. 
The competition 
The prerequisite of the functioning of the market is competition. An extremely 
great number (an infinite number) of manufacturers and customers can be 
found on the ideal market. One of the basic theses of Marxist economics is that 
the market exhausts itself via the inevitable monopolisation. This is valid, if the 
marginal and average unit cost decrease owing to the increase of production 
(via the manufacture of not only 100, but 1000 buses). Therefore, neoclassical 
economists posi t that with the increase of production, the marginal cost 
curve will not decrease to a certain point, but increase after that. Nevertheless, 
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this astonishing phenomenon undoubtedly requiring explanation is nowhere 
explained-at least in the textbooks I know.25 This needs to be accepted as a fact , 
since the attention is diverted f rom the fact of the absence of an explanation 
generally via charts and tables. Recently, economists have still commenced the 
examination of not perfectly competing, oligopolistic markets. 
In fact, perfect competition is improbable for all that, since as we saw the 
goods are exceptionally homogeneous. The competition is less manifest on 
the market of Adidas track shoes. Namely, it is in the rarest cases that w e 
encounter perfect competition on the real market , which is the prerequisite of 
the Pareto optimality. 
The price o f the exchange 
The starting point of neoclassical economics is that whi le production has 
expenses, exchange has no ones. Having recourse to the comparison made by 
Coase,26 who first raised the problem with great impact, this conception is of 
the nature as if we tried to describe the physical phenomena on the Earth 
without positing friction. The functioning of the market cannot be grasped 
without transaction costs, that is, the costs of exchange. This scope encompasses 
search and information costs, bargaining and decision-making costs, control 
and enforcement costs.27 If there weren't such costs, the existence of companies 
would be unexplainable, since then the manufacture and assembly of machines, 
etc. would be solved by exchange. However, exchange has significant expenses 
and the funct ioning of the market is shaped significantly via the minimali-
sation of total costs, among them transaction costs. Transaction costs account 
for a considerable part of total costs emerging at the level of society. With 
reference to former empirical research. North 2 8 estimates that to be 45 p.c. 
(almost half) of the national revenues of the USA. This is the sum which 
neoclassical economics doesn ' t take account of. 
The theory of transaction costs is the point of departure of neoinsti tu-
tionalist economics. Coase, North and Will iamson agree that institutions in 
broad terms (organisations, systems of norms, etc.) are generally adequate for 
the decrease of transaction costs, this is what partly accounts for their existence. 
25
 E.g.. Stone: op. cit. 183-184. 
26
 Coase: op. cit. 9-53. 
22
 Ibid. 18. 
28
 North: op. cit. 28. 
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Crucial institutions of the decrease of transaction costs are the state and law. 
This conception is reflected by the economic theory of law.24 
Optimality in the absence of conditions 
For a long time, economists were satisfied with the mathematical deduction of 
the conception that the market is optimal in case of the prevalence of adequate 
conditions. As far as 1 know, the conditions were not surveyed systematically 
and it was especially not examined how the absence of conditions influences 
the Pareto optimality. In essence, it was supposed that these divert the func -
tioning of the market from optimality only to a small extent and perhaps 
various effects counter-balance each other (with the exception of the distorting 
effect of the state). Whereas, Greenwald-Stiglitz3 0 proves that the absence of 
conditions not only certainly diverts the functioning of the market from the 
Pareto optimality, but it is frequently diverted to a large extent, which is 
intuitively not expected. They sum up their results as follows: 
The paper thus casts a new light on the First Fundamental Theorem of 
Welfare Economics asserting the Pareto efficiency of competitive equilibrium. 
The theorem is an achievement because it identifies what in retrospect has 
turned out to be the singular set of circumstances under which the economy 
is Pareto efficient. There is not a complete set of markets; information is 
imperfect; the commodities sold in any market are not homogeneous in all 
relevant respects; it is costly to ascertain differences among the i tems; 
individuals do not get paid on a piece rate basis; and there is an element of 
insurance (implicit or explicit) in almost all contractual arrangements, in 
labor, capital, and product markets. [. . .] 
We have constructed a general model which shows that in all of these 
circumstances, Pareto improvements can be effected through government 
policies, such as commodity taxes. Our methodology not only identifies 
the presence of inefficiencies, but also enables us to identify both the 
appropriate direction of policy intervention and observable measures of 
their successful application. [ . . . ] 
We have elaborated a general model, which shows that in all these 
cases a state intervention, such as e.g., the luxury tax facilitates a Pareto 
29
 In Hungarian: Coûter, R.-Ulen, Th.: Jog és közgazdaságtan (Law and Economics). 
Budapest, 2005. 
Greenwald. B. C.-Stiglitz, J. E.: Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Informa-
tion and Incomplete Markets. The Quaterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986) 229-264. 
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improvement. Our method does not s imply indicate inefficiency, but helps 
to find the proper direction and method of state intervention. 
Stiglitz expounds and elaborates this thought later in several other essays. 
Company Optimality 
The analysis of economic concepts and myths concerning the market served 
primarily the elucidation and critique of the theoretical foundation of NPM. 
This is the ideological background, which generally underlies the conceptions 
related to the mostly negative value of the state and its function possibly 
limited to a narrow scope. The company functioning on the market determines 
primarily the ideal for the N P M , which publ ic administration should fo l low. 
Let's see what constitutes efficiency in case of the company, to what extent 
this efficiency is true and to what extent it can be applied to public administration! 
The concept of company optimality 
Adapting the concepts of systems theory, company efficiency can be described 
with the formula of OUTPUT/INPUT. This expresses that the working of the 
company is all the more optimal and eff icient , the larger output can be reached 
with the less input. Input includes labour force, primary materials, machines 
and energy, whereas output includes the product itself, goods or services. This 
can be expressed financially. Input encompasses costs and expenditure, while 
output encompasses revenues. In this context , it is worth referring to the fact 
that the definit ion of profit can be described with the same factors: O U T P U T 
(revenues)-INPUT (expenditure), that is, efficiency basically coincides with 
profitability. 
The eff iciency of the company finds meaning on the market. Namely , the 
price of inputs and outputs is determined by the market . That company is 
successful which manufactures expensively marketable products with low costs. 
Positing that prices reflect social utility, that means that an efficient company 
is a company successful on the market and this company is eff icient on a 
social level, as well. 
The eff iciency of market mechanism manifests itself in this, as well , since 
it informs the company about its efficiency extremely rapidly and precisely via 
prices. It does not only inform, but it also manages a selective-rewarding 
mechanism. The companies that work inefficiently and utilise relatively too 
much of social property, to which they contribute insufficiently go bankrupt 
and get selected out. 
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The queries of company efficiency 
It is probably discernible on the basis of the above that the crucial issue of 
company efficiency is whether the market price reflects social values. We saw 
that in general this is not valid. It is possible therefore that the company is 
efficient according to the market prices, whereas, socially it is not. On the 
basis of the mentioned example: the advertising agency successfully deceiving 
the consumers is especially efficient on the market . Several fur ther facts 
emerge concerning the efficiency of companies. Let me highlight the most 
important ones. 
The efficiency of administrative units 
In the large and complex corporate system it is basically impossible to determine 
how the specific organisational units contributed to the given extent of efficiency. 
In case of administrative units, it is especially difficult, what is more, impossible 
to determine the extent of their contribution to efficiency or profits. Who can 
tell the extent of the contribution of the accountancy, the HR department etc. 
to the efficiency of the company. The significance of the problem consists in 
the simple fact that public administration and governance are the administra-
tive units of the public, of the society. 
The self-interested management 
It is a publicly known fact, which coincides with the point of departure of 
economics that individuals within the company generally take not the corporate, 
but their individual interests into consideration. E.g., Tullock31 as one of the 
founding fathers of Public Choice theory claims that climbing a rung of the 
hierarchy is facilitated by intelligence as well as by taking not the corporate, 
but the self-interest (i.e., individual progress) into account. According to 
Tullock, this is less manifest at companies than in public administration, since 
the owner supervises the managers more closely. This argument is less valid 
at e.g., jo in t ventures. Several scandals of the recent years32 (e.g., Enron) 
revealed that corporate management was interested in nothing else, but their 
own income and bonuses. Crozier33 introduces the role of power games in 
31
 Tullock, G.: The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington D.C.: 1965. 18-21. 
32
 e.g., Enron. 
33
 Crozier, M.: A bürokrácia jelensége (The Phenomenon of Bureaucracy). Budapest, 
1980. 
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organisational dynamics, Perrow34 or Bakacsi35 elucidate that the role of these 
is determining at companies, as well . Essentially, the principal-agent theory 
also dwells on this problem. Therefore, corporate participants are by no means 
motivated by corporate efficiency, thus, corporate dynamics is not necessarily 
characterised by this trend, either. Again, the question is whether the market is 
adequate for coercing companies into efficiency at an acceptable level. 
Contingent luck in corporate success 
According to the populational-economic trend of organisation theory, from 
among the contingent mutations of companies the one that survives in the 
long run is that which is more capable of adaptation to the changes of the 
environment unpredictable for the company.36 All the management wisdoms 
are in fact hoaxes. Although, the statement is audacious, several facts seem to 
support it, among others e.g., the fact that sharply contradicting management 
theories prevail at the same time and the choice among these is determined 
rather by fashion than tested increase in efficiency.3 7 
The applicability of the corporate model in public administration 
divergence or similarity of public and private management 
Are the public and private, i.e., corporate management basically similar or 
divergent? The answers to the question are rather contradictory. Lőrincz, Lajos38  
points out that standpoints traversed historically in one or the other direction. 
The classical essay most frequently referred to in the science of public 
administration,39 which also draws on former works, recognises substantial 
divergences. Allison outlines public administration as one in which the 
measurement and interpretation of efficiency is difficult, while it needs to 
meet other abstract and concrete requirements. Abstract requirements include 
lawful and democratic working and safeguarding equal treatment, equity, 
34
 Perrow: op. cit. 281-288. 
35
 Bakacsi Gy.: Szervezeti magatartás és vezetés. Budapest. 1998. 
36
 Kieser, A. (ed.): Szervezet ebnél etek (Organisation Theories). Budapest, 1995. 318-35. 
л
 Powell, W.-DiMaggio, P.: The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. 
Chicago. IL, 1991. 26-27. 
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 Lőrincz L.: Közigazgatási reformok: mítoszok és realitás (The Reforms of Public 
Administration: Myths and Reality). Közigazgatási Szemle, 2007. 3-13. 
" Allison, G. T.: Public and Private Managers: Are They Fundamentally Alike in All 
Unimportant Respects? In: Lane, F. S. (ed.): Current Issues in Public Administration. New 
York, NY, 1982. 134-151. 
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openness, etc. These can easily collide with the requirement of efficiency, 
which thereby is only one of the requirements. It is a peculiar paradox that in 
case of public administration these requirements frequently colliding with short-
term efficiency can in the long-run become the pledges of social efficiency. 
Democratism, the safeguards of constitutionality protect from the brutal rationality 
of bureaucracy, which, when distorted into a dictatorship, threatens the whole 
society.40 
Public administration needs to meet concrete requirements, as well, such as 
the expectations of interested social groups and their interest representatives, 
the branches of judicial and legislative powers. The management of the public 
sphere as manifestly opposed to the business sector takes place by the permanent 
control of the media. Openness also pertains to a broad scope of citizens. 
There have always been approaches, which emphasise the similarities of public 
and private management. These don ' t regard the divergences as important or 
construe them as anomalies. Essentially, this approach characterises NPM, as 
well. Below, I will bring up arguments for the issue why the management of 
public administration as a quasi company is inadmissible. 
Efficiency and effectiveness 
Via an oversimplification, efficiency refers to the already mentioned OUTPUT/ 
INPUT formula, whereas effectiveness refers to the extent of the achievement 
of a goal. These two factors are the same in case of a company: both coincide 
with the possibly highest profit. What is more, according to market ideology, 
both guarantee an optimal level of social welfare, that is, efficiency on a social 
level. No doubt, in the absence positive social impact, companies could be still 
efficient and effective on the actual market. (See, e.g., successful advertisement 
agencies). 
A basic concept of the theory of public policy and public administration is 
the separation of efficiency and effectiveness,4' and in another dimension, the 
distinction of efficiency measured and construed on the level of the organisation 
and of the whole ofpublic administration,42 
40
 This was referred to by Weber, when he considered more democratically functioning 
states altogether more efficient than the extraordinarily efficient Prussian public administ-
ration. See, Albrow, M.: Bureaucracy. London, 1970. 64. 
41
 Hajnal, Gy.-Gajduschek, Gy.: Hivatali határok - társadalmi hatások. Bevezetés a ha-
tékony közigazgatás módszertanába (Office Boundaries-Social Effects. Introduction into 
the Methodology of Efficient Public Administration). Budapest, 2002. 11-14. 
42
 Lane, J.-E. (ed.): Bureaucracy and Public Choice. London, 1987. 23-24. 
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We have seen that in case of the activity of administration, efficiency can 
be rarely defined. The application of the OUTPUT/INPUT formula is especially 
difficult in the public sphere, since outputs (public services) generally have no 
actual price, and even expenses can be frequently hardly defined. What is 
even more essential; in the public sphere, the actual value of the output is 
determined by its social effect . Public administration is effective, if it fully 
complies with its objective, the increase of social welfare, since this is the 
objective of public administration. Therefore, effectiveness queries social effect, 
whereas efficiency refers to the amount invested to reach this effect. Of course, 
the amount invested encompasses not only the input of public administration, 
but social expenses as well, of which the company takes no account, unless the 
state charges them to the company. 
It follows from the above that a specific public administrative organisation 
can be efficient (and even effective in a narrow sense), while it is not efficient 
from the viewpoint of the society, therefore, of the whole public administra-
tion. Thereby, the Labour Office can send unemployed people in great numbers 
to retraining courses (which is one of its major tasks), which work very cost-
efficiently (a lot of people are trained at high level, in a large number of 
hours at low cost). Therefore, the organisation can be considered effect ive and 
efficient. At the same time, if the content of the training is not adequate (e.g., 
dressmakers are retrained to be miners), the activity will be unsuccessful from 
a general social point of view, and thus, its efficiency will be essentially low. 
In a summary: in case of the public sphere, the company efficiency index is 
practically incalculable. Since in the public sphere the standard of value of 
the activity is not the financial profit, but the positive social effect, therefore it 
is not really relevant, since the prices do by no means reflect the social value. 
Client-orientedness and authority matters 
Companies endeavour to meet most of all the consumers ' demands, so that 
their products are chosen. One of the objectives of N P M is the reinforcement 
of client-orientedness, in the area of which results have been achieved the most 
unambiguously. I claim however, that the satisfaction of clients is not necessarily 
an asset.43 
431 elaborated elsewhere, how peculiar client satisfaction is, which may as well work 
out in opposition to the actual achievement. Gajduschek, Gy.: Módszertani útmutató a 
hivatali iigyfélelégedettség méréséhez (A Methodological Guide to the Measurement of 
Client Satisfaction in Offices). Államreform Bizottság honlapja (Homepage of the State 
Refonn Committee), 2005. Here, however, I do not dwell on this. 
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Is it auspicious if the police is evaluated on the basis of the satisfaction of 
criminals, or if the criminals can choose which investigating authority should 
proceed in their case? Is it a favourable sign that the banks are basically satisfied 
with government control? A part of the tasks of the state is public service, the 
beneficiary of which is the individual citizen (education, healthcare, social 
services, public transport, etc.). In these areas, which developed good half a 
century ago with the appearance of the welfare state, the opinion and satisfac-
tion of those concerned can be an important and relevant index. 
The other part of state tasks prevailing for thousands of years is the so-called 
authoriative activity, typically various types of law enforcement. Proceeding 
as such, the state intervenes against the client and incurs inconvenience (prohibits, 
obliges, fines, raises taxes, etc.). Although, it does so in favour of the community, 
all the other citizens, but they do not directly appear as clients in this procedure. 
Briefly, the market mechanism attached to "the direct consumer", which can 
be very useful on the market, may lead to a deformed feedback opposed to 
real assessment in this fairly significant area of state activities. 
The market mechanism does not work 
The market cannot attend to and has never attended to the majority of state 
tasks. The market is unable to provide public goods. At other times, the market 
opt imum obviously departs f rom the social opt imum and f rom that which the 
large majority of the society considers the social optimum (e.g., everyone should 
get elementary education). 
We need to remark that most NPM techniques do not dispute this fact . 
Instead, they would sustain the state as a f inancier, although, the task would 
be expressly performed by the organisations of the business sector or market 
mechanisms would be applied. The explanation of NPM is the increase of 
eff iciency. An alternative, not less plausible explanation is that NPM is an 
ideology, which favours enterprises, especially larger business enterprises44  
via opening up new market segments and the generation of large procurments 
for capitalist groups. 
44
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Risks 
Acknowledging that competition is the guarantee for efficiency, this conceptually 
entails that certain companies go bankrupt. Is it acceptable that organisations 
serving the whole society or large communities simply disappear, so that their 
tasks are not performed by any party in the short or long run? E.g., water, 
electricity, gas supply and the drainage system, prisons, the maintenance of 
public order and education. 
Empirical data 
Of course, it is the most convincing, if we examine empirically whether the 
public or private organisations work more efficiently. This, however, beyond 
the methodological problems encumbering comparative research, is impeded 
by several obstacles. There are relatively few areas, in which we find both 
public and private organisations, and if we do, they frequently appear not to 
perform the same activity (e.g., expensive private schools). For limitations of 
scope, even the rough survey of methodological problems is impossible. 
Instead, I will attempt be low to introduce the results of empirical research 
published in this subject-matter in the broadest possible scope. (A more 
detailed summary: Gajduschek.4 5) 
Weimer—Vining46 surveyed the publications published before 1989. The 
authors found that from among the reports of research carried out in the scope 
encompassing electricity supply, air travel and fire service, 65 claimed that the 
performance of tasks by private organisations was more efficient and more 
successful and only 7 found that the performance of tasks by a community was 
more efficient, whereas in 19 cases no unequivocal conclusion could be 
reached. Since I did not find a similar comprehensive and summarising study, 
I tried to survey the studies published in the meantime myself. Unfortunately, 
I could identify only 16 empirical comparative studies, but I d idn ' t find a 
single one, according to which the performance of tasks by a community 
organisat ion was more eff ic ient . Nevertheless , in the majority of cases 
methodological aspects can be raised, which query the final conclusions. 
45
 Gajduschek, Gy.: Közigazgatási eredményesség - Piaci hatékonyság? avagy Alkal-
mazható-e a piaci ideál a közigazgatásban (Success in Public Administration-Efficiency 
on the Market? or. Is the Market Ideal Applicable in Public Administration?). In: Lőrincz L. 
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The other approach is the examination of the effect of NPM. This consists 
in the transfer of the solutions of private managemet and the market mechanism 
to the practice of governance and public administration. Therefore, the question 
can be raised whether eff iciency increased as an effect. The data in this case 
are not clear and convincing, either. In the 5th chapter of their book analysing 
the results, Polli t t-Bouckaert4 7 emphasise that the increase of efficiency can be 
construed on several levels (they distinguish four levels), but unambiguous 
index-numbers cannot be defined on any of the levels and convincing data do 
not obtain. At the same time, NPM seems to have been able to restrain the rate 
of state expenditure increasing for centuries and gradually accelerating in the 
previous decades. The authors also establish that competition situations generally 
improve efficiency disregarding whether w e are talking of a public or private 
organisation. It is an interesting but not a surprising statement that while N P M 
considers the satisfaction of costumers one of the most decisive aspects and 
as an effect "client-orientedness" gains ground, according to data, the trust in 
public institutions and public services significantly decreased specifically in 
the countries of NPM. 
As several experts and more and more simple newspaper articles highlight, 
the price of the contingent increase in efficiency achieved by NPM must be 
paid elsewhere. That price consists in the absence of long-term investments, 
the decrease of safety, the exclusion of problematic clients (vis-a-vis of equal 
access). Of course, NPM affects the whole state, as Rhodes in his article 
establishing a concept (Hollowing out of the state) wrote the state erodes 
mostly as an effect of NPM. This emerges in the absence of co-ordination, the 
sectors function in a fragmented manner and the left hand frequently does not 
know what the right one is doing. The perspicuous relations of responsibility 
dissolve, since instead of the former lucid (bureaucratic) structures, several actors 
in various positions appear, among whom the relations are mostly puzzling 
(contractual, subjected, political, client, etc.). As an effect , the public policy 
making capacity of the centre weakens and the political control over public 
administration, which is the pledge of democratic functioning, also weakens 
considerably. 
A rough assessment of the Hungarian situation 
In Hungary, N P M evolved at the same t ime as the change of regime, which 
implied the radical transformation of the functioning of the state and the 
economy. Both the change of regime and N P M channelled the changes in the 
47
 Pollitt-Bouckaert: op. cit. 
384 GYÖRGY GAJDUSCHEK 
same direction: the decline of the role of the state and the reinforcement of 
market processes. Therefore, it would be both theoretically and empirically 
difficult to detach the role of NPM within the process of the change of regime. 
This role may be most identified in the conscious diminution of the state, and 
within this, of public administration and in the maximisation of the opportunities 
of the business sector. 
The change of regime undoubtedly entailed notable and shocking changes 
in several elements. Beyond the decrease of the power of the state, the changes 
led to the uncertainty of the scope of state. On the other hand, a part of the 
instruments formerly applied for the performance of state tasks became legally 
prohibited, another part of them became socially and management-technically 
inadequate. As for me, I think that the final result of the process is the emergence 
of the impotent state, which is incapable of the performance of its most 
elementary tasks: incapable of the maintenance of order and the enforcement 
of the law.48 
In line with the change of regime, the establishment of the framework of 
the Rechtsstaat also took place. It may be due to the natural oscillation of the 
pendulum that a kind of hyper-Rechtsstaat was formed with safeguards for 
individual rights (at least on the face of it), which frequent ly surpass the 
similar institutions of the most developed democracies. From the viewpoint of 
our subject-matter, this entailed that the state and especially public administ-
ration became almost perfectly jeoparadized without its instruments used before. 
It became incapable of control of the illegitimate methods manifesting them-
selves in the business sector. 
The solutions of NPM were originally introduced in relatively well-
functioning states. Whereas, in post-socialist states NPM in line with the hyper-
Rechtsstaat ivas thrust on a confused public administration unestablished as to 
its function, structure, functioning and administrative culture. Thereby, N P M 
did not serve the improvement or reconstruction of former solutions (of the 
welfare state), but increased the chaos exclusively in favour of those wishing 
to fish in troubled waters. The practical foundations, on which NPM could 
really contribute to the increase of eff ic iency, were also missing. The well-
functioning market is missing, as there are several actors (sellers) that can 
perform specific tasks (eg. Road construction). The few existing sellers are not 
reliable. The well-functioning legal system is also missing, in which crystallized 
contractual-institutional techniques exist for the employment of private organi-
48
 Gajduschek, Gy.: Rendnek tenni kellene (There Should Be Order). Budapest, 2008. 
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sations for the performance of public tasks.49 Underlying all these, the necessary 
political, administrative and business culture and ethics are missing. 
As early as in the mid-'90s, Verheijen50 as a single among foreign experts 
warned of the dangers. Summarising the results of a research which analysed 
the public administrative systems of the Central-Eastern-European region and 
the effect of NPM, he pointed out that 
- in these countries, where coordination was always a problem, NPM fur ther 
exacerbates it, and beside the absence of the horizontal coordination 
among ministries, generates the absence of vertical coordination; 
- perplexes totally the otherwise problematic relations of responsibility, 
since NPM intends to supersede bureaucratic responsibility for the utilisation 
of resources by responsibility for achievement, however, in a Central-
Eastern-European context this rather entails the total collapse of the system 
of responsibility; 
- the continuity so important in public administration is terminated; 
- NPM reforms lead to the politicisation of public administration in the region. 
The statements of Verheijen seem to be confirmed by the facts. 
In the absence of significant empirical research, we can merely draw on 
impressions or hypotheses, if we question the main promise of NPM, i.e., the 
increase of efficiency. We know numerous scandalous stories f rom the press 
encompassing motorway constructions and the procedure of the sale of the 
buildings of public organisations to enterprises, which are then rented by the 
same public organisations, thereby, they reimburse the whole purchase price 
as rent in 2 or 3 years, etc. Therefore, we can hardly attribute an efficiency 
increasing effect to NPM in the region. Carrying things to extremes, it functioned 
as an instrument of the illegitimate privatisation (i.e. stealing) of public property. 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this essay, I criticised the ideology of "market-corporate is good, state 
public administrative is bad", which manifests itself most directly in New Public 
Management, which is supported by mainstream economics and Public Choice 
theory. 
49
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In my hope my arguments have raised doubts concerning the conviction 
that market competition and exchange are some primeval and optimal social 
organisation, which reinforces the greatest virtues of the individual and at the 
same time grounds the democratic establishment. 
I suppose I have succeeded in undermining the statement that the market is 
really efficient. I think it is even more essential to introduce the conception 
that the specif ic efficiency of the market, the Pareto optimality cannot be 
applied to state activities, what is more, one of the basic tasks of the state is a 
displacement f rom the Pareto optimality (if that prevails). 
The queries concerning the applicability of the corporate ideal may have 
also raised doubts. This can be reinforced by the fact that even if international 
experiences are conflicting, Hungarian experiences, although they are not 
processed scientifically, seem to be unequivocal. Here, NPM has not even 
been increased economic efficiency. On the contrary: N P M has led to waste 
and an increased level of corruption. 
All these are mere arguments. Concerning NPM, critical voices have been 
more and more emphatic in international special literature for almost a decade, 
which has not had considerable effect yet. The ideology idealising business 
life and the market was swept away by the great depression in one or two 
months. 1 am afraid from this time on, we will hear exclusively the voices of 
criticism (the loudest will be the former preachers of N P M ) . In the meant ime it 
is to be feared that employable solutions will also vanish into thin air (as 
usual), although there were some. 
As for me, I see two large, basically different areas of state activities. One 
of them is authoritative activity, in which the state proceeds with the instruments 
of power against the citizen, for whom it generally incurs "inconvenience" in 
the interest of the community. The other is the area of public services, which 
became determining primarily with the emergence of welfare states, and as 
such, it is a new state phenomenon, although, the overwhelming majori ty of 
the resources of the budget is spent on such purposes. In these areas in the 
majority of cases it can be relatively precisely defined who the "consumer" is, 
the party to whom the state provides something, and what the content of the 
service is. Of course, this separation is extemporaneous,5 1 since several public 
51
 The legal conception of Hungarian public administration recognises only the first 
element and construes the second one primarily in this theoretical framework. The Anglo-
Saxon conception, however, regards everything as public service, therefore, construes every-
thing on the basis of the logic of "services". As for me, 1 think the unelaborated nature of 
the two theoretical approaches is a great deficiency of the science of public administration. 
The differences and similarities and their consequences are unclear. 
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administrative activities can' t be classified to either area, whereas several 
activities can be classified to both areas. Nevertheless, this separation can ground 
the decision on the application of NPM techniques. Namely, the activity of 
the authority follows a basically different logic from that of the market (it is not 
accidental that this one has been a state activity for several thousand years). 
Whereas, in the area of public services the application of market mechanisms 
can have several advantages. 
Let me remark that the market is an extraordinarily auspicious feedback 
mechanism for the company. It informs the company rapidly, reliably and 
unambiguously about the market assessment of its achievement via prices. 
What is more, it does not only inform but at the same time also sanctions and 
eventually selects out the company with low achievement according to the 
value judgement of the market. It would be difficult to deny the advantages of 
this mechanism vis-à-vis the political feedback mechanism, which supervenes 
basically at the elections every four years, which is only indirectly related to 
the real achievement of the state and of politicians governing the state and to 
be elected. In case of the state designed to serve the community, the market 
feedback mechanism has a remarkably significant deficiency, namely, that market 
prices do not reflect the scale of values of the society, which contradicts the 
declarations of economists. So far as the state can correct this by representing 
the social values or at least approaching these, the orientation via prices and 
strengthening the competition can be expressly advantageous in several areas 
of public services. 
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preservation of a social-organisational framework via overspending, which altogether 
contradicts the possibility of development and the sustainability of equilibrated development. 
Keywords: social rights; welfare state; welfare benefit, social state; social policy; social 
concept; neo-liberal economic policy; administration; Fundamental Rights Charter of the 
European Union; Lisbon Treaty; active integration; civil society; civil organisations 
Introduction 
The obvious social restrictions in Hungary as well as in other countries of 
Europe in recent years make it absolutely reasonable to examine to what social-
economic context the discernible withdrawal of welfare services provided by 
the state is attributable. The similar manifestations are supported by no means 
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by the same system of social conditions. The cancellation of welfare benefits 
raises tensions everywhere, however, in post-socialist states this coincides with 
the fact that in societies which provide welfare benefits at a higher level than 
they could afford according to the level of economic development, the transition 
is by far more difficult, since the population had not been in fact prepared to 
design its life on different bases. In Western Europe, the transition has been 
somewhat more planned and the role taking of the state and the effect of the 
European integration have been capable of gradually adjusting social motions 
to different paths. These societies demonstrate that the peripheral conditions of 
the responsibility of individuals taken for themselves have evolved, scilicet, these 
states offer alternatives, real opportunities and individual fates follow coerced 
paths to a less extent. I think the complex conception which does not regard 
social expenditure as unproductive cost, but regards it as a heaver of economic 
growth, which associates welfare benefits with achievements, does really provide 
greater opportunity for sustenance at an individual and social level equally. 
An inquiry into the public administrative context of the issue is equally 
important. Since on the one hand, it was the establishment of the social duties 
of the state that entailed a significant extension of the state and administrative 
duties by taking a new kind of role in the 19th century at the expense that the 
state abandoned its former non-interference policy with economy, which at the 
same time swelled its duties to an unpredictable extent. Although, it endeavours 
to shirk that scope of duties more and more, it is not all as smooth sailing as 
we imagine, since in the meantime the social consciousness of humankind due 
to the incorporation of social rights into international documents and domestic 
law has grown to such an extent that the curtailment of these rights cannot be 
implemented without a hitch, scilicet, the free spirit cannot be smoothly corked 
back into the bottle. Nevertheless, public administration is trying to apply new 
solutions, on the one hand, by transferring its duties to the actors of the civil 
sector, on the other hand, by making in the same manner the implementation of 
its social duties more efficient, inexpensive and more reliable. 
The social concept has covered a long distance since its evolution. Social 
rights have had ascendant and descendant eras,1 although, they have been in 
the crossfire of ideological, philosophical and economic-political debates at all 
times, nevertheless, they have not been relegated or neglected so far, since at 
times this was attempted, it turned out to arouse fits of social passion, which 
has often forced the most resolute reformers to recoil. 
1
 See: A szociális piacgazdaság szociálpolitikájától a neoliberális állam antiszociál-
politikájáig (From the Social Policy of Social Market Economy to the Anti-Social Policy 
of the Neo-Liberal State). http://www.brainworker.ch/Sozialstaat/sozialpolitik.htm 
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We can state that Europe is not only the land of origin, but also the principal 
keeper of social rights, since it is associated with the concept of Europeanism. 
(They have turned up outside Europe as a result of waves of constitutional-
ism.) This, however, does not imply that the enforcement of social rights and 
social achievements in European states would mean the same. The fact that social 
rights have manifest bad patches dependant on the economy and politics, has 
not implied the explicit acknowledgement of the change of the basic ideology 
set forth under statutes. At the same time, we need to understand that social 
states have not constructed their systems on the same basis, and in this context 
some of them on an essentially more solid basis in terms of welfare could reach 
more considerable achievements, i.e, social security which insures living for 
all, thereby, they have become exemplary (the Scandinavian wonder). Such 
diverse starting points seem to be more adequate for the maintenance of social 
achievements, possibly since social solidarity became more established in 
public thinking, which renders basic issues, such as everyone has the right to a 
living at all ages, substantially unquestionable. 
When we follow up the changes of the social concept below, we need to 
inevitably consider the various economic policies, which underlie or support 
state politics. Economic policies followed by the states objectively substantiate 
the relation to social rights in economic terms, however, economic efficiency 
and the relation of the state to social rights are not in direct proportionality.2 
For the sake of completeness we need to add that its contrary is not positively 
true: we cannot claim that securing social rights is infallibly anti-achievement, 
whereas achievement-orientedness would by all means entail social insensitivity. 
Scilicet, the solution is to be found in their balance. This may require a new 
way of thinking and essentially, calculations to find out whether a less expensive, 
but more expedient manner of service obtains instead of the prodigal solutions 
considered unchangeable. It is also certain that goals need to be refrained, 
however, we cannot acquiesce without full revision either in adherence to the 
maintenance of expensive solutions believed (or claimed) to be unchangeable, 
or in the abandonment of social care.3 
2
 Butterwegge, Ch.: Krise und Zukunft des Sozialstaates. The Crisis and the Future of 
Social States (Second revised edition). Wiesbaden, 2005, 318. 
3
 The manner, process and examples of the readjustment of welfare services are analysed 
in the world-famous work also published in Hungary by Osborne, D.-Gaebler, T.: Új utak a 
közigazgatásban (Reinventing Government). Budapest, 1994, 330. The fifth chapter deals 
with achievement-oriented government, which makes it obvious that new objectives and 
measurable achievements can turn the provision of services more inexpensive and better 
(consumer friendly). 
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What seems to be certain in any case is that the social concept is present 
in the ideology of the European Union and the effect of the EU prevails and 
influences the trends of development. This defines a path in post-socialist states, 
as well, from which any departure is not advisable in the spirit of Europeanism 
and in the interest of remaining within the EU. Although, in post-socialist states 
the constrained cancellation of social rights implies something different f rom 
that in the EU15, which, however, does not mean at all that it would arouse 
less tension in these societies, what is more: the change of the basic ideology 
entails, if possible, greater crises in the lives of individuals as well as in politics. 
The social state requires the harmonisation of state action at several levels: 
a) The legal framework, within which all the actors of society can proceed, 
needs to be elaborated at the level of regulation. (E.g., The relations of employers 
and employees can be settled by the instruments of labour law. These encompass 
the prohibition of child labour, the issue of labour agreements, the instruments 
of protection against dismissal, the regulation of working hours. This is 
merely one area of the pertinent regulation, which needs to be elaborated and 
implemented in compliance with others.) 
b) Social counterbalance is secured by tax policy and the provision of services. 
c) The third level consists of financial securities, which provide solutions 
for elementary life-situations (disability to work, illnesses, retirement, caring and 
unemployment insurance, basic insurance and welfare benefits for employment 
seekers, welfare housing constructions, etc.). 
d) Finally, this scope includes institutions that promote social integration 
and socialisation from education to child and youth policy as well as personal 
services, e.g., in the form of counselling, training and help in threatened life 
situations. 
The state in different societies does not undertake the same role as to the 
standard of welfare services. The difference consists in the way it interferes with 
market relations, to what extent it distorts them or facilitates turning the social 
processes market-oriented, and with respect to these relations, to what extent it 
endeavours to proceed in a restrictive and redistributive manner. On this basis, 
/ distinguish liberal, conservative and social-democratic basic types. 
The state with a social role can have various definitions. In a functional 
sense, the social state is the complex of state institutions and tax regulations, 
which can provide solution for crisis situations in a democratic way, remaining 
in the framework of the social order. These are risks which the market itself 
cannot handle. 
According to the so-called normative definition, the social state implies the 
extension of state action towards the social. Consequently, the state is capable 
to decrease social inequalities with legal means. These require the transfor-
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mation of former state action in the spirit of a new social justice, which is 
possible of course only to a limited extent, since the incorporation of the social 
concept into the capitalist economic order contradicts the basic concept of 
capitalism f rom the outset.4 
Today, social role-taking by the state essentially overlaps a definite scope 
of welfare services. Its most important pillars are: 
- a comprehensive retirement pension scheme, 
- education organised (or supervised) by the state, 
- access to healthcare services guaranteed by the state, 
- other services accomplished via redistribution and covered by taxes, 
among these principally the various methods of handling unemployment. 
The evolving peripheral conditions of the entire new system attach services 
to achievements, that is, they integrate more and more conditions into the 
system, which basically modify the role of the state, decrease and restructure 
its expenditure, thereby, they base the security of citizens on the market, and 
on that basis, the state announces social equal opportunity as a basic principle. 
Neo-liberal economic policy and social role-taking by the state 
The crisis on the labour market evolving subsequently to the oil crisis in 1974-
75 led to a departure f rom the demand principle of the Keynes-system and 
directed the economic policy incurring the change of the state social policy 
towards an export-oriented supply theory. Afterwards, further establishment 
of the social state was terminated, although, there was no proof that the manage-
ment of the social state led to the economic crisis, rather that it could not in fact 
prevent the crisis and proved an inadequate instrument for the avoidance of crises.5 
4
 Heimann, E.: Soziale Theorie des Kapitalismus. Theorie der Sozialpolitik (The Social 
Theory of Capitalism. A Theory of Social Policy). Frankfurt am Main, 1928, 3 (reprinted 
1980) 167. 
5
 This sums up the main argument of the followers of the neo-liberal era of Keynes, 
nevertheless, they do not see another exit, but the decrease of wages. As Péter Farkas 
accordingly formulates in his article „Mi jön a monetarizmus után? (A liberalizmus előre-
törése a hetvenes évektől") ["What follows monetarism? (The sudden advance of liberalism 
since the '70s")], Magyar Tudomány, 45 (2000) 1087. "The experts classified to the trend 
known as post-keynesianism opened the way towards free market principles. The main 
representatives are J. Tobin and F. Modigliani. On the one hand, they emphasise more 
powerfully that "adequate functioning of the market underlies the rational working of the 
economy", but they also add: "market prices and wages are too stiff to create a socially 
acceptable balance without adequate state economic policy...". On the other hand, they 
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Neoconservative theories and the state policies based on them can be 
distinguished by the feature that they declare conceptual equality and they are 
confused enough to motivate the majority, while in fact they commercialize all 
life-conditions. Becoming a product marks the human condition from birth to 
death, including studying, free- t ime activities, love, culture, and so on. 
Neo-liberal economic policy increases social differences more and more 
even in the face of increasing wages. Namely, not only the standard of living 
rises, but in the face of moderately increasing wages, a price-restucturalisation 
takes place, which classifies wider and wider strata of the society as hard-up 
groups and turns even the life of the less poor more and more unendurable in 
the face of the pressure of consumer society. 
It seems that it is not the lack of the budget that is the only reason for the 
repression of the social achievements of social states, but the world-wide (global) 
economic competition, fi-om the pressure of which Europe, which professes social 
principles, cannot withdraw itself whereas its working seems to become contra-
dictory, while struggling in the net of this duality. The principle of efficiency 
would require that the socially aided should "get straight" the sooner the better, 
however, they are often banned from working, while living on unemployment 
benefit. 
The policy supported by a neo-liberal basis represses allowances without 
performance, whereas, it maintains state social policy in a renewed, modernised 
form and also extends it with elements that contradict the very neo-liberal 
economic policy, which eventually manipulates them from the background. 
If the states coherently enforced the neo-liberal logic, that would entail that 
since the expenditure of the social state cannot be afforded, retirement pensions 
need to be cancelled or curtailed, and there would be no obstacle to the elimi-
nation of nursery schools, to raising the retirement age limit, to the elimination 
of the taxation of the real rich according to their assets, to becoming tax-free 
of capital returns, to the elimination of the taxation of real estates. 
Even if state measures are not so radical, nevertheless, the following tendencies 
are unfolding in the background: 
claim that if disproportionateness is too high, the role of the state should be more powerful, 
otherwise fine-tuning is sufficient. Contradicting the former leftist interpretators of Keynes, 
they consider the moderation of wages necessary (in the interest of curbing the inflation 
and the increase of productivity and production, etc.) Therefore, from an entirely different 
theoretical basis, they reach the same point as the liberals: the key to the solution of 
difficulties is the moderation of wages. The experts classified to the trend known as post-
keynesianism are open towards free market principles." http://epa.oszk.hu/00700/00775/ 
00022/1087-1096.html 
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- Endeavours directed at the improvement of the structure of the state 
budget emerge, 
- Expenditure on labour and education is powerfully limited, 
- The period of paying unemployment benefits is radically curbed, 
- Repressive measures are taken with respect to those living on wel fare 
benefits, the unemployed and refugees, 
- Due to the active labour policy of the state, the partial privatisation of 
the labour market ensues. 
Western European societies seem to unanimously follow neo-liberal thought 
or the implementation of the according sets of measures is just in full swing. 
At the same time, the reduction of social expenditure is not a sufficient instru-
ment. On the other hand, the increase of revenues should be arranged, which is 
circumstantial, since the owners of finances can always resort to instruments 
such as the stoppage of taxes, black market, or "creative" accounting.. . In fact, 
a redistribution of revenues takes place, which via the legal decrease of the 
burdens of enterprises and other forms of amenableness of the state towards 
them results in an ever increasing difference in income. 
Eventually, Agenda 2010 of Europe is also based on the neo-liberal economic 
policy, even if in form it maintains the legal framework of the social state. From 
the once social role-taking of the state hardly has been retained more than the 
formulation of principles, on the basis of which instead of real state services, 
rights and f reedoms are set forth, which at least in principle facilitate, but do 
not on any account guarantee a living. An ever more significant role devolves 
on individual efforts and the state promises assistance to these, which in certain 
cases does not overextend counselling and a control over the sustenance of 
rights. 
Social policy really seems to be a Sisyphean task, since its ultimate goal, 
i.e., granting equality for all the members of society, has never been achievable. 
If, however, a certain task is not accomplishable in a certain manner, it is 
possible that the goals or the manners of implementation or both need to be 
modified. Nevertheless, we cannot sedate the society with the maintenance of 
the illusion of both, and not only for ethical reasons, but also because sooner 
or later the soma will not help the trouble, because a situation can occur, when 
the inevitable consequence of drug-omission may be the publication of concealed 
or stretched reality-segments. Therefore, social rights need to be deployed not as 
a dysfunctional instrument of sedating the people, or as a substitute instrument 
of arousing remorse, but they need to be regarded as an opportunity, which 
cannot only be referred to, but which like the gravest social problem can also 
be treated: wisely and prudently without an ulterior purpose, viewing it as an 
indispensable instrument of the sustenance of society. 
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In this sense, the apparently rightful quest ion remains, if the state, when it 
facilitates, what is more, supports the becoming market-oriented of social 
processes, acquiesces in the fact that those without services or vegetating on 
the periphery of being are doomed to eternal exclusion or intervenes in the 
interest of balancing the processes by redistribution, which grants opportunity 
for those in a socially disadvantaged or cumulatively disadvantaged situation. 
If the state cannot provide that or reduces the responsibility of people for them-
selves by insuring services, which makes the society forced into overreaching 
solidarity hostile towards the "parasites", then the state does not perform its 
real mission, i.e., the maintenance of the balance via securing the sustenance, 
survival and fur ther development of society. An extravagant diversion by the 
state in either direction or a resigned detachment is a state policy, which cannot 
be not undertaken, since we feel pity for discredited politicians, but because 
non-interference with them means the real danger with respect to our future. 
The evolution of the social law of the European Union and its main legal 
sources 
The regulations of the European Communities have covered a long distance 
until this day, when the Fundamental Rights Charter, which also encompasses 
social rights, has gained its ultimate form and may become mandatory. 
The basic outlines of the contemporary social policy of the EU are specified in: 
- the European Social Charter, 
- the Lisbon Treaty, 
- the Fundamental Rights Charter of the European Union. 
In the beginning, the rules of the European Communities were directed at 
the elaboration of a uniform regulation with respect to the social sphere. By 
today, however, this principle seems to have been abandoned. The three essential 
areas to be harmonised are: overcoming unemployment, improvement of the 
conditions of existence and of labour, guaranteeing the participation rights of 
social partners. 
The Social Charter sets forth working guidelines for the parties concerned 
and cannot be regarded as a severe regulation, because it expects the acceded 
state parties to take the necessary measures dependant on their current economic 
performance. 
Social policy belongs to the scope of tasks, which do not pertain to the 
effect of Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty specifying the exclusive authority of 
the EU, or to the effect of Article 6, which specifies the tasks, with respect to 
which the EU has authority for the implementation of measures supporting, 
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harmonising or supplementing the measures of the member states. These 
documents, like the documents of the EU generally need to be interpreted in 
harmony with each other. Nevertheless, the 2007 version of the Fundamental 
Rights Charter of the EU further specifies the fundamental rights provisions of 
the Lisbon Treaty, thereby, it may take effect together with the Lisbon Treaty.6 
The Fundamental Rights Charter is a "formation", which defines the working 
framework of social provisions, nevertheless, the fact that it was framed has 
great significance, since it is a modern formulation of subsistence, social 
security and sustainable life quality, which, although neither detached from 
the system of economic conditions, nor impassive in a social sense, contains a 
catalogue of human rights, the enforcement of which it also facilitates. 
As to its basis and dating back to its historical origin, the current social 
policy of the EU is framed in the spirit of the conceptual system of the social 
state. In spite of that, no meritorious endeavour obtains in the EU for the 
establishment of a common redistributional social system, whereas, it intends 
to enforce the most important regulatory elements of social policy on a 
common basis. The advance of social political systems is restrained by factors, 
such as the significant differences among the economic development of the 
member states, which have increased due to the enlargement of the EU. The 
developed countries of Europe manage extended and expensive social systems 
despite the gradual rationalisations. Its economic conditions prevail only to a 
limited extent in newly acceded countries, therefore, although the continually 
strengthening neo-liberal tendencies (as we intended to demonstrate in the first 
section) have turned the former social policy, which tried to prescribe definite 
standards, unfounded, a modified version of the social concept supplemented by 
several elements is still part of the conceptual system of the European Union.1 
A new social vision is emerging in the EU concerning how welfare can be 
most promoted in the midst of the challenges of our age. Opportunities, access 
and solidarity are placed in the focus of this new approach. This vision reflects 
the increasingly accepted view that although, society cannot secure equal 
results for its citizens, we need to endeavour to promote equal opportunity 
more and more resolutely. 
6
 The Fundamental Rights Charter of the EU considered as a basis for the analysis 
here is a revised version of the Charter solemnly proclaimed on 7th December, 2000, 
which shall supersede the Lisbon Treaty at the time of its taking effect. (See, С 303/14 HU 
the Official Gazette of the European Union, 14.12.2007.) At the moment its future is 
uncertain, nevertheless, we think it is necessary to deal with it. 
7
 Cf., Falusné-Szikra К.: Az EU szociálpolitikája és Magyarország (The Social Policy 
of the EU and Hungary). Fejlesztés és Finanszírozás, 2004, No 1. 
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The Fundamental Rights Charter contains the full scope of civil, political, 
economic and social rights as the first document in the history of the EU. It 
draws on the basic treaties and secondary law of the European Union, the 
Convention and its Protocols, the constitutional traditions of the member states, 
the adjudication practice of the European Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg, the content of the European Social Charter and 
the Community Charter on the Basic Social Rights of Employees, and on various 
international treaties and conventions.8 
The Fundamental Rights Charter (just as the "European Constitution Treaty", 
as part of which it may become mandatory) does not reflect either the labour 
society or Europe of the peoples, but the conceptions of the capital, of political 
classes and eurocracy. ' Nevertheless: considering the power relations of global 
capitalism, we need to appreciate as an apparent actuality that in the midst of 
these relations the charter insists not only on the requirement of European 
unity, but also on a modernised version of the social conceptual system. 
The essential provisions of the Fundamental Rights Charter with respect to 
social rights can be found not only in the expressly relevant chapter. It can be 
discerned that the Fundamental Rights Charter is rather moderate as to social 
and related rights: it does not declare more than what suits the framework of 
neo-liberal economic policy without threatening the competitiveness of Europe. 
Nevertheless, I think that it contains the potential of the social conditions of a 
broader social policy (interpreted not only as the minimum of living). 
The social vision of Europe 
Social challenges and the directions of finding answers in Europe 
As we saw, Europe seeks solutions for social problems via new ways and new 
paths, while it acknowledges that certain problems occur globally and that it 
cannot withdraw itself from the regularities of certain economic challenges.10 
s
 E.g., the Conventions of the European Council on Human Rights, Biomedicine and 
Personal Data, the decisions of the International Criminal Court, the New York Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, the Convention 011 the Fight against Corruption, the Treaty 
on Civil and Political Rights of the UN. 
Cf., Szigeti. P.: Előre az Európai Unió IV. szociális pillére felé (Ahead towards the 
Fourth Social Pillar of the European Union). Eszmélet, 2004. No. 64. http://eszmelet. 
freeweb.hu/ 
"' http:/Avww.euroinfo.hu/europaszerver/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=l 
&id=44 
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Owing to these, social processes commenced in the EU, which appeared 
tendentiously in each state separately, by reason of which confronting them is 
inevitable. 
The most striking fact (as I stated in the introduction) is that social societies 
have not mastered poverty, what is more, new forms of social exclusion have 
evolved, against which the fight needs to be taken up in new manners and on a 
new basis. It is basically important that the society creates opportunity (mainly 
by investment in human resources) for individuals to sustain their vitality 
throughout their lives, to stand the test in the midst of challenges, and even 
advance as far as possible. European states seem to be aware that this does not 
only require solidarity, but also commitment and investment. The principal 
goal is basically the extension of life potentials. 
It can be generally experienced, which in the future may tendentiously 
remain unmodified, that in the life of each person several transition periods 
occur as to employment (such as the transition between school and the workplace, 
various jobs and positions, job-seeking and training, the interruption of career 
and the caring period and between active employment and retirement). The 
danger of polarisation prevails between those who can cope with these 
difficulties and those who are unable to do so. 
Taking cognizance of this, the EU elaborated a system of objectives, which 
is capable of making the labour market more flexible. The incentives and 
limitations are adjusted to this and they define the scope for action of em-
ployees and enterprises, so that they are made capable of successful adaptation 
to changes. Security and flexibility can mutually reinforce and complement 
each other ("flexible security"), thanks to which career starters can start their 
active life more steeled, where they can get on more easily and remain active 
for a longer term, since flexible transitions and simply surmountable hin-
drances are concomitant of their entire career. 
The recognition that investment into childhood and youth is crucial as 
regards the improvement of later prospects is ever more prevalent. This invest-
ment is for life (investment into the future). Within this framework, special 
efforts need to be made in the interest of the development of childcare facilities 
and of educational institutions for little children, the proper adjustment of 
school curricula, the reduction of too early school leaving, and the solution of 
those difficulties that young people need to face on the labour market and with 
respect to accommodation and finances. 
The fundamental change can be recognised that the tendentious endeavour 
to maintain a "job-for-life ", which secures early retirement, is relegated to the 
background in favour of the view of "capacity for work for life ", which provides 
various strategies for active years in retirement. This is promoted by the more 
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easily accessible opportunity for studying for life, flexible working hours, safe 
and innovative working conditions and the modern and effective mechanisms 
of social protection. Due to this approach, the number of those increases, for 
whom work is attractive and whose active life is extended. During this period, 
they can on the one hand accomplish their life goals, on the other hand, their 
living is based on more solid grounds in their elderly years and retirement 
pension is not the only source of it. 
The consequences of the aging society are more and more apparent. The 
new health and social risks have significant consequences as to the systems of 
social protection. However, demographic change provides new opportunities 
for the spread of innovative services, products and technologies. For instance, 
caring for the old as a welfare service can be an essential source of growth and 
of job creation. From the viewpoint of life cycle, the social and financial 
consequences of aging necessitate taking responsibility among generations and 
the thorough consideration of the distribution of related costs among generations. 
The active role-taking of women in work and society is still hindered by 
several obstacles. It implies a risk that caring tasks related to the aging of society 
devolve on them in an excess ive proport ion. It is essential that depart ing 
f rom its traditions, (which can by no means be called progressive), the EU 
abandoned the social and taxation policy based on the "man is the provider" 
model and shifted to the " two-breadwinning" family model, which allows for 
individual rights to a greater extent, both members of which can take on jobs 
and are capable of the proper harmonisation of professional, private and 
family life. The promotion of this is a task to be supported. 
The priorities of the future social policy of the EU consist in the elimi-
nation of the differences in salaries between the sexes, the elaboration of 
taxation systems, which encourage taking on employment, the accomplish-
ment of affordable and accessible forms of caring for children and the old, 
the establishment of "family-fr iendly" circumstances, which secure a more 
flexible order of leave at workplaces during the whole life. At the same time, 
these measures contribute to the tendency that more employees remain 
steadily in active life and that the risk of poverty is reduced. 
Active integration (in the sense of integration into society) and the enforce-
ment of the prohibition of discrimination demands financial sacrifices f rom 
the society, since it is not true, that life-prospects are actually equal in 
contemporary society. 
Actual and equal employment opportunities, the opportunity of studying 
for life, welfare and health services remarkably differ in the member states of 
the European Union. A significant part of the population of Europe knows the 
problems of poverty and social exclusion. It implies serious difficulties for the 
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population to create adequate life-conditions and get a job. Since human fates 
are different, according measures are necessary for the solution of the respective 
problem. Its precondition is that a sufficient income-subsidising system necessary 
for warranting lives suitable for human beings obtains, at the same time it 
needs to be ensured that this system should not be the source of prolonged 
living, but it should be attached to the opportunity for (entry) or return (in)to 
the labour market, which can be secured by the promotion of job creation, 
vocational training and retraining. 
Up to 44.6 million persons between the ages 16-64 (that is, 16 p.c. of the 
population of the EU in active age) claims him/herself to contend with durable 
health problems or disabilities. Many of them would be willing and able to 
take on employment, in case adequate circumstances are secured. Although 
discrimination on grounds of disability, age, religion, race, ethnic origin and 
sexual orientation is prohibited, they do exist and for many they are detri-
mental as to life-prospects. 
Owing to a lot of various internal and external processes, European societies 
need to become more open, diverse and complex. The acceptance of diversity, 
the active integration of those in the most disadvantageous situation, the 
promotion of equality and the elimination of discrimination are momentous 
priorities in the EU. 
Mobility within the EU belongs to the fundamental rights of citizens, since 
free movement within the EU is a recognised feature of more integrated 
economy. More and more people resort to this, if they have the opportunity. 
Although, Europe reckons with a new wave of migration, which is in a sense 
necessary for Europe to cope with challenges incurred by the aging and decrease 
of the population with capacity for work. These waves may be more stirring 
than traditional waves of migration and the number of people abandoning their 
homes and then returning there will continually increase. This will result in 
more open, diverse and complex European societies. For the promotion of an 
easier integration of migrants, new and prospective approaches are needed, 
which place the emphasis on mutual respect based on the two-directional 
process of exercising rights and complying with obligations. Active participa-
tion in collective activities such as culture, sports and politics reinforces the 
coherence and solidarity of European communities, therefore, it is a good 
instrument of the struggle against the dangers of division and isolation. 
Voluntary work and commitment to the civil movement may have prominent 
roles in the reinforcement of social cohesion. In contemporary Europe, cultural 
exchange is as lively and vigorous as never before. By reason of the growth of 
free time, the demand for new cultural products manifests itself more powerfully 
than ever before. The cultural diversity of Europe is the source of individual 
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progress and worldwide spiritual nourishment. At the same time, this has an 
economic aspect, since innovation and creativity are important driving forces of 
economic activities and employment in a knowledge-based world. 
The role of the European Union 
In several areas of social policy, the different policies of the member states, 
the diversity of practice and the heterogeneity of national institutions speak 
against harmonisation. Nevertheless, the purpose of action in the interest of 
common goals is extraordinarily sweeping. Therefore, in several political areas 
(such as employment, social inclusion, social protection, education, youth, 
culture, healthcare and the integration of immigrants) the EU has framed 
common objectives with different timetables, reporting mechanisms and indexes, 
which serve monitoring progress and comparing long-standing practices. 
The responsibility of member states is noteworthy with respect to taking 
the necessary political steps so that this vision comes true. The strength of the 
European Union consists not only in the common scale of values, but also in 
common action, during which the member states jointly endeavour to achieve 
results. The reform treaty also contains a horizontal social clause, which 
highlights the commitment of the EU to employment and social protection 
and reinforces the role of regions and social partners as part of the political, 
economic and social arrangement of the EU. 
The experiences of the European employment strategy introduced 10 years 
ago, which also constitutes an essential pillar of the Lisbon strategy, demonstrate 
that these mechanisms are able to result in positive changes, place those 
priorities in new light that were formerly not attached prominent significance 
on an EU-Ievel. These are the issues of "flexible security", the quality and 
productivity of work, childcare, immigration, illegal employment and of the 
situation of minorities. These processes undergoing for several years are 
considered successful, since they have facilitated for member states to determine 
common objectives. However, they have proved to be less successful as to the 
encouragement of political efforts necessary for reaching these common goals. 
The EU has needed to think it over and to think continuously further how 
to make these processes more dynamic and how to facilitate in view of tradi-
tions that efforts concentrate more on implementation and the diversity of 
institutions. ' ' 
" For instance, the approach based on "common principles" applied in the case of 
flexible security would be adequate for the promotion of the active integration of persons 
most distant front the labour market with the most far-reaching respect for national 
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For the period 2007-2013 up to 75 billion EURO has been assigned to the 
European Social Fund (hereinafter: ESF), due to which those in active age 
can obtain new capabilities and enterprises can build up innovative work systems. 
Besides, upon the initiative of the Committee, the European Globalisation Fund 
was established to promote the reintegration into the labour-market of workers 
who are made redundant on account of the transformation of global commercial 
customs. This fund is a remarkable manifestation of solidarity for those affected 
detrimentally by the consequences of globalisation. These persons need to be 
offered actual preventive and active measures, which will help them in 
adjustment and progress. 
The Committee launched a debate concerning the future of the European 
budget after 2013. It is important that the results of the current consultation on 
social relations should be integrated into this debate. The EU has an important 
role as to the definition of key issues, pressing negotiations and securing the 
political impetus necessary for common European challenges. Such negotia-
tions are promoted by The European Year of Equal Opportunities for All 
(2007), The European Year of Cross-Cultural Dialogue (2008) and The European 
Year of Struggle against Poverty and Social Exclusion (2010). 
The evolution of consciousness and the analysis of social questions are 
often hindered by the lack of complete and up-to-date EU-level statistics and 
indexes. The collection of comparable data is necessary and poses a serious 
task further on. Nevertheless, these data are indispensable for decision-makers, 
so that they can provide adequate information for open discussion and assess 
the social effect of initiatives. 
Several foundations and agencies (the European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of Life and Working Conditions, the newly established the European 
Agency for Fundamental Rights and the European Institution for Equality 
between the Sexes) promote the information of decision-makers and those 
concerned. The more regular consultation and the convocation of independent 
expert bodies (including the experts of countries outside the EU) are good 
methods for reinforcing scientific bases and enlivening European political 
debate. 
As to its principles, the renewed Social Agenda issued in July, 2008 builds 
on former experience.12 This array of concepts is guided by the principles of 
characteristics and member state authorities. Besides, it seems that greater attention has to 
be paid to securing coherence among various co-ordinational processes (e.g., the Lisbon 
strategy, the strategy of sustainable development and programming structural bases). 
12
 As a source, I used the Europe-server, which is accessible on the following homepage: 
http://www.eubusiness.com/Social/renewed-social-agenda/ 
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solidarity, success and opportunity. Tasks of high priority include the f reedom 
from discrimination, the improvement of the situation of young people and 
women, the reinforcement of patients ' rights and further approaching the 
school systems in the interest of migration and mobility. 
The EU intends to further approach its objectives to reality. An important 
basis of this is taking those surveys into consideration, which were carried out 
among the population in the member states and which will be used during 
negotiations with the member states concerned for the elaboration of sets of 
action. 
The social effects and the effects on employment of the current crisis will 
in all certainty incur a graver situation, therefore, efforts at all levels need to 
be expedited in the interest of intervention against unemployment and a funda-
mental reform of the systems of welfare aid, healthcare and public health. 
The rapid growth of unemployment threatens with more unemployed than 
at any time since World War II, therefore, the EU convened an extraordinary 
Employment Summit. 
With the decline of economy, the rate of the unemployed in the EU27 rose 
from 8.1 p.c. (February) to 8.3 p.c. (March). At present, there are 20 million 
unemployed in the EU, which is four million in excess of the datum last year. In 
the Euro-zone, the rate of unemployment increased from 8.7 p.c. to 8.9 p.c. 
However, the worst is probably yet to come. According to expectations, the rate 
of unemployment in the Euro-zone may reach 11.5 p.c. by the end of 2010: such 
a high rate of unemployment has been unprecedented since World War 11. 
The subject matter of the Employment Summit held in May, 2009 was 
remarkably topical: In March, more than 600,000 people lost their jobs in the 
EU and in recent months, there have been protests by reason of the social 
situation in several countries.13 
According to the speeches delivered at the Summit, companies could consider 
the reduction of the working hours of employees instead of prompt dismissals. 
The employees could spend their relieved free time on the acquisition of new 
capabilities. Some companies in Germany have already introduced this method. 
Besides, companies should employ more trainees, which would promote 
that young people (especially secondary school and college graduates) take a 
firm stand on the labour market. At the moment, more than 17 p.c. of young 
people under 25 is unemployed (which is the double of the average rate of 
unemployment) and according to estimations, this rate in the member states 
can exceed 30 p.c. in the future. Therefore, education should develop the most 
sought capabilities. 
1
 http://ec.europa.eu/news/employmer4/090507_hu.htm 
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The launch of several new enterprises should be supported, which could 
also improve the employment of young people and the unemployed. 
The Committee put the most important proposals of the conference on the 
agenda of the summit of EU leaders in June. 
It is impossible to impede that the crisis entailed increasing unemployment, 
but swift action may promote that less positions were terminated and that millions 
of people found new and better employment. 
The current programs of the European Social Fund support annually 9 million 
people, merely in 2009 10.8 billion Euros has been made available in the form 
of support via the Fund. The Fund is accessible in case of need incurred by 
the crisis, e.g., for the improvement of the harmonisation of the demand and 
supply of labour force, for the support of the common initiatives of social 
partners, for the encouragement of social innovation and employment partner-
ships and for the reinforcement of state employment services. The simplifica-
tion of the rules pertaining to ESF will facilitate the prompt raise of advance 
payments by 1.8 billion Euros. In all cases, when ESF programming needs to 
be adjusted to needs incurred by the crisis, the Committee will ensure both the 
change of programs as soon as possible and redistribution from other funds. 
Social Europe and its Hungarian lessons 
The review of the social systems, objectives and achievements of the European 
Union demonstrates that the view that marks the system of objectives of the 
EU has significance beyond the traditional v iew of the social state. It is a 
complex system, the elements of which cannot be selected one by one and seek 
solution for one or the other independently, because the result can manifest 
itself only as a co-efficiency of various state actions, which as a complex can 
result in the social security of citizens. This requires new activity on the part 
of the state, a "comprehensive" responsibility for the concerns of society, 
although these concerns should not be settled by the state, but it should activate 
the employees in public service, demand and promote that everyone should 
proceed in his/her problem-solving(-handling) role."14 In this role, the state 
should activate the market and the labour market, the citizens themselves and 
public administration, as well. 
14
 von Bandemer, S.-Hilbert, J.: Vom expandierenden zum aktivierenden Staat (From 
the Expanding to the Activating State). In: Bandemer, S. (et al.) ed.: Handbuch zur Ver-
waltungsreform (Handbook to the Reform of Public Administration). Opladen, 1998, 29. 
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I have dealt with the details of that and since I don't intend to repeat 
myself, let me just refer to: 
- The first scope of tasks (activating the market) encompasses the deregu-
lation of the labour market and making it flexible, relieving it from commercial 
constraints, the taxation of enterprises and profits, the establishment of a 
minimum wage scheme, the relegation of measures protecting the employees 
and securing their participation rights into the background. 
- The activation of citizens is promoted by driving back the elements of 
social security, the integration of expectations and obligations into unemploy-
ment and support schemes, the stipulation of the requirement of and the demand 
of training, in a summary, the integration of various elements of taking 
responsibility for themselves into the system. 
- The tasks of public administration encompass securing the conditions of 
the smooth working of the market, managing the agreement, quality assurance and 
attestation schemes, and as an essential element, the change of the methods of 
financing, e.g., attaching it to achievement and making it a matter of 
bargaining. An according example is the financing method of expert services, 
in connection with which the wage elements related to social assistance in 
line with the related costs and overhead expenses are chargeable. A further 
example is the settlement of accounts according to social fields, which offers 
various f inancing according to various areas of social assistance. 
It would be worth studying these forms in details, which, however , would 
depart from the more theoretical research included in the present study. Never-
theless, we can discern that these working and financing forms of public 
administration are totally dissimilar to the social working of Hungarian public 
administration, which works basically as a state distribution system and still 
does not lack the character of an authority. 
Considering the whole period fol lowing the change of regime, the greatest 
trouble is that the social (basically arising as state) expenditure "inherited" 
from the socialist (Kadarean) regime could not be radically curbed or reduced 
more extensively by the addition of co-financing elements. The most significant 
question prevailing until our days has been that af ter the termination of the 
rules of obligatory employment under the socialist regime, how the living of 
those becoming unemployed or generally, how the social security of the 
members of society can be secured. 
Concerning this, noteworthy debates take place not only in the society, but 
also on the scene of politics, but it was necessary to clarify legally how far the 
effect of the Constitution and social law ranges. In this respect, the Consti-
tution and the Constitutional Court held from the outset that the rights granted 
in the former social formation cannot be upheld unchanged, since they are not 
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unlimited. In the adjudication practice of the Constitutional Court, the right to 
services and provision necessary for a living was construed as the minimum of 
constitutionality. This guarantees the right to human dignity which is a basic 
requirement. Besides the establishment of institutions, social rights are enforced 
via the civic rights, nevertheless, no constitutional norm exists with respect to 
their expanse. 
In view of the bearing capacity of the national economy and the condition 
of the budget, the task of the state is to define the breadth of services considering 
that the extent of welfare services cannot fall short of the minimum level 
prescribed under Article 70/E of the Constitution. The abstract quality requirement 
of the constitutional minimum of the right to services constitutes exactly the 
realisation of the right to human dignity via securing a living.15 
A well-known sociologist10 concerned with this subject matter is trying to 
f ind an answer to the question what the reasons for the fact are that Hungarian 
public administration has not undergone the decisive contentual-forma! change 
affecting its working, which should have been accomplished so that it became 
adequate for performing its role directed at the maintenance of social balance 
under the current social conditions. One of her principal arguments is that the 
process of denationalisation (desetetisation) has not undergone, what is more, 
in a sense the old socialist-statist methods could survive under circumstances, 
the political conditions of which have ceased to prevail. The author emphasises 
that the structural change has not even entailed the fundamental change of 
the organisational system, the working methods can be considered totally 
conservative and in comparison with European solution methods regarded as 
modem, they are by all means obsolete. One of the obvious reasons for this is 
that cooperation with the society has not evolved yet, thereby, the only decisive 
element of the renewal of the system is the working of the parties, which have 
isolated themselves to a great extent. That is, Hungarian reality is characterised 
by the prevalence of party interests, aloofness fi-om the civil sphere and the will 
to formally comply with the European system of expectations and requirements. 
Legal special literature has mostly dealt with this issue, when it assessed 
the activity of the Constitutional Court, and chronologically, when Hungary 
ratified the European Social Charter. 
15
 Holló A.-Balogh Zs. (eds.): Az értelmezett Alkotmány (The Construed Constitution). 
Budapest, 2000, 706-709. See especially, Decision no. 32/1998, (VI.b25.) AB, which 
substantiates the disposition of the Constitutional Court. 
16
 Szalai J.: Nincs két ország...? Társadalmi küzdelmek az állami (túl)elosztásért a rend-
szerváltás utáni Magyarországon (Aren't There Two Countries...? Social Struggles for 
State (Over)Distribution in Hungary after the Change of Regime). Budapest, 2007, 63-90. 
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The formulation of social law equalled a reform from the point of v iew of 
public administration, which has retained its basic structure, that is, the 
manifestation of tasks on multiple levels and their distribution among state 
administrative and self-governmental organs. The formation of the system of 
social security into self-governments had been a momentous, but inert attempt, 
which was fol lowed by renationalisation after a short t ime. The establishment 
of job-creation subsidies as an instrument of active intervention can be considered 
to be in compliance with the European model, which, however, has not entailed 
a significant and permanent decrease of the unemployment rate. 
The reform of healthcare has been a matter of debate for a long time. In 
spite of the fact that each government since the change of regime put the 
respective reform on the agenda, and eventually, the legal peripheral conditions 
of both privatisation and of supplementary insurance evolved gradually, until 
this day (2008), all attempts at the reduction of the number of hospital beds 
failed by reason of the resistance of society, primarily of the society of physicians. 
The outcome of the present reform (the privatisation or pluralisation of health 
insurance funds) as to its social effects is for the time being unknown, although, 
we are aware that it has not been received favourably by all the population. In 
this area, we can also establish that the population acknowledges that reforms 
are necessary in the interest of the sustainment of the balance of society and 
the budget, nevertheless, it does not commit itself either to the conceptions of 
government or of the opposition,17 
The reform of the retirement pension had been launched earlier, neverthe-
less, by 2007 the private pension funds proved to be incapable of guaranteeing 
such an efficiency with respect to securing a solid living for citizens as the 
(distributional and imposing) pension scheme guaranteed by the state used to. 
This attempt did not mean more than a set of measures coerced by the state, 
which (or the manner of the implementation of which) didn' t prove really viable. 
On the basis of the models rendered by European countries, more differentiated 
methods are necessary. 
According to my judgement , the main cause of the failure (in almost all 
cases) consists in the fact that reform measures are supported by state guar-
antees, which totally contradicts the rationality of the measures,18 s ince it 
17
 Cf., Vásárhelyi, M.: Ki nevet a végén? Reformfília és reformfóbia. In: Schlett I. 
(ed.): Merre tovább Magyarország? (Who Laughs When the Game Is Over? Reformphilia 
and Phobia. In: Which Way to Go on, Hungary?). Budapest, 2008. 376-426. 
18
 This is valid in the case of retirement pensions as well as of tuition fee loans. The 
system has become market-based, which is favourable, nevertheless, it contains too many 
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relieves those concerned from the burden of risk and responsibility, the most 
important element of the enterprise, whereas it guarantees profits. Apparently, 
measures have been gradually taken for the prevention of early, advanced and 
disability retirement, which can be considered to be rather administrative than 
a solution bearing social content in the spirit of the EU. 
Even if briefly, but we cannot fail to mention the reform of education, which 
is again pennanent. For twenty years, denationalisation as a slogan prevails as to 
public administration, which in fact means that while the state has formally 
shirked its obligations as a maintainer, has actually abandoned its institutions 
in the spirit of autonomy. While Europe endeavours to renew education as to its 
content, form, quality and efficiency, Hungary is still distant from the enforce-
ment of such endeavours in its system, and instead of the application of incentives, 
sometimes it employs expressly direct instruments of direction. It has been 
proved several times that frugality on the part of the state in this area has given 
rise to lavishness on the part of the institutions, not to mention that it creates 
little opportunity for real development for the institutions grappling with budget 
confinements. 
Apparently, measures have been taken for the solution of specific areas of 
equal opportunity. These, according to a t ime-honoured Hungarian method, 
have obtained organisational framework, thereby, they can be reckoned up 
towards the EU as achievements, but for the t ime being, their real social effect 
cannot be discerned. 
Furthermore, Hungary has also taken measures to simplify the foundation 
of enterprises by the establishment of a one counter settlement in public 
administration, however, anyone who tried their working knows that it can by 
no means called perfect . 
In one of his treatises, Elemér Hankiss enumerates all the causes that 
special literature has pieced together as the causes of the failure of the change 
of regime.19 
Almost all the authors mention the absence of real democratic traditions,20 
when analysing Hungarian circumstances. One of its most eloquent testimonies 
is that civil organisations working as the principal revisers of public administra-
social elements to substantiate the responsibility of citizens for themselves, which is the 
basis of the conceptions of the EU. 
14
 Cf., Hankiss, E.: Átmenet - megújulás - regresszió. In: Schlett (ed.): Merre tovább 
Magyarország? op. cit. 112-188. hi this treatise, Elemér Hankiss analyses the contradictions 
of the peaceful revolution and analyses the situation that has evolved politically and 
economically in Hungary as the failure of the imagined democratic establishment. 
20
 Almond, G. A.-Powell , G. Bingham J.-Strom, K.-Dalton, R. J.: Összehasonlító 
politológia (Comparative Political Science). Third revised edition. Budapest, 2006, 83. 
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tion cannot make their voice properly heard. Although, on a philosophical and 
factual compromise-making level these would have significance, not to mention 
that they would have tasks taken over f rom public administration (not only on 
grounds of state aid). 
During the recent 10-15 years, the institutions of the EU have demonstrated 
continually growing interest in the dialogue with civil society, on an EU level, 
as well. 
The participation of civil society has modest traditions in current Hungarian 
society, although, the respective special literature opens up new prospects to 
competent participation in the social sphere, as well.21 This is most eloquently 
proved by the fact that it has become a program in the Hungarian Ministry of 
Social Affairs, maybe as an effect of the EU. The program, however, formulates 
the actual opportunities for participation more narrowly than it is possible, 
when in decision-making it focuses on participation in law-making, whereas, 
in the EU essentially more is facilitated legally." 
A treatise on the internet analysing the civil sphere"1 demonstrates that 
while the number of civil organisations has considerably risen, out of these 
only few work in the social sphere. Their relations with public administration 
are marked by the fact that the organisations that are members of the Economic 
and Social Council have the most opportunities. 
Science makes valuable statements as to the subject of the failure of the 
"welfare change of regime", when it draws the attention to the errors of the 
prevailing government and to the dangers which refer to overspending by the 
state and which shift that overspending on to the future instead of directing the 
processes within a real framework. 
A treatise on the problematic issues of the accession of Hungary to the EU 
(which is only one of the many) formulates the problem of the steady deficit 
of the state budget as one of the most worrying concerns of the accession, 
which as a phenomenon has been prevalent in all of the newly acceded states. 
21
 Kiss, Cs.: Az Aarhusi Egyezmény kiterjesztésének jelentősége - A feielelős részvétel 
elve (The Significance of the Extension of the Aarhus Convention-The Principle of 
Responsible Participation) [Non-Profit Sector Analysis. Studies on the Exercise of Partici-
pational Democracy, see. http://www.nosza.hu/kiss.dbk.pdf] 
22
 The Action Plan is accessible on the internet: http://www.szmm.gov.hu/main.php? 
folderID=16437&articleID=32285&ctag=articlelist&iid=l 
23
 Kuti, É. (ed.): A magyarországi civil társadalom és a nonprofit szektor helyzete, uniós 
kapcsolatai, fejlődési irányai (The Situation, EU Relations and Directions of Development of 
the Civil Society and the Non-Profit Sector in Hungary). Expert Opinion Budapest. 2008. 
(Version under harmonisation, the study is a property of the Economic and Social Council.) 
http://www.mgszt.hu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=19&Itemid=17 
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The deficit of the state budget does not emerge as concomitant of the fluctua-
tions of economy, but it is a basic structural deficiency of the post-socialist state, 
which derives mostly from social overspending by the state. Restrictive economic 
policy is not an adequate instrument for the elimination of that, because the 
only possible solution can derive from increasing incomes, which could 
substantiate the decrease of the deficit of the state budget and the coverage of 
social expenditure.24 
The inherent truth of these statements is by all means justified by the graph, 
which shows the extremely high rate of social expenditure in a comparison of 
the European Union.2 5 
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Chart 1. Social expenditures as per cent of GDP and GDP per capita 
The graph clearly demonstrates that in comparison with our economic develop-
ment, the rate of social protection expenditure in comparison with the GDP is 
above the average. 
24
 Cf., Körösi, I.: Magyarország útja az Európai Unióba - Kompország a nyugati parton 
(The Path of Hungary to the European Union - A Cruising State on the Western Shore). In: 
Kiss J. L. (ed.): A huszonötök Európája (The EU25). Budapest, 2005, 786-787. 
25
 Source: Hungarian State Budget and Social Expenditure: A European Comparison. 
www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2008/kitekint/20080610_almos.ppt 
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András Sajó in his excellent, but staggeringly sceptical study titled "The 
Social Reproduction of the Troubles of the Working of the State" states the 
following:2 6 " A s to welfare services, the state has irretrievably intertwined 
with the society, the political and economic actors and as a captive of this 
intertwining, with the system providing welfare services, which is less and less 
maintainable. The troubles of the working of the state are entailed by this 
intertwining. Party policy dependencies reinforce the reproduction of state 
dependencies. The system of state organisation is incapable of more rational 
achievements not only by reason of the over-politicised and anti-initiative 
nature of its organisations, but because instead of reforms, the enforcement of 
the self-interest of quasi feudal organisations takes place. By reason of the size 
of the country, the evolved intertwinings do not facilitate the evolution or 
working of critical expertise. The massive violation of state norms by the 
society and authorities is a part of the working of the state and not simply a 
contingent consequence. It is connected with the infringement of the norms 
and the institutionalisation of irresponsibility prevailing in the scope of state 
organs without any consequence." 
However, that is not the only reason of overspending by the state. It entails 
a far greater problem that the growth of state expenditure was not attached to 
actual economic and social reforms in a manner it should have taken place 
according to the logic of the European Union. Even if we strip all political over-
tones from the statements that criticise the economic policy of the Gyurcsány 
government, it is appalling that all the elements of this economic policy work 
dysfunctionally, and in fact instead of creating a balance, it attempted to solve 
urgent troubles by skidded state salaries, while in fact it did not change the 
structural problems of economy.27 
The inclusion of those with proper insight into decision-making processes 
and the establishment of the guarantees of the solidity and the stableness of 
institutions would be indispensable, which in themselves could ground the 
recuperation of confidence in the state.28 
26
 Sajó A.: A társadalom működési zavarai és az államgépezet (Social Malfunction and 
the machinery of government). Adam- és Jogtudomány, 49 (2008) 3. 233. 
27
 Cf., Gazsó, T.—Stumpf, I. (eds.): A jóléti rendszerváltás csődje. A Gyurcsány-kormány 
első éve. (The Failure of the Welfare Change of Regime. The First Year of the Gyurcsány 
Government). Budapest, 2005. 745. See. the chapter titled "The Main Directions of Economic 
Policy" 45-65. The same holds true for employment policy, which instead of improvement 
entailed further unemployment and thereby further increased social overspending. 
28
 Maybe we don' t need to prove that the organisational structure of public administra-
tion is unfortunately (several times superfluously) under continuous reorganisation, just to 
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Today, research concerning expressly public administration convincingly 
proves that public administration can be neither efficient, nor law-abiding, since 
its controlling and fining activity, that is, the applied sanctions are not preventive, 
since they encourage people not to comply with, but to circumvent the law.29 
This just i f ies that encouragement might be a better instrument than punish-
ment, but the fixations of social conscience by all means contradict this. Of 
course, this is only one factor of the efficiency of public administration, since 
as we saw, it should undergo a fundamental change in its working, so that it 
could comply with new expectations. Not only the objectives should be properly 
defined, but the paths towards them should be found within a legal framework. 
* * * 
The purpose of this treatise has been to highlight that social objectives cannot 
be treated as isolated from their economic and social context. We must not 
acquiesce in the fact that the main function of public administration, i.e., the 
maintenance of the balance of society requires more than efficiency in economic 
terms. But: more and not less! We should not risk balance by the maintenance 
and preservation of a social-organisational framework via overspending, which 
altogether contradicts the possibility of development and the sustainability of 
equilibrated development. 
quote one example, how many times the organ keeping in touch with the civil sphere has 
changed hands during the recent 10 years. 
The first "Department of Civil Relations" was established in the Prime Minister's Office 
and was subject to the supervision of the minister of chancellery. This situation prevailed for 
a relatively long time. The first change supervened in 2003, when civil matters fell under 
the supervision of the minister without a portfolio responsible for equal opportunities. The 
organisational unit in this era was named the Directorate of Civil Relations, but after a short 
time it was rearranged as a major department subject to the supervision of the Ministry of 
Youth, Family and Social Affairs and of Equal Opportunities. In 2006, a new change super-
vened. The department in charge of the civil strategy of government and of the maintenance 
of civil relations was transferred to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, but this time 
not as an autonomous major department, but as a department with a rather low number of 
staff. 
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1. Introduction: Queries in European and Global Perspectives 
As far as challenges are concerned to find what place may Hungary occupy with 
her law and legal culture in the European Union after her accession to member-
ship is concluded, first of all it seems to be suitable to trying to foresee the 
future in mirror of the development f rom recent past to the present, through a 
comparative historical analysis. 
In accordance with this, the first item to examine is the foundational issue 
of the ways in which the European Union ' s common law issued uniformly to 
all its members, its administrative implementation under the promise of some 
well-balanced and co-ordinated uniformity, as well as its judicial application 
by its central law-adjudication agencies will be in the position to exert a decisive 
impact on either the long-term survival or the gradual withering away of the 
historical specificities and relative independence of the national legal systems 
involved. Or, as seen from the opposite side, the dilemma of partner states is 
in what exactly and to what extent this law of the European Union may become 
a genuinely and truly sui generis formation indeed. Otherwise formulated, how 
much its creation, administrative implementation and judicial ascertainment 
with feasible adaptation are to become captive of the giant partners fighting 
with one another within the Union to extend their respective (national) influence 
to the rest, in order that the English, German and/or French domestic traditions 
can eventually be transformed into one single all-European scheme. All this 
covers the prospects of standing divergence versus final convergence of the 
(continental) Civil Law and the (Anglo-Saxon) Common Law mentalities; the 
selection of the models for, as well as the techniques and future chances of, the 
common codification of European (private substantive and procedural, and further 
on) laws; the definition of the pattern(s) followed in law-adjudication exercised 
by the common judicial fora of Europe; and, altogether and taken as a basis, the 
mapping out of both the legal traditions of the participating states by delineating 
their historical groups and sub-groups (with past and present co-relations and 
changes of shift thereof) and of their chances of either ultimate preservation 
or perhaps sublation-in the process of and despite their continual self-adapting 
transformation, in the first place as to their respective sources of the law. their 
conceptuality, structure and problem sensitivity, as well as the techniques and 
judicial reasoning they use, including its canonised skills as well. 
Such dealing with the above, if exhausted by fil l ing up similar frames 
exclusively, would appear as suggesting some self-offer for servile copying, 
albeit the way open for all new-comers is by far not of one-sense in principle. 
For as members of equal standing by now, we cannot take as simply given 
from the beginning that, just as a token and independently of us as actors 
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(destined merely to watch the scene f rom a distance), in the Union ' s womb 
and through its complex chain-movement, law is getting continuously formed 
addressing us, too; while it is not to be taken as a self-propelling cause either 
that from all this some definite modification and continued change of respective 
domestic laws will ensue as the fo rmer ' s simple extension or mechanical 
conclusion, as in some reflex automatism. Or, just two-sensed and therefore 
also mutual and multi-actored this way is. Accordingly, the opposite pole of 
why to investigate ef fec ts will exactly be the issue, whether or not there are 
skills and chances hidden in our traditions, institutionalisations, particular 
solutions, experiences, or even practices of pressurisation, through the coming 
activation of which we can also assert our own interests wi th in-and by con-
tributing to- the European Union 's common thought and institutional action 
in a truly creative manner and without disrespect to its overall ideality and 
functional complexity. 
At the same time, we had better to be aware of the fact that we actually 
take part in the above mechanism of mutual influencing by far not exclusively 
with consciously pre-planned steps and patterns. For there is a brute fact, namely, 
the one of our relative Central & Eastern European impotence resulting from our 
specific historical conditions. For the region's Communist past, which spanned 
over nearly half a century to detach it from the daily Western European and 
Atlantic routine, has driven all those concerned to forced paths, diverting them 
from the very chance of any organic development. Or, this past made own 
practices developed and enforced throughout the West, against which we, 
Hungarians, for example, may now call back our own historical (and partly 
also nostalgic) remembrances (to former efforts at state-building, bourgeois 
revolution, liberal governance up to our involvement in the First World War, 
struggles between the two world wars, or, lastly, republican foundations 
during the short coalition period after the second worldwide catastrophe) at the 
most, which, however, inevitably and in the strictest sense, had also cut us off 
from contemporary Western European and Atlantic practices developed in their 
after-war recovery and afterwards, by having transformed our traditions into a 
historical fore pattern anchoring in their already distant past. That is, our 
ideals became in the meantime dated as mere remembrances rooted in the very 
past of Western civilisational patterns, forbidden and denied for us at their 
time, while we could hardly get own experience from their daily practices, 
evolved with them through nearly half a century. Therefore, eventually and in the 
last analysis, in both facts and ideals we are in a remarkable phase delay. For 
this very reason, the issue is also bound to be raised how much will our overall 
heritage-no/ens, volens—affect our near future as an in-built impetus given. 
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Based upon own potentials, we are already both new members and constituent 
parts of-with shared ability also to contribute to- this unifying Europe. There-
fore we are expected to answer the query for sustainability in a sensitive manner, 
namely, to rate what kind of future can be prognosticated for us in the dilemma 
of preservation mixed by mutual influences or assimilation under the pressure 
of overweighty partners, and also what kind of role traditions historically 
evolved may play in forming all this, defining its basic directions while 
transforming themselves into a conservative antipode in control of current 
adaptations, as main factors to strengthen internal forces needed so much for 
facing current challenges effectively and in an adequate manner. 
Of course, plenty of researches have been carried out in Western Europe 
concerning various aspects of such and similar topics, even if in a rather 
isolated contexture. Neither panorama nor developmental perspective has been 
offered by them till now. As series of analyses within the reach of positive law 
and closed down in its well-established theoretical framework, they have been 
mostly building on their prevailing outlook as some ready-made recipe, without 
sensing the paradigmatic novelty of the total move which is going on anyway 
now with universal historical significance. Consequently, in want of own 
conceptualisation and methodological foundation, they have simply extended 
(insufficiently and by far not adequately, by the way) that what is anyhow 
prevalent as given in their everyday domestic routine. And still, own partici-
pation with own abilities necessitates own answers, specific of own challenges, 
as has ever been used in-and in a manner worth of-social sciences. 
2. Basic Issues 
2.1. Hitman Refinement 
The European integration is one of the greatest victories of centuries, perhaps 
of millennia, as a development that may predestinate the mankind ' s overall 
fate for a long period of time. For such an institutionalisation of channels of 
international collaboration on a voluntary basis and launched in every step by 
co-operative participation is a hardly overvaluable advance in the homo 
sapiens' history. It is to note that not more than ten generations divide us from 
feudal particularism only, which presumed continuous group-fight with altering 
chances. It might result in some profit for occasional winners but it caused 
mostly lost (if not plain destruction) for nations and states concerned. In huge 
regions of the West of Europe where enemy in the proper sense (i.e., external 
power threatening our commonly shared civilisational values) had never menaced 
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survival, mostly also Christian princes, overlords sworn to the same God hankered 
for, or borne a grudge against, the property of their similia. Castles undamaged 
we admire in the Western hemisphere today as historical monuments are 
furnished with all imaginable defensive arts against those (yesterday perhaps 
still friend and fellow-in-arms neighbour) rounding on our life, property, spouse, 
and power equally, while we know that eventually no human artifice can save 
anyone arrived to the top on earth against the intrigue of others, aspiring with 
the same fighting spirit to the same arrival. Well, we may wonder at our still 
prehistory of a nearly recent past, how the refinement-or se l f -ennoblement-of 
human race proved to be relative for long centuries: scarcely less than two 
millennia later that the message of Christianity (in company of other world 
religions transmitting legacies basically concordant with the above) had become 
the common language of our predecessors.1 
Coming nearer to our present, just a bit more than half a dozen of generations' 
period separate us from the age when by force of his arms Napoleon aspired to 
found a Europe-like empire, and our parents still might live red, then brawn 
and yellow dictatorships that made efforts to form global empiredoms by mere 
power. In history, the borders of causalities and coincidences often grow dim, 
since in a stage of constant and mutual expansion-in a modern state of bellum 
omnium contra omnes, later in variations of waging warfare and concluding 
peace treaties (making place to one another in a forecalculable sequence), and, 
as the achievement of our modernity, hardly cramped by the so-called inter-
national law either then or since then-every state actor experiments with 
optimising its situation legally, by setting in sheer power techniques and by 
making a defensive ideology out of its actually followed practice alike (putting 
it as a troubling issue to the posterity whether or not in the final analysis the 
catch words of the Christianity, ruled by the Church's adopted politics, or, 
later on, the ones of democracy-that is, the attention to be paid to and by the 
public opinion-had been confined to this); and, with the wisdom of posterity 
at the most and with no little resignation-most of all post festam-we take 
notice of the fact that, with some variations in resemblance but still coming 
from common descendence, the same spirit of the age has materialised in one 
1
 It is worthwile recalling the fact that sociological essays are used to report about re-
feudalisation as a still strangely viable phenomenon also in Europe, in the very periphery 
of the European Union, whose stage of development is described most adequately in terms 
of Pierre Comeil le 's drama El Cid, reminding of the Iberian states during the 11"' to the 
13lh centuries. Cf., e.g., Shlapentokh, V.: Russia. Privatization and Illegalization of Social 
and Political Life. Michigan State University, 1995. 
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of them and perhaps also in the other, maybe coming out as the winner of the 
given conflict. 
Notwithstanding all this, it was in such a confrontation among nations that 
international law began to regain new strengths (together with its immensely 
considerable and varied professional branchings off by today), in line with and 
also resulting in the proliferation of international organisations, which were some-
times destined to become straightforwardly a legally circumscribed world state 
substitute, sometimes established to fulfil strictly delimited duties, considered 
as necessary; however, they had a common mark in that they were given a 
particular-and sui generis-legal status. Today ' s American hegemony has formed 
in the same way, in the world-wide interaction of giving and receiving, using 
all available potentials as defined by the actual challenge and the desirable 
response, which recontextualises also international law in a new paradigmatic 
situation.2 Today this direction is coupled- i f not identified with the former in 
its entirety, despite numerous interlocking it has-with the trend of globalisation, 
basically revolving around a world-economic interest. Filled with the taste of 
progressing in progress and bearing the pur i fy ing and self-recreating ef fec t of 
the Enlightenment, not even these times might we answer otherwise the question 
once formulated by the Academy of Dijon, calling the farsighted vision of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau about the ennoblement of morals, than by saying that: 
our instruments are constantly refined -although, and with returning generality, 
endeavours striving to reach the end have in the meantime become still more 
implacable, in result-maximalisation more inconsiderate, because by being 
capable of setting more refined technologies, they may envision a still by far 
more total effect . 
What and how will be precipitated in our legal thinking and in our theori-
sation on law from all this? According to the shortest reply: much and little at 
the same time. Theoretical reflection seems to be always retarded. This is as if 
our earlier conditions were too forceful, since the possibilities within the prevailing 
frameworks are almost limitlessly able to pursue the old paths undisturbed, by 
adapting the known ones, and open for cautious developments. Nearly this is 
what we can learn from explorations into the historical logic of scientific 
2
 Gooding. R. E.: Toward an International Rule of Law: Distinguishing International 
Law-breakers from Would-be Law-makers. The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005) 225-246 raises 
the straightforward issue that the claim of »rule of law, not of men« formulated within a 
state has been changed to »rule of law, not of states« in relations among states (227); 
however, in case of the overdominance by a superpower rosen there is hardly any guarantee 
for voluntary and one-sided moderation-beyond the hope that international co-operation 
will be effective enough to "really internalize the settled rules governing relations between 
»civilized nations«." (229). 
LEGAL THEORISING 421 
development. Namely, advance is carried on within the frame of paradigms 
already formed; theorising upon new recognitions is achieved by gradually 
dissolving the tensions which are faced in this body of knowledge undertaken 
unchanged from the earlier period, and, this way, also mitigating them in 
consideration of its future; and it is only somewhen, at certain historically 
exceptional periods, that all this may turn to be over the limits of tolerabil i ty-
moreover, most frequently not even as the necessary effect of circumstances 
that cannot be explained otherwise in epistemology than as the issue generated 
by trout-fly, secondary, merely coincident phenomena, or by external forces, or 
after a chance of breaking through is recognised-when, perhaps, a new paradigm 
will be bom. 3 
Moreover, in law, the practicing of and theorisation on which is unchangedly 
cultivated mostly as closed within state boundaries and predisposed of the own 
cultural inveteracy, we ourselves seldom become cloven and duplex. Instead, 
we expand rather our suitable practices and habits to new territories-simulta-
neously as test and experiment-for that we may carry on chasing what is already 
well-known (by its further analytical exploration, synthetic re-definition in 
larger contexts, as well as reaffirmation in extrapolations), proceeding on on 
ways that are made safe thereby. It is in this sense that the present haunts. For 
we are inclined to see pretence, opportunity, and new experiment of extending 
ourselves-our past and experience-in this new European reality, rather than 
trying to sense, recognise and theorise it as a sui generis actuality, with both 
readiness measured by and approach adequate to it. 
2.2. The Westphalian Heritage of State Law and International Law 
Anyway, there is some implicitness dominating our jurisprudential thought, 
functioning as sieves of professional socialisation, on the one hand, and as the 
filtering agent of verification, on the other. It may serve as an aggregate of 
habitual criteria on both sides of the input and the output, defining primarily 
what can be thought of law. 
For us, interestingly here and now, such implicitness is forwarded first of 
all by taking the so-called Westphalian duo-that is, dividing up the law's 
world to nation-states, ruled by domestic regimes, on the one hand, and inter-
national law, serving as the governing principle amongst such states, on the 
3
 Kuhn, Th. S.: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, 1962; cf. also vom 
Dietze, E.: Paradigms Explained. Rethinking Thomas Kulm's Philosophy of Science. 
Westport, Conn. 2001 & Marcum, J. A.: Thomas Kulm's Revolution. An Historical 
Philosophy of Science, London-New York, 2005. 
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other-as a basis. In conformity with the latter 's underlying origin, nature and 
operation (despite huge efforts anyway), international law is until today pulpy 
and fluid, rugged in all its components as forming day to day, since due to its 
occasionality and weakness in centralisation, it is not summed in reliably 
comprehensive and completed doctrine.4 This is why now-à propos the "inter-
national rule of law "-great feelings of its defect are formulated, recognising 
the need of determined steps to overcome it through various forms of promotion.5 
Since it is a common experience that as soon as international power balance is 
split (by the practical dissolution of the League of Nations in the late interwar 
period or the end of bipolarity after the fall of the Soviet Union now), 
hegemonic interest is to prevail again (visibly vis-à-vis others),6 as backed by 
the standing and well-known celestial solemnity of references made to superb 
and unchanging principles. 
In turn, national laws are used to be seen in the duality of the continental 
Civil Law and the Anglo-American Common Law (or, in triality, as complemented 
to by the so-called mixed regimes), when their established technicalities, 
institutional networks, or firm foundations in basically developed doctrines (or 
doctrinal outlines) are considered. Here and now, it is not their actuality that 
may be seen as problematic but their unproblematic reception as something 
given from the outset as an exclusive natural fact. For it has some imperialistic 
undertone when the process of ongoing globalisation, sheltering behind all 
present moves, is also taken into account; when it ignores the broadening of 
the topics of investigations devoted to social formalisms by social theories since 
the beginning of the 20"' century; when it features up the standing imprints of 
Euro-centrism or ethno-centrisms. Since the epoch of Eugen Ehrlich and Max 
Weber, so-called non-state laws as well as the cases of legal pluralisms, deriving 
from some parallel and/or concurring predominance, have also called the 
undivided attention of jurisprudential (legal sociological and anthropological) 
research.7 Or, when we are invariably footed in the so-called Western Law, we 
4
 Nevertheless, for its demand, see, e.g.. Jääskinen, N.: Back to the Begriffshimmel? 
A Plea for an Analytical Perspective in European Law. In: Prêchai, S.-van Roermund, B. 
(eds.): The Coherence of EU Law. The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts. Oxford-
New York. 2008, 451-461. 
5
 Cf., e.g., Koskenniemi. M.: The Politics of International Law. European Journal of 
International Law ( 1990) 4-32. 
6
 Cf., e.g.. as a cry out. by Phelan, D. R.: It's God we ought to Crucify'. Fiesole, 1992. 
7
 For basic issues related, cf., by the author: Jogelmélet - jogi néprajz, avagy a nép-
szokásvizsgálatok teoretikus hozadéka [theory of law-legal ethnography, or the theoretical 
fruits of investigations into legally relevant folkways]. Társadalomkutatás 26 (2008) 3, 
275-298 & <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/v778k4q3p4061h56/fulltext.pdf>. 
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are tempted to attribute low relevant significance to legal traditions far f rom us 
and named simply as "others", lived and living almost undisturbedly in the 
greater part of our globe, that is, to traditions which we consider mostly as 
parts of their religion but which are often the indistinguishable and by far not 
definitely unsuccessful parts of a comprehensive world-outlook, working well 
in their own traditional environment and medium. And this narrow-minded 
focus may have proved to be persistent with us at a time when we actually 
have not yet developed any truly general or, in the strict sense of the word, 
universal legal t / ieory8-unless we count as such with such caricatures as 
afforded by Kelserfs positivism (as to a European continental version), or the 
analytical trend (as to the British pattern), in addition to (as the historical 
predecessor of all jurisprudence ever undertaken) the catholicos claim for 
universality as offered by the philosophy of natural law. 
2.3. The Place of European Law 
Where can one find the place of European law? For that what may be seen 
f rom the representations of European legal literature as a synthesis is of quite 
uncertain contours without theoretical message, even if spiced with historico-
political arguments occasionally, mostly covering or substituting to national 
interest pressed. Even in monographies the cacophony of incidental remarks can 
only assure some perspective, namely, from outside. The nationally diversified 
normative stuff will remain separated, perhaps with the sole exception of doctrinal 
propositions to prepare some common codes of the European Union. They, in 
turn, seem to reincarnate the idea having once prevailed in conceptual jur is-
prudence,9 with abstract notionality defined within an established systemicity 
that is backed by the professionally shared belief in the creative force of 
human rationality. This is completed by the hope that constructions thusly 
gained will embody final rationality. 
We can perhaps get a more sensitive picture by also counting with the fact 
that „Forging a legal Europe and post modernism are just complementary to 
one another."10 For in this case, too, the multiple mediations through which the 
8
 As a demand for it, cf., by the author: Összehasonlító módszer és jogelmélet 
[Comparative method and legal theory]. [1973] In: Útkeresés. Kísérletek - kéziratban [The 
search for a path: unpublished manuscripts]. Budapest, 2001, 97-101. 
Cf., by the author: Leibniz und die Frage der rechtlichen Systembildung. In: 
Mollnau, K. A. (Hrsg.): Materialismus und Idealismus im Rechtsdenken. Geschichte und 
Gegenwart. Stuttgart, Wiesbaden 1987, 143-121. 
10
 Arnaud, A.-J.: Pour une pensée juridique européenne. Paris, 1991. 300. [„Élaboration 
d 'un Europe juridique et post-modernisme vont de pair."] 
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formalisms in the operation of European institutions are fil tered-with priority 
guaranteed to common institutional manifestations (directives and decisions) 
while, on the other end of the operational mechanism, a through and through 
filtration will be achieved by the national agent interpreting all these (just 
enabling us to conclude that, after all, nei ther "supranational monism" nor 
„centrality of domestic law" taken separately but a compromise reached by 
both simultaneously shall p reva i l n ) -push us back from the illusory hope of 
certainty to the mere facticity of uncertainty. 
From the perspective of methodological thinking, w e may perceive the 
same transformation process already realised in social sciences at an early stage 
of the 20th century, when the notional purity of rule- or statutory positivisms was 
corroded by sociologisms also entering the field, that is, by the positivism of 
facts.12 Nurtured by earlier expectations (and not without firm grounds), all this 
had first imprinted minds with the fear of genuine anarchy; getting gradually 
replaced by a functionalist view of society, which could only take a more or 
less solid theoretical form after long debates on the issue of priority and 
attempts at final subjection, by the second half of the century. On its turn, this 
new concept was from the beginning based on plural actors and the endless 
series of social interactions, changing the mythical definitivum of some primary 
act, or creative intervention and final determination, to the functional inter-
dependence of partial complexes in actual co-operation. This has resulted in 
the dissolution of legal positivism1 3 while arriving at a new, relatively well-
balanced state.14 
" La Torre, M.: Legal Pluralism as Evolutionary Achievement of Community Law. 
Ratio Juris, 12 (1999)2, 182-195 on 192. 
12
 For the debate m Archiv fur Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie during the years 1916 and 
1917, see Paulson. S. L. (ed.): Hans Kelsen und die Rechtssoziologie. Auseinandersetzungen 
mit Hermann U. Kantorowicz, Eugen Ehrlich und Max Weber. Aalen, 1993. 
11
 Cf.. e.g., by the author: What is to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates 
Revolving around the Topic of 'The Judicial Establishment of Facts' . In: Atienza, M. -
Pattaro, E.-Schulte, M.-Topornin, B.-Wyduckel. D. (eds.): Theorie des Rechts und der 
Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Werner Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin, 2003, 657-676 
and-exemplifying the positivism's dissolution in a case-study—Meeting Points between 
the Traditions of English-American Common Law and Continental-French Civil Law 
(Developments and Experience of Postmodernity in Canada). Acta Juridica Hungarica 
44 (2003) 21-44 & <http://www.akademiai.com/content/x39m7w4371341671/?p= 
056215b52c56447c8f9631 a8d8baada3&pi= 1 >. 
14
 Cf., by the author: Macrosociological Theories of Law: From the 'Lawyer 's World 
Concept' to a Social Science Conception of Law. In: Kamenka, E.-Summers R. S.-Twining, 
W. (eds.): Soziologische Jurisprudenz und realistische Theorien des Rechts. Berlin, 1986, 
197-215. 
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Once the certainty of all the uncertainties inherent in the state of post 
modernism is reflected upon the complex of European law, one can reach 
some points of orientation. First of all there is a striking common experience 
in that everything even in a loose connection to it seems to have been permeated 
by a kind of "missionary zeal".15 This is characterised by both its weigh and 
extraordinarity, formative of the future of European history, and the fact that it 
lacks any strictly circumscribable subject. For today "a reactive, event-driven and 
context-dependent approach to EU legal studies" is the mainstream,16 considering 
the fact that the "European Community law represents more evidently perhaps 
than most other subjects an intricate web of politics, economics and law. It 
virtually calls out to be understood by [...] an interdisciplinary, contextual or 
critical approach."17 
The medium itself in the womb of which all this is to happen is the fluid 
state of ceaseless being something and becoming something else as well, since 
"The EU, after all, is a polity in the making".18 The European law as it is at 
any given time is the first of those factors shaping the commonness in Europe 
at any time; and what is known presently as the European Union is the prime 
factor to form the European law-in an interdependence and with a mutually 
conditioning force that, beyond the dynamics of their mutual effects and self-
sustaining output, there is almost no ftx(ed) point to relate to them in the 
manner of Archimedes. Therefore one may state it without sheerly rhetorical 
overestimation reaching a dead-end that "there is simply no single answer to 
questions such as: what is the legal constitutional nature of the EU, and what 
is the role of the law in the governance of the EU?" 1 9 For all this is about the 
specificity of the European law's ontological nature and its self-determination 
through the mutual definition of the forces working in its just-so-being. Just in 
the way as the European law's criterial component "conditionality attached to 
supremacy is not a temporary aberration, but a permanent feature of the EU 
constitutional order."20-since it is also to show those apparently (self-)contradic-
tory features that can at all be interpreted within the dynamism of the total 
15
 Walker, N.: Legal Theory and the European Union: A 25th Anniversary Essay. 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 25 (2005) 481-601 at 586. 
16
 Ibid., 583. 
17
 The first time by Snyder, F.: New Directions in European Community Law. Journal 
of Law and Society. 14 (1987) 167-182 on 167. 
18
 Hunt, J.-Shaw, J.: Fairy Taie of Luxembourg? Reflections on Law and Legal Scholar-
ship in European Integration in <http://64.233.183.104/search?q=cache:F42D5KPUYG8J: 
www.sheffield.ac.uk/content/l/c6/06/90/87/Hunt%2>, 5. 
19
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whole, taken as a process. Even the constitutional foundations of its structure 
can be best described in the enigmatic but reliable language of legal and 
political phi losophy-in the way, for instance, that the relationship between the 
Union and the domestic national orders is "pluralistic rather than monistic, and 
interactive rather than hierarchical".21 
In the evergreen polemics of legal theory whether it is the rule that makes the 
law (as suggested by the transformation of regola into rules with the ancient 
Romans and by the axiomatic conceptualisation in early modern continental 
Europe) or the law's presence, with the quality of juridicity, will only be 
revealed through the judicial event (as ever professed by the experimental 
pragmatism of the Anglo-Saxon wisdom), there is a new contribution to the 
underlying issue by the conclusion, maybe shocking for the first time, according 
to which "The European Union's legal system has become the most effective 
international legal system in existence, standing in clear contrast to the typical 
weakness of international law and international courts ." For all this is nothing 
but the outcome of the fact that in the political processes of the European 
Union the European Court(s) of Justice and the national courts have become 
co-actors in imposing a common will, called European law, on the governments 
of member states.22 
3. Analogies 
3.1. Solar System with Planets 
There is a methodologically inspiring symbolic expression provided by the 
metaphor of "solar system with planets", based on the various forms of 
interaction and interdependence between the intellectual tradition embodied by 
the ius commune as the once European jurisprudents ' law, on the one hand, 
and its local applications, on the other. According to a learned author, "Maniio 
Bellomo-L 'Europa del diritto commune 6th ed. (Roma: 1993) 205-206-has used 
the imagery of the lus commune as the sun and the iura propria, the legal 
norms of kingdoms, principalities, and city states as the planets to explain the 
relationship of the his commune and iura propria. The metaphor is perceptive 
and accurate. The sun is not an inert mass, without energy or gravity that does 
21
 MacConnick, N.: Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State, and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth. Oxford-New York, 1999. 
22
 Alter, K. J.: Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an 
International Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford-New York, 2001. 
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not exercise any influence on the planets. To describe the sun as a great 
theoretical star in the sky that has no real life or influence of its own would be 
silly. On the other hand, the planets have their own conditions, forces, norms 
that regulate their self-contained worlds. Each planet has a different set of rules, 
but each is affected in different ways and from a different distance by the energy 
of the sun. No planet would reject the sun; it would be folly and unthinkable. 
The result would be chaos for the planet 's system. My conclusions can be 
stated succinctly: The Ins commune was not bookish law, was not the law of 
the greats, to be read, savored, and returned to the shelf, was not learned law 
in contrast to real law. It was the cauldron f rom which all European legal 
systems emerged."23 
Such a metaphor, I guess, can serve as a convincing analogy to describe 
the simultaneously centrifugal and centripetal, unending moves characteristic 
of the cases of legal pluralism, and most of all, the actualisation/implementation 
of the European law as unity in principle, showing certain diversity of practice 
at the same time. Otherwise expressed, this means that once some depth is 
actually reached by the process of European integration, there will also be some 
inertia and gravitational force in work as well, which may ensure that its law, 
independently of how it operates in fact, will also be able to exert its continued 
impact, feeding back, of course, the challenges it is to respond to, even if mostly 
in a rather indirect manner. 
As it will be cleared up in the following paragraphs in more details, it is 
the pluri-directional move by plural actors (with the overwhelmingly massive 
force that is to be formed anyhow in the womb of such movements) that will 
specify the particularity of the operation of European law. 
3.2. Pre-modernity, Modernity, Post-modernity 
The amalgam that the operation of the European Union is, exhibits a variety of 
features ranging f rom premodern, through modern, to postmodern. 
Premodern, insofar as it genuinely reverberates with echoes of the ius 
commune tradition. 
Yet, at the same time, European law exhibits features of modernity as well. 
It carries on with the tradition of legal positivism, yet at the same time, we 
recognise the process of the classic nation-state being transposed rigidly into 
the rather different setting of the succeeding new age, in tandem perhaps with 
2 j
 Pennington, K.: Learned Law, Droit Savant, Gelehrtes Recht: The Tyranny of a 
Concept. Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 20 ( 1994), 205-215 & 
<http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/leamed.htm>. 
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the potential stigmas attached to being out of date, and showing signs of being 
artificially produced-a result of the forceful nature of the process. Efforts and 
attempts aimed at producing European common law have thus far been located 
along more or less exclusive codification strategies, and have attributed primacy 
to the systemic idea,24 and subscribe to the notion of law being susceptible to 
being fixed in a chosen fonn onto the skeletal structure provided by the formulae 
of rules. 
Additionally, the air of postmodernity also permeates this sphere. This 
becomes tangible through the way the innumerable directives (that are not only 
capable of creating internal tensions among one another, but even of completely 
cancelling the effects of each other) are to practically overwrite the body of 
rules comprising European law. The fundamental cause of this reversal is that 
these rules are only enforceable through actualisation by the courts, that is, 
via adjudication governed by value judgments and the weighing of conflicting 
interests, which are essentially authoritative proclamations produced in decision-
making scenarios. 
This is a postmodern construct, accepting the primacy of principles over 
rules to the extent that, for example, the equality of languages natively dissolves 
in the cacophony of regulations that which (although in and of itself can be 
perceived as merely text) may nevertheless no longer be monocultural even in 
its simple textuality, since it is floating above the individual culture specific 
languages of all member states. Also to the extent that the community actions 
are-intentionally, due to one of the most fundamental principles determining 
the nature of this construct-subjugated to the various specific interpretations 
(arbitrary choices) produced by member states based either on powers afforded 
by a status of local autonomy or other powers exclusive to the given juris-
diction. Also to the extent that, by extending the freedom of the choice of the 
law, it gives rise to the coexistence of competing national forums, which 
combined with the freedom of contract and of enterprise ultimately gives way 
to a certain favoured legal system (or systems) gaining monopoly status along 
with the other (or others) becoming hol low from a practical perspective (since 
even their remaining degree of sovereignty is thusly rendered inconsequential). 
In other words, also to the extent that although the powers of the national (as 
in member state) entities are theoretically preserved, nevertheless, in the practical 
realm, a continent-wide globalisation has (already) been put into motion by 
practically almost fully liberalising the marketplace of initiatives and allowing 
freedom of choice among the various relevant legal regulations. Consequently, 
24
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the potential outcome of this process could be that in fact the status of the state 
may soon become largely nominal indeed-because of the freedom of enterprise 
and of commerce. The reason for this is that in the case of giant commercial 
enterprises comprised of freely constructed concentrations of influence that 
are the most successful in the battle to acquire the largest market share, the de 
facto force upholding order increasingly resides with the players themselves, 
as their legal agreements tend to designate as arbitrators of their potential legal 
wrangling certain agencies commissioned to act as forums producing rulings 
on their disagreements. When the relevant provisions are composed with an 
appropriate level of sophistication, it is even possible to create a legal construct, 
whereby even the courts of the European Union may end up having a rather 
limited practical influence over these paralegal or non-legal procedures. 
4. The Structural Pattern of the European Law 
4.1. Legal Culture of the European Union 
Well, using a multi-tiered image of the potential wholeness of law,25 it is 
possible to distinguish three different layers: 
law 
surface level 
(legal rules, case law, etc.)  
legal culture 
(legal concepts, general principles, lawyer's  
methodology)  
deep structure  
and strange as it may sound, our conclusion is that so far the legal setup of 
the European Union appears to have reached only the first level.26 To put it 
differently, the culture and core structure of European law, i.e., its conceptual, 
theoretical, and methodological assets, and its doctrine (in the sense of a 
25
 Tuori, K.: EC Law: An Independent Legal Order or a Post-modern Jack-in-the-Box? 
In: Erikson, L. D. et al. (eds.): Dialectic of Law and Reality. Readings in Finnish Legal 
Theory. Helsinki, 1999, 397-415 at 403. 
2
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Rechtsdogmatik) have not been fully formulated, its wholeness has not been 
attained by far . 
Truly, that which is commonly referred to as the objectification of law27 
has been present for quite a long time, and it has materialised in the form of a 
solid amalgam block of a rather chaotic composition. The contracts concluded with 
the European Union, the directives and other positive sources of law emanating 
from the representative and governmental bodies representing the European 
Union, furthermore, the corpus of its own juridical rulings beyond the transposed 
and adopted elements, i.e., in addition to the body of acquis-has objectif ied 
the law. Nonetheless, to this day no palpable certainty or generality has evolved 
out of this: neither do we see an already crystallised form of legal conceptuali-
sation, nor do we notice a strategic construction happening along a set of principles 
producing a balanced construct, and even whatever could be understood as being 
a more-or-less consensual methodology is lacking f r o m the process.28 And 
certainly, in the absence of all of these obviously no genuine doctrine exists, 
unless we consider this term to cover even those compendia released by authors 
(which are subject to being revised or rewritten with perhaps daily frequency), 
that seem to report every single development structured in whatever fo rm of a 
grouping, and which tend to be rather void of genuine thought regardless of 
being produced under the guise of bona fide science. 
Still, the stuff comprised of accumulated normative materials resembles at 
best-even with the best of intentions—the critical mass produced by the layers 
of deposits formed on top of each other left behind by a long tradition of Anglo-
Saxon case-law. So it resembles an incomprehensible heap that can only be 
penetrated via the use of some method of creating subgroupings based on 
typification, which then has the effect of reducing the apparently inherent, 
native chaos. This can be achieved by identifying certain precedent-blocks that 
do in fact exhibit truly significant differentiating features when examined from 
a specific perspective; yet w e are well advised to keep in mind that no one 
such structural construct should be considered absolute or exclusively valid in 
its given form, nor is it in any way predestinated, because using a different set 
of principles or method in trying to create/perceive order can produce another 
reasonable breakdown of interconnected units. Consequently, it would be just 
27
 Cf., by the author: Chose juridique et réiflcation en droit: contribution à la théorie 
marxiste sur la base de l 'Ontologie de Lukács. In: Archives de Philosophie du Droit 25 
(1980) 385-411. 
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as misguided a self-deception to call this an order or a system29 as it would be 
to recognise some sort of correlation in the very formal deductive thinking 
applied some time ago by Leibniz when attempting to form the corpus of the 
perfect language, the total conceptual system, and the finalised knowledge 
(the ghost of which also resurfaced in connection with the attempted configu-
ration/treatment of law by scientific methodology as a system in David Hilberths 
axiomatism-ideal30 as being the test of genuine scientific value), which mandated 
that all individual components be attributed the prestige of an axiom,31 due to 
what in reality was a complete lack of theorems, while with all of this would 
merely create the trap of self-destruction because our procedure would in fact 
cause the notion of axiomatics per se become totally senseless. 
If we dared even to arrive at any conclusion based on this negation and 
finding of incompleteness, then our first one would obviously be that the 
developmental process as it stands today can only be understood as being 
partial, because in our v iew even its already established would-be foundations 
and its superstructure to be occupied are lacking: we perceive the presence of 
only coordinated intentions and actions, rather than that of an actually unified 
community.32 We consider as the next relevant observation the notion that there 
is a remarkable absence of a fully developed common legal culture, which 
results in numerous fur ther retardations, thereby multiplying the amplification 
of its own effect. And finally-as our third, although somewhat quietly whispered 
observat ion-we would like voice our increasingly strongly held belief that in 
European law-a giant conglomerate of uncertain generality (due to all of its 
components being f ragmented by special as well as conflicting interests)-the 
specific details of common desires and commitments can be overwritten by 
partial aims that appear to show an increasing level of independent existence. 
And in this we can expect a result no better than something improvised: a step-
by-step progress, predictable planning by default hampered by compromises, 
24
 Cf., by the author: Law and its Approach as a System. Acta Juridica Academiae 
Scientiarum Hungaricae 21 (1979) 295-319. 
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because what could otherwise be conceptually coherent progress can easily be 
(and predominantly is) overwhelmed by ad hoc answers produced with daily 
regularity. In other words, we have what is an institutionally well-formed giant 
structure, which has been filled with meaning and is furthermore operated by a 
well-established bureaucracy, where nonetheless we notice that the hands have 
been taken of the steering wheel. Consequently, individual agents are doing 
whatever they feel most appropriate with their powers. And unless this actually 
leads to some serious unexpected malfunction (materialising in a scandal as an 
eventual political outcome, and in a breakdown or loss of confidence in terms 
of the institutional operation), then we can be certain that daily management 
shall cover and smooth this over by keeping in or pushing into the limelight 
whatever current affair topic arising from the latest conflict happens to be the 
most appealing to the public 's interest. 
So everything here is a derivative; no single part is actually original y e t -
since it is not self-generating, rather all of it is generated. Or, as it is quintes-
sentially expressed: "The law of the EU is not the »European legal culture« 
but the product of the European legal cultures."3 3 So however hard we try w e 
are at this t ime unable to locate a „common legal grammar"3 4 that would be 
comprised of common concepts, thinking, and of uniform attitudes toward 
law. The sense of absence in this regard is felt across the entire community of 
European legal scholars. So it is no wonder then, that those turning disillusion-
ment into positive energy (most often) tend to transpose their desire and sense 
of longing for wholeness into work done toward the preparation of a common 
European codification. This is the form in which the much-desired common 
law's complexity materialises, involving the fact that the foundations are unclear 
and the American experiment with private (model) codes and unofficial 
restatements of the law is untested. Mostly the path by codes, that is, the 
imposition of a common body of law as centrally enacted is longed for. Leeways 
are also searched for and the Dutch solution with the idea of (national, or 
individual, that is, case to case) optionality is widely proposed. Even the "Common 
Frame of Reference" is seen as a Trojan horse, substituting to codification while 
advancing its continental conceptuality and systemicity, albeit in a way deficient 
of working democracy. All this seems to be hold on; the fact notwithstanding 
that mere principles without the commonality of the underlying cultures in the 
33
 Visegrády, A.: Legal Cultures in the European Union. Acta Juridica Hungarica 42 
(2001) 203-217 on 216. 
j 4
 Zimmermann, R.: Roman Law and the Harmonisation of Private Law in Europe. In: 
Hartkamp, A.-Hesselink, M.-Hondius, E.-Joustra, C.-du Perron, E.-Veldman, M. (eds.): 
Towards a European Civil Code ed. 3ld rev. ed. Nijmegen-The Hague, 2004. 21-42 at 41-42. 
LEGAL THEORISING 433 
background cannot guarantee legal security. And although contracts are the most 
technical field of all relationships within the bonds of the private/civil/business 
law, what is hitherto elevated to a community level is most ly the chaos of 
casualism. All that notwithstanding, however, gradual convergence in a kind of 
frameworking regulation can be surely foreseen. 
The situation is similar in case of the common judiciary as well. The roles 
and mixed styles of, as well as the various interpretations by, the European 
Court of Justice are overviewed so that conclusion as to the nature of pluralism 
and alleged juristocracy characteristic of legal operations of the European Union 
can be drawn. Roles in substitution to both the European Union constitution and 
internal law harmonisation, extended to penal law, representing the ent ire 
European Union law and order and working in the law's silence as well, undecided 
whether in a casual or precedential manner but striving for sensitive institutional 
balance all through, while testing a new large-organisation operational structure, 
are all at stake here.35 Style is French-type decision making complemented to 
by English-type general-advocating intervention. Interpretation is complex in 
methods, plurilingually based, fertilising general principles with dubious 
certainty and foreseeability of the law in end result, as fed back by the variety 
of national reactions and autonomously actualising implementations eventually. 
Naturally, the question may be raised, how could a f resh culture in a 
developmental state have its own tradition.36 Well, as much as this kind of an 
observation is proposing a sensitive excuse, it is just as much based on a 
misunderstanding, since culture is not a matter of time period. So in culture we 
ought not merely look for the length of t ime continuum as the sign of having 
been canonised by a sense of tradition, it is not the mere fact of a period of 
t ime having elapsed, rather what we find more crucial is that the concept that 
we characterised as culture be permeated-as a native fea ture -by the intent to 
pass tradition on 51 However improvisational the present state of the European 
35
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law is. by applying this method, theoretically we may be able to recognise 
those places of more intense concentration that do in fact point in this kind of 
a direction, and which therefore are undoubtedly identifiable as being present. 
Of course, the awareness of tradition building is not enough. For, as its is widely 
expressed, "But the European Union, like any state, needs symbols, memories 
and myths that can be the foc i or catalysts of emotional attachment."38 How-
ever, from another perspective-that of the nations adopting the common ru l e s -
it is worth pondering the fact that the instruments of European law tend to just 
be tossed mechanically onto the pre-existing traditional body of law without 
being organically integrated, or at least an attempt being made at their successful 
integration. For the "European rules are literally copied and inserted into 
domestic legislation, without even any attempt to integrate them into a new 
coherent whole."3 9 And this holds the fact notwithstanding that the genuine 
effects shaping domestic laws can be characterised as depending upon factors 
on the merge of the extra-legal as all "it is less a matter of positive law than of 
legal culture." Consequently, the supposed interaction taking place in the cultural 
context, which is in fact def ined as being based on mutual relations, will be 
void of plurality, and will j u s t lead to unilateralist isolation. Furthermore, this 
is taking place within the framework of a process that w e have to identify as 
something being governed by the supranational within the national as a 
"currently undergoing legal acculturation".40 Yet, this gives us the same sense 
of hope we have just referred to above, because it is easy to imagine that the 
series of national acculturations occurring due to the "shock of globalization" 
shall eventually feed back into the slow formation of the whole structure. In other 
words, these immensely elaborate complexes include certain hidden potentials 
of wiggle room and influence exerting mechanisms, which are hardly discoverable 
in advance, yet at the same t ime are capable of acting counter to the forecasted 
directions and already settled issues to a decisive degree. 
Analysis / Postivismo jurídico y análisis conceptual. Stuttgart. 2007. 181-193 & [as a 
national report presented at the World Congress of the Académie internationale de Droit 
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In sum, culture is defined as a community pattern, a collective programming 
of minds. Legal culture, differentiated f rom mere uses and skills and attitudes, 
is also defined as a pattern of thinking (in construction and reconstruction 
continued) with a pre-selective force which, as part of the law's genuine ontology, 
gets shaped by each and every of us within the given culture, even if majored 
mostly by legal professionals. Many objectifications notwithstanding, the 
European Union ' s legal culture is deficient, reduced to surface manifestations, 
stimulated by mostly borrowed components. With a variety of available typifi-
cations within the Union, the issue can also be raised which of the national laws' 
components are getting unified and what is to remain f rom participating national 
legal cultures if their organic unities are atomised as freely selectable elements. 
4.2. Implementing a Grand-System Functioning 
So what we may notice then is that all of our legal knowledge acquired so far 
has been rendered senseless, since it has been overwritten by the way European 
law has been functioning. So we now have a new order, which is developing 
as an open system. Certainly, there are given cornerstones, such as values, 
principles, and quite a lot of rules. Nevertheless, all of these are t ransformed 
into appreciable order, and more significantly, a system with foreseeable future 
developmental stages programmed in advance only by their actual contemporary 
interpretation. Still, none of the components constituting this functioning unit 
are capable of serving us as a point (or points) of departure-as axioms-when 
attempting to describe the general nature of the range of its systemic reach, its 
structure, future processes launched in its name, and normatively referenced 
correlations thereof. In essence, this is such41 that each and every element of it 
is natively contextualised and pre-positioned, that is, it in and of itself does not 
possess a definitive force, so it is only in some sort of flexible and transient 
(i.e., specifically actualised) conjunction with the others that it is capable of 
exhibiting definitive force. But its contextualisation and positioning are provided 
by its actual environment at any given time, that is, its openness toward the 
exterior, its strategic and tactical choices in taking on the challenges posed by 
the real world as its surroundings. In other words, internally it disciplines 
41
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according to what is concurrent, because it deals with the questions to be answered 
within its relatively closed system, but mostly not in any way that would result 
in achieving any degree of authoritative certainty, that is, exclusivity or 
singularity without alternatives. It activates with the tools of forum, scope of 
power, and decision, with which it always closes off (reseals) its system within 
the realm of the here and now at any given t ime; however this then does not in 
and of itself become the root of the same or other forums, scopes of power, or 
decisions belonging to the consecutive phase, so the only real derivative is that 
the carriers of today ' s processes shall-theoretically and according to the notion 
of what is expectable-be founded on the previous system's state of systemic 
self-closure. This is because these cornerstones themselves are divergent: they 
are facing various different directions while carrying different potentials as 
well, that is, in and of themselves they are of significance, but they do not 
form a closed system, therefore its particular interpretation on any given day 
is always (in)formed by their continuous balancing based on unending updating. 
Therefore we believe that envisioning any sort of counter-posed or perhaps 
antagonistic bipolar relation would be fundamentally off-target, it would precisely 
deny the basic idea of the European Union itself. The reason for this is that w e 
do not see this as a case of the European entity facing off with all the national 
ones, rather the former is a central (directly and exclusively communal) forum 
existing along with those of the member states', and making decisions regarding 
their affairs (at least in an indirect way), whi l e the latter are all European 
entities themselves. As it is be ing stated nowadays , the j u d g e s of national 
courts themselves are (or, in fact should be) obliged to conduct even the more 
intimate/internal affairs as European judges, in essence keeping in mind the 
principles governing a Europe that is becoming increasingly m o r e integrated.42 
4.3. With Legal Pluralism? 
Legal pluralism is the case especially of the European Union,4 3 "when it 
contains inconsistent rules of recognition that cannot be legally resolved f rom 
within the system."4 4 
In order to contain and set a final limit to the process of pluralisation that 
had been becoming increasingly arbitrary, the European Court of Justice has 
42
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declared and has had it declared three times that it has primacy and supremacy. 
For, according to its founding charter, it "is entitled to definitively answer all 
questions of European law"45 and, as concluded by the doctrine based on its own 
jurisprudence, "is entitled to determine what constitutes an issue of European 
law"46 and "has supremacy over all conflicting rules of national law"47-without all 
this being by far not yet sufficient to in and of itself capable of guaranteeing 
that no overlapping and inconsistency occur.4 8 
This is exactly the root of the hope-filled desire that if we could somehow 
interpret the entire European legal system's structure-and within it the ongoing 
dynamics created by omnipresent, unavoidable conflicts, and the ad-hoc system 
of providing the resolutions thereof-within the framework of the perspective 
of limited pluralism, then the end result could be a more controllable overall 
scenario. As the proposition forwarded suggests, "the pluralist model provides 
a comprehensive framework within which these inconsistent claims can coexist. 
Provided that the practical conflict within this model remains potential, and 
actual disputes are avoided, this can provide a stable, even a long-lasting, form 
of settlement." By the force of this, "It encourages the Court of Just ice to 
interpret European law in a manner that will be palatable to national courts, 
and, at the same time, discourages national courts from blindly insisting on the 
primacy of national rules. In short, the competing supremacy claims may serve 
to create an atmosphere of cooperation between the courts, where each side 
has an incentive to strive to respect the position and tradition of the other."4 9 
Well, we have every right to view-at first sight-these kinds of (and similar) 
attempts to find a solution as arising from a sense of paralysis, and characterise it 
as a valiant yet laughably Utopist; after all, it is a rather rare occurrence in 
history that a large structure would purposeful ly hinder its own process of 
attempting to reach what would otherwise be a state of perfection in relation to 
its desired rule of rationality, by incorporating structural components that 
create confusion and impede its own progress. But as soon as we take it for 
granted that the European Union-as it exists today-could only have been 
formed from its predecessor formations and the latter's deformities in such a 
way that it created its unity from the inter-national and the national (derived 
from the entities that are the member states) -where the former enjoys pr imacy, 
but the latter maintains the right of updating vis-à-vis i tself-with only a limited 
45
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number of guarantees used as the glue, then w e are forced to apply a dose of 
reality and be grounded in our thinking. And this then is the confirmation of 
the fact that this is a machine that is far f rom being able to guarantee smooth 
operation; yet it is exactly due to the s tructure affording its inherent fo rces 
(which are at the same t ime of a centripetal and centrifugal nature) a large 
degree of f ree f low and play , that an uninterrupted dynamism is present , 
which advances or may advance the cause of the common Europe th rough 
the contemporaneous processes behind unity and diversi ty- that is, those of 
partial autonomies grouped under the umbrella of a single overriding d o m i n i o n -
and through the temporal chain of solutions dissolving confl icts arising f r o m 
them. 
But if this is so, then it fo l lows from this that we pose the question: can we 
truly call pluralism what we are talking about here. If it is religious command-
ments or ethical rules, territorial customs, mercantile ususeS, sets of professional 
expectations or self-regulations of associations that fall within the system of 
referential gravitational pull of law, then the right of pluralism to exist is truly 
legitimate, because it is independently existing and operational dynamic entit ies 
that find themselves on a common platform on an ad-hoc basis , and here it is 
indeed the law ( the formal pos i t ing by the s ta tus of s ta tehood) that happens 
to do the referencing; but that which is be ing referenced, nevertheless, is 
contributing / may contribute its own essence and criteriality-in an unchanged 
state. However, European legal order-as we saw earlier-has a certain mult i -
polar nature, whereby a few of the European Union 's institutions of "»mixed« 
authori ty"- in which "the power-sharing composit ion [ . . . ] does not [ . . . ] , in 
practice, work in a clear way , , 5 0 -do in fact carry on with their legislative, 
executive, and judiciary tasks, but they will only be able to apply the end results 
thereof in a precarious structural position (addressing mostly the state insti tu-
t ions and ci t izens of the m e m b e r states), w h e r e these national state agencies 
on the one hand adopt these results in one way or another (or refuse to do so by 
the means of s o m e technical manoeuvre), but on the other hand, subsequently 
the adoption of these community norms become target for challenge (based on 
the method of adoption or the shortcomings of the adopted norms) either by 
other state agencies or individual citizens (or some organised group format ion 
thereof) in front of either the national courts of the same member state, or some 
community level forum. So, on the one hand then, the community-level enti ty 
has no true independent life, since its only task and raison d'être is the represen-
50
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tation and management of the community interlinking the member states. On 
the other hand, all that is derived from all this member state officialdom is not 
simply a reflex or projection of the centrally posited, but inevitably creative 
weighing and adaptation as well, which among themselves (and especially 
within the sphere of these acts layered on top of each other), and in conjunction 
with interpretations by other member states, and naturally, also in light of the 
general community perspective, provide a fertile ground for a series of possible 
conflicts to occur. 
Yet still, the legal order of the European Union has no other life than the 
dynamism inherent in this. And this then, including its tensions and resolutions, 
continuously results in both solutions and repeated accumulation of conflicts 
within the institutional manifestation of what is, after all, a communal existence. 
It is this complexity, and the slow and uncertain organic integration similar 
to the theoretical solution mentioned above (or more precisely: from the inherent 
order-out-of-chaos philosophy that is ultimately the hidden core here), that may 
be the reason why-unt i l this day-i t remains practically unmentioned that one 
of the European Court of Justice's prime function would be to foster the process 
of the European legal order becoming internally more coherent and functioning 
harmoniously, which task and the latter 's completion, however, "remains under-
theorized, [...] remained relatively unaffected by the rich legal-philosophical 
literature on adjudication".51 
5. Theoretical Model of the Operation of European Law 
5.1. Muitipolarity with Centripetality and Centrifugality 
The metaphor of the solar system as a sub-systemic part of the galaxy describes 
such a relational sphere of the masses inside-which are moving along their 
path amidst the relevant physical forces- that is derived from their mutually 
relative positioning during their continuous movement , and the organising 
principles and facts connected to energy, mass, and position (as basic attributes) 
of which are depicted by our human culture of the modern era through the 
laws of physics.52 The paths of these masses are at once centripetal and 
31
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centr ifugal-as they are at all times balanced-and are defined by interrelations 
derived from the given quantitative characteristics of the given positions. In 
the realm of sociality, with the metaphor applied to ins commune, we can see a 
different equation, where we have polyphony resulting from the centrifugal 
forces gradually forming national separations (started by towns, princes, etc.) 
within the monophony of a Christian Europe, with these forces eventually 
overwhelming the counterbalancing exerted by the centripetal nature of the 
culture justified by and justifying through the common tradition. 
The legal reality of the European Union is derived from its bipolar structure, 
because when its centrally posited rules are locally integrated into practice 
(which is defined by the sovereignty of the nation state), this is done under 
circumstances whereby (and while) even law posited autonomously by the 
sovereign nation state is subjugated to that posited by the European Union, 
since the former may not go against the latter due to the latter having direct 
force and validity (thusly primacy); and so we get what is a somewhat altered 
metaphor of the solar and planetary system. In this tailor-made metaphor we 
have a centrifugal aspect that is merely a reaction to the (f)act of having joined 
the process of European integration, that is, we see a process of divergence 
based on the fact that even though having to give up certain blocks of sovereignty 
is a well-known prerequisite of jo in ing the European Union, nevertheless, the 
national interest now within the European f ramework is making attempts at a 
sort of optimal harm-reduction aimed at rendering the effects of partially lost 
sovereignty minimal. And in this case the centripetal force is represented not 
by the (canon law of) "Roman" tradition of the club of Christian nobility or any 
other common ideology, rather it is exerted by the uninterrupted flow of texts 
composed in the row of working languages and background cultures. 
It is exactly due to this divisionalisation of sovereignty-as this sort of 
structuring is derived from a constitutional level, since its source is the treaty 
(treaties) establishing the Union-why the theoretical possibility of discrepancy 
is natively present in even the conceptualisation of this solution. It is rather rare 
that we see overt attempts at finding out just exactly how far the boundaries of 
discrepancy lay. how much farther the walls can be pushed outwards, and 
neither is it common that we see a player pronouncedly rejecting these-this 
being against the rules. But covertly the governments and judiciaries of member 
states do this all the time, in a way finding an outlet for their need to experience 
their national independence. This is primarily so, because their constitutions 
Daston, L.-Stolleis. M. (eds.): Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe. 
Jurisprudence, Theology. Moral and Natural Philosophy, Farnham Burlington. VT, 2008. 
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define these truly national institutions as genuine national agencies-a definit ion 
connected to the relation of the executive and the judiciary being of a subordinate 
nature to the legislative. Their legal status as well as the body of law to be 
applied by them is provided from the single source of the legislation working 
within the framework of statehood. Consequently, they have a centuries-old 
intimate relationship with their own national law, since this is their natural 
habitat. And since their professional activity is subordinated to the legislative 
body of their own homeland, even such a scenario is possible where , in a 
borderline situation, is actually rooting for his or her own case, so to speak, in 
opposition to his or her own law. 
Yet they receive the body of European Union law as (well, let us say) a mere 
extra task, a sort of chore, which merely multiplies what is an already ample 
body of domestic sources of law. So they usually treat these similarly to how 
an English judge would treat statutory instruments when simply fol lowing 
their own tradition: with distrust, as a sort of hampering, almost a illegitimate 
meddling that should best be avoided. And if this external intrusion is unavoid-
able, then the judge shall respect it only to the extent that he or she absolutely 
has to. 
So to summarise: although law-making and law-application in their polarised 
dichotomy manifest as an external obligation for the judge, still he or she treats 
and respects the domestic law as his or her own, because it is in fact his or hers. 
This is in contrast to the European law, which the j udge only experiences as 
something arriving on his or her bench in a whimsical fashion f rom distant 
outside powers beyond his or her reach, and coming in forceful and unpredictable 
waves, with blatant disregard for their own level of integrability. While a judge 
is continuously contributing to the building of the body of law formulated by 
his or her legislator, because the judge feels that he or she is in fact part of the 
process of dogmatic refinement, rejuvenation based on actualisation, with the 
European law the judge is not very much exuberant about the possibility of 
contributing to progress-among other reasons, because his or her chance to 
contribute is at best limited, perhaps even practically nonexistent. Therefore his 
or her perspective remains that of the domestic law-regardless of what happens 
to be the premier background of his or her particular procedure. 
In any case, the model of the legal order of the European Union has , so to 
speak, spread the process of "law-provision" over different f/'eus-with almost 
as much conscious determination as Hans Kelsen once had, when in 1922 he 
revised his original stand from before WWI on law-application and imputa-
tion/ascription as a mere consequence calculation and validation, by declaring 
that for the Rechtserzeugungsprozess to actually occur, there are at least two 
stages needed, since the actualised (i.e., case specif ic) application of the 
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fu ture-bound-and therefore general-abstract-posited can only take place in the 
context of the given specific.53 
5.2. Order, Out of Chaos 
Until the 20th century practitioners of our social sciences (including our legal 
science) could hardly imagine that law or any somewhat objectified normativity 
could in fact be effective without a positivism that treated its subject with clear 
definition exist ing behind i t - so without support being provided by such an 
assumption of an operational order being present, which would be able to 
provide the state judiciary, the professional discipline, the teaching church (etc.) 
with grounds allowing it to clearly translate into the language of practice-and 
enforce with its sanctioning mechanisms that which is posi ted by the given 
normative order. It presented its operation as being mechanised in its ideology: 
sort of as a truly ausdifferenziert homogeneity (following Nik/as Luhmann"s 
terminology of Ausdifferenzierung), thus l i f t ing the procedures performed in 
the name of the above-mentioned entities above general everyday heterogeneity. 
So what did it do then? It lifted a conceptual order above the everyday, it has 
rendered itself reified, and in a somewhat alienated form it (relying on secret 
knowledge incomprehensible and enigmatic for the everyday person) promoted 
into the status of brutally unquestionable consistency and necessity that which 
appeared, with good reason, to the excluded layperson to be not only without 
convincing power , but also even an indecipherable and randomly cruel twist of 
fate.5 4 In short: it chased chaos away in order to see order in its place. Because 
chaos and order are in this approach antinomies, and when faced with them, 
w e either pick the one or the other . 
It was with the arrival of 20"' century sociology that we see the reformula-
tion of the descriptive vision of society. The previous understanding of society 
as the conglomerate of manmade reified structures in self-propelled motion 
was replaced by a model that w a s not based on a one-way mechanicalness (as 
is the case with the definition above), rather, it was focusing on the spontaneous 
motion of concurring simultaneities, and on the continuously occurring social 
practice within them, on the statistical result of the motivational-battles of 
individuals, on interactions occurring in actuality. And surprisingly-although 
53
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its descriptions of the micro were recording nothing but chaos (a continuous 
floating and state of in-between within the perpetuity of attractive and repulsive 
forces)-stil l , thanks to the development that in all of this it was, nevertheless, 
always and determinately searching exclusively for signs of order being created 
(including the details of how, along what avenues, principles, perspectives, 
and with what chance of success), in its descriptions of the macro it could 
arrive at the logical conclusion of the potential for and fact of order out of 
chaos, that is, one originating from, borne out and derived f r o m chaos. 
And it is important to note here that the theoretical notion of macro-order 
originating and eventually manifesting f rom micro-chaos is what laid the 
foundation of the general perspective of modern economics; modern sociology 
is also rooted in this perspective; and this is the theorematic fundament 
eventually settled on by the deconstructionist aspect of today ' s jurisprudence, 
and this latter-incidentally-is a branch of scholarship with much older theoretical 
foundations and developmental span than the former ones.55 
Today 's social analysts call our attention to the fact that according to the 
"normativist model" of the early 20th century-f rom Emile Dürkheim to Talcott 
Parsons-'socxQty after society was depicted primarily in terms of the consistency, 
regularity, and continuity of its system of rules and of the power of these rules 
to bring about behavioral conformity".5 0 It was only later that the recognition 
has been formulated according to which "The essence of human life did not lie 
in following rules and in being rewarded by one 's virtue but in making the 
best use of rules for one's own self-interest, depending on the situation". From 
this time on, social theories are changed in that "rules are seen as ambiguous, 
flexible, contradictory, and inconsistent; [...] they serve as resources for human 
strategies, strategies that vary from person to person and from situation to 
situation... Order is never complete and never can be".57 
Well, this has the realisation serving as its foundation deeply rooted in 
social theory, according to which we have absolutely no criteria available to us 
for providing proof of "differentiat ing at an ontological level" among the 
various branches of social sciences. Jurisprudence too is comfortably f loat ing 
on being propelled by its concept of normativity (the force of normative 
enactments, and so on), while it has absolutely no social scientific affirmation 
55
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that it could point to for support.5 8 And this may result in cynical, apparently 
relativising attitudes-with the dry constatation, for instance, that "the making 
of rules and social and symbolic order is a human industry matched only by 
the manipulation, circumvention, remaking, replacing and unmaking of rules 
and symbols in which people seem almost equally engaged" 5 9 - , unless we are 
cognisant of the fact that this description originates f rom the classic author of 
cultural anthropology: re lying on a diagnosis of standard human behaviour 
exactly so that she could somehow be enabled to demonstrate the nature of the 
eventual order rising out of the chaotic nature thereof. 
Well, it is as if early on the deconstructionism of legal science seemed to 
have dethroned the professional tenet of legal positivism, voiding it with 
critique that was exposing it for what it was and irreversibly (destructively) 
overwriting it. In the long run, however, this seems to have produced the result 
of the previous static vision of order-whereby everything is rendered reified 
with mechanical simplicity-being replaced by the potential for order being 
described as a process, through / understood as / traced back to the attribute of 
the ceaseless dynamism of fluctuating motion. In terms of the methodology of 
fermenting this train of thought , it was perhaps Ludwig Wittgenstein, then on 
the one hand, the speech-act theory (as the consequence of the auto-transub-
stantiation of the positivist philosophy of science), and on the other hand, the 
cognitive sciences that played the most decisive role in contributing. As a new 
systemic concept this could then become the point of departure for imagining 
a self-organised entity that would be constructed through autopoiesis-that is, 
through a process whereby the systemic end-result features solid and confident 
self-identity, despite its internal governing principles having been formed 
along the way through a variable and protracted process. It was the Eng l i sh -
American movement of Critical Legal Studies6 0-which, functioning perhaps as 
an agent provocateur, was questioning the underlying ideology and offering new 
methodology at the same t ime-that reshaped the landscape most effectively 
and to the most radical extent, yet the final conclusions were drawn (concurrently, 
and in terms of partial result perhaps even ahead of it) by a new legal 
ontology.61 
58
 Luhmann, N.: A Sociological Theory of Law. London, 1985, 13, noting on 20 that 
"Until today there is not a single notable beginning to a sociological theory of the 
positivity of law." 
50
 Falk Moore, S.: Law as Process. London-Boston, 1978. 
6,1
 Cf. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_legal_studies>. 
61
 Cf.. by the author: Towards the Ontological Foundation of Law (Some Theses on the 
Basis of Lukács ' Ontology. Rivista Internazionale di Fiiosofia del Diritto [Roma] LX 
(1983) 127-142 {& in Fiiosofia de! Derecho y Problémás de Fiiosofia Social X, coord. 
LEGAL THEORISING 445 
The reason for this was that the latter could raise the level of discourse 
onto a higher level in terms of social scientific significance, as it managed to 
place both the external ideological criticism (which, based on an epistemological 
approach, was attacking from a counter-position and aiming at revealing 
hidden weaknesses) and the criticism of the methodology applied by lawyers 
when establishing their visions of the world inside the process-description of 
the actual operation of law, thusly it could analyse the components discovered 
therein as true ontological entities. Since it characterised the overall social 
complex as it exists at any given time as it is measured by the status of self-
affirmative exertion (at any given time) manifesting in the interaction of partial-
complexes of natively relative autonomy that eventually form some sort of 
final (tendential) unity resting on an identifiable trend. And hidden inside of 
this we have-even as far as the operation of law is concerned what is an 
obligatory prerequisite for today 's economy-centred mainstream materialism: 
the conflict of interests embedded in the collision of different manifestations 
of legal formalism, and in those scenarios where abstract positive legal rules 
are applied in specific cases conjuring discrepancies in practical implementation. 
Nonetheless, it is exactly the legally constructed formulation of conflict-
resolution and conflict-settlement within the legal professional methodology's 
process-reconstructions that fill the gap between-on the one hand-the lack of 
a truly unbroken chain of logic, and-on the other hand- the specifically unique 
nature of an adjudication situation (in which the adjudicator fills an irrevocably 
personal role of a constitutive character with an irrevocable and non-trans-
ferable personal responsibility attached to adjudicator 's participation). 
In all of this we can find the explanation (in terms of the legal organisation 
of the European Union) for what which we have introduced as the bipolar 
structure comprised o f -on the one hand- the production and releasing of law 
by the European Union as a supranational entity, and-on the other hand- the 
reception and conversion thereof by the member states, and- th i rd ly-as the 
simultaneity of randomly colourful motion propelled by centripetal and centrifugal 
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forces , which nonetheless has the net result of creating order with its overall 
cohesive critical mass. So which of these forces is of a creative nature in this 
precariously balanced (balancing) structure? Well, according to the above, 
these are, on the one hand, the explicit legislative activity of the whole of the 
representative institutions of the European Union, and that of its agencies 
empowered to produce and put law into force (manifesting in the power to 
enter treaties, release directives, and produce court rulings), as well as its tacit 
legislation (which demands recognition under the aegis of acquis communautaire), 
and, on the other hand, the reception given to all of these by the member states 
at their organisational-institutional levels (e.g., how they carry their validity 
into further spheres, how they adapt and implement them). And the final product 
of all of this is no other than something nobody has attempted to describe thus 
far , although this could be a sort of a The State of the Law of the European 
Union similar to what is recurring practice of the State of the Union in the 
United States.62 
As we know f rom George Lukács' gigantic socio-ontological undertaking,63 
m a n ' s conscious identifications of aims always tend to get realised differently 
f r o m the original target, as they end up being either relatively more or less, or 
they may simply get realised as something entirely different. And as we know 
also from him: this is not merely a sign of divergency, a margin for error, a human 
failure, a lack of a valiant effort, or perhaps that of futility, rather a fundamental 
fact of socio-ontology, and as such, it is the starting point of any praxis-philosophy 
understood as a system of social theory capable of providing/venturing to seek 
an actual description of practice. So the order t h a t - ш conce/Vo-happens to be 
produced out of all of this, is exactly whatever could possibly evolve at all as 
the result of the free-flowing and fixed forces active in the system. Observing 
it at any given t ime, its corresponding state is then such a characteristic, in the 
framework, on the ground, and f rom the origin of which-exactly as just-so-
being [Gerade-so-Sein] in the exclusive ontological actuality-all subsequent 
movements are taking place. 
It is strange for us to recall today about Engels-who attempted to apply 
Hegel's methodological notions to the philosophy of science of his t imes-just 
how much his multifaceted concept of dialectics (which, despite its dogmas 
and certain erroneous components, included at least the potential for some 
sense of openness in terms of prospect), rigidified, and subsequently became 
62
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the scene of brutally irrefutable and inexorable (perhaps best described as 
automatically predestined) social processes in the Soviet version of Marxism, 
as a materialistic theology of a kind of order, which possesses such a sense of 
superiority, perfection, and completeness (derived from having been successfully 
finalised), which is equal in measure exactly to the degree of to which it is free 
of contradiction at any given time. It also brings a smile to our face when we 
recall that it could have actually been the dilettantism of the Chinese Socialist 
dictator, Mao Tse-Tung,64 when it came to his dabbling in philosophy (which 
incidentally also relied on elements of Eastern wisdom), that may have opened 
the eyes of the then already Sovietised Central and Eastern European region to 
the notion that to rebut, that is, contradiction, is no antonym of order. It is not 
anarchy, not rebellion, not counterrevolution; thusly it is neither a matter of 
state security. Because it is in fact not a sign of rejection (through statements), 
rather it is a natural sign of life, as such is the true lifestyle of any organism 
that is in fact actually functioning; or to use Lukács-speak once again: it is the 
phenomenal form of the quality that anything that can operate is performing 
its operation along the aforementioned line, this being a fundamental fact of 
existence, opposite to which there can be nothing but the denial of life (i.e., 
motionlessness or death). 
So tension, conflict, or the fact that resolutions of issues are reached via 
difficult processes at any given time are not signs of dysfunction, rather these 
are the functionality of any truly operational system. No manifestation of a 
lack of order, rather it is exactly the unavoidable prerequisite for and the way 
of the reconstruction/reaffirmation of order (theoretically always at a higher 
level), which is a naturally occurring and necessary process from time-to-time, 
as order has to be able to provide answers to the challenges facing it and has to 
withstand when practical (compromise) solutions are reached at any given 
time, storms of expectations as well. 
5. J. Practical Continuum in a Standing Flux 
It is this kind of kinetic-dynamism into which we have the structuring solution 
for the problem that a serious portion of the European Union's legal manifesta-
tions are of a soft, rather than a hard nature integrated, that is, this law can 
hardly be interpreted within the static framework of formalism containing such 
plain polarities as obligatory / not obligatory, can be applied / cannot be applied, 
or valid / not valid. So all of this presents us a flexible image (i.e., a kind actually 
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not binding through its formal character) of law (allowing for ever-changing 
conclusions being drawn from case to case, based on the various inter-
pretations of cases and standards dependent on context or the criterion of what 
is purposeful), which is an exact denial of both the classic legal positivism 
characteristic of our Continental yesteryears as well as that of our Socialist 
European yesterday,6 5 since it overwri tes the possibility of imagining a law 
of "a purely domestic character".66 Because what it offers instead is merely 
continuum.61 It is the most that we could discover today through an ontological 
reconstruction as a final truth behind the formalism and discipline-obligation 
of the kinetic processes of law.68 Our supplementary factor here is, however, 
that those classic form-structures that have been relied on by the individual 
nations have by now mostly been weakened by having been integrated into the 
legal order of the European Union; and the professional deontology implied as 
its own recommends a kind of concentration (which is deconstructive in the formal 
sense, as it is destroying even the remaining legal homogeneity) on expressly 
substantial (i.e., one merely referred by the legal normative expression, but not 
contained therein, thus heterogeneous) contents. 
In addition to the continuous presence of and reliance on the teleological, 
the other element that has also been serving as the foundation of this was the 
juridical formulation of the doctrine of "direct application"6 9 and "indirect 
effect"7 0 as early as a quarter century ago. However, characteristically of the 
professionally formulated obscure speech of the European Union, this burst 
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into the legal order thereof in such a way, that it, on the one hand, has left it 
unclear to this day exactly what, when, and under what circumstances (i.e., in 
the presence of what fulfilled conditions) can the centrally posited overwrite that 
by the national legislation; and, on the other hand, it continued to maintain the 
national legal orders 011 the polar opposite side, while leaving the task to the 
national side to adapt or exchange the nationally posited for anything originating 
from the community; a process that has thusly continued to be based on domestic 
application, that is, on the discretion of local contemplation and interpretation. 
Since no other conclusion could indeed be drawn than the one according to 
which "the Member States' obligation arising from a directive to achieve the 
result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the Treaty 
to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the 
fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States 
including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the Courts. It follows that, in 
applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before 
or after the directive, the national Court called upon to interpret it is required 
to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter."71 
It is easy for us to see, that it was the entire legal perspective of the 
European Union which was turned into a pragmatic-instrumentality instead of 
the primacy of any legal dogmatism in this way, being true to its ever more 
openly acknowledged mobilising function, rather than being true to its regulatory 
function in the classic narrow sense.72 
It is well known that in the large structure itself, which is being built 
during the process of operation, beyond the directives influencing only certain 
limited areas, it is undoubtedly the court rulings (which also take on the task 
of securing the entire legal order and constitutionality) that set the milestones; 
with a huge number of consequential results that often set even the vision of 
the role of the community courts on new paths, and these results can occasionally 
be more dramatic than even the founding treaties concluded with the utmost 
formality. Consequentially in this process, as a result of the liberating effect 
of these factors, the authors of the European law continue down the slippery 
slope and tend to keep upping the ante by proposing ever-bolder ideas, thereby 
further eroding this formlessness. They draw legal conclusion from trends and 
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facts of institutional developments, while the only f ramework provided for any 
of this kind of activity (regarding the role of the judiciary, the alleged dissolution 
of any formal-doctrinal discipline, the ultimate ideal of the pragmatic ambition 
capable of penetrating just about anything) is the overgeneralisation of other 
authors. Moreover, it is as if nobody was bothered by the fact that (whether it 
be a community act, or the generalisations of a free-floating intellect that we 
are talking about) even the bare minimum of what was regarded as a sine qua 
non even in the Socialist doctr ine is absent: laying the foundation of whatever 
is the target of their eventual intervention with first doing preparatory work, 
case-studies and debates on cost/benefit analysis, and with the identification 
and affixing of the actual cornerstones. 73 Yet they keep skipping these steps, 
since we can only find a limited number of pointers about the underlying basic 
issue whether a precedent-type law is in fact alive or is in the process of 
development inside the w o m b of the European Union (and if so, then which 
type of it, which sui generis version of it); these pointers being certain judicial 
decisions of unclear status themselves, which are not overtly identified as 
possessing the quality of precedent, and where this quality is only identified a 
personal interpretation of the author, based on self-referential clues, or on 
consequences drawn from other clues. But if all that intuitive reconstruction 
can decipher out of any such signal is that -a long certain fundamental material 
values and procedural principles, and with the insertion of certain forums-i t is 
the efficiency of reaching target that is of premier importance, then we have 
indeed returned to reliving74 the excitement-filled historical time of the 
"revolutionary honeymoon period".7 5 Since this means that the state of things 
is such that the main area of action is the mobilisation for self-propelled social 
activity and the encouragement of autocatalytic processes (akin to grass-roots 
initiatives), in an atmosphere where each player is stopping the building of new 
boundaries at their own doorstep; a building process that , incidentally, is 
continuously breaking down the previously demarcated ones. 
Consequently, these kinds of complex movements, including divergent 
motions, discernible in the legal reality of the European Union simply represent 
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a certain state, that of being alive, and, moreover, as a necessary actualised 
fonn and consequence of its consciously designed multipolarity. Naturally, f rom 
an analytical perspective, ultimately it is not the presence of these factors that 
is of interest, rather it is the longitudinal tracking and observation of whether 
or not the totality of these motions exhibits the character of a singular trend 
when evaluated at the end of their respective time period, and if such uniform 
(tendential) trend is in fact identifiable, then what is the nature thereof. In 
other words, how does the end result likely to manifest measure up against the 
one that had been ideally expected at the outset; is there a need for intervention 
to correct the course, that is, is it called for that the future course of these be 
reset with the tools at hand, and if so then in what direction. 
It also follows from the above that it can only be considered wishful and 
rather simplified ideological thinking (bordering on the Utopian), based on 
which the statement could be made that, based on what is undoubtedly a level 
of integration getting higher by the day, both the European Union and its law 
shall eventually reach a unifonn or unified state, so to speak. Because this would 
not result in the coming of some End of History7b-so that an eschatological 
synthesis could then bless our everyday reality-since never in history have w e 
actually witnessed, as a socio-ontological reality, humankind reaching a f inal 
state of rest longed for in the form of a transcendental final arrival. So whatever 
is taking place now is actually not a process eventually terminating in a f inal 
uniformity, not convergence, not a final resolution, and neither is it an ultimate 
coming together of all the contributors in a projected future Golden Age at the 
end of a single path. Instead, we should likely say that in the current structure of 
the European Union the discrete parts (existing at any given time) preserve 
their state of standing apart while and via being diverging components ofpartial 
units constantly restated/reaffirmed at ever higher levels. Accordingly, the 
discrepancies necessarily regenerated at any given time are not so much 
contradictions based on the denial of something, rather they are variations 
forming with a relative independence on top of a principal thesis that is merely 
implicitly expressed (because these variations-just as in the repetitious fugal 
structure-express the main theme in their fragmentary quality). 
5.4. Activated by Nations 
However, at the same time, several further consequences result from the 
recognition of the above. Since in this sort of complex kinetic scenario only 
that gets actually realised in practice, which is effectuated and enforced. 
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Yet, it is important for us to see here that whatever we identified as bipolarity 
in the way the European Union ' s legal system is structured, carries relevance 
exclusively f rom the perspective of legal imputation/ascription, referencing, 
and (validity-)enforcing; but it has no real existence in terms of the sociological, 
and neither does it have an independent existence discernible from a disciplinai 
perspective of the theory of power/officialdom. Since just as in the League of 
Nations or in the United Nations, it is the aggregate of the constitutive member 
states that is the actor in acting in the name and through the institutional 
system of the given international entity (showing that multiplicity had by then 
been transformed into a common will), this has been observed as happening 
the same way in the history of the evolution of the European community thus 
far. While whatever is produced as European law in the regulatory or adjudicatory 
institutions of Brussels, Strasbourg or Luxembourg provides the foundation for a 
legally independent source of validity, one that, nevertheless, has no existence 
without the constitutive states. Not only because (legally) there would be no 
entity on the receiving end, but also because whatever even actually does appear 
as European law could not (sociologically) be forged without them. It is merely 
as consequence of the series of its establishing treaties that we can even talk 
about the existence of the European Union, of its institutional system, of 
citizenship expressing inclusion therein, and of any other. While the operative 
character of the nation state is a sociological reality, the European communal 
conglomeration of national operations is jus t a legal derivation and reference, 
a normatively treated conceptual web, in which the only additional reality is 
represented by the presence of conformity (the bare fact that conduct is in 
functional correlation with the posited), and behind it, it is the ideology of 
being European that represents an additional psyche, which can be described 
as prevailing (since it lands itself to being described as operational). While the 
Union's administration, its activity as a unit is just the treaty-based projection 
of a given grouping of national entities, however, lacking anything that was not 
already present in the composing national frameworks. We have all contributed 
to the construction of its buildings, it was us who recruited its functionaries, 
we continue to provide its funding. It, thusly, has nothing beyond what is ours. 
Its projections too are just whatever we ourselves have transferred to it via 
empowerment provided by our association. So it is the wholeness as a relative 
total manifested in them, each and every consent and fulfilled desire, in a peculiar 
transformed state, once the compromises reached as a result of cooperation allow 
it. And this is so even if, as result of the neophyte attraction of our t ime we 
can now locate a growing number of individuals in Brussels, in Strasbourg or 
in Luxembourg, as well as in international law offices who due to having been 
artificially programmed or because of a personal conviction-are loyal or attached 
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to no nation, but to the entity that generates they themselves: the European Union. 
Their individual-psyche, however, is no ontological category until such a func-
tioning psyche does not manifest as a force exerting palpable influence on our 
social existence, that is, until it does not appear as an independent social factor. 
However, the ontological significance and practical exclusivity of the member 
state status grants a practically exclusive significance to the only possible forms, 
intensity and effect iveness of national participatio, that is, the optimality 
measured against the given nation's wiggle room in the framework of all players. 
Consequently, all nations have to plan their path with conscious preparatory 
groundwork, including the forms and methods they wish to rely on when 
attempting to influence community life, while taking into account all that has 
already transpired in terms of strategies and tactics applied successfully/un-
successfully within the dynamics of the total structure, and also regarding 
theoretical and procedural methods, value and interest related trends, and ways 
of national adaptation and implementation; doing all this by way of conducting 
prudent comparative studies (applying criteria such as whether or not the particular 
instance under scrutiny was a singular or historically proven solution, while 
also paying attention to identifying what are and are not the established 
notions of nationhood and tradition in the European sphere of argumentation). 
Naturally, as a feature of national participation, member states represent them-
selves in the European Union based in part on their successive governments, 
and in part by their representation in the European Parliament, the nature of 
which in any given tenu is also determined, although indirectly, by the political 
makeup of their national legislative body. And regardless of how deep the 
domestic political divisions may be in this respect, these two national sides 
obviously must -us ing a term borrowed from Lukács once again-manifest in a 
tendential (as in governed by a common trend) unity, otherwise it is inevitable 
that the common national interest will suffer as result of their pugnacious and 
narrow-minded approach missing the big picture. 
And this sheds a particularly important light on the phenomenon we tend 
to refer to as phase-lag in our own Central and Eastern European legal 
universe as an inherited piece of reality surviving from the Socialist political 
system, which we have been forced to endure. In particular, this means that 
since WWII we have not been able to get to know directly, and consequently 
have not been able to familiarise ourselves with, and master the connected 
practical skills related to certain significant developments that have occurred 
in Western European and Atlantic law, as well as in the legal implementation 
of natively (directly) societal considerations (such as the use of referring to 
natural law by taking into consideration "the nature of things"; the argumen-
tation and persuasion resting on principles and stipulated clauses; the speech 
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in terms of human rights and with the constitutionalisation of issues; and the 
open contest of values that are to be safeguarded (based on weighing the one 
against the other); similarly to how have been left out of the changes that have 
occurred in terms of how the juridical function has evolved from being a mere 
dispenser of official pronouncements to being the venue and tool of resolving 
multiplayer societal problems.77 
And the inexorable conclusion arising from this is that from the trichotomous 
typology of premodern and modern followed by postmodern outlined earlier, 
the potential carried by the latter, i.e., the postmodernism's instrumentality, 
has essentially remained unused in the juridical practice of formerly Socialist 
Central and Eastern European member states. Consequently, our room for play 
has been limited to however much is afforded by modernity, which obviously 
results in our relative uncompetitiveness, which is a sort of innate handicap on 
the common European legal marketplace. So until such time that we will have 
reached a state of complete equality of methodology, we shall continue to be 
the cause of the limited nature of our own effectiveness and curtail the 
protection of our national interest, or we can be the (indirect) cause of these 
efforts being limited (or perhaps even practically defeated) by exterior forces. 
6. Conclusions for the European Law as Practiced 
6.1. The Ethos of the Tasks 
If, and to the extent, our strategy followed so far has been determined by 
unconditional integration-as if the lack of such total integration would 
prevent us f rom enjoying the desired benefits of our new member state s ta tus-
then (after the initial years of "junior" membership spent rehearsing our new 
role) we will inevitably have to supplement this view and bring it to a more 
sophisticated state, and then we have to organically reintegrate it into this new 
totality, by way of doing prudent work in particularly significant areas, such 
as the channels, procedures, methods and routines of protecting national 
interests. Above all, we would be well advised to get proficient at the new 
culture of sensibility, the command of which frees us from the tie of what is 
otherwise an unavoidable necessity of the legally consequential, and whereby, 
instead of a straight subordination, we could also engage in a practical dialogue 
therewith, and thusly maximise its potential advantages, and, at the same time, 
minimise certain of its aspects that may hie et nunc appear disadvantageous 
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for us, or in the best case scenario, whereby we could turn it into the source of 
newly discovered advantages (using it as a sort of anabasis, as in the Greek 
dramas). 
Because behind all that, in general, we find the internal intellectual struggle 
of the European legal thinking of our t ime-namely, for example: the dilemma, 
significance and stake, and even the sheer likelihood of convergence of the 
Continental and the Anglo-Saxon approach to legal regulation; the interrelation 
of the national-domestic and the intra-European international; the details of 
(voluntary and involuntary forms of) legal harmonisation and the chance for 
common codification; the contest of the various national heritages and their 
respective fixed "styles" both in common juridical work and in the creation of 
a new legal tradition; and also the way in which a par excellence independent 
and genuinely European legal scholarship can develop; and finally, based on 
which the designing of the internal structure and the generation of the 
substance of a European legal education has been occurring (along the line of 
the equivalency criteria)7 8-manifested in an (internal) contest, which-al though 
occurring hidden in the shadow of the abstract regime of academic juris-
prudence-is, in a final evaluation, a field of competitive struggle. Yet, we would 
be well-advised to be cognisant of the fact that, even on the marketplace of 
doctrines it is not merely the ideas themselves that are on offer; the issue of 
whether or not they are destined to eventually become widely recognised and 
accepted as consensual concepts is dependent on their overall depth (sophisti-
cation of their background), which is obviously a feature of exclusive privilege, 
afforded only to those national entities that have larger and more robust scientific 
institutions, and also, behind this, on the power of the familiar, the habitual, 
and also that of (special) interest covertly/indirectly reinforcing these longitudinal 
constants almost unnoticeably generating a sensation of comfort , as the 
foundational discussions themselves are also "for the most part, firmly based 
in national and local contexts".79 
6.2. For Reaching an Own Future, Thanks to Own Efforts 
Because, as we could see, the European colossus currently referred to as the 
Union is being building in the hope of putting the enormous energy potential 
of our continent to use, in what appears to be an unprecedentedly liberated 
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new European intellectual sphere, which has been ridded, so to speak, of 
historical and national restrictions. So the key players continue to be the still 
fall ible historical particularities, since it is not spiritual ideals leading the way, 
rather we are still guided by the same old familiar actors, namely statehoods 
which have previously ended up fighting (by choice) or having to fight (due to 
the external will of other forces) many wars in the name of protecting their 
individual interests during their millennia of common history. Consequently, 
their separate interests even now continue to be identified in their own self, 
regardless of the fact that now these happen to be wrapped (sublimated) in 
the encapsulation format designated by the community life identified as the 
"European Union". What used to be a bloody conventional physical battle 
fought with amis has by now reached-at least in its appearances, on the sur face-
the more (post)modern, currently acceptable form of democratic participation, 
whi le the whole dynamics have, not surprisingly, remained unchanged, and it 
is still a battle of interests that is the immediate context of this reality. 
These interests are largely national. Yet now these can be neutralised, 
altered, or rebalanced/reconstituted by local and regional (including cross-
border regional, in the case neighbouring states) interests, which, from time to 
t ime, are even capable of circumventing/substituting/overtaking that which 
would otherwise not have appropriate form if attempted to be formulated from 
(within) the regular framework of nationhood. Beyond the tipping point, these 
traditionally structured interests (characterised as partial, fragmented, or 
particular) can easily find themselves on the polar opposite of the critical mass 
of these newly constituted gravitational centres; and these characteristically 
global-economic trends of cosmopolitan pervasion focused on global empire-
building aspirations and the amassing of wealth, which by now have occupied 
a position antithetical to the once Westphalian achievement, and propose a 
fu ture for Europe that is going to surpass the notion of nation-statehood (as a 
way of existence defined as the one distinguished from the inter-nationalist 
way) -do ing all this under the pretext of advancing integration, but also (and in 
reality) under the spell of a bureaucratic (decision-making) powerhouse of a 
supeipower, envisioning a comfortably conducive environment for the effective 
control of preferred market positions; doing all of this on a heap of rubble that 
had in its previous state been the democratic ideal (now rendered the democratic 
deficit) , and the social concern that had once upon a time also been a basic 
promise, and as such, potential of the envisaged Europe. 
Legal cultures are standing side-by-side in this complex. In legal terms, 
nation by nation they are al l - individually-equal as member states, yet their 
chance of survival (i.e., their potential for either gaining further strength or losing 
significance altogether) in a historical sense, is measured by their ability to 
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exert influence based on their innovating power.80 Whatever academic pathos 
surrounds the guesswork involved in attempting to size up the chance of 
European continental Civil Law and Anglo-Saxon Common Law traditions 
eventually fusing or continuing to exist side-by-side, the prospect of convergence, 
obviously, shall not be determined by its internal factors, rather it will be the 
net result of the individual abilities for survival, the outcome of the battle of 
competing intellects pitched against each other. The preparatory work of the 
harmonisation and codification of European common law is registered by its 
cultivators everywhere as academic research, in abstract vehicles, under the 
aegis of the principle of the universality-concept of science; while and at the 
same time we must also recognise that these processes occur in reality as 
vehicles of the direct application of legal methodologies, skills and usages, and 
value systems native to national background cultures, that is, as inherent part 
of, or serving the cause of, national expansion. Finally, the particular nation 
states are not merely recipients and ultimate interpreters of the central case-
law produced as the output of European juridical work, but addit ionally-
through their strategic and tactical choices applied to their official commentaries 
and preliminary questions and inquiries submit ted- they themselves can 
potentially become participants in, or even movers of the processes, and thusly 
the constituent determinants of the future of the community. 
This is because the Union's Europe is about dynamism. For almost at least 
two decades we have been witnessing what is apparently the relentless seething 
of a laboratorie vivant fed by a certain jacobinisme activism.81 In this process 
we have the decisive force of the raison économique driving integration, 
which is supplemented, as raison symbolique, by other features as well, which 
are all derived and adopted from the spirit of the times, as, for example, the 
case may be with human rights in our situation, which in this scenario are 
serving as the background for the body of rules governing free trade and the 
free movement of goods, that is, features that function as props on the stage 
arranged according to the requirements of postmodern democracy.82 And let us 
not miss the point that both of these legal tiers directly effect our future: they 
hold the key to what is the true meaning of our membership in the European 
Union, thusly they have a lot to do with the chain of consequences defining 
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the framework of our life. Fo r - a s termed by one of the past presidents of the 
European Cour t -„Qui participe à la Communauté épouse son droit".83 
So the final outcome of our analysis is that there is no natively European law. 
So far we have member state nations, and currently it is only their cyclically 
renewed consensus (which is ideally reached via mutual compromise) that can 
produce the European law. They can do this in a community of nations in 
which each and every participant is nominally equal. Yet in practice, however, 
their particular size, economic wealth, and, last but not least, their level of 
sophistication in terms of being cultured (well versed, fluent) in the ways of 
Europe renders (promotes or demotes) them players with d i f fer ing chances 
of success amid the continuity of challenges and contests. Their skilfulness, 
endurance, focus, and tactical affinity are being tested all the time. There are 
of course no losers per se, only players whose interests are forced from the 
fore . Those statehoods and nations behind them are destined for such less 
favourable track, which have proved to be less proactive in terms of keeping 
even their own dynamism alive. Or, it proves to be true and concludable in all 
its feasible directions to claim that "If the »new legal order« is to have reality 
and full meaning it cannot be simply the extension of any one constituent system 
to a broader field of application."84 Instead, what we have here is the sum total 
of all parts, wherein only that gets included which had previously been released 
into the common stream of the common procedure with appropriate care and 
determination.85 
83
 From the speech of President Robert Lecourt (1967-1976) in celebration of the 20th 
year of the Declaration by Robert Schuman in Brussels on 5 May 1970. 
84
 Mitchell, J. D. В.: British Law and British Membership. Europarecht 6 (1971) 97 -
11 8 at 98. 
85
 A research partly carried out and translated thanks to and within the Project K62382 
financed by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund. 
1216-2574 /USD 20.00 
© 2009 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
50, No 4. pp. 459-487 (2009) 
DOI: 10.1556/AJur. 50.2009.4.5 
KALEIDOSCOPE 
MÁRIA BORDÁS* 
Public Services at Local Government Level 
1. Public Policy Issues 
1.1. Definition of Local Public Service 
According to the most widespread definition, public services serve public interests 
and are provided by the government. The state is often held accountable for 
these services. However, not all public sector services will be considered here. 
Some services, such as the police, the legal system, crisis management, etc. are 
not discussed by this study. These services are traditionally associated with the 
executive power of the state in Europe, although the American practice has 
successfully privatized some of them. 
Public services can be classified as infrastructure and welfare services. 
The provision of welfare services is based on solidarity. In other words, the 
state balances the unequal effects of the market and ensures basic goods and 
services for those in need. Infrastructure services, such as postal nad transport 
services, etc. often have great capital intensity and low profitability, and several 
other services, e.g. the maintenance of public places, roads, etc. are not lucrative 
either. Given the lack of private capital, the state began to provide them in 
response to the pressures of necessity.1 
Some public services seems more rational to be provided by local governments 
than at central level. Public services, such as the postal service, telecommuni-
cations, gas, electricity, railways, airways, and highways, are traditionally provided 
by central government authorities. These central public services are regarded 
JD PhD Corvinus University in Budapest, Faculty of Public Administration 
E-mail : maria.bordas@t-online.hu 
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as state monopolies closely connected with the service functions of the state, 
however many of them have been liberalized in the last decades. 
The argument for shifting public services to the local level is that local 
governments are more efficient at providing them." 
- Flexibility means that it is more advantageous to provide public services in 
a small area, because local governments can better adapt to changes in 
local needs. 
- It instigates electors to get more involved in local initiatives, e.g. what 
public services they want, communicating that towards the local govern-
ment, i.e. expressing their interests in the organization of public services. 
- When local governments have the right to make their own decisions and 
regulate local affairs, they can easier meet the requirements of citizens. This 
dissolves the monopoly position of the central government. 
- The provision of public services is more democratic, for the majority 
interest can be better manifested on the local level. 
- Taxpayers can contribute to public services with local financial resources 
and as customers can better control provision of services. 
- Elected boards of local governments can better supervise their admin-
istrative apparatus than a central public authority, in the preparation, 
implementation and monitoring stages of the provision of public services. 
- The local management of public services offers a better opportunity for 
the transparent and open operation of local governments. Local govern-
ments thus become more accountable to the public. 
However, devolution has not always resulted in a more democratic environ-
ment for decisions of local governments.3 It is observed by researchers that in 
countries with lower level political culture and less developed civil society, 
influential local "potentates" can monopolize rules of democracy. 
Failure of localism can occur when laws are not deregulated in order to ensure 
the discretion of local governments. Acts of Parliament representing central 
government can limit localism. One way for violating the discretion of local 
governments is when a local task is heavily and strictly regulated by central laws. 
The right to make decisions, however, is respected when the laws determine 
the main requirements of service provision for the local governments. Also, 
2
 Horváth, M.T.: A helyi közszolgáltatások (Local Public Services). Budapest, 2000. 
35^40. 
3
 Verebélyi, I.: A devolúció nemzetközi tapasztalatai, különös tekintettel a humán köz-
szolgáltatásokra (International experiences of devolution, with special regard to human public 
services). In Fogarasi, J. (ed.): Önkormányzati kézikönyv (Local Government Handbook). 
Budapest, 2000. 25-38. 
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freedom to organize services on the local level is limited when a supervisory 
authority is al lowed to strictly control activities of local governments. Instead, 
cooperation between central and local governments is advised. 
The central government can limit the economic independence of local govern-
ments by providing targeted subsidies for them. Laws may prohibit local 
governments f rom imposing local taxes, or suppress their needs for credits. 
In order to avoid these legal failures caused by legislation, constitutional 
regulations guarantee that certain rights of local governments should be respected 
by the Parliament. Rights of local governments, similarly to human rights, may 
not be violated by any law or government decision. 
Many think that not all local public services can be provided in a small area.4 
For example, hospitals cannot be efficiently organized in a fragmented local 
government system. Small local authorities do not often have the professional 
skill to manage special local public services. 
The establishment of special regional public authorities is recommended to 
avoid the unwanted effects of small local governments. As another example, 
cooperation between local governments can be mentioned to manage complex 
local public services. 
1.2. Public Policy in Developed Western Countries 
1.2.1. Political and Administrative Environment 
The provision of public services as a task for the state has been strongly 
influenced by public administration traditions. In Continental Europe, absolute 
monarchies first established centralized public administration systems. Later on 
state intervention was limited by laws, and public administration had to work 
under refined regulations. The theory of the "legal state" meant at that t ime 
that these laws bound the activities of public administration tot prevent inter-
vention in private affairs. 
European theories have stressed that the public interest is better served 
when provision of public services is accepted as a state responsibility. The 
theory of "the provident state" meant that it was the responsibility of the state 
to ensure public services for the citizens. In Europe, public authorities are 
4
 Illner, M.: Territorial Decentralization: an Obstacle to Democratic Reform in Central 
and Eastern Europe? In: Kimball, J. D. (ed.): The Transfer of Power-Decentralization in 
central and Eastern Europe. The Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, 
Budapest, 1999. 7 -42 . 
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responsible for the provision of certain public services.5 Affairs of public ser-
vices belonged to the public sector and were based on public law. 
The American culture has always had an aversion to centralized power. 
This has encouraged the establishment of voluntary and charitable organi-
zations. The individualist tradition stresses equal opportunities, which meant 
that it is the individual 's responsibility to improve their situation by their own 
efforts. The provision of public services has been a matter of public policy, 
based on the needs and influence of various economic groups. 
The American "New Public Management" emphasizes economic eff ic iency 
as a central value in the public sector. Public administration, similarly to the 
business sector, should be based on management principles. Instead of strict 
legal regulation, centralization, hierarchy and bureaucratic administration, "New 
Public Management" encourages private (business) administration of public 
services with public oversight. Public services are seen as practical tasks to be 
dealt with on the local level, rather than as a matter of public interest. 
There is a persistent debate in Continental European literature on the question 
of whether the American public management approach can be applied in law-
governed European administrative systems.6 Other pressing questions include 
whether the law-governed character of European public administration can 
provide adequate public services and whether such services will be maintained 
in the manner intended by law.7 
Two basic public policies have developed in western countries, as a result 
of debates of 1980's.8 
The "New Conservative Public Policy" reflects the interest of the American 
middle class that can buy public services in the market, but is unwilling to 
finance the welfare costs of the poor. This policy considers state withdrawal 
from the provision of public services and maintains minimum state intervention. 
Local governments have to establish a new relationship with the private sector, 
so that public services should be provided under business principles. Civil 
society, such as charitable and self-organizing organizations are involved by 
local governments in the provision of welfare services for the poor. This public 
policy decreases redistribution in the state budget. 
5
 Lőrincz, L.: A közigazgatás kutatásának tudományos irányzatai (Aspects of Research 
on Public Administration). Budapest. 1976. 78-80. 
6
 Konig, К.: Public Administration-Post-Industrial, Post-Modern, Post-Bureaucratic. 
Paper. EGPA Conference, Budapest, 1996. 2-3. 
7
 Waldo. D.: The Administrative State. New York. London, 1984. 153-154. 
8
 Horváth, M.T.: A helyi közszolgáltatások szervezése a modern államban (Manage-
ment of Local Public Services in Modern State). Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
Budapest, 1999. 95. 
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The "New Left Wing Public Policy" maintains a centralized administrative 
system, which influences the provision of local public services. Local govern-
ments are obliged by law to provide certain local public services. The central 
government subsidizes local governments from the state budget by using a 
financial regulatory system. The level of redistribution is high in this system, 
which is a guarantee for the assurance of solidarity in the provision of welfare 
services. Other preferences, such as a regional financial system and regional 
development of the central government can be achieved as well. 
1.2.2. Local Government Environment 
Delegated model 
The provision of public services is also influenced by the character of local 
governments. In the delegated model local governments are a part of the govern-
ment system, in terms of not having their own, rather a delegated scope that is 
given them by the central government. The scope of local governments is often 
heavily regulated by laws, too, in this system. In other words, laws strictly 
determine the activities of local governments, so local governments can act 
only if laws entitle them to do so. 
In the delegated model the central government controls local governments 
by limiting their financial accountability. To achieve this goal, the state subsidizes 
local public services with targeted and addressed grants from the state budget. 
Local governments have little freedom to make decisions on the provision of 
public services based on local needs. A central financial regulatory system 
aims to balance any inequality of local governments by giving grants from 
centralized appropriations for specific purposes. 
Political issues are not emphasized in the delegated model, because local 
governments have less political power in this system. Instead, the servicing 
function of local governments is strengthened by the extension of local public 
services to be provided by local governments. 
The delegated model of local governments has in most cases evolved in the 
centralized, law-governed public administration systems. This model is typified 
by the bureaucratic organization of local governments. Organization of local 
governments is based on hierarchy: local public services are provided by local 
government institutions as a part of the organization of local governments. 
Decentralized model 
In the decentralized model local governments are regarded as local political 
power with their own scope to decide on certain local issues. Local governments 
have their own financial responsibility, too, which means that they have the 
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right to acquire financial resources by imposing local taxes and having other 
income, such as business-like activities, privatization, etc. 
The central government encourages local governments to learn alternative 
ways of providing local public services in this system. This means involving 
the civil and the business sectors into the provision of local public services 
and the establishment of an interactive relationship with them. The emphasis is 
laid on management principles in the decentralized model, which implies the 
requirement of efficiency in the provision of local public services. 
Economic efficiency should be achieved when public services are managed 
by local governments. Managers of local governments are accountable to the 
citizens as taxpayers to efficiently use public money. Local governments are 
often expected to cut their budget and staff in order to decrease local taxes to 
be paid for local public services. Citizens, self-organizing bodies have a strong 
incentive to participate in the decision-making process of local governments. 
Taxpayers are regarded as customers and local public services as goods. 
Local governments are expected to provide local public services at the lowest 
price and the best quality. Customer choice should also be assured by providing 
differentiated services. General availability of the services has less importance 
than in the delegated model, but the emphasis is on customer satisfaction.4 
Local public services are typically organized by local governments, and 
provided by business firms, non-profi t or charitable organizations. Market 
principles, such as competition, invitation of public tenders, market prices, 
profit-oriented firms, etc. are often used in the decentralized model. Local 
governments operating in this system are minimally regulated by laws, which 
specify exactly how and in what manner local public services ought to be 
provided. Although, public policy has high expectations of local governments 
to find the best way for meeting the requirements of citizens. 
1.3. Public Policy in the Post Communist Countries 
1.3.1. Changes of Local Public Services 
The Communist states aimed to equally care about the needs of citizens, regardless 
of their contributions. This is called the "paternalist" philosophy of the communist 
state. During the Communist era, public services in Eastern European countries 
served as part of the wealth redistribution system of the state controlled 
Osborn, D.—Gaebler, T.: Reinventing Government. How the Entrepreneurial Spirit 
is Transforming the Public Sector. Budapest, 1994. 
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economy. The Communist state ensured the welfare of citizens by dictating h o w 
certain goods and services were to be provided to the general population. 
Not only were welfare services provided f ree of charge, but below-market 
prices for goods such as foods, flats, and utility services were also established 
and subsidized by the central government. 
Communist budgets served the interest of production more directly than 
the interest of welfare. For example, they of ten subsidized loss-making state-
owned enterprises. Until the 1960s the so-called "bureaucratic redistribution'''10  
based on a macro-economic plan meant that markets existed only on the 
periphery of the economy. Central planning, state investments, and bureaucratic 
allocations prevailed. Starting in the 1960s, however, market allocations gained 
precedence. 
When that system disintegrated after the transition in 1990, a small portion 
of the society became wealthy, but most became increasingly poorer. This 
special market produced a n e w entrepreneurial class that has obtained great 
wealth and a political elite that has achieved great power. The interests of 
these two elites are often able to suppress what remains of the bureaucratic 
state redistribution system. 
Recently, groups whose incomes were provided historically by the state 
bureaucracy have found themselves at t remendous economic disadvantage. 
The guarantee of low incomes and subsidized basic goods and services, such 
as food, homes, utilities and health care under communism have disappeared. 
With the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the creation of open 
market institutions in the post-Communist era, a "grey economy" prevails and 
the state budget is under great pressure. 
In post-Communist economies there is a pronounced pattern among the 
entrepreneurial class of successfully avoiding the payment of taxes and social 
insurance. As a result, the state budget is further depressed. T h e reaction of the 
government is to further increase fees and taxes, which, ironically, even more 
encourage people to avoid paying them. 
The political elite and "newly rich" argue that costs of certain public services 
shouldered by the state in the former Communist regimes are far beyond the 
s ta te ' s ability to pay for them. In many Eastern European countries since the 
collapse of communism there has been tangible movement toward the with-
drawal of the state from public services. 
10
 Kornai, J.: A hiány (The Shortage). Budapest, 1982. 
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But this withdrawal of ten occurs without either well-defined political 
concepts or elaborated theories. The post-communist countries are often called 
as "premature welfare states" 11 
Although laws in the post-Communist countries still emphasize the state 's 
responsibil i ty, this tendency by the state to withdraw f r o m public services 
is increasing. Moreover, with constitutional and administrative regulations 
emphasizing that the state has a high-level of responsibility to support certain 
public services, how can the withdrawal of political support and fund ing for 
public services be justified f rom a legal standpoint? 
A main purpose of this study is to shed light on whether changes in the 
provision of public services since the transition are more heavily influenced by 
American or Western European traditions. 
1.3.2. Local Governments during the Transition 
Territorial governments in the communist regime were established on the so-
called "democratic central ism" of the soviet model.12 Th is system was neither 
democratic, nor did it represent real local interests. 
Territorial governments were put under dual subordination: subordination 
to higher territorial governments and their own elected council.. Election of 
the members of the council was formal, due to the lack of competing candidates. 
The Communist political party nominated the members of the council and 
appointed the executive board or the administrative apparatus. Hegemony of 
the communist party prevailed in the affairs of territorial governments. 
Issues of territorial governments were heavily regulated by central laws, or 
decided by central public authorities. Territorial governments did not have the 
right to decide about local matters, but were obligated to implement central 
tasks. Instead, decentralization, which means a devolution of functions of state 
to autonomous territorial governments, and déconcentration were widespread. 
This latter terminology implies shifting governmental functions to the local 
level within the hierarchical system of state bureaucracy. 
Structure of territorial governments were based on sectorial administrative 
means. Local tasks were performed by the enterprises owned and closely 
controlled by the territorial governments. Territorial governments were 
administered by the executive board of the higher territorial government, the 
last resort in the sectorial ministry. 
" Kornai, J.: Az egészségügy reformjáról (Reform of Health Care). Budapest, 1988. 
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 Illner, M.: op. cit. 7-42. 
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Local finances were a part of the state budget, in a restricted finance system. 
Territorial governments did not own property, but merely handled state-owned 
assets. 
The bureaucratic system of vertical subordination in territorial government 
degenerated into a system of networking where personal political relationships 
played an important role. In other words, contributions to local services were 
negotiated informally between the territorial governments and high level political 
administrators. 
Autonomous local government systems were established in the Post-
communist countries at the beginning of the transition, due to a high expectation 
of the public toward democracy and localism. In this system local governments are 
required to organize local public services in their own scope. Local governments 
are the local political power with the right to decide in local matters. 
However, a tendency toward maintaining some degree of centralism or even 
one toward centralization can be observed. Central governments intend to 
maintain their control over territorial political and economic development. A 
question is, whether constitutional and other legal regulations can give a 
guarantee to the decentralized power of local governments. 
2. Privatization Issues 
2.1. Privatization Conceptions 
2.1.1. Conservative Way for Privatization 
Conservative theories for privatization hold that local governments began 
shouldering more public services than they could effectively manage.13 In this 
view the principle of free choice is violated, because services are provided by 
local governments and not the marketplace. 
This privatization theory maintains that only market values, such as competi-
tion, profit-orientation, private participation, etc. can enforce economic efficiency. 
Another public interest, i.e. customer-oriented public services can be better 
served, too, when public services are put under market-based operation. 
13
 Savas, E. S.: Privatization-the Key to a Better Government. London, 1987. 47 -49 . 
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This theory holds that local governments should provide better quality 
public services from decreased taxes. High redistribution is thought to be unjust. 
Free choice and efficiency due to competition reduce costs. 
Privatization is thought to be able to be implemented only if the tasks of 
local governments are in fact decreased. 
To achieve these goals, local governments should cut their budget by 
withdrawing from public services and encourage business firms to provide them. 
When competition is established, and monopoly positions are diminished in the 
market of public services, competition supervision, price regulation and quality 
control of local governments will not be needed. This results in a cost reduction 
in the budget of local governments. 
When privatizing public services, local governments should establish a 
new relationship, the so-called "public-private partnership" with the business 
sector. That implies an interactive relationship for cooperation, in which local 
governments hold responsibility for the provision of public services, while 
utilizing the initiative and creativity of private firms. Local governments will 
be responsible directly to the customers, when public services are subject to 
market principles. 
This style of privatization may not mean transferring public services entirely 
to the private sector. Instead it results in shifting to a so-called "regulated market" 
where local governments, as organizers, can assign the operation of services to 
private enterprises, as providers. In other words, the public services market is 
under the oversight of local governments, so that the accountability of local 
governments can be maintained. 
The general opinion in the US is that local governments shouldering the 
provision of public services is an unfavourable political decision. With few 
exceptions, services can be provided by business firms in a competitive environ-
ment. When a fee for the services can be charged, privatization is avoidable. 
Only payment for the services can assure rational consumption. There are tax-
based services, such as public lighting for which a fee cannot be charged. 
Opportunities for privatizing these services are more limited, but are possible 
by contracting out. 
If most public services are provided under market conditions, the poor are 
excluded f rom their consumption. However, social welfare issues cannot be a 
reason why local governments should provide free of charge or low price services. 
Social welfare policy can be executed by other means, such as subsidies, social 
aids, vouchers, or charity, etc. 
US social policy never intended to provide more than a few governmentally 
administered welfare programs. This is in line with the belief of many that 
poverty is in many ways the fault of the individual, not the result of social 
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inequality. The Constitution acknowledges the political, not social or welfare 
rights of citizens. With few exceptions, local governments are not bound by 
law to provide welfare services. 
2.1.2. Left Wing Privatization Policies 
As opposed to conservative theories, left wing policies for privatization consider 
that local governments must assure the public interest, by meeting not only 
requirements of quality and continuity, but the general availability of public 
services, as well. Local governments are a type of public authority based on 
hierarchy in the government system, for their operation is inconsistent with 
entrepreneurial principles. Besides, local governments are closely connected 
with politics, and less dependent on customer decisions. 
Local governments have to shoulder the provision of those public services, 
too, that are not profitable. In most public services, for example, non-compe-
tition is unavoidable. For example, institutions for the homeless people, or public 
lighting cannot be easily shifted to a competitive environment or per formed on 
a fee basis. Local governments must exercise control over quality and costs. 
In Continental Europe, public interest is the reason cited for the state's 
responsibility to shoulder welfare programs. Social rights are mandated in 
many national constitutions, and European Union treaties. Under public law, 
welfare belongs to the public sector. It aims to assist the poor. 
In contrast to US conservative theories, left wing policy claims that there is 
justice in providing welfare services because these services are based on fair 
redistribution. Application of business principles in welfare services is inconsistent 
with solidarity. To this way of thinking, freedom means recognition of social 
citizenship, including the rights of individuals to be protected from inequality 
brought about by the market. 
2.2. Privatization Means 
2.2.1. Spontaneous Privatization 
Spontaneous privatization takes place, when local governments entirely withdraw 
from the provision of certain services. The withdrawal of local governments 
gives way for business enterprises and charitable organizations to provide these 
services. Local governments may encourage citizens' voluntary organizations to 
provide public services, or individuals to manage the services on their own. 
This way to privatization is supported by conservative theories, rather than by 
left wing policies. 
470 MÁRIA B O R D Á S 
2.2.2. Dissolving State/Local Government Monopolies 
In conservative theories privatization is completed when competition is estab-
lished in the area of a former monopoly. Business firms are considered to 
provide the best quality service at the lowest price, due to the profit motive. 
Profit orientation can allocate financial resources in the most effective way. 
When competition cannot be established and profit-oriented firms cannot 
be employed, competition can be imitated in the following way: 
- Some local public services, such as drinking water supply, for example, 
are natural monopolies, where competition would contradict economic 
rationality. Public tender is invited by local governments in these cases. 
The right for the operation of the local public service will be awarded to 
that applicant giving the best offer: lowest price and best quality. Inviting 
public tender can assure equal opportunities and hinders corruption. 
- When a market-based fee cannot be charged for a particular service (as 
is the case for services for drug addicts, or maintenance of public roads) 
local governments have to subsidize the provider of the service. The 
price of the service is regulated by local governments, or stipulated in 
the contract made between the local government and the provider. The 
regulated or contracted price should guarantee reasonable profit and 
prevent monopoly pricing. 
2.2.3. Non-profit Enterprises 
Local governments often assist non-profit enterprises in providing public 
services for several reasons. Non-profit enterprises are encouraged to provide 
public services, when privatization policy holds welfare as inconsistent with 
business-like activity. Many Americans consider non-profit organizations to 
be more reliable than for-profit businesses, especially when customers cannot 
judge and choose the quality of services. Consumers of non-profit services can 
benefit from qualities such as flexibility, autonomy, customer-oriented services 
and satisfaction of special needs. 
2.2.4. Application of Contracts 
Local public services can be contracted out, as a way of establishing public-
private partnerships. Local governments entitle private enterprises to operate 
those public services which were previously local government monopolies in 
franchise or concession contracts. Contracting parties stipulate the most important 
conditions of the provision of the local publ ic services, such as quality 
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requirements, continuity, general availability of the services, supervision by 
the local government, termination, compensation, duration, etc. 
Contracts are used for keeping local government supervision over the 
privatized service, so that interests of the public may be maintained. In s o m e 
cases local governments tend to have the majori ty of the business shares in the 
business firm to which the right to provide the service has been awarded. In 
law-governed administrative systems laws often regulate privatization conditions 
as obligatory elements of the contracts for the local governments. 
2.2.5. Regulated Market 
Health care is a special field of local public services in terms of having three 
members in its provision. Finances of health services are based on insurance 
principles everywhere. Insurance can be private (as is the case in the US, or 
the additional insurance in the publicly f inanced systems) or public (as is the 
case in the national health insurance or the state budget systems). 
According to the American practice, health services are one of the mos t 
marketable services. Even in this business oriented health system, health services 
are not provided entirely under market principles. Social welfare issues, or 
other market failures, such as externalities: epidemic, lack of insurance, are to 
be avoided by regulations. 
For this reason, the governments provide f ree health services for the poor 
and elderly. The poor cannot afford to pay the market price for health insurance. 
The elderly should pay expensive health insurance, because they constitute a 
high risk and cost for the business-oriented insurance companies. Some heal th 
services, such as vaccination, are obligatory when epidemic needs to be avoided. 
State intervention is applied to health care in order to solve market fai lures. 
However, state regulations in the market of health care can occur in many ways. 
In the US, health care providers are obliged by law to provide free heal th 
services for poor and elderly people. The price of these free health services is 
regulated and paid by the government. This government intervention represents 
welfare issues. Any national health insurance system based on citizens' mandatory 
contribution would limit customer choice and increase taxes. 
Health services in Europe are local publ ic services, but financed by a 
national insurance-based system. Economic eff iciency is also a most important 
issue of the privatization here. Several variations of market mechanisms vs. 
state regulations can be developed as a result of privatization. 
However, the privatization of health care is unlikely to alter the publ ic 
finance systems in Europe. This is because central and local governments have 
to respect health services as a universal constitutional right when organizing 
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health care. Solidarity as a public interest which privatization policies have to 
observe implies that health services should be generally available for all citizens. 
Mandatory contribution of citizens to health care should be retained. 
Opportunities for privatization are limited in European health care. A regulated 
market can be established in the three segments of health care: regulation, finance 
and service. 
Competit ion can be established be tween health providers for acquir ing 
financial resources from the national heal th insurance. Insurance companies 
purchase health services of providers on the basis of the quality of the services. 
Both health providers and health insurance companies compete for clients, which 
certainly resul ts in a better quality of health services. 
Health care providers may operate in the form of privately-owned business 
associations or non-profit organizations. Without the direct control of local 
governments, health care providers can make more rational economic decisions. 
Prices of health services are often regulated in the public finance systems, 
due to the requirement of global cost containment. Prices of health services are 
based on complex incentives in order for health care providers to be able to 
provide health services of the best quality and most efficiency. 
2.3. Privatization Tendencies in the Post-Communist Countries 
Reflecting the policy of developed Western countries, former political elites in 
post- Communist countries have attempted to develop a so-called "premature 
welfare state" theory. The communist government promised much more welfare 
than it was capable of realizing. Welfare kept at the level of early communist 
states was unrealistic in the 1990s. 
This circumstance gave impetus to the political elite to withdraw from 
public services. However, the "premature welfare state" theory misinterprets 
"non-intervention" of privatization policies. Non-intervention does not mean 
the radical withdrawal of the state from publ ic services. 
Some post-Communist authorities have attempted to decentralize and privatize 
public services in order to modernize the system. Welfare services are in-
sufficiently provided by local governments. But replacement of state-welfare 
services by so-called self-organizing institutions has not taken place: instead, 
serious deterioration of welfare has occurred. Welfare privatization in the post-
Communist countries has been fairly limited. The civil sector is not suff iciently 
developed to al low the state to withdraw f r o m providing welfare services. 
Due to a lack of state funding, some wel fa re services have been shif ted to 
business f i rms . Market conditions have been created, but there are relatively 
few private initiatives in the field of welfare , since the majority of cit izens do 
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not earn enough to pay for them. In the wake of transition, social policy depending 
on privatization is not an attractive prospective for the near future. 
During the communist era, infrastructural local services operated under 
strict administrative supervision in the form of state-owned enterprises. The 
prices of services were low or free of charge, due to the "paternalist" philosophy of 
the communist state. Profitability was not an issue in the system, because the 
state subsidized the losses of its state enterprises. 
Some of the infrastructural local services were put under market-based 
operation as a result of privatization. Supervision of local governments over 
the privatized service should be maintained. There is a conflict between the 
profit interest of the private firm and the public interest of local governments. 
Public interest is identified as good quality, low price, the continuity and 
availability of services. The interest of the private firm is to achieve the highest 
possible profit. 
When public service providers are in a monopoly position, they are also in 
a position to increase the price of services, while decreasing their quali ty. 
Abuse of the monopoly position can be controlled by competition, the super-
vision of which is exercised by a central administrative authority. In the absence 
of competition supervision, local governments should regulate prices and control 
the quality of services. Local governments, however, do not have sufficient 
management skills to balance between public and private interests. 
When privatizing infrastructural local services, local governments have to 
impose new local taxes, or increase the price of services, so that the profitability 
of the business enterprise is ensured. Citizens are in most cases unwilling to pay 
more for better-quality service. Local governments are more interested in main-
taining the status quo, i.e. local public services at low price and bad quality, than 
in managing political tensions caused by higher taxes or prices. 
As a result, the privatization of local infrastructural services is insufficient 
in post-communist countries, due to the lack of management skills and funds . 
Most of local infrastructural services are still insufficiently provided by local 
government-owned enterprises. 
3. The Hungarian Case 
3.1. Questions of Autonomy in the Legal Regulations 
The first issue to be explored if local governments have autonomy in the legal 
regulations to organize local public services. 
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Optional local public services 
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments determines local public services that 
municipal local governments provide. They are as follows: 
settlement development and management, environmental protection, housing, 
canalization, maintenance of cemeteries, local public roads and public places, 
local public transportation, public sanitation, fire protection, public safety, energy 
supply, employment management , primary education, health care, welfare 
services, children and youth care, public education, sport, public health. 
It is up to municipal local governments if they shoulder the aforementioned 
tasks or not, and if so, how and in what manner . Municipal local governments 
should respect local needs and take their financial possibilities into account, 
when making decisions on the provision of local public services. 
Compulsory local public services 
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments identifies compulsory local public 
services as fol lows: drinking water supply, primary education, primary health 
care, primary welfare services, public lighting, maintenance of cemeteries, local 
public roads 
Municipal local governments are obliged by Act L X V of 1990 on Local 
Governments to provide the aforementioned services. However , this act does 
not say how and in what manner . It is left to the discretion of municipal local 
governments, unless another act regulates the provision of these services. 
However, each of these compulsory local public services is regulated by secto-
rial acts. Sectorial acts regulate in detail the quality and fees of the service, 
applied contracts, supervision of the provider, etc. 
Moreover, Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments entitles acts to determine 
other compulsory local public services. Only a few local public services, such 
as public sanitation, can be mentioned, when another act other than Act LXV 
of 1990 on Local Governments obliges municipal local governments to provide 
a local public service. 
The extent of the sett lement, its population and other specifics should be 
taken into account when a local public service is declared compulsory. In other 
words, local governments are equal when exercising rights, but differentiated 
when laws determine obligations for them. 
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments obliges the county local govern-
ments to provide local public services, when municipal local governments are 
not obliged by laws, or are unwilling to provide them. Municipal and county 
local governments should make an agreement regarding which one of them 
will provide local public services. 
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Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments lists compulsory local public 
services for the county local governments as follows: secondary education, 
public education, sport, child care, sport, secondary health care, secondary 
welfare services, environmental protection, employment management. 
Conclusions 
The conclusion based on the relevant legal regulations can be made regarding 
the autonomy of local governments that local governments have little freedom 
to choose which local public services to provide. 
Local public services to be provided by local governments are listed by 
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments or other acts. Almost all of them are 
declared compulsory. Some of them are compulsory for municipal governments, 
and others are subject to agreement between municipal and county governments, 
as to which one will provide them. 
Local governments have more freedom to decide how and in what manner 
they provide local public services. The minimum quality and types of some 
local public services, such as health care, child care, welfare services, drinking 
water supply, education, are heavily regulated by sectorial acts. Other local 
public services are typically not strictly regulated by laws, or if so, it is 
optional for local governments whether they follow these rules, or not. 
3.2. Constitutional Protection for Local Government Rights 
Constitutional rights of local governments relevant on the provision of local 
public services are as follows: 
- Right to make decisions in regulation and management. Local governments 
have the right to pass decrees and resolutions in local government affairs. 
Their decisions can be supervised only regarding legality. 
- Right to exercise property rights, such as pursuing business-like activities, 
discretion in using income, selling, buying, leasing their own property, etc. 
- Right to have financial resources proportional to tasks. Local govern-
ments have the right to impose local taxes, and receive state subsidies. 
- Right to form organization and operation of local governments. 
- Right to association with other local governments. 
The Constitution entitles the Parliament to detail the aforementioned rights in 
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments. The main rights of local governments 
for providing local services are: 
- Offering to provide voluntary local public services, if they are not declared 
by law as the responsibility of some other public authority. 
- Cooperating with the civil sector in performing local tasks. 
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- Establishing local government institutions, business associations, and 
nonprofit organizations to provide local public services. The director of the 
organization shall be appointed by the local government. 
The legal method for enforcing the constitutional rights of local govern-
ments is that the Constitution prohibits the Parliament f rom violating those 
rights listed in the Constitution and Act L X V of 1990 on Local Government 
when passing acts . 
As mentioned earlier, sectorial acts of ten regulate in minute detail how 
local public services should be provided. When these acts determine quality, 
technical, and other requirements, the withdrawal of the right to make decisions 
by the local governments does not arise. 
Violation of autonomy is more problematic, when an act regulates privati-
zation issues. T h e local governments exercise all the rights to make decisions, 
when establishing a local governmental institution to provide local public 
services, appoint and recall its director, finance and closely control its activities. 
When privatization happens, the connection between local governments and 
providers necessarily becomes loose. 
This is because privatization, as a way of modernization, contradicts the 
traditional bureaucratic administrative means. Market principles, such as compe-
tition, business-like activity, incentive, etc. cannot be manifested in the operation 
of the local government institutions. Local governments are expected to establish 
a new relationship with the business and civil sectors when privatizing local 
public services, too. 
If local governments exercised all the rights of decision making in the 
provision of publ ic services, the implementation of privatization would be 
impossible. For this reason, the central government tends to keep the rights to 
vindicate its preferences when regulating privatization issues by acts. 
Central governments in most cases cannot give up control of the privati-
zation processes of local governments, because the Constitution makes the 
central government responsible for certain local public services. This is the 
case when the Constitution regulates the right to health and welfare as constitu-
tional rights, and obligates the central government to guarantee these rights for 
the citizens through organizing the health care system, national insurance and 
institutions as a safety net. 
When the central government decentralizes certain public services to the 
local level, it does not mean that it can totally give up accountability for these 
services. Control over local public services by the central government can 
occur only by legal regulations. The tendency of the central government to 
influence local matters through legal regulations is closely related to the 
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centralized and law-governed character of the Continental European public 
administration, as well. 
Constitutional rights of local governments can be violated by an act on 
privatizing local public services in two ways: 
The act withdraws the right to decision-making from the local governments 
A privatization act often determines the legal form, i.e. business association, 
not-for-profit company, etc., of the local public services provider, based on the 
preferences of the central government. It may be thought, for example, that 
economic efficiency of certain local public services can be assured only in the 
operation of a profit-oriented company. Or, on the contrary, only a not-for-
profit nature of the local public service provider can guarantee welfare issues. 
Conditions of the privatization contract to be made between the local govern-
ment and the local service provider can be regulated by acts, too. Contracts are 
an important applied privatization means, which give the opportunity for the 
local government to keep supervision over the privatized service. Central legal 
regulations often establish obligatory elements, such as the fees for services, 
general availability, exclusive rights of operation in a given area, procedure 
for public tenders, etc. to be stipulated by the contracted parties. 
The right to operate local public services is in most cases a monopoly of 
the local government, which can be exercised by a private firm only by 
concession or license. Getting the right to operate may be the condition for 
acquiring state financial resources. To choose the private firm to be awarded is 
evidently left to the discretion of the local government, although the central 
government may establish incompatibility in the activity of the private firm: 
e.g. the pharmaceutical industry cannot buy business shares in hospitals. 
The act violates the right to property of the local governments 
When local public services are privatized, the property of the local government 
has less relevance, because the emphasis is on awarding the right for the operation 
to the private firm. Local public services are generally not connected to public 
property of high value, like the energy supply, telecommunications or the high-
ways, for example, so sale of the publicly-owned property less frequently occurs. 
Health care, water supply and housing may be mentioned as exceptions. 
The privatization policy of the central government may aim to decrease 
private property in the field of a local public service, e.g. sell the local-govern-
ment owned flats to the tenants. It is possible that the central government intends 
to establish favorable conditions for the purchasers, e.g. low interest credits in 
long term or low price for doctors to buy business shares in health institutions. 
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Local governments may be required by government policy to lease the building 
free of charge, where the local public service is provided. 
The acts on finance affairs do not assure sufficient financial resources for the 
local governments to provide local public services 
The act on the annual state budget may decrease general or targeted grants to 
be generated for local governments. In many cases, local public services are 
financed partly by the state budget, or the national insurance, and partly by 
local governments. Local governments are often not entitled by acts, either, to 
impose local tax sufficient to finance local public services. 
Acts on privatization passed by the central government were in some cases 
challenged before the Constitutional Court, referring to the violation of the 
rights of local governments. The Constitutional Court has to balance its decision 
on the basis of rationality between two interests: the autonomy of the local govern-
ments and the influence of the central government to perform certain reforms. 
The Constitutional Court stated in its decisions that the autonomy of local 
governments is not absolute and unlimited. Acts passed by the Parliament 
cannot withdraw local government rights or limit them in a manner so that 
they lose their inherent meaning. This means the legal provisions protecting 
the autonomy of local governments f rom the central government. 
A local government right is not only manifested in the single right to 
decision-making. Instead, it entails a complex array of points, including the right 
to make decisions. When some of the decision-making rights are withdrawn, 
but the local governments have enough leeway remaining to make decisions 
that hold responsibility contingent on the performance of their tasks, the 
constitutional rights of local governments are not violated. The Constitution 
Court should case by case consider if right to decision of local governments is 
in fact violated. 
Local governments ' right to property may be limited if it is related to an 
important local public service. The public policy of the central government to 
improve local public services is an important public interest serving as a base 
for the limitation of the right to property. However, the act can not oblige the 
local government to sell its property, because that would mean an entire 
withdrawal of the right. When property rights are limited, local governments 
should receive compensation in proportion to the limitation. 
The Constitutional Court states in its decisions that it is up to the discretion 
of the central government to establish a finance system for the local govern-
ments, provided it is in the form of Parliamentary act. If ministries or other 
public authorities, such as the national insurance, decide case by case about 
the grants to be generated for local public services, the autonomy of the local 
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governments is violated. This is, however, a formal, not a content, requirement 
for the legislation. 
It is vague to judge from a legal point of view if the funds available for local 
governments are sufficient to finance local public services. It seems to be the 
constant interpretation of the Constitutional Court that it should be up to the 
financial possibilities of the state budget to determine in which manner local 
public services will be financed by the state. Along this line, the Constitutional 
Court made the conclusion, too, that it is a professional, rather than a legal 
issue, that what kind of finance system is created by the state to subsidize local 
public services. 
Only in extreme cases do finance affairs become constitutional issues: if 
local public services cease to exist, due to insufficient financial resources. 
Regardless of the insufficient finances issue, local governments remain re-
sponsible for the provision of local public services. It is involved in the 
interpretation of the Constitutional Court, that decreasing grants to be generated 
for local public services by the state budget does not mean the violation of the 
right to sufficient fund of the local governments. 
Conclusions 
There is a tendency by the legislation to centralize local issues by passing 
privatization acts that withdraw local governments ' rights. Local governments 
try to keep their autonomy from the central government when acts violate their 
rights. The Constitutional Court tends to protect the rights of local govern-
ments on decisions and property in its interpretation, but much less readily 
admits their right to sufficient income to provide local public services. 
As a result, the central government is not legally liable to decrease the 
funds to be generated for the carrying-out of local tasks. Local governments 
have relative freedom to decide how they organize local public services. There 
is a tangible tension between the central and local governments due to the 
efforts of the central government to implement its preferences by urging 
reforms in the field of local public services. Financial resources for local tasks, 
however, are more and more in short supply. 
3.3. Financial Autonomy of Local Governments to Provide Local Public 
Services 
Three issues of financing local public services should be answered: 
- Whether local governments are autonomous in their financial decisions 
when managing local public services. To judge this requirement, the 
proportion of local governments' own revenues against their entire revenues 
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should be compared. Local taxes in the own revenues are also important to 
consider. The proportion between normative versus special grants is not 
randomly established. 
- Whether local governments possess sufficient funds to provide a wide range 
of local public services dictated by local needs. This is a complex issue, 
which needs to take into account not only local governments' share in GDP, 
or the characteristic proportion of local government revenues, but the level of 
decentralization and local tasks, as well. Whether local governments depend 
too much on the state budget, which can decrease grants needs to be 
considered. 
- Whether the finance system assures efficiency and good quality of local 
public services. Finance systems should be based on incentives. For 
example, if the local government system is fragmented, or finance is targeted 
at differentiated tasks, funds cannot be used efficiently (spill over effects) 
The promotion of market principles, such as competition, the involvement of 
the business and civil sectors is the best way to assure high quality service. 
3.3.1. Rights to Economic and Financial Autonomy 
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments declares that local governments shall 
provide local public services. In order to manage them, local governments: 
- Dispose their own property, administer their budgetary revenues and 
expenditures. They are entitled to independently manage their own eco-
nomic administration in the framework of finance laws. 
- May choose how they maintain their own budgetary organization (local 
government institutions) support private entities (business associations, 
non-profit organizations) purchase services by any other means. 
- Have the right to their own revenues, shared taxes and support from the 
state budget . The budget of the local governments is part of the public 
finances. In other words, this budget is distinct from the state budget, but is 
linked to state subsidies and other budgetary ties. 
On the basis of the provisions of the Act, local governments are fairly free 
to administer their economic activity and choose ways of providing local 
public services. 
The question is whether local governments have real financial autonomy in 
the current publ ic finances to provide sufficient local public services set by 
laws and local needs. 
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3.3.2. Assets of Local Governments 
State-owned assets of local public services, such as some of the utilities, health 
care and welfare institutions, schools, etc. were transferred to local govern-
ments at the beginning of the 1990s. The assets of local governments may be 
real estates and financial assets (shares). 
Assets related to local public services are primary assets of local govern-
ments. Some of the primary assets, such as local roads, public parks and squares, 
are completely unsalable. Partially salable assets are the utilities, public 
buildings, and local government institutions. 
The selling of negotiable assets of local governments or providing them as 
contributions in cash to business associations may be limited by local govern-
mental decrees. Otherwise local governments have the right to exercise property 
rights, similarly to private persons. 
3.3.3. Own Revenues 
Local governments have the right: 
- To pursue business-like activities with their assets and can have profits, 
dividends, interests and leasing fees deriving from this. However, business-
like activities may not jeopardize the provision of local public services. 
The accountability of local governments in business associations may not 
exceed their contribution in cash. Local governments may raise loans and 
issue bonds, too. 
These afore mentioned capital revenues have increased from 4% to 16% in 
the total local budget during the last 10 years. 
- To levy their own taxes, fees, and environmental fines. Local governments 
are empowered to decide which types of local taxes to levy in the frame-
work of available local taxes regulated by Act С of 1990 on Local Taxes. 
Rates of local taxes can be determined within legal limits. These revenues 
have increased from 16% to 24% in the total local budget, due to the 
increase of local taxes. 
- To have shared revenues with the state, including shares from individual 
income and vehicle tax. The percentage of shared revenues has not changed. 
3.3.4. Grants from the State Budget 
- Normative grants form the major part (70%) of all subsidies from the state 
budget. The annual act on state budget fixes the amount of nonnative grants 
each year. The allocation of nonnative grants is based on need-based (local 
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unit expenditure) and per capita-based (number of inhabitants and defined 
age cohorts) measures. 
Normative grants, however, are not based on actual costs, in terms of 
contributing just a part of the actual costs. One type of the normative (population-
based) grants may be allocated to any local public service, such as the 
maintenance of health institutions, communal services, etc. The other type of 
normative (per capita based) grants may be allocated only for specified purposes, 
such as each social welfare service and educational institution. 
- Targeted and addressed grants are specified by Act LXXXIX of 1992 on 
Targeted and Addressed Grants. Targeted grants are established for 
important public goals, such as solid waste disposal, or medical instruments, 
for example, and will be given if the applicant local governments meet the 
conditions. 
Addressed grants are discretionary and support specific investments with high 
capital intensity, such as the reconstruction of hospitals. 
- Poorer and less developed local governments with unbalanced budgets 
resulting f rom external factors receive special state grants. 
The normative and specific grants have decreased from 50% to 30% of the 
total local budget, due to the decrease of normative grants. This decrease is from 
20% to 13% in the state budget. 
3.3.5. Transfers from other Public Authorities 
Funds are obtained through transfers from other public organizations, i.e. National 
Health Insurance, for the management of health services. Reform conceptions 
in Hungary agreed that solidarity in health care should be maintained. In other 
words, health services should be available for all citizens and contribution to 
health care should be proportional to their income, while health care provision 
is equal, regardless of contribution. 
To achieve this goal of solidarity, instead of the former state budget system, 
national health insurance was established.14 The national health insurance fund 
is formally independent of the state budget, but in fact the act on the annual 
state budget determines its sub-areas, such as medicine, primary, secondary 
health services, preventive healthcare, etc. The state budget subsidizes the national 
health insurance fund, too, when it makes a loss. 
14
 National Health Insurance is preferred in the Continental Europe. This is because it 
is clearer for the customers how their contributions will be spent on health care, if the 
national health insurance is separated from the state budget, than if it is up to day-to-day 
political decisions as to how health care will be financed from the state budget. 
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Health care providers are under dual finance in the current finance system: 
Their maintenance is financed by local governments, whereas their services by 
the National Health Insurance Fund. Local governments are obligated to provide 
buildings free of charge to health care providers, even if the health care providers 
are privatized. Local governments receive population-based normative grants 
f rom the state budget for the maintenance of health institutions. Addressed and 
targeted grants are also available for this aim. 
Conclusions 
Conclusions that can be drawn f rom the financial autonomy of local govern-
ments to provide sufficient local public services are as follows: financial 
autonomy is much less assured in the current finance system than where the 
decentralization of local public services is determined by legal regulations. 
- Normative grants dramatically (by 40%) decreased, although capital 
revenues increased by 400%, and local taxes have become more important. 
(150% increase) These latter increases of own revenues compensated for 
the decrease in normative grants. 
- Local governments are still fairly dependent on the state budget. The 
percentage of grants of the state budget in the total local budget is still high 
(30%). Furthermore, the state has an unlimited right to decrease it year by 
year in the annual state budget. Measures of normative grants are not 
differentially calculated and are not adjusted to the real local needs. 
- The percentage of local taxes is still low (9%) in the revenues of local 
governments. Fees for local services are not typical, (1,5% at present) 
due to the paternalist traditions of the communist era. Increasing capital 
revenues (15% at present) is not supported by public policies, since it is 
local governments that are considered to have the responsibility to serve as 
public authorities rather than entrepreneurs. 
- 50% of state grants are targeted and addressed grants. Normative grants 
are based on types of local tasks, too. This does not give local govern-
ments freedom to decide on how and in what manner they manage local 
tasks. The principle of "one service-one provider" is the rule: finance is 
based on the type of services, which does not encourage the establish-
ment of providers providing complex services. 
- The efficient allocation of funds by local governments to manage local 
public services is not an issue in the current finance system. Using 
business principles as a way towards efficient local public services is 
not supported. Collecting fees for local services, especially for welfare 
services, which could assure reasonable consumption, is not accepted 
by the public. 
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Unions of local governments, which could compensate the fragmented local 
government system in the provision of local public services, is not promoted 
by the finance system, either. 
Health care is the only local public service where the lack of efficiency and 
quality of the services has been the most apparent and has led to serious 
political tensions, such as demonstrations, a main subject of elections, etc. 
Although the public finance of health care in the GDP has decreased only by 
1% of the GDP (from 5,9% to 4,9%) during the last 10 years, citizens experience 
a dramatically worsened quality of services. '5 Health care is considered under-
financed and wasteful at the same time. 
3.4. Problems of Regionalism and Fragmentation 
Regionalism has not developed in the Hungarian public administration yet, but 
the local government system still operates in the traditional structure. This local 
government system is considered fragmented in terms of being insufficient 
when local public services are provided. 
Attempts at reforming the local government structure have been so unsuccess-
ful, because the local government act can only be amended by an act adopted 
by the qualified majority vote of parliament, for which a consensus between 
the government and opposition parties has not even once been created. 
In 2006 a government decree referred public administration offices to the 
county level, altering their classification as county capital. In 2007 though that 
government decree was annulled by the Constitutional Court. 
European Union directives, however, require the creation of the regional 
level between the central and territorial ones. The region is not only a public 
administration unit, but also a new territorial unit of economic development. 
European Union grants are often bound to region development. 
In the Hungarian public administration system - without the emergence of 
a constitutional problem, only units on the regional level, such as e.g. region 
development councils could be created which were not local government 
bodies, i.e, were not delegated a public authority's scope of responsibility and 
are not local representation bodies. 
18
 The total costs of health care (public and private finance) decreased only by 0,7% 
due to the increase of private distribution (0,5%), such as under-the-table money, medicines, 
private clinics, etc. Citizens increasingly have to contribute to their health care from their 
private resources. The percentage of both the public finance and the total costs in the 
GDP is very low compared to OECD countries. 
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In the present local government system in past years, two new public 
administration entities have emerged: the small region and the district centre. 
These two public administration entities are not regulated by a unified law, 
furthermore even an amendment of the local government act has not occurred, 
only certain sectorial acts confer public authority responsibilities onto this level. 
In these cases acts also stipulate, with a taxative enumeration of municipalities 
what territories small regions or district centres extend to. 
Municipalities operate in each settlement, such as villages, towns, cities, 
and in the counties and the capital of Hungary. The local governments of 
counties and the capital serve as superior administrative authorities to decide 
administrative cases, when administrative decisions from the first level are 
appealed. 
Local governments of the counties and the capital have their own tasks to 
provide local public services, too. This is the case when the local public service 
requires special professional specifications, such as hospitals and secondary 
schools, for example. The local governments of the counties and the capital 
are obligated by the act to provide certain local public services, when local 
governments of smaller villages or towns do not provide or are not capable of 
providing them. 
This system is not sufficient when dividing tasks between the local and 
county level, because it does not take into account the territory where public 
services are provided. It does actually occur that people living in the territory 
of a local government consume a public service provided by a county local 
government, without contributing to that service through their local govern-
ment. (spill over effects) 
Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments declares f reedom of association 
for local governments and regulates the cooperation of local governments in 
the following way: 
- The position of a common notary can be established when the population of 
the neighbouring settlements is below 1000-2000. 
- Local governments may establish associations in order to implement their 
common task more efficiently and sufficiently. 
- Local governments may establish supervisory associations for the founda-
tion, maintenance and development of a common organization. Local 
governments make an agreement in which they stipulate the legal form of 
the organization, their financial contributions, types of the services the 
association will provide, and other rights and obligations. 
The local government associations are regulated by the act, for it is a generally 
accepted view that local governments of small settlements are not capable of 
providing most of the local public services. However, when local governments 
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associate, they can better perform development programs of the given area, 
more easily acquire financial resources through tenders, or from the state 
budget. Also the provision of local public services, such as water supply and 
waste water management, cannot be sufficiently adapted to the territories of 
local governments. 
Nevertheless, Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments does provide 
opportunities to local governments to cooperate with each other in the provision 
of local public services. Although the management of small areas has little 
tradition yet. The association of local governments is less frequently applied 
for providing local public services than it would be expected. 
3.5. Management Values and Bureaucratic Structure 
Management values are not assured in the structure of local governments. 
Instead, legal regulations emphasize the implementation of the tasks of local 
governments set up by laws. The tasks of local governments can be classified 
as legislative (to pass decrees in the f ramework of superior acts), jurisdiction 
(to apply laws when deciding administrative cases), and servicing (when 
providing local public services.) 
When implementing this latter task, the representative body of the local 
government passes a resolution in which it orders the establishment of an 
institution or firm to provide the local public service. Also, the representative 
body is entitled to decide on whether to privatise a local public service or not, 
or if so, how and under what conditions. 
It is the duty of the notary and the off ice of the mayor to organize the local 
public service based on the resolution of the representative body. When the local 
public service is provided by a local government institution it is supervised by 
a public servant of the office of the mayor. The notary assures only the legality, 
not the efficiency of the operation. 
The only guarantee for efficient operation is that if consumers complain to 
the representative body at public hearings and the representative body orders 
the improvement of the service. This feedback, however, does not work well 
in practice. 
Local governments have committees elected f rom the members of the 
representative body to deal with special fields, such as health care, welfare, 
economic, financial issues, etc. Members of these committees are politically 
appointed, but not experts in the field. 
Public servants of local governments are in most cases not trained as managers, 
either. They consider it more important to keep legal regulations related to the 
local public service, such as complicated financial rules, technical require-
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ments, etc., than efficiency, quality and customer oriented services. This is due 
to the bureaucratic traditions of public administration and the lack of manage-
ment values. 
Local governments are careful when deciding to privatize a local public 
service. This is because they do not know how to keep sufficient control over 
the privatized services. 
Privatization has less risk when the local public service is privatized for 
non-profit organizations, which is the case in the welfare services. Laws 
determine in minute detail how welfare services should be provided by non-
profit organizations. 
However, laws do not detail how to supervise a privatized for-profit private 
firm. A business-oriented private firm is motivated by the profit, not public 
goals, such as quality, continuity and general availability of the service. Local 
governments do not have sufficient management skills to balance between 
these private and public interests. They can easily lose control over the business 
firms, which may make the customers unsatisfied. 
Central government's example of privatizing some infrastructure public ser-
vices does not encourage local governments to privatize most other infrastructure 
local services. 
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Twenty years after the "refolut ion" (the constitutional revolution that was 
negotiated over the National Roundtable Talks), a collection of essays which 
were published in 2006 and were aiming at nothing less than providing an 
analytic and synthesizing overview of the preceding legal developments were 
republished-a fact that provides ample evidence for the endurance and validity 
of the analyses. 
The peculiarity of the negotiated regimes changes, like that of Hungary 's 
lay in the fact that law was the very tool that enabled the political and 
economic transition, and, pragmatically speaking the transition itself consisted 
of the very process of substantially changing the legal sys tem-a process that 
obviously did not end by amending the constitution and the most important 
laws that shaped the political (and economic) structure. In the past years, there 
is not a single area of the Hungarian legal system that would not have been 
subject to fundamental changes. 
Hungary 's new legal order is based on Law No. 1989. XXXI. amending 
the 1949 Constitution. Although in the past two decades several hundred laws 
were passed amending and restructuring the Hungarian legal system in the 
spirit of this substantially new constitution, despite repeated political efforts 
and a number of drafts prepared and debated by legal academics, professionals, 
and politicians, no new constitution was adopted. This "old-and-new" Constitu-
tion, which still bears the name Law No. 1949. XX., provides the f ramework a 
constitutional democracy: the principles of rule of law, separation of powers, 
political pluralism, market economy, human rights, etc. Actually, it is proverbial 
that the only provision that remained intact from the initial 1949 text is the one 
which states that Budapest is the capitol of Hungary. 
Nevertheless, the 'constitutional revolution' did not end with the compre-
hensive amendment of the constitution and other acts (such as the law on the 
freedom of assembly, association, electoral law, etc.). Over the coming years, 
in part under the influence of EU-law approximation and the tacit or explicit 
demands or expectations of international organizations-and thereby obligations 
set forth by international conventions (such as for example the European 
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Convention on Human Rights) the reshaping of the Hungarian legal system 
took the form of a continuous process, where even the constitution was amended 
several times. 
Thanks to the extensive jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (established 
in 1990), the new constitutional order had been solidified. Unsuccessful as the 
attempts to adopt a new constitution were, legislative efforts throughout the 
1990's and the first half of the new millennia succeeded in the complete trans-
formation of all other areas of the legal system. As mentioned above, practically 
all branches of went under a significant change, and in fact, some were 
reconstituted almost entirely differently. 
The initial period of furiously paced and therefore somewhat hastily 
completed legislative work, was followed by a more consolidated period f rom 
around the mid-1990's , when the comprehensive work of redrafting the base-
laws of the ma jo r branches of law began. This was also made necessitated by 
Hungary's accession to the European Union-the process of which was underway 
at the time. The areas affected were: the Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Labor 
Code, the Act on Criminal Procedure and the Act on Public Administrative 
Procedures. Beyond meeting the demands of harmonizing with EU law, the 
new codes attempted to synthesize preexist ing legislation and carry out a 
substantive codification. While a comprehensive overview of the entire process 
would have been an insurmountable task, in this collection of essays the 
authors highlight the most important trends and developments that characterize 
their chosen f ields of law. 
The first essay in this volume, by András Bragyova, a member of the 
Constitutional Court, professor of constitutional law at the University of Miskolc 
and Scientific Advisor to the Institute of Legal Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, addresses the theoretical question of the extent to which 
these radical changes permeated the entirety of the legal system, and how 
changes in the law and the legal system have affected the continuity of the 
latter. The author argues that although the political changes acted as a catalyst 
for fundamental-even radical-changes in both the law and the legal system, 
this did not break the continuity of the legal system. The current Hungarian 
legal system is the same as its predecessor in terms of its continuity with it, 
whilst at the same time being fundamentally different f rom it in terms of its 
content. The fundamental feature of the legal system, its claim to validity as a 
legal system had not changed. This claim of validity (which consists of four 
fundamental claims: being indubitable, exclusionary, primary and unconditional) 
in contrast to the claim of authority rests upon itself. According to Judge 
Bragyova, a legal sys tem's validity is identical to its continuity, that is: its 
norms stay equally valid even if they change. In other words, the continuity-
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existence of the legal system is based on the permanence (constancy) of its 
validity claim. Now, the specificity of regime changing processes is that they 
have a past-denying aspect. These past-repealing legislations are fraught with 
the inherent contradiction that they deny the equality of the legal system's 
validity claim while wishing to uphold the continuity of the legal system. The 
author argues that past-denying legislations need special justifications and 
since they bound to come in conflict with the continuity of the legal system; 
they may only be accepted in "new" legal systems, which are built on breaking 
the continuity, but not in legal systems like those that went thorough the 
"refolution" and preserved the continuity of the legal system. 
Of the essays investigating changes in specific areas of law, the first one, 
by Attila Rácz, professor of constitutional law at the Corvinus University, 
focuses on the remodeling of State organizations for legal protection. The 
reader is guided through the Round Table Negotiations and the various post-
1989 stages of institutional reform that concern the newly established or reformed 
institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, and the ombdus-institutions, the 
Prosecution's Offices and the judiciary. 
The next section, authored by András Sajó, member of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, Research Professor at the Institute of Legal Studies of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Professor at the Central European 
University focuses on legislation and jurisprudence concerning free speech-an 
issue of central importance to the political transition and the functioning of 
constitutional democracies. The essay, which provides a thorough overview of 
the Constitutional Cour t ' s case law, is part of a larger project: the scrutiny of 
the sustainability of liberalism after 1989 in Hungarian law. The author, who 
since then had been elected as member of the European Court of Human 
Rights refutes the claim that liberalism necessarily fails as both as a political 
ideology and a social model and consequently looses its imposed appeal in a 
clan-based pre-modern society, like the Hungarian. Judge Sajó shows the 
weak, but nevertheless long roots of liberalism in Hungary-a society which 
he sees an essentially modern "liberal" society with traditionalist values and 
patterns of behavior. He also argues that despite illiberal tendencies, as a small 
state Hungary simply needs to accommodate liberal demands of its European 
environment. The analysis shows that the implementation of liberalism has not 
been a linear process, but a set of parallel, only partly interrelated develop-
ments, where liberal ideology did not preclude illiberal solutions. Although 
the analysis of free speech jurisprudence serves as a litmus test for social 
patterns and attitudes and the test case for the sustainability of liberalism in 
law, the author adds that free speech (despite being vital for the whole society) 
is predominantly and elite concern, thus the endorsement of liberal traditions 
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in this field is not a conclusive evidence to the successful of liberalism in other 
institutions, public consciousness and behavioral patterns. 
The next essay, by István Balázs, professor of administrative law at the 
University of Debrecen, focuses on the readjustment of public administration 
since the 1980'ies. The political changes also brought a thorough overhaul of 
the public administrative system as well, with regards to its tasks, competence 
and organizational structure. There is no area of public administration that has 
remained untouched by radical change since 1989-1990. The analysis, dealing 
with this issue emphasizes, that similarly to other Eastern European and East-
Central European states in general, the Hungarian process was directed at the 
approximation of the Western-European model of public administration. The 
author provides a detailed assessment of the development of the legal frame-
work of local governments, central, regional and local administrative organs, 
police administration, state audit institutions, the structure of the government, 
the processes of deregulation, decentralization, along administrative procedure, 
and the legal, financial and human resources status of the 800,000 state 
employees1 and the financial and legal status of the approximately 3100 local 
governments. 
The longest and most detailed section of the book focuses on the area of 
economic law, a field that where transformation actually preceded the political 
transition, as the 1988 law on economic enterprises was adopted two years 
before the first free elections in 1990. Tamás Sárközy, professor of constitu-
tional law at the Corvinus University and Scientific Advisor to the Institute of 
Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences chronicles the develop-
ment of Hungarian property, economic and business law (including separate 
assessments on corporate law, the law of foreign investments, the law of 
bankruptcy, cooperatives, privatization, consumer protection and pricing law, 
intellectual property, copyright and trade protection law.) The analysis includes 
financial law (securities, security exchanges, banking and insurance laws 
along accounting law, labor law, insurance, social security and welfare law. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first part deals with the 
development of economic civil law in general. The second part scrutinizes (i) 
company and business law, (ii) privatization law as special division of law 
unique to the transition process, (iii)banking, securities, securities exchanges 
and insurance laws, (iv) cooperative and agriculture law, (v) bankruptcy law. 
The third part focuses on developments regarding the developments of the 
Civil Code. Despite the fact that in the past f ive years a significant redrafting 
of company took place and a brand new Civil Code has been prepared and 
1
 Hungary has a population of approximately 10 million people. 
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submitted to the Parliament, the analysis stops at 2004, because, according to 
the author, accession to the European Union opens a new phase in the field -
as EU economic law has direct effect in Hungary. 
The last two sections, by Ferenc Nagy, professor of criminal law at the 
University of Szeged, and Réka Végvári, Research Fel low at the Institute of 
Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences focus on the considerable 
changes the political and economic transition induced on substantive and 
procedural criminal law. In order to meet the demands of a constitutional 
democracy and obligations set forth in international human rights documents, 
the Criminal Code was amended more then fifty times since 1989 and in 1998 
a new Criminal Procedure Code was adopted-restructuring the system of coercive 
measures (most of all the rules on arrest, pretrial detention, house arrest, and 
restraining orders) and redrawing preexisting rules on evidence and remedies. 
Also, a number of new offenses and sanctions (including a range of alternative 
sanctions) were introduced along the complete reform of political and-part ly 
due to privatization and the transition to market economy-economic criminal 
law. Further new institutions include bail, witness protection and a form of plea 
bargain. 
The case of criminal law and the Criminal Code (or, likewise, civil law and 
the Civil Code) show a pattern similar to the constitution and the constitutional 
framework: severe, structural amendments indeed produce a substantively new 
(field of) law, which can fulfill its new role to sustain liberal constitutional 
democracy, even if the official title still revokes "old", pre-transition, and pre-
constitutional memories.2 
András L. Pap 
2
 The Constitution is L a w No. 1949. XX, the Civil Code is Law No. 1959. IV., 
and the Criminal Code is Law No. 1978. IV, originally adopted in 1949, 1959 and 1978 
respectively. 
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